War Reporting in the International Press:
A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Gaza War of 2008-2009

Dissertation

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A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Gaza War of 2008-2009

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Declaration

- I hereby declare and certify that I am the author of this study which is submitted to the University of Hamburg in fulfilment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
- This is my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged.
- This original work or part of it has not been submitted to any other institution or university for a degree.

Mohammedwesam Amer

June 2015

Abstract

This study analyses the representation of social actors in reports on the Gaza war of 2008-09 in four international newspapers: *The Guardian*, *The Times London*, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*. The study draws on three analytical frameworks from the area of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) models: the transitivity model by Halliday (1985/1994), the socio-semantic inventory by Van Leeuwen (1996), and the classification of quotation patterns by Richardson (2007). The sample of this study consists of all headlines (146) of the relevant news stories and a non-random sample of (40) news stories and (7) editorials. To give statistical estimations for the qualitative analysis, the study examines the frequency distributions of linguistic and representational processes.

The findings indicate that Israeli politicians and Palestinian civilians are the most frequently included and quoted actors across the four selected newspapers. The analysis shows substantial similarities in representation patterns among the four newspapers. More specifically, the selected newspapers foreground Israeli agency in achieving a ceasefire and targeting Hamas, whereby Israeli actors are predominantly assigned (1) transitivity processes, e.g. behavioural, verbal and material processes, and (2) activated roles. By contrast, the four newspapers foreground Palestinian agency in refusing ceasefire and firing rockets through (1) assigning the Palestinian actors relational and material processes, and (2) activated roles. These agency realisations indicate that Israel reacts to Hamas' firing of rockets, i.e. reactions to actions. Within these patterns of representation, civilian actors on both sides are treated equally in facing consequences of war, i.e. balancing suffering of Israeli and Palestinian civilian actors although the number of Palestinian casualties is distinctively higher.

In quotation patterns, the selected newspapers show Israeli efforts towards achieving ceasefire and justification for targeting Hamas and are drawing on Israeli news sources, e.g. Ha'aretz and Yedioth Ahronoth in quoting Israelis. On the contrary, the newspapers show Hamas' rejection and conditions for a ceasefire agreement, calling for fighting Israel, and suffering of Palestinian civilians from consequences of war. The newspapers refer to Al-Jazeera and Hamas' TV – in quoting Hamas leaders, e.g. Khaled Meshal and Musa abu Marzouq.

Overall, the findings of this study suggest that news reports on the Gaza war of 2008-09 are influenced by (a) political orientations of the newspapers, (b) editorial policies, and (c) journalistic practices. The most represented actors are Israeli governmental officials, whereas Palestinian actors are Hamas members. This representation draws an overall image that the war is being directed against Hamas.

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List of Abbreviations

CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis

GU: *The Guardian*

TL: *The Times* (London)

NYT: *The New York Times*

WP: *The Washington Post*

IPA: Israeli Political Actors

PPA: Palestinian Political Actors

IMA: Israeli Military Actors

PMA: Palestinian Military Actors

ICA: Israeli Civilian Actors

PCA: Palestinian Civilian Actors

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Chapter One: Setting the Scene

1.1 Introduction

We live in a globalized world characterised by competing claims of political and religious rights, nationalistic ambition, resource allocation and collective memory. These international tensions and contexts are acutely evident in the eruption of violent confrontations as witnessed in recent Middle Eastern conflicts and wars. In this world, mass media are a continuous and influential force in modern societies. This study provides a critical discourse analysis of US and UK press coverage of Middle East wars, focusing mainly on the Gaza War of 2008-09.

The current chapter introduces the study as a whole. It briefly introduces critical discourse analysis as the study's main approach. It also presents the interplay between media, war and discourse in the international news. Moreover, this chapter introduces historical events from the Middle East with a major focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Gaza war of 2008-09. It then states the rationale and objectives of the study. Finally, it outlines the chapters of the dissertation.

1.2 Critical Discourse Analysis: the Main Approach of this Study

Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) is considered the main approach of theory and method of analysis in this dissertation. The theory comes from different constructions and conceptions of discourse within CDA (see section 2.2.1). As a method, CDA links together theoretical concerns and practices to contribute to critical understanding (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Richardson, 2007; Wodak and Meyer, 2001, and Van Leeuwen, 1996). CDA, an influential discourse analysis approach, has taken as its subject the study of the intertwined links between language use and social power. Titscher et al. (2000:146) hold that "CDA is not concerned with language use per se, but with the linguistic character of social and

cultural processes and structures". This means that the analysis in this study goes behind the linguistic analysis of clauses/sentences to study the actions and the reactions (Fairclough, 1992b; Wodak and Meyer, 2009).

In this study, CDA is used to examine the representation of social actors (Israeli, Palestinian and other actors found in the texts) in the discourse of four influential and international US and UK newspapers in the coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09 (see section 3.3.1). It is used to highlight linguistic features and discourse practices motivated by media producers to represent social actors and to manipulate the cognition and knowledge of war events by the audiences (the receivers/readers). CDA then examines ideological stances or implications in the media discourses on the Gaza war of 2008-09. Accordingly, some power relations are sustained ultimately in the interplay between media, war and language use as explained in the following section.

1.3 Interplay of War, Media and Discourse

Wars are synonymous with deep and painful social, cultural and political divisions alongside intense human suffering. While war is inherently destructive, retrospective analysis of the writing of war could allow the necessary distance and detachment needed for objective critical analysis. The perception of war increasingly affects its cost, duration and outcomes (Connelly and Welch, 2005:x). For example, according to Siegelman (2009:2), Lebanon was not perceived as a threat before the war, while Gaza on the other hand was always seen as menacing.

Montgomery (2005:239) suggests that war is a term that reorganises "the discursive fields through which responses to the destruction of the twin towers could be articulated and led them in a fateful direction". Griffin (2010:8) elucidates that "war is a high-stakes enterprise; public perceptions and public support are never left to chance". Expanding the understanding of the war and offering many definitions of war in his book *A Study of War,*

Wright (1964:17) regards war as "an extreme intensification of military activity, psychological tension, legal power and social integration" which is only produced if the enemy is "approximately equal in material power". This definition focuses on the parity of military encounters but of course the combat not necessarily "should take place between comparable adversaries".

In this study, the main concern[1] is on how the intensified war actions/operations *mainly the battlefields with its elements* i.e. how social actors are represented in the selected US and UK newspapers (see section 3.3.1). In this regard, this study does not consider military, violent or armed conflicts as war(s) because wars simply happen in roughly shorter time than conflicts. Also, military or violent conflict could happen inside one country but when it happens between two countries, it is then a war.

In destructive situations of wars, people such as correspondents, editors, reporters, analysts, politicians and military officers are involved directly. Ordinary people are involved indirectly as they depend on media practitioners to get news about war events. The ordinary people would also be directly involved as they get to experience the war first hand. They might become victims of the war or at the very least suffer humanitarian situations, consequences of war, etc.

In war coverage, journalism has a great role to play as Richardson (2007:7) states "journalism exists to enable citizens to better understand their lives and their position(s) in the world". This role makes a wide range of local or international audiences aware of and understands war actions rather than just relay information superficially. Fowler (1991:11) claims "the world of the press is not the real world, but a world skewed and judged".

[1] This study does not deal with symbolic or invisible meanings of war behind different terms, i.e. social term represented in war on drugs; economic term represented in war on poverty. Also, my concern is not on the legitimacy of war by the (international law) or considering war as an appropriate instrument or a condition of existence or how military methods and procedures are employed.

Internationally, news media have a great responsibility in reporting wars and conflicts. Dominant media outlets have become so ubiquitous and influential that many people (perhaps especially in the Western world where the views of the religious establishment may be less influential) depend largely, and often implicitly, on media accounts as vehicles and sources for value-setting, attitude-shaping, sense-making, and knowledge-gaining. Balabanova (2007:145) concludes referring to the opinion of Alexander Solzhenitsyn[2] that "in the Western world, the press has become the greatest power within the Western countries, more powerful than the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary". However, Hackett (2005:85) points out that "many critics argue that even in established liberal democracies like Britain and the US, journalism is falling short of expectations of how it should function as an agent of democratic rule".

Van Dijk (1995a:30-31) sums up that "in present global conflicts and in ongoing and increasingly harsh forms of inequality, mainstream Western media are far from being innocent or impartial. On the contrary, they are an inherent part of the problems". For example, "Western audiences have not been well informed by their media about terrorism and about geopolitical role of the United States in Asia and Africa" (Van Veer, 2004:3). Nowadays in such a world full of conflicts, wars and troubles, we can see that media - as main players in our world - influence the various discourses and representations of actors and events in the societies where we live especially in reporting hard news, e.g. wars. Matheson (2005:142) argues that "the power of media mainly lies in the forms of representation they reflect for the purpose of perpetuating wider social structures, generally being supposed to reflect an objective reality". Hence, this study examines the representation of social actors as produced by US and UK media in their coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09.

[2]A Russian novelist, historian and critic of Soviet totalitarianism (Wikipedia)

Media are influenced and affected by different factors, e.g. governments, cultures, values and languages. Simply put, in the modern world of developed communication, no government makes war unless it is sure of how to use media to get its people's general and wholehearted support. From this, war is understood in the way it is perceived and expressed decisively and it can be assumed that winning war is winning the media through which winning minds and hearts (audience support) is essential (see Payne, 2005:81). For example, during the Iraqi war in 1991, the US administration and the Pentagon succeeded in using the media to mobilise public support for the war. Also, during the war and ongoing conflict, the Israelis and the Palestinians largely share the same function of media to attract public and international sympathy for their rights and to expose the enemy's brutality.

In war, the ability to destroy other nations, countries or armies may be possible, but gaining and controlling their minds cannot be won without propagating and/or censoring specific discourse(s) using language (specific linguistic features and discursive strategies) in media. In this regard, media war is shaped in part by the language used by news producers. Taylor (1995) contends:

> "Real war is about the sounds, sight, smell, touch and taste of the nasty, brutal business of people killing people. Media war, however, is literally a mediated event which draws on that reality but which, in and of itself, is confined to merely an audio-visual - and therefore inherently desensitizing - representation of it (cited in Dodds, 2005: 222)".

Dodds (2005:222) suggests that in Taylor's (1995) argument there are two wars: one war is real in which combatants may perish. Another war is the media war where the grim realities of conflict are reported and represented to a distant and non-participating audience. The importance of this media war implies in the discourse that is produced in coverage of wars. During a time of war, journalists are supposed to cover *all* sides related to the war objectively, without resorting to propaganda, but "journalism becomes

shaped and *driven* by [….] propaganda" (Richardson, 2007: 180). Askari (2012:1) states that "wars are invariably premeditated and so afford time for resolution, occur frequently in full view of mankind and could be known to millions if reported by the media".

Within this concept, media war(s) is a battle against the flow of information. That is, it is "battles to control the channels of communication, to determine the form and content of messages and to identify who gets to deliver them" (Jackaway, 1995:4). This control of information brings power "over the domain of meaning-making, to shape the cultural agenda, public opinion, and the nature of social discourse" (Jakaway, 1995:4). This is a power that leads the way in how millions of people experience and see war(s). Wars differ in their forms, types, involvement of military forces and their circumstances. In this regard, war reporting differs accordingly. Richardson (2007:178) assumes that war reporting is constructed in a radically polarised way, between the good guys and the bad guys (see section 2.3.1). Thus, discourses dominated by official propaganda will only allow two positions to be taken up; for war, or against war.

The above introduction suggests that media and war are based on an interrelated correlation, which leads to and draws on a specific discourse on a specific phenomenon, the Gaza war of 2008-09 in the international news in this study. Discourse, as we shall see in chapter 2, is a combination of practices: textual, discursive and social. These practices represent, evaluate, justify and/or legitimise a phenomenon in media, e.g. the Gaza war of 2008-09.

The role of language used in news coverage is vital and powerful to construct discourse(s) when representing social or war actors or in "articulating, maintaining and subverting existing relations of power in society" (Talbot, Atkinson and Atkinson, 2003:1). Fowler (1991:4) suggests that "each particular form of linguistic express in a text –wording, syntactic option, etc. – has its reason. Differences in expressions carry ideological

distinction and thus differences in representation". Talbot, Atkinson and Atkinson (2003:5) claim that "any text, any use of language, represents the world in particular ways, whether these serve the vested interests of a multinational corporation, the perspectives of an independent publication, or an individual journalist".

In this vein, Bignell (1997:88) states that "news discourse reports only a selection of facts. What is reported is the selection of facts assumed to be significant". "A discourse is a particular way of representing the world or parts of the world" (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002:143). We can see this more obviously when examining that, what counts as important to one newspaper could be less important to another. The main approach of the current study (CDA) sees discourse in its relation to journalism/media. Richardson (2007:45) clarifies "CDA maintains that social practices and the discursive practices of the production of journalism exist as a dialectical (i.e. a two-way) relationship". He explains the dialectical relationship between the consumption of journalistic texts and social practices: readers decode the meanings of texts using knowledge and beliefs of the world, and these texts go on to shape (through either transformation or reproduction) the same readers' knowledge and beliefs.

The interplay between media, war and discourse makes them components in the process of building news especially when war is considered as an international crisis and is changed from inter-state to intra-state or vice versa (see Connelly and Welch, 2005:xv). From such interplay, we can see that the media have integral roles in the conduct of war. These roles were evident during the Middle East wars, e.g. the American war on Iraq in 2003, the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006, and the Gaza war of 2008-09 and of 2014 as we see in section (1.4). This makes the content and style of prevalent media transmissions during these wars or conflicts, e.g. Gaza war of 2008-09, rich material for discovering both the mechanisms and nature of discourse formation, as well as continuities and discontinuities in

the influence of particular forms and sources of media rhetoric, both within and between competing national and international, Middle Eastern and Western, media outlets. The major focus in this study is on international news (see section 2.5).

For analysing the media discourse in reporting the Gaza war of 2008-09, one of the recent and most controversial Middle Eastern wars, in the US and UK media, I believe, it is crucial to give an overview of some conflicts and wars in the Middle East, and to situate the events of the Gaza war of 2008-09 as a part of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This will help us understand the empirical findings of this dissertation and the reflections of media coverage.

1.4 Wars in the Middle East

The Middle East has witnessed wars, conflicts and changes across ancient and modern history. The number of wars and conflicts has increased since 1940s[3]. Recently, the Middle East has witnessed three wars that attracted the attention of the international community and extensive media coverage, and led also to widespread claims of media bias and concern over the nature of media influence, representation and legitimisation. The Middle East also witnessed revolutions known as 'Arab Spring' in many parts of the Middle East, e.g. Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Egypt and Syria (see Cottle, 2011)). However, this introduction outlines some of these events briefly and gives attention to their media coverage. It also gives some more details on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which represent the essential historical context for the Gaza war of 2008-09, which is the main target in this study.

[3] For details on the conflicts in the Middle East, see (Askari, 2012:26-41)

1.4.1 Iraq War 2003 and Lebanon War 2006

The United States attacked Iraq in 2003 in an operation called 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' (see Munshi, 2004:55; see also Askari's chapter, 2012:85). Peng (2008:361) considers the war as "a global-village happening shared not only by the belligerent nations, but also by the entire world regardless of race, nationality and political and ideological differences". In regards to the war on Iraq in 2003, Munshi (2004:55) states that "global television networks make it possible to observe world events almost as soon as they happen and sometimes even as they happen".

Referring to the criticism of media restrictions in the coverage of first Gulf/Iraq war in 1991, Joshi (2004:127) suggests that "the Pentagon came up with a new plan. This was the concept of embedding media persons within US military units". The embedded journalists come from the US and friendly EU and Arab countries. Byrne (2003) introduces that "the war in Iraq has changed the face of war reporting forever". Askari (2012:109) draws attention to the fact that "the war propaganda machine persuaded Americans that the Iraqi people would greet US troops as liberators, waving flowers and American flags". From such propaganda, "the war was waged to liberate Iraqis from Saddam's tyranny, to destroy his WMDs[4], and bring about democracy in the Middle East" (Askari, 2012:109).

In such media coverage of the war, Al-Rawi (2012:28) points out that "some US officials misled the American public into believing that Iraq was a serious threat to US national security and to the whole international community". Al-Rawi further states that "many media fabrications were designed by the CIA[5] to distort and direct the public into believing that Iraq was utterly evil" (2012:33).

[4] WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction
[5] CIA: Central Intelligence Agency in the USA

The Israeli war on Lebanon (known also as the second Lebanon war) happened in the summer of 2006. Philo and Berry (2011) explain that a group of Hezbullah attacked an Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) convoy, killed three soldiers, abducted two others, and took them across the border. Hezbullah argued that the abduction was the only way to secure the release of Lebanese prisoners in Israel. The Israeli Prime Minister Olmert warned Hezbollah and asked for the return of the soldiers, but Hezbullah refused to return them unless it was in the context of a prisoner swap. On the abduction day, Israeli forces bombed many Lebanese areas. Israel then intensified its operations across Lebanon (see also Rothbart and Korostelina, 2011:76-82).

In relation to media coverage of the 2006 Lebanon war, Fakhreddine (2007:3) suggests that "the extent and range of coverage has far-reaching implications not only for Arab public opinion, but also possibly the global perception of the war". Similarly, Gonger (2007) states in the *Jerusalem Post* that "Hizbullah won the Second Lebanon War by achieving a propaganda victory over Israel".

In the context of the whole situation in the Middle East, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still a central issue for most Arab countries (see Ehrenfeld, 2011 and Joy, 2010). The following subsection outlines shortly the prominent historical events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

1.4.2 Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Gaza War of 2008-09

This section focuses on historical events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, a full historical and political description of the conflict (64 years old, as at the time of writing this dissertation) is beyond the scope of this dissertation. This study does not claim that the historical background[6] mentioned here is comprehensive, but at least it might help readers understand some major events. Philo and Berry (2011:9) introduce that "the origins and history of particular events are contested by the different parties involved. Participants tell the story from their own point of view and often to legitimise their own actions". In order to give a historical context to the political and/or military events during the 3-4 years before the Gaza war of 2008-09, I start from the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and outline political events before Gaza war of 2008-09 and the war itself.

In 2005, Israel removed "all the 8,000 Israeli settlers and destroy their houses" (Shlaim, 2009a:308) and its military troops from the Gaza Strip. Shlaim (2009a:309) points out that the real purpose of the withdrawal was "to redraw unilaterally the borders of Greater Israel by incorporating the main settlement blocs on the West Bank into the State of Israel". For this, he further states that the withdrawal was "a prelude not to a peace deal with the Palestinian Authority but a prelude to further Zionist expansion on the West Bank" (2009a:309). Roy (2007:311) refers to President Bush's consideration of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as a way that "would allow the establishment of a democratic state in the Gaza and open the door for democracy in the Middle East". Roy further explains that the plan "gives Israel exclusive authority over Gaza's airspace and territorial waters, which translates into full control of the movement of people and goods into and out of the Strip" (2007:314; see also Shlaim, 2009a:309).

[6] For detailed historical background, see Philo and Berry (2011:10-160) and for the chronology of events, see (Shlaim, 2009a:x-xxi).

In 2006, the Palestinians had the second legislative elections. Hamas – the Islamic Resistance Movement[7] – won the elections in a somewhat unexpected turn in which the Palestinians "voted the party [Hamas] into power, ousting Fatah, which had dominated Palestinian politics for decades" (Handley and Ismail, 2010:179). In this situation, Hamas was criticised by the US and EU who "shamelessly joined Israel in ostracizing and demonising the Hamas government and in trying to bring it down by withholding tax revenues and foreign aid" (Shlaim, 2009a:310).

McGeough (2011:263) points out that "the United States and the European Union cut virtually all aid funding because the Palestinians elected a government that refuses to explicitly recognize Israel and to eschew violence". Also, Philo and Berry put forward that "after the elections American and the EU moved to block direct aid to the Hamas administration in Gaza and diplomatically isolate the organization". But this strategy was not successful to weaken Hamas. This way sets "the scene for a violent schism between the Islamist movement and its Fatah rival in the Gaza Strip" (Philo and Berry, 2011:122).

Another important event in 2006 is that Israel witnessed elections which led to electing Kadima[8] Party headed by Olmert (see Philo and Berry, 2011:122). In 2007 and 2008, some Palestinian militant groups kept firing rockets into Israeli areas in the north. "Militants from Hamas and Islamic Jihad sporadically launched Qassam rocket attacks on Israeli settlements near the border with Gaza" (Shlaim, 2009a:312).

In the meantime, Israel kept imposing and tightening its siege on the Gaza Strip and kept targeting Palestinian activists. To avoid these clashes, Israel and Hamas agreed on a six-month ceasefire mediated by Egypt in June 2008. Philo and Berry (2011:137) point out that " in November [2008]

[7] See (Roy, 2007:72) on the shifting position and activities of Hamas in the Gaza Strip

[8] Formed in November 2005 by then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Kadima (Forward) was intended as a centrist alternative to existing parties (BBC guide available on http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-21073450

the truce came under strain when Israel killed six members of Hamas' military wing and injured several others during an incursion into Gaza" (see also Shlaim 2009a). For this reason and others[9], Hamas did not accept the extension of the ceasefire. It accused Israel of disrespecting the conditions of the ceasefire agreement, i.e. opening the border crossings and refraining from military actions in Gaza (see Philo and Berry, 2011:140).

Israel rejected this accusation and the Hamas conditions to end the siege. It launched more attacks on Gaza (Philo and Berry, 2011:140). In consequence, the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, threatened Hamas of launching rockets or "facing a broad military offensive" unless it stops its rocket attacks from Gaza (Philo and Berry, 2011:141). Kaposi (2014:6) outlines that at end of December 2008 when the ceasefire expired, "both parties remained ambiguous about their subsequent aims, with action not necessarily corresponding to rhetoric of conciliation". In this situation, Hamas continued firing rockets and Israeli kept targeting Hamas. Following the Israeli warnings, Israel started[10] launching air raids across the Gaza Strip.

The operation took place during the days between December 27, 2008 and January 18, 2009. This operation took different names, e.g. Gaza Crisis by BBC and Al-Jazeera; Operation Cast Lead[11] and Al-Furqan Battle[12]. To maintain neutrality, the study refers to the place and the year of the war, i.e. Gaza and 2008-2009 like other researchers, e.g. Shreim, 2012. Gavriely-Nuri (2013:42) states that "on 27 December 2008, Israel launched

[9] See Philo and Berry (2011:135-141) for detailed discussion
[10] For daily events, see war timelines, BBC: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7812290.stm and Al-Jazeera: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2008/03/200852518495846946 9.html; also see Kaposi, 2014
[11] Operation Cast Lead is the name given to the Gaza war 2008-09 by Israel. For more information on connotations in Jewish culture (the holiday of Hanukka), see Gavriely-Nuri's (2013:42) full explanations.
[12] Al-Furqan is the 25th Sura of the holy Qur'an known as "*The Criterion*". See Kayyali and Ḥuṭayṭ (2009)

a wave of air-strikes against targets within the Gaza Strip in order to halt the rockets which had been fired into southern Israel for many years" (see also Percival, 2008).

Israel used "F-16 fighter jets, apache helicopters and unmanned drones" (Philo and Berry, 2011:141). Despite the build up of hostilities and warnings, the people of Gaza were still surprised by the largely unexpected scale of the assault and its timing. Israeli missiles targeted “densely populated areas as children were leaving schools. Parents rushed into the streets to search for them” (Percival, 2008). In response, “Hamas intensified its rocket attacks and their range” Gavriely-Nuri (2013:42). The war “claimed the lives of over 1,300 Palestinians and 13 Israelis” (Shlaim, 2009a:307). Israel ended the war with “a unilateral ceasefire and declaration of victory […..] Hamas ended the war bruised and battered but still in power, still defiant and holding the moral high ground” (Shlaim, 2009a:307). Israel has always claimed the aim of the war was to end the rockets on the south of Israel and to release the Israeli soldier captured by Hamas in 2006, but this was not only reason for the war. Shlaim (2009b) commenting on the obvious and hidden reasons for the war:

> The declared aim of the war is to weaken Hamas and to intensify the pressure until its leaders agree to a new ceasefire on Israel's terms. The undeclared aim is to ensure that the Palestinians in Gaza are seen by the world simply as a humanitarian problem and thus to derail their struggle for independence and statehood. The timing of the war was determined by political expediency. A general election in Israel is scheduled for 10 February 2009; as it approaches, all the main contenders are looking for an opportunity to prove their toughness. The army's commanders had been eager to deliver a crushing blow to Hamas in order to remove the stain left on their reputation by the failure of the war against Hezbollah in Lebanon in July-August 2006.

In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the news media is an integral part of the war, offering different dimensions of coverage and attitudes. For example, during the Gaza war of 2008-09, Israel closed all the borders of the Gaza Strip and prevented journalists, humanitarian aid workers and human rights monitoring bodies from entry (Philo and Berry, 2011:141). Adelman (2009)

states that it was "difficult to directly access information since Israel had banned independent observers and journalists from entry into Gaza to cover the war" apart from *The New York Times* which had "a correspondent based in Gaza". However, the war attracted international media coverage and attention. In other words, the Gaza war of 2008-09 is exceptionally significant in terms of the extensive media representation of a distant conflict.

The media coverage of wars makes the international news (e.g. US and UK in this dissertation) a 'battleground' for the warring parties because they perceived bias in the same news report. Clark Hoyt[13] (2009) states that once the war starts, *The New York Times* "is caught in familiar crossfire, accused from all sides of unfair and inaccurate coverage". He writes one of the claims of the Israeli and Palestinian complaints:

> Supporters of Israel want coverage that stresses the terror caused by Hamas rockets fired ever deeper into Israeli territory, and are offended at so many pictures of Palestinian casualties. Supporters of the Palestinians want the coverage to focus on the suffering caused by Israel's bombs and missiles, and on the economic sanctions and border closings that isolated Gaza before the latest fighting began.

Across the years of conflict, both the Israelis and the Palestinians have accused the Western media of bias against their own side and issue. Media bias, as Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006:281) explain, means that "all the accounts are based on the same set of underlying facts. Yet by selective omission, choice of words, and varying credibility ascribed to the primary source, each conveys a radically different impression of what actually happened".

The choice to slant information in this way is what they consider as media bias. Israelis claimed the coverage by Western media was biased because it focused on the killing of Palestinian civilians. For example, Cordesman and Moravitz (2005:390) demonstrate that some pro-Israeli

[13] The public editor for the *New York Times*

supporters criticise the use of word 'bold' in headlines, as in "bold attack on Israelis" in the San Francisco Chronicle which caused complaints as it was perceived as "a positive portrayal of the attack" against the Israelis. They also demonstrate that pro-Israelis protest against "the limited coverage of pro-Israeli rallies compared to pro-Palestinian protests in the United States" (2005:391). Israeli newspapers such as *Ha'aretz, and The Jerusalem Post* supported an Israeli defence narrative and focused on the firing of Hamas' rockets rather than Palestinian civilian casualties and Western media have been latterly accused of adopting an Israeli viewpoint with Siegman (2009) stating that "Western media have accepted a number of Israeli claims justifying the military assault on Gaza".

Palestinians, meanwhile, consider the media biased because it portrayed the war as an Israeli defensive rather than an offensive attack. Cordesman and Moravitz (2005:390) point out that some pro-Palestinians consider the media portrayal of Palestinian attacks as starting a cycle of violence that gets an Israeli response. They refer to Edward Said's criticism that "many advertisements in the newspapers attacking Arabs and praising Israel; and on and on. Because so many powerful people in the media and publishing business are strong supporters of Israel, the task is made vastly easier" (Cordesman and Moravitz, 2005:391).

In such a context of historical events and criticism of media bias, we can see the role of media as an influential part in conflict. I find that it is crucial to analyse critically the discourse practices in the media coverage of the war in Gaza Strip and their connection to the larger Middle East. The next section points out the rationale for conducting this study.

1.5 Rationale and Motivation for this Study

As an in-depth piece of media discourse analysis, this study concentrates on the discourse produced by international and elite US and UK press in their coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09. It seeks to delineate in particular the discursive practices and linguistic features that are responsible for drawing a specific representation of the social actors. My motivation for conducting the current study includes various dimensions:

CDA is distinct from other approaches of discourse analysis. It has an overtly political agenda (Kress, 1990) which is very relevant to examine war coverage. CDA provides a critical dimension of socio-cultural aspects and explanations in examining texts rather than just analysing linguistic features as is the case of textual analysis. CDA aims ultimately to make a change of "the existing social reality in which discourse is related in particular ways to other social elements such as power relations, ideologies, economic and political strategies and policies" (Fairclough, 2014). This is one of the ultimate goals of this study in analysing war reporting in the international press. Within this context, "no war can be fully understood unless the reasons for its outbreak are also understood" (Biernatzki, 2003:26) and "war, to be abolished, must be understood. To be understood, it must be studied" (Deutsch, 1970:473). From these principles, studying war reporting by CDA is vital to understanding how it is reported and covered in media.

Media is an arena for ideologies leading to different representations of social actors in war reporting. These representations shape what we think about wars such as the Gaza war of 2008-09. For this, this study's focus on US and UK newspapers as international press is legitimate and suitable. American and British media inform a diverse public and audience of the events and circumstances of wars, producing influential discord, not only at the local level, but also the international level, shaping world public opinion on events, e.g. the Gaza war of 2008-09.

The Gaza war of 2008-09 is one of the longest recent wars in a series of ongoing wars within Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In international context, the Gaza war of 2008-09 is a turning point in changing attitudes towards Israel and more involvement of international community in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Voltolini (2013:79) suggests that "Operation Cast Lead was the moment when the penny dropped and the EU (and the majority of its member states)[14] slowly began to change their attitude towards the Israeli government [...] and to be less willing to unconditionally support Israel".

To the best of my knowledge, a few CDA studies have examined the media coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09 (Kandil, 2009 and Shreim, 2012, see also section 2.4.1). This lack of studies motivates this work to offer both an original and pertinent analysis of interrelationships and developments in the nature, form and influences upon dominant discourses. The study and its findings are very likely to be relevant to future scholarship both within and beyond the field of linguistics, critical studies, politics and media studies given the current and likely future global interest and entanglements with the Middle East and the arising need for greater mutual intercultural understanding.

In exclusively investigating the Gaza war of 2008-09, this study aims to give a novel contribution to the literature on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its reflections on media discourse on the Middle East war(s). The aim of this study is to contribute to critical understanding and discourse analysis of the international press on Middle East wars and mainly the Gaza war of 2008-09 in US and UK media. For the generalisation of this aim, it is divided into several objectives:

[14] Words between brackets are original.

1. To find the differing representations of social actors and processes by identifying the transitivity selections, representational processes and quotation patterns and sources used by the US and UK newspapers in their reporting of the Gaza war of 2008-2009.
2. To unveil ideologies underlying the different practices in the representation of social actors and examine their reflections on the image of Israeli and Palestinian actors in the international press.
3. To contribute to critical discourse studies which attempt to decode the workings of ideologies in media discourse and war reporting.

To achieve the above-mentioned objectives, the study employs critical discourse analysis (CDA) as the study's main approach (see section 2.2.2). This is a cross-disciplinary study that brings together contributions from the fields of discourse analysis, linguistics and media analysis in examining media coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09. In this regard, the current comparative study aims to offer revealing evidence, and thus stronger empirical strength that may be limited or missing when examining media reporting within a single country either the USA or UK. Therefore, the analysis of media discourse and war reporting is "particularly worthy of a serious study" (Shreim, 2012:10). In order to achieve these aims, a detailed review of related literature has been carried out in order to determine a better understanding of the current war (the Gaza war of 2008-09). This review is followed by examining war reporting. The next section outlines the chapters of this study.

1.6 Outline of this Study

This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduces critical discourse analysis (CDA) and its role in the study. It then discusses briefly the relation between war, media and discourse. It also gives a brief background to the events of the Gaza war of 2008-09. It points out the reasons for conducting the study and the aims of the study.

Chapter 2 draws a theoretical framework for the whole study. The chapter explains meanings of discourse as a practice (textual, discursive and social). It further presents theoretical overview, assumptions and criticisms of CDA. It then discusses discourse in relation to media, representation and ideology. The chapter points out concepts of war reporting. Moreover, it presents findings of some studies on war reporting by critical discourse analysis and media studies. It illustrates US and UK media as international news and shows some similarities and differences between them and their relation and involvement in covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Chapter 3 presents the study's methodological framework. It states the research questions and explains the procedures and decisions to collect and analyse data. It differentiates between the four selected newspapers, *The Guardian, The Times, The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*. The chapter further explains the methods used for the analysis: the transitivity model, the socio semantic inventory and quotation patterns.

Chapter 4 analyses transitivity selections in the headlines of all news stories published on the Gaza war. It examines the processes associated with the social actors and their roles. The analysis examines the frequency distributions of the inclusion of the social actors, and frequency distributions of the processes associated with the social actors. Further, the chapter examines the types of transitivity processes, and how these processes represent the subgroups of social actors, political, military and civilian.

Chapter 5 examines the representation of social actors in the news stories and editorials. The analysis examines six representational categories from Van Leeuwen's (1996) socio-semantic inventory in sampled texts from news stories and editorials. Similar to chapter 4, this chapter examines the frequency distributions of inclusion and exclusion of social actors. The chapter then examines the representation patterns in regard to representational processes: inclusion and exclusion; role allocation; genericisation and specification; nomination and categorisation; and functionalisation and identification.

Chapter 6 examines the quotation patterns and sources. In the analysis, the study applies Richardson's (2007) classification of quotation patterns. The chapter examines firstly the frequency distributions. It also examines the media sources and analyses the verbal processes, i.e. reporting verbs associated with the social actors. The chapter further investigates themes of quotation patters associated with the social actors.

Chapter 7 concludes the study and summarises the main findings of the analysis. It shows similarities and differences between the four selected newspapers. The chapter then points out aspects of causality and agency, and identifies bias features in the discourses of the coverage of the 2008-09 Gaza war. The chapter then states factors that influence reporting the Gaza war of 2008-09 in the US and UK newspapers as international press. Further, the chapter highlights challenges in utilising CDA in analysing the Gaza war of 2008-09. Finally, the chapter draws a general conclusion and states limitations and contributions of the study and give some recommendations for further research.

Chapter Two: Critical Discourse Analysis, War Reporting and International News

2.1 Introduction

The chapter presents a review of Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA). CDA is an influential theory and method in examining media discourse practices in international news coverage of wars in this study. The chapter then outlines concepts of war reporting and practices of news selections. It also reviews studies on war reporting in CDA, media and communication. Further, this chapter provides an overview of the international news with a major focus on the media in the US and UK, and their relations to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the end, the chapter summarises the main theoretical points of the framework.

2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

2.2.1 Meanings of Discourse

The term ‘discourse’ is vigorous, and thus there are various definitions and interpretations of discourse according to scholars’ and frameworks, e.g. constructionist, structuralist and functionalist. In the constructionist approach of discourse, Phillips and Hardy (2002) emphasise that “without discourse, there is no social reality, and without understanding discourse, we cannot understand our reality, our experience or ourselves” (cited in Heracleous and Marshak, 2004:1290). That is, reality produced in discourse is constructed and reconstructed. This statement shows the importance to understand and to be aware of specific discourses that could mislead the people in constructing their identity. Heracleous and Marshak (2004:1290) state that "the main aim of constructionist approaches is to understand this constructive process through hermeneutic exploration of the discourses involved".

Deborah Schiffrin (1994) explains two general definitions of discourse: structuralist and functionalist. The structuralist approach sees discourse as a particular unit of language (specifically, a unit above the sentence). The functionalist approach sees discourse as an analysis or a study of language in use. Furthermore, Brown and Yule (1983:1) state “the analysis of discourse is, necessarily, the analysis of language in use”. Therefore, discourse “cannot be restricted to the description of linguistic forms independent of the purposes or functions which these forms are designed to serve in human affairs" (see also Richardson, 2007:23).

Common CDA-based definitions of discourse hold that discourse is "a circular process in which social practices influence texts, via shaping the context and mode in which they are produced, and in turn texts help influence society via shaping the viewpoints of those who read or otherwise consume them” (Richardson, 2007:37). Fairclough (2014) makes it clear that “discourse is language viewed in a certain way, as a part of the social process (part of social life) which is related to other parts “in a dialectical relation in the social process”. As proposed by Harvey (1996), Fairclough (2014) elucidates that these distinct parts are discourse (language); power; social relations; material practices; institutions (and rituals); beliefs (values, desires). Based on different approaches and conceptions of discourse within CDA, this study considers discourse as follows:

> *Discourse as practice[15]: textual, discursive and social practice (Fairclough, 1989, 1993, 1995b) that not only represents what is going on, but also evaluates it, ascribes purpose to it, justifies it, and so on (Van Leeuwen,2008).*

[15] In brief, the practices of discourse are the processes by/through which journalists produce reports/texts, and readers use and understand these texts/reports.

In this context, this study examines practices in the news production: linguistic features, representational discursive categories and ideological implications in the production of war reporting through the application of CDA (see chapter 3). The study then explains why these practices produce a discourse in the way it is (see chapter 7). This examination follows a major dimension in CDA that "a discourse-focused critique is not an optional extra for critical analysts; it is an essential feature of critical social analysis" (Fairclough, 2014).

Discourse as a text focuses simply on texts and on linguistic features in the sentences. Fairclough (1995b:17) considers text as "both spoken and written language" that is "produced in a discursive event", and it is "a product rather than a process – a product of the process of text production" (Fairclough, 1989:24). For instance, the texts used on TV are different from the ones used on radio. The TV texts include visual images and possibly representations, but radio texts include audio and sounds without visual images. This comparison between TV and radio texts shows the production, consumption and interpretation of texts in different senses and ways. That is, the text includes actual words in addition sometimes to photographs, layout and different kinds of maps, diagrams and other visual aids that are commonly used in newspapers. In this study, I focus only on textual features in texts selected from four newspapers (see section 3.3).

In explaining discourse as text, Fairclough (1989:12) distinguishes between three values following Halliday's (1985) meta-functions: experiential, relational and expressive. Briefly, the experiential value is a trace of and a cue to the way in which the text producer's experience of the natural or social world is represented. The relational value has to do with the contents, knowledge and beliefs. It is cued to the social relationships which are enacted via the text in the discourse and to the producer's evaluation of the bit of the reality it relates to. The expressive value is a trace of and a cue to the producer's evaluation of the bit of the reality it relates to.

Based on these three values, Fairclough (1989:112) emphasises that "any given formal feature may simultaneously have two or three of these values". In media discourse, reporters and editors select certain aspects of reality. They include and exclude events according to their production policy.

To explain discourse as discursive practice, Fairclough (1989, 1995a/b) considers discourse practice as mediating between the textual and socio-cultural dimensions. In his explanation of discourse practice, Fairclough (1995b:58) states that the discourse practice includes aspects of "text production, distribution and text consumption" (see also Fairclough, 1992b:78; Richardson, 2007:69; Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000:448). Fairclough (1995b:58-59) specifies two facets of the discursive practice: institutional process (e.g. editorial procedures), and discourse processes (production and consumption). For Fairclough (1995b:60), discourse practice "straddles the division between society and culture on the one hand and discourse, language and text on the other".

At this stage of analysis, CDA rejects the claim that language is an autonomous system distant from its social and cultural context. Also, at this stage, there is a reference to encoding and decoding of the meaning in the texts. In Richardson's thoughts, such encoding and decoding pave the way to the transition from textual analysis to discourse analysis because the latter "involves an analysis of texts as they are embedded within, and relate to, social conditions of production and consumption" (2007:39).

Discourse as social practice implies "a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them" (Fairclough and Wodak's principles, 1997:258; see also Fairclough, 1992b:65). Within this relation, Fairclough (1995b:18) compares two discourses: discourse as social action and interaction, people interacting together in real social situations.

At the level of social practice, CDA researchers examine the text against its historical, social and cultural background. The social and historical aspects are concerned with power and ideology issues. The cultural aspect is concerned with the questions of value and identity. In explaining social practice, Richardson (2007:42) states:

> In essence, CDA involves an analysis of how discourse (language in use) relates to and is implicated in the (re)production of social relations - particularly unequal, iniquitous and/or discriminatory power relations. Analysis retains the details of both textual analysis (the analysis of prepositional content) and discourse analysis (the analysis of text production and consumption), but now these insights are expanded and viewed in relation to the wider society. Specifically, the form-content-function of texts, as well as their production and consumption, are subject to critical analysis – that is, subjecting discourse to ethical and political critique, challenging the features that contribute to the perpetuation of structured inequalities.

In brief, this stage of analysis sheds light on the relationship between interpretation and the wider context. For Richardson (2007), discourse analysis becomes critical at this stage as it upgrades from textual analysis to critical analysis. The social practice is the wider socio-cultural, socio-political, ideological, institutional, historical context, and structures that surround the text, and in which the text is explained in terms of production, distribution, transformation and consumption. Among the social and historical aspects of the discourse as social practice, this study is interested in the ideological implications, e.g. agency attributions, bias manifestations, liberal and conservative spectrum that all explicitly and implicitly convey certain images and assignments in the representation of the social actors, and thus *possibly* convey or reflect political goals or interests.

2.2.2 CDA: Overview and Assumptions

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a form of discourse analysis that is a broad and complex interdisciplinary field (Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Wodak and Meyer 2001) with different theories, methodologies and research issues (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002; Weiss and Wodak 2003; Blommaert, 2005). Briefly, discourse analysis clarifies the way meaning is constructed to show the ways of constructing and constituting the social actors, and how these representations construct a certain understanding (see Bertrand and Hughes, 2005:94). The different definitions of discourse analysis pave the ways to a variety of CDA understandings and conceptions.

Van Dijk (1988a:24[16]) defines discourse analysis as a theoretical and methodological approach to language and language use. It aims mainly "to produce explicit and systematic descriptions of units of language use [called as] discourse". Fairclough (2003:3) sees discourse analysis as "oscillating between a focus on specific texts" and a focus on what he calls the "order of discourse, the relatively durable social structuring of language which is itself one element of the relatively durable structuring and networking of social practices". Smith and Bell (2007:78) hold out that discourse analysis "involves a close examination of text, including visual imagery and sound as well as spoken or written language" and aims to "elucidate the meanings and social significance of the text".

CDA is interested in "the process of making meaning, rather than just in the meaning itself" (Bertrand and Hughes, 2005:174). This makes CDA "aggressively interdisciplinary and pluralistic in both method and theory" (Wodak and Weis, 2005:124). This means that there is a multiplicity of approaches and theories within CDA (see Bell, 1995:25-30; Fairclough

[16] Also, Van Dijk (1988a) gives brief review of the historical development of discourse analysis. He links the origins of discourse analysis to classic rhetoricians such as Aristotle.

and Wodak, 1997:262-268). Thus, it is difficult to stick to a specific set of tools or to a methodology per se (Fairclough, 2001; Meyer, 2001).

Pointing to various approaches to CDA (e.g. Fairclough, 1989), Pennycook (1994:121) suggests that these approaches “share a commitment to going beyond linguistic description to attempt explanation, to showing how social inequalities are reflected and created in language”. According to Fairclough (1995a), CDA studies the opaque relationships of causality and determination between two parts: (1) discursive practices, events and texts, and (2) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes. In particular, CDA is “fundamentally interested in analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009:10; see also Wodak and Meyer, 2001: 2; Wodak, 1995:204).

Fairclough further points out that CDA aims to “investigate how [...] practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power” (1995a:132). CDA “takes a particular interest in the relation between language and power” (Wodak, 2001:1), and it “specifically considers institutional, political, gender and media discourses (in the broadest sense) which testify to more or less overt relations of struggle and conflict”.

Within these cornerstones and aspects, CDA seeks to reveal unequal relations of power and representations that "underlie ways of talking in a society, and, in particular, to reveal the role of discourse in reproducing or challenging socio-political dominance" (Bell and Garrett, 1998:6). This reflects that CDA has explicit socio-political interests. In this regard and in a developed trend in CDA, Fairclough (2014) asserts that “CDA combines critique of discourse and explanation of how it figures within and contributes to the existing social reality, as a basis for action to change that existing reality in particular respects”.

In this dimension, this study not only focuses on critique of discourse in media coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09 (chapter 4,5 and 6), but also it provides explanations how this discourse is produced in relation to factors that influence war reporting in international press (chapter 7). Richardson (2007:1-2) considers CDA as "a perspective on critical scholarship: a theory and a method of analysing the way that individuals and institutions use language". From such a perspective and in line with Richardson's view of CDA in his book *analysis of newspapers*, this study adopts that

> Critical discourse analysts offer interpretations [and explanation] of the meanings of texts rather than just quantifying textual features and deriving meaning from this; situate what is written or said in the context in which it occurs, rather than just summarizing patterns or regularities in texts; and argue that textual meaning is constructed through an interaction between producer, text and consumer rather than simply being read off the page by all readers in exactly the same way (Richardson, 2007:15).

This constructivist approach of CDA asserts that meaning in discourse hides in or lies behind the words (the language). In Richardson's (2007:15) words, "CDA argues that textual meaning is constructed through an interaction between producer, text and consumer rather than simply being read off the page by all readers in exactly the same way". Such an assumption shows language is constructive, and thus discourse shapes images and representation of social actors. According to Fairclough (1992:64), three aspects can be distinguished in relation to the constructive effects of discourse: constructing social identities and subject positions in communication, constructing social relationships between people and constructing systems of knowledge and belief. These effects correspond to three functions of language: ideational, interpersonal, and textual functions. This study is interested in the ideational function, i.e. representation of social actors (see chapter 4 and 5).

To extract the actual meaning, we should be critical in our examination of the text, discursive practices represented in the processes of news production and consumption and the larger context of discourse. Fairclough (2014) claims that “being critical is not just identifying features and types of discourse which are open to criticisms of various sorts [...], it is also asking: why is the discourse like this?” This means the critical analysis also looks for explanation. Hodges and Nilep (2007:3-4) explain that being critical is "to imply a broad understanding of critical scholarship". They explain that generally such a scholarship is characterised by careful analysis of empirical data. It entails a certain amount of distance from the data in order to examine the issues from a wide perspective.

CDA essentially stems out from the premise that language is a social and practical construct which is characterised by a symbiotic relationship with society. In this context, Fairclough and Wodak (1997:277-280) suggest principles for CDA summarised briefly in eight points (see also Titscher, et al. 2000:146):

1. CDA addresses social problems.
2. Power relations are discursive.
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture.
4. Discourse does ideological work.
5. Discourse is historical.
6. The link between text and society is mediated.
7. Discourse analysis is interpretive and explanatory.
8. Discourse is a form of social action.

Indeed, language shapes society, but it is also shaped by it (Weiss and Wodak, 2003). Thus, CDA aims at clarifying the way linguistic-discursive practices are linked to “socio-political structures of power and domination” (Kress, 1990:85) by emphasising “the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance” (Van Dijk, 1993a:249). Such an aim makes the way, in which institutions and their discourses shape us, visible as the overarching goal of CDA. Within these principles and aims, the scope of this study on war reporting and its aims fit very well.

2.2.3 CDA: Criticisms and Responses

There are two distinct schools of thought regarding criticism of CDA (see Blommaert, 2005:31-37). Here, I discuss supporting arguments and criticisms of CDA. The most sustained criticisms of much of the work of CDA are articulated in the debates between Blommaert (2005) and Fairclough (1996), and explained further in Fairclough (2014), and between H.G. Widdowson (1995a, 1995b) and Norman Fairclough (1996). The criticsm of CDA is also articulated in the debate between Michael Billig (1999a, 1999b) and Wetherell (1998). Further, Philo (2007) criticises the methodology of CA. The criticisms of CDA are centred on CDA as an exercise in interpretation, not analysis, selective, partial and qualitative, and too ambitious in its quest for social change. This section reveals some of these criticisms and responses.

Blommaert (2005:35) criticises the extensive focus on linguistic analysis. He claims that "the emphasis on linguistic analysis implies an emphasis on available discourse, discourse which is there". He considers it as a "linguistic bias" which "restricts the space of analysis to textually organised and (explicilty) linguistically encoded discourse, not to where it comes from and goes to".

In his reply, Fairclough (2014) accepts this criticism, but he considers the "great deal of what is called discourse analysis in the social sciences does not include any linguistic analysis of texts, or includes hardly any" as a reason to focus on linguistic analysis in CDA. In response to where discourse goes, Fairclough (2014) refers to his book '*Language and power*' which claims that "discourse is dialectically related to social structures; it is shaped by them but also contributes to reproducing them and changing them".

Widdowson (1995a:159) argues that CDA is “invalid as analysis” because it is “an exercise in interpretation”. Thus, the analysis examines all possible interpretations which lead to various meanings of a text where each meaning is “conditionally valid”. That is, it only reveals the subjective discourse perspective of the analyst (1995:169).

Fairclough (1996) responds that the analysis is based on applying a clearly defined set of procedures in a systematic way. Thus, CDA as analysis “provides an analytical procedure [...] and applies it systematically to various types of data” (p.52). He further states that CDA “is not an exercise in interpretation in Widdowson’s sense” (p. 52). Fairclough (2001) suggests that CDA can never be objective: it always has particular interests, always comes from a particular perspective, and renders analyses that are partial and incomplete. In the same vein, Wodak (1999:186) points out that "researchers do not separate their own values and beliefs from the research they are doing … [therefore] researchers must be constantly aware of what they are doing”. In such a debate, the risk implies in granting and/or imposing our preconceptions, conceptions and hypotheses as individual researchers/analysts for such a particular perception.

Widdowson (1995a:169) further claims that CDA “presents a partial interpretation of text from a particular point of view”. He explains that the partial interpretation happens in two senses: ideological commitment of researchers and selection of textual features supporting preferred interpretation. He argues the analysis should involve the examination of several interpretations, but in CDA such an examination is not possible because of prior judgments. In his reply, Fairclough (1996) draws attention to the open-endedness of results required in CDA studies. He explains that CDA is always explicit about its own position and commitment, unlike most other approaches of analysis.

Since this study uses a purposive systematic sample (see section 3.3.2), such a criticism is applicable in the current work. Through CDA, this study analyses a certain pre-defined phenomena (the Gaza war of 2008-09), and the analysis examines the discourses around the phenomenon (see section 7.6.2 on the challenges of utilising CDA). While I am selective in constructing the sample of this study (see section 3.3.2), I do not accept any accusation that the arguments or findings of this study are preconceived before conducting the analysis and examination of the discourse practices of the war reporting in the media.

A further criticism of CDA is made by Philo (2007). He argues that it is "not possible to analyse individual texts in isolation from the study of wider systems of ideologies which informed them and the production processes which structured their representation" (2007:184). For this, CDA is not sufficient to stand by itself to analyse media texts. Likewise, Philo (2007:184) argues that it is "necessary to simultaneously study processes of audience reception before making judgments about social meaning and the potential impacts of texts on public understanding". Philo defends the methodologies that the Glasgow University Media Group follows in their textual analysis studies with analyses of the processes of both production and reception. Further, Philo (2007) argues that media discourse analysis is weak or not enough when it excludes considerations of production and reception processes. He states:

> there is a need to develop methods which can trace the communication of messages from their inception in contested perspectives, through the structures by which they are supplied to and processed by the media, then to their eventual appearance as text and finally to their reception by audiences (Philo, 2007:192).

In response, I refer to Weiss and Wodak's (2003:7) suggestion that CDA is considered as "a theoretical synthesis of conceptual tools". They think the mixture of theory and method could be opportunities for "innovative and productive theory formation" which strengthens CDA.

Some of the criticisms mentioned above are practical and worthy of being taken into consideration. CDA as a theory and method is suitable for examining the media coverage of war. CDA goes beyond textual or content analysis to examine the context(s) of the text(s), e.g. social, cultural, religious, political, historical, economic and cognitive that surround and frame the creation of a text(s). Therefore, the use of CDA is justified based on the need to "provide an account of the role of language, language use, discourse or communicative events in the (re)production of dominance and inequality" (Van Dijk, 1993a:279).

For this brief comparison of the debates, this study finds CDA a suitable theory and method to investigate the representation of social actors in war reporting in this dissertation. As such, this study considers that a critical analysis of war reporting is useful in examining how certain images, representations and ideologies are (re)produced and contested in different news discourses across and within the US and UK media coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09 (see section 1.5). CDA is my preferred approach in spite of much criticism. CDA is valid for analysing a diversity of the discursive practices and strategies in war reporting in the international press (see e.g. Richardson, 2007; Barkho, 2008). While there is a great focus on the textual features, this study takes into consideration political contexts and journalistic practices of the discourse; it gives enough space in the analysis to themes that the textual analysis finds in their larger contexts.

2.2.4 Discourse and Media

This section focuses on the concept of discourse in media. We have already seen in section (2.2.1) that discourse is either written or spoken. Discourse in media consists of both texts (news stories relatively), and the processes to build and produce the texts. Generally speaking, discourse in media obviously reflects ideological interests and stances of those in powerful positions, i.e. the elite, politicians, journalists, etc. (Fowler 1991, Fairclough, 1989, 2001, 2003; Van Dijk, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, Richardson, 2007). In this context, Fairclough (2001:40) considers media discourse as a "one-sided" event that has a sharp discerned division between producers and interpreters. That is, one crucial function of media discourse is to communicate among two domains: the public and the private concerning the temporal setting of media properties. For instance, media brings news events (e.g. political, war, criminal) as its own sources in public domain to the peoples' attention (news consumers through TVs, radios, newspapers and internet) in their home (private domain). In my research, this relates to how the selected newspapers cover the events of the Gaza War of 2008-2009 and bring them to their readers.

This communicative event includes different participants such as reporters and/or editors who mediate the messages to the audiences who are the receivers, and most importantly the third parties representing different segments and powers in the public domain. In this regard, media discourse does not have immediate feedback from interacting participants. Media discourse producers construct their ideal audiences for ideal subjects. Also, they portray the war, and advocate and defend their involvement in the war. This study involves an analysis of the discourse of newspapers. In doing this analysis, the study adopts Richardson's (2007) views on the news as an argumentative discourse genre. As a genre, news shapes our experiences and values, and yet it is shaped by them. For this, there is a need to uncover the ideological implications behind the (mis)use of such genre mainly

during the times of war. News offers an ideal source of data from which we can learn about social meanings and stereotypes through its mode of language and communication (Bell, 1995).

In considering news texts as social practices representing the views and actions of certain social classes or groups, Curran and Seaton (1988) stress that they are subject to the social constraints and institutional relations within which journalists operate (cited in Thetela, 2001:349). News of events is both reported and interpreted by different people (reporters, editors, institutions, etc.). However, interpretation of news is composed of opinions, arguments, and aspirations of those who report and publish news. Smith and Bell (2007:95) suggest that “the news has its own discourse, which is shaped by variables such as journalistic practice and media ownership”. Within these texts, discourse is interlinked with representation as we will see in the next section.

2.2.5 Discourse and Representation

Representations depend on specific perspectives from which they are constructed. Wenden (2005:90) explains that representation refers to the language used in a text or talk to assign meanings to groups and their social practices, to events, and to social and ecological conditions and objects in discourse analysis (e.g. Fairclough, 1989; 1995 a,b). This study refers representation to the process of meaning production through combination of texts. In this concept, meaning is constructed by linguistic representation in news media. Bignell (1997:80) suggests that "news is not just facts, but representations produced in language and other signs like photographs".

Fairclough (2000:170) highlights that the question of discourse is the question of how texts figure (in relation to other moments) in how people represent the world, including themselves and their productive activities. That is, different discourses are different ways of representation associated with different positions. Fairclough (2003:124) sees discourse as “ways of

representing aspects of the world – the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the mental world of thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and so forth and the social world".

Media discourse is in fact a representation of reality, and has become a target for CDA. In this regard, media reports represent different perspectives of the same event. Media news constitutes a part of the resources which people deploy in relation to one another, especially when competing and dominating (Fairclough 2003:124). Fairclough (2001:4) acknowledges that news media is interesting to analyse because it provides "an understanding that news representations are subjective interpretations, conditioned by the political and social surrounding". As already outlined above, one dimension of discourse as a text is the linguistic features in a sentence. Fowler (1991:4) states that "news is a representation of the world in language". This shows that discourse representation represent the events of war by including different linguistic features and discourse practices. Fowler (1991:4) reasons that

> "Language is a semiotic code, it imposes a structure of values, social and economic in origin, on whatever is represented; and so inevitably news, like every discourse constructively patterns that of which it speaks. News is a representation in this sense of construction; it is not a value-free reflection of facts".

Fowler's argument suggests that news is not only a genre that shapes human experience and human values, but also it is shaped by both human experience and values. Language "can never appear by itself. It always appears as the representative of a system of linguistic terms, which themselves realise discursive and ideological systems" (Gunter Kress, 1990 cited in Taiwo 2007:220). Fowler (1991: 29-30) says that "different languages not only possess different vocabularies (and other aspects of structure, but vocabulary is the clearest illustration of this point), but also, by means of these linguistic differences, they map the world of experience in different ways" depending on the stance, ideology or aim of the war reporter.

Fowler's statement leads me to say that language in use (discourse) which is used to report war events cannot be claimed to be objective or neutral; the events and the ideas must be (re)presented and transmitted in language through some medium (seen, spoken or written) with its own philosophy, attitudes and values which make up potential perspectives on events. This leads the war reporters to (re)-produce and (re)present discourses and stances on war being covered.

Upon the considerations discussed above, we can see media discourse as a source of power that can be hidden or obvious. It is a site of ideological stances. This study examines how representations of actors (individuals or groups) in US and UK newspapers are based on underlying ideological perceptions. This means the focus will examine how individuals or groups are represented. “Some particular representations in the press may conceal truths that need to be told and may legitimise particular negative labelling or identity in the interest of certain people or government” (Chiluwa 2011:197).

In this regard, representation of social actors relates them to specific behaviours and attitudes, e.g. making violence, making efforts to achieve a ceasefire, firing rockets, etc., as we shall see in the analytical chapters 4, 5 and 6. These particular representations of individuals or groups in media are linked to certain ideologies. "Ideological work of media language includes how individuals or groups, identities and relations are represented" (Chiluwa, 2011: 197). The following section sheds light on discourse and ideology.

2.2.6 Discourse and Ideology

Discourse as a practice (textual, discursive and social) plays a major part in (re)production of social inequalities, and thus in the ideological-political dimension in media and in the society as larger context (see Gee, 1999). One can posit that ideology underlines any form of the linguistic expression in a text, a sentence or paragraph. Van Dijk (2000) considers media discourse as the main source of attitudes and ideologies of ordinary citizens. Androutsopoulos (2010:182) points out that researchers from sociolinguistics, language ideology and media discourse all "agree on the potential of discourse in mainstream media to shape the language ideologies of their audience, that is, their belief, or feelings about language as used in their social world". He further suggests that "language ideologies are not neutral or objective, but serve individuals or group-specific interests, that is, they are always formulated from a particular social perspective and have particular referents and targets" (Androutsopoulos, 2010:183). Fowler (1991:101) also claims that "news is not just a value-free reflection of facts. Anything that is said or written about the world is articulated from a particular ideological position".

There are different views of ideology that depend on the area in which ideology is defined or dealt with. In this wide scope, this study is based on the premise that linguistic choices in texts carry ideological meaning(s). Fairclough (1992b:88) maintains that “ideology invests language in various ways at various levels, and that we do not have to choose between different possible locations of ideology, all of which seem partly justified and none of which seems entirely satisfactory”. This premise leads me to point out the relationship between language and ideology. Van Dijk (1998a) maintains that ideological stances in discourse are achieved by means of linguistic tools or strategies for hegemonic ends, for discourse reproduces ideology and are influenced by it.

Since there is a relation between language and ideology, discourse is ideological as it contributes to the existence of power relations. Fairclough (2003:9) considers ideology as a modality of power, as “representations of aspects of the world which can be shown to contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power, domination and exploitation". In this vein, ideology is "difficult to be read off texts" (Fairclough, 1995a:71). This is because meanings are “produced through interpretations of texts” and because ideological processes relate to discourses as whole social events and “not to the texts which are produced, distributed and interpreted as moments of such events” (Fairclough, 2010:57).

Van Dijk (1995a:248) considers ideologies as “basic frameworks of social cognition, shared by members of social groups, constituted by relevant selections of socio-cultural values, and organised by an ideological schema that represents self-definition of a group”. Here he emphasises the cognitive function of the organisation of the social representations of the group. Also, Van Dijk (1998a:21) points out that "opinions and ideologies involve beliefs or mental representation" but they "are usually not personal but social, institutional structures" (p.22). That is, ideology constructs the social representation and construction of peoples’ identities, fashions their interpretation of events and monitors their social practices (Van Dijk, 2000).

The above conceptions of ideology make us expect reporters/journalists to frame, legitimise, or validate actions and opinions in covering events (see Wenden 2005:93). For example, such an ideological process may control the general point of view of the wars in the Middle East, in general, as well as the Gaza war of 2008-09 in particular.

2.3 War Reporting in Media: News Types and Practices

2.3.1 Conceptions of War Reporting

Reporting wars in media is an essential resource for journalism and readers. Considering news as a genre, and in line with Richardson's (2007) view that news is argumentative genre, understanding the nature of war is essential to understand the way war is reported, represented, covered, and analysed by different media outlets. Allan and Zelizer (2004:4) state "war reporting's positioning as a litmus test[17] for journalism [...] rests on an understanding of its capacity to influence public perceptions". This is clear in live reporting, especially in 24-hour news, as this raises public perception and understanding of the nature of war.

Allan and Zelizer's (2004:4-5) conception reflects the professional aspect of war reporting as the war reporters/ journalists should be present enough to respond to what is happening, yet absent enough to stay safe; be sufficiently authoritative so as to provide reliable information, yet open to cracks and fissures in the complicated truth-claims that unfold; remain passionate about the undermining of human dignity that accompanies war, yet impartial and distanced enough to see the strategies that attach themselves to circumstances with always more than one side. In such a professional war journalism, war reporting sustains a certain discursive authority –namely that of being an eyewitness.

Boyd-Barrett (2004:25) considers war reporting as genre, i.e. a distinct type of journalism. In his analysis, he argues that the genre "obfuscates the reasons why the media focus on some wars rather than others, often fail to capture both the deep-level and proximate causes of wars or explain their actual durations and aftermath" and genre "hide the extent of media manipulation by official monopolization of information

[17] Matheson and Allan (2009:7) explain litmus test as "its daunting circumstances throw into sharp relief existing criteria of good journalism, such as impartiality, fairness or even an alignment with a national interest".

flows". He also argues that the genre "plays into the hands of power, and this is nowhere more apparent than the media's failure to identify the meta-narratives or grand strategies that explain the links between different wars over extended periods of time" (2004:25). Also, he contends that war-reporting-as-genre obscures the collusion between media and government. In his conclusion, Boyd-Barrett demonstrates that the role of war-reporting-as-genre is to misinform and obfuscate in respect to some of the most important international conflicts in the past half-century or more, in addition to how the media's reporting of war has been almost guaranteed to misinform the public and deliberately confuse the issues.

Ninan (2009) expresses that "perhaps the most fundamental ethical issue in conflict coverage is how much truth-telling do you do in times of war. Do you tell it like it is, or weigh the consequences of doing so?" From different considerations of war reporting, and studies on wars from linguistics, media and communication perspectives, this study considers war reporting as

> *a multi function-task operated/executed by journalists in a war time to cover war events using language that conveys patterns of representation (discourse) on the war actors to either local or international audience(s).*

Simply, this multi-function task implies reporting and covering the military actions. The task also represents a "litmus test"[18] for journalism which influences public perceptions and/or to misinform the public, disguise the truth and confuse the issues. Moreover, doing such a task requires the journalists covering war(s) to be prepared to gather information in order to keep the local and international audiences informed of the war events in an objective way of reporting. The task is multi-functional in terms of the information they provide on the war events. The journalists covering war

[18] A term used by Allan and Zelizer (2004:4) in defining war reporting (see the previous footnote)

events not only aim to persuade and convince their audience (local and international) of their description and interpretation of the war events/actions as being the rational and appropriate ones, but also they convey specific representations of the actors and processes of the war. Van Dijk (1996:24) states journalism represents "opinion statements [….] embedded in argumentation that makes them more or less defensible, reasonable, justifiable or legitimate as conclusions" (cited in Richardson, 2007:64).

Shaw and Martin (1993:44) portray war reporting as a car windshield wiper. They state war reporting "continues after a war ends, as a car windshield wiper wipes a few times more before coming to rest". They explain that "press coverage, like the windshield wiper, can be manipulated to some extent in terms of the speed with which it moves, or the blades can be improved in some way. However, the essential function and characteristics remain the same". Such a task of war reporting in media depends on practices of news selection. This is explained in the following section.

2.3.2 News Selection in War Reporting

This section focuses on how news is selected in war reporting. Selecting news stories is one of the practices of text production. Peng (2008:361) state that "news media in different political, economic and cultural systems might show great diversity in news selection, prominence given, frames applied and attitudes toward the protest". Nossek (2007:43) suggests that journalists and editors are responsible for news selection. He refers to them as "gatekeepers" applying a set of norms of professional practices[19]. In this context, Nossek (2004:346) proposes that "journalists apply a set of norms to their professional practice. Journalists work for media organisations and

[19] see also(La Porte, 2007:99) on meaning of gatekeeper

are part of a larger social organisation, namely the institution of the media, which interacts with, and is affected, by other social institutions".

Media usually have more materials during wars than the limited space available to journalists in print media. Therefore, some news is selected and others are excluded. Fowler (1991:41-42) states that “the practice of news selection and presentation are habitual and conventional as much as they are deliberate and controlled”. War events are various and cannot be mentioned or covered by the news, so these events are subjected and controlled by a selection process by which these events become news stories that help people understand the world events partially. Haque (1988:4) suggests that “the criteria used for rejection of news are probably more illuminating than those for selection”. He exemplifies that “the reasons cited for the rejection of news stories by the Arab gatekeepers demonstrate a cultural reality and an Arab consciousness of it which may be significantly different from that of the developed countries of the West”. He then clarifies some of the reasons for rejection of news, e.g. “late arrivals, adequately covered yesterday, too much violence, repulsive, favouring terrorism, unacceptable sex and alien political propaganda” (1988:4).

According to these concepts of news selection, it becomes clear that the communication of news events cannot claim to be objective because the events and the ideas must be transmitted through a medium with its own philosophy, attitudes, linguistic expressions and social values which constitute a potential perspective on events. Bignell (1997:91) states that “selecting news events for the news cannot be thought of as neutral, nor can it be prior to the representation of the event in a narrative code”, but the news selection “already involves an awareness of the narrative codes in news discourse”. The more newsworthy an event is considered to be, the more likely it is to be selected for publication and to be presented prominently (Zillich et al. 2011).

In covering wars, media institutions/organisations put great effort to pinpoint or select news. Boyd-Barrett (2004) considers the Western media "highly selective" in covering wars and conflicts. "A war that does not attract media attention is not therefore unimportant, of low intensity or scale; nor is it necessary of scant strategic importance to Western interests" (26-27). For example, the conflicting case between the US and North Korea was more compelling than the Iraqi war in 2003. However, reporting the case of the North Korea was overshadowed by the Iraqi war although the case of North Korea was "equally if not potentially more serious tension brewing between the United States and North Korea"; however, "war with Iraq suited the US administration's game-plan of reshaping the Middle East – a highly influential, controversial, "neoconservative policy that had mixed pro-Israel, anti-Arab overtone at the service of control over world energy reserves, specifically, and US global hegemony, in general (Boyd-Barrett, 2004: 26-27).

Selection, by journalists and the media, is also involved in choosing sources of quotations, for example, who are interviewed or who are quoted or heard in the news. According to Fairclough (1995b), one striking feature of news production is the overwhelming reliance of journalists on a tightly limited set of officials, and otherwise legitimised sources which are systematically drawn upon, through a network of contacts and procedures, and sources of facts and to substantiate other facts (p. 49). In contrast to officials, ordinary people, whenever they are used as sources, are mostly allowed to speak about their personal experiences rather than expressing opinions on an issue (Fairclough, 1995b:49).

2.4 Researching War Reporting

2.4.1 CDA Studies on War Reporting

This section summarises CDA studies[20] on war reporting. The following table shows a general overview on CDA studies on war reporting. CDA studies have focused on media discourse, war reporting, and the representation of various socio-political groups and politics. Certain criteria are used to compile table (2.1), e.g. CDA studies on analysis of linguistic features in war reporting, and CDA studies on Middle East conflicts in general, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular.

[20] My assessment is based on surveying the reputable academic journals, the library of Hamburg University, and searchiong Google website.

Table 2.1: CDA Studies on Wars

No.	Author	Year	Linguistic realizations	Phenomenon/Main analytical problem
1.	Bishop et al.	2007	- Representation processes to make overt the power relations performed through texts	- The coverage of events and the statements of government elites in Israel and Palestine by the news media of US and Canada as a product and an artifacts of their cultures
2.	Caroline Vaughan	1995	- Thematic choice and the discursive characterisations of the four nationalities (Lebanese, Palestinian, Israeli and American)	- The Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006
3.	Corina Filipescu	2011	- Structures/construction of meaning in discourses	- Discourse analysis illuminating the construction of meaning that constitutes the Palestinians in Israeli newspapers and how these representations construct a certain understanding about the Palestinians
4.	Dalia Gavriely-Nuri	2009	- A complex discursive analysis of metaphors: (1) Discourse analysis of the micro-context analysing each metaphor in its specific context; (2) Linguistic analysis of each source domain (3) Discourse analysis in the macro-context analysing the political implications of the war-normalizing metaphors in the broader political and international context	- Metaphorical mechanism engaged in by Israeli political leaders
5.	Eugenie P. Almeida	2011	- Linguistic structures, textual properties, and stylistic devices of the stories - Examining six dimensions (1) direct quotes (2) indirect quotes or paraphrases (3) terms denoting violence (4) terms denoting negative emotions (5) terms denoting conflict and (6) positive discourse	- Palestinian and Israeli Voices in Five Years of U.S. Newspaper Discourse
6.	Haarman and Lombardo	2009	- Examining the issues of evaluation, the expression of the speaker or writer's attitude or stance towards, viewpoint on, or feelings about the entities or propositions	- News coverage of the Iraqi war in 2003

No.	Author	Year	Linguistic realizations	Phenomenon/Main analytical problem
7.	John Richardson	2007	- Discursive practices of journalism: propaganda campaigns including the involvement of journalist's country, the quoting sources, the fastness to publish the news and the audience pressure to perceive sensibilities or political viewpoints. - The transitivity of Headlines	- Iraq War in 2003 - The relationship between the representation of the invasion and the strategic interests of governmental resources in the US and the UK
8.	Leon Barkho	2008	- Forms of linguistic expressions in news –lexis, syntax, options, selection - The actors who produce the discourse or have a say in how it should be shaped; the protagonists of the conflict the BBC covers; and the way other media assess the coverage	- The Palestinian-Israeli conflict - Linguistic representation in the BBC's discursive strategy and practices in relation to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to see whether the corporation's beliefs, norms and assumptions vis-à-vis the issue have a hand in the shaping of its discursive features
9.	Luisa Martín Rojo	1995	- Inclusion and exclusion processes: Division and Rejection - Division establishes an inclusive "Us" and an exclusive "Them" or "Him".	- Legitimating the Expulsion of `Illegal' Migrants in Spanish Parliamentary Discourse
10.	Noriko Iwamoto	1995	- Patterns of Transitivity - Concepts of Agent, Patient, and Range from transitivity theory of Functional Grammar as analytical tools	- The relationship between linguistic structure and socially constructed reality - The use of language for propaganda purposes during the Second World War in Japan
11.	Petrina Doyle	2010	- Semantic features of the texts in relation to wider discursive practices and social relations through intertextuality	- Discourses of security and defense mainly the Weapons of Mass Destruction, Iraq war as a war on terror and Iraq links al-Qaeda
12.	Raphael Nir and Itzhak Roeh	1992	- Non-linguistic variables affecting salience in the whole news story - Linguistic variables in the reports and the headlines	- Israeli journalistic coverage of the Palestinian first Intifada as an event that has a series of incidents
13.	Dirks, Una	2006	- Three domains of meaning: the revelation of the immanent horizon of meaning referring to the inner text structure, the expressive horizon of meaning constituted by the modes of mediation journalists from the topic-related situation with and the documentary horizon of meaning transcending and integrating the immanent and expressive strands	- The British and German newspapers coverage of the USA and the UK ways to legitimise the necessity of the Iraq war.

Among these CDA studies, I summarise briefly four studies because they are the most relevant and important to the current study, and the space is limited in this chapter. Also, these studies deal with US, British and Israeli newspapers. **Almeida (2011)** conducts a qualitative and quantitative discourse analysis of US newspaper coverage on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from 2002 to 2006. She collects 250 articles from seven newspapers and combines techniques from corpus linguistics with the discourse analysis to make the conclusions more empirical. Almeida (2011) finds that Israeli and Palestinian authorities were directly quoted roughly equally over the five years. She demonstrates that counts of the words in the sample reveal both the strikingly violent nature of the writing about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Almeida (2011) concludes that US news coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is characterised by expressions of violence, conflict, and negative emotion.

Barkho (2008) examines BBC's discursive strategies and practices in covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This study investigates the actors producing or shaping the discourse, the protagonists of the conflict that the BBC covers. The analysis draws upon extensive interviews with BBC editors, BBC editors' blogs, media reports on BBC's coverage of the conflict, English and Arabic BBC online reports, BBC guidelines, independent panel report(s) and the abbreviated version of its journalists' guide to Palestine and Israel. Barkho (2008) finds that the BBC editors are aware of the terminologies they use and their deficiencies to describe the conflict, but they are mostly in the dark with regard to the type of syntactic structures used in reporting the conflict. Thus, the BBC treads a lexical tightrope in attempts to appear balanced and impartial in the eyes of the protagonists and in the process, it risks denting its own overarching values.

Nir and Roeh (1992) examine the linguistic/rhetorical phrasing of journalistic news items and examine variables that affect the salience of news reports in two Israeli newspapers. They choose 320 news items from

December 1987 to April 1989. They analyse the transitivity selections in headlines and subheads to examine the linguistic variables. Their analysis reveals a tendency toward gradual increase in both newspapers, and the salience of the reports is clearly on the decline in both newspapers. The use of modifiers in news headlines in general, and of loaded modifiers is exceptional because it lies in the textual schemata of headlines, an elliptical style with a very low rate of redundancy.

Richardson (2007) examines the transitivity in 2007 headlines chosen from four British tabloids and four broadsheets. He examines the frequency that national actors are referred to in the sampled headlines. This examination indicates the almost complete absence of the UN as an actor. The analysis also shows the number of actors of *'unknown'* nationality was produced by two semantic-syntactic features: the use of passive verbs with deleted agents and using personal pronouns such as 'I', 'me' and 'we'". The examination of processes demonstrates ratio of noun phrase as a main difference between the tabloids and broadsheet headlines. Richardson concludes that the propaganda war that aims to justify the US-Led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was not successful, but when the war started, the propaganda campaign succeeded because "military and governmental sources are better adept at controlling the media during wartime conditions than they are in "peace time" (p. 218).

Overall, CDA studies summarised in the table (2.1) demonstrate different reporting of the same events, and show the governments' control of media during wartimes. CDA studies also show that there are links between media and government during war as governments control media during war times. In achieving so, media and mainly newspapers set linguistic features i.e. metaphors and ideological propositions to buttress its arguments and construction of the situation. The strategies in news texts, e.g. normalisation and passivisation help journalists manipulate and mystify the responsibility and agency of the warring parties.

2.4.2 Media and Communication Studies on War Reporting

Coverage of wars and conflicts has been studied by a diversity of disciplines and studies within media and communication. The following are among many studies that focus on Middle East wars within media and communication studies (Allan and Zelizer, 2004; El-Nawawy and Iskander, 2003; Hoskins, 2004 and Kellner, 2004). One salient remark is that many of the media studies on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict examine the representation of the Israelis and Palestinians in US media more than other countries.

Boyd-Barrett (2004) uses narrative analysis in studying a range of casualties to war reporting, truth and understanding through a narrative form. He exemplifies and explains how the casualties are experienced by the US, Afghanistan and Iraq between 2001 and 2003 in comparison with casualties of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where four million lives were lost between 1997 and 2003. The narrative analysis shows how obviously the news media decide to report and represent war causes, durations and aftermaths.

Lewis (2006) employs a quantitative content analysis to examine the role of UK media in reporting the Iraqi war in 2003. The sample includes 1,534 reports from four TV channels: BBC 1 6 o'clock News, ITN News at 6.30pm, Channel 4 News at 7pm and Sky News at 10pm from the period of time between 20 March 2003 – 11 April 2003. He points out three arguments for going to the war in Iraq in 20003: the legal basis for war, that is, the issue of WMDs, the brutality of Saddam Hussein's regime, and the Iraqi people's desire to be liberated from this oppressive regime. The findings show that the BBC is biased to the government's attitudes of war. However, Channel 4 is the only channel that is wary of reports of unconfirmed/credited stories from the frontlines in addition to criticism of official war discourse.

In a study based on content analysis of four main British television news sources during the Iraq war, Lewis and Brookes (2004) examined the patterns of coverage and assessed the degree to which the government's case for the Iraq war was validated or undermined by the television coverage. In their conclusion, they conclude that the overall weight of the coverage may have encouraged undecided people to support the war. "Opinion polls during the war indicated support increased from 45 percent at the beginning to 63 percent in the days following the destruction of Saddam's statue in Baghdad" (Lewis and Brookes, 2004:298).

Philo and Berry (2011) conduct a study on reception processes to examine the extent to which media texts are accepted and/or rejected, as well as the manner in which news texts were interpreted by audiences. Philo and Berry (2011) find the Israeli narrative dominated the news during the Gaza conflict. The Israelis were forced to respond to unwarranted rocket attacks by Hamas. The study finds exclusion of Hamas' reasons for the conflict, e.g. resisting an illegitimate military occupation by Israel (p.336-7). Philo and Berry (2011) finds some dominant themes in the British media coverage, e.g. ending the rockets, the need for security, an end to the smuggling of weapons and the need to hit Hamas. Explanatory statements issued by Palestinians/Hamas constitute a much lower total (p. 341). Philo and Berry (2011) find a perpetuated one-sided view of the cause of the conflict, underlining the issue of the rockets without reporting Hamas' offer to halt rocket fire in exchange for lifting the blockade and by omitting the alternative Palestinian rationale on the main purpose of the attack (p. 344).

The above mentioned media studies show examples of how media and communication scholars analyse war reporting by methodologies. The next section points out differences between CDA and media studies in researching war reporting.

2.4.3 Differences in War Reporting Research

This section highlights differences between CDA, and media and communications of war reporting. Also, it relates the similarities and differences to this current study. It is important to note that this study shares the same linguistic background as the above mentioned CDA Studies. To clarify, the focus in this study benefits from the methods and conclusions of the studies summarised above in addition to cover other aspects that have not been mentioned in the studies.

Almeida's (2011) study is important because it could be a model of combining qualitative and quantitative research methods as she combines discourse analysis and corpus linguistics. Also, she focuses on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But the difference is that she focuses only on national US newspapers, whereas this study focuses on the international level (US vs. UK) of newspapers. Also, this study employs CDA as qualitative methodology. In terms of quantitative approach, this study only refers to frequency distributions of inclusion and exclusion of social actors across the newspapers. Barkho's study is relevant to this study in terms of focusing on transitivity and linguistic analysis; however, this study focuses on print newspapers rather than TV. Also this study does not interview journalists or editors as this is not relevant to the research questions and objectives of this current work (see section 3.2).

Richardson's (2007) study is important and very relevant to this current dissertation for some reasons. His view of discourse is informed by critical theory[21]. In this context, this dissertation is built on the strong foundation of Richardson's work as the periods of time in his study and mine are close to each other. He analyses one war and uses a transitivity model by Halliday (1998/1994) and so does this study. This study follows Van Leewen's (1996) socio-semantic inventory, whereas he follows

[21] For the core concept of critical theory, see Wodak and Meyer (2009:6-7).

Fairclough's methodological framework of CDA. Richardson (2007) deals specifically with the Iraq war in the British Press, whereas this study examines the Gaza war of 2008-09 as foreign/international news in the US and UK newspapers.

Overall, despite these differences among the studies themselves, there is still a shared linguistic ground among them. They deal with reporting wars or conflicts from a CDA perspective. It is the ground on which this current study is based. The scholars in media studies have examined media accounts in relation to the content of news stories basically of one or another specific war mostly in one national media outlet. Such examination discovers the emergence of specific contents rather than discourses. In contrast, I approach the US and UK media from a CDA perspective. This does not mean that I will not use some tools from media studies. Some techniques will be used to support the CDA statistically (see analytical procedures in sections 3.4.3, 3.5.3 and 3.6.2).

The summary of CDA and Media studies on war reporting in the previous two sections (2.4.1 and 2.4.2) indicates that there are differences between CDA and media/communication studies (see table 2.2).

Table 2.2: Differences between CDA and Media/Communication Studies

Item	CDA studies	Media and Communication studies
Approach	Structuralist, Functionalists, constructionist	Realist - assumes that an independent reality socially constructed exists
Objectives	Investigate discourse over text	Investigate contents, frames, narratives in texts
Data Source	Meaning is fluid and constructs reality in ways that can be posited through the use of interpretive methods	Meaning is fixed and reflects reality in ways that can be ascertained through the use of scientific methods
Methodological framework	Qualitative basically, e.g. Fairclough's (1989,1995 ,2010,) Wodak's (2001a, 2009) Discourse Historical Approach Van Dijk's (1993b, 1997, 2001) Socio-Cognitive Approach Van Leeuwen's (1995, 1996, 2008) Socio-Semantic Inventory	Quantitative e.g. Content analysis Frame analysis
Categories	Exploration of how participants actively construct categories	Analytical categories taken for granted and data allocated to them
Inductive/Deductive	Inductive	Deductive

Adapted from Hardy, Cynthia, Bill Harley and Nelson Philips (2004)

The differences lie in theories and methodologies in examining war reporting. Most obviously, CDA studies follow mostly discourse theory and CDA or corpus linguistics to examine linguistic features or discursive strategies. The media/communication studies use mostly content analysis or frame analysis methods to examine the content and find quantitative results.

2.5 International News Flow and War Reporting

'International news' is a vague term and could be problematic in building a theory to analyse conflicts and wars. For this vagueness and difficulty, this study focuses mainly on the US and UK press among the elite[22] international Western media[23]. They are both published in the English language which represents the most widely used language all over the world. This fact represents a reason why the US and UK press are international. International news in this dissertation means *mainly* the news published by world newspapers that have a wide range of readers (audiences) from all over the world, and thus makes its news read internationally. In addition, this news is also foreign news to the newspapers' national audiences and is produced (mostly) by foreign journalists[24] who report news from outside their countries. "International reporting can be used as a synonym of foreign reporting" (Oganjanyan, 2012:8). The next section focuses on US and UK media as international news, similarities and difference among them, and their coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

[22] See Nossek (2007:50) on reasons for focusing on elite/quality newspapers; Bloch-Elkon and Lehman-Wilzinh, 2007:122-123)

[23] I mean by Western media the US and UK newspapers selected for the current study (see section 3.3.1).

[24] El-Nawawy (2002:83) He defines the foreign correspondents as "those individuals who are stationed in countries other than that of their origin for the purpose of reporting on events and characteristics of the area of their stationing through news media based elsewhere".

2.5.1 UK and US Media: International Dimensions

US and UK media are considered influential on the international level on one hand and in the Middle East on the other hand. Both media present news internationally from all over the world. US and UK have media markets beyond their scope of culture or language. For this, it is crucial to examine their discourse and language practices in reporting wars and conflicts. In Western countries, people depend largely on media with its different facets to make sense of international crises such as wars, conflicts, and disasters which happen in the Third World, including the Middle East. Thus, the portrayal of information from the Middle East by western media outlets is a particular concern of this study

In the context of information flow, it is worth mentioning that the four main World media agencies – Associated Press (AP), Agence France-Presse (AFP), United Press International (UPI) and Reuters are located in the Western countries: the United States, France and Britain (see Rantanen, 2004:304-310). In a study on hegemony around the world, Wu (2003:9) finds "presence of news agencies impact news flow regardless of the nation's development level"

I think that providing/sending information might have been affected by the revolution of satellite TV and social media. But, there is no doubt that international media agencies and newspapers, where Western journalists work, still provide the ground and the source to provide information to the audiences around the world. For example, Boyd-Barrett (2004:29) explains that Western reporting of the Afghanistan war in 2001 and Iraq war in 2003 "were stories told by Western correspondents reporting from Western positions speaking to (mainly approved) western political and military services". This shows media sources for Western audiences on which the audiences in the west rely to get the information about the wars and conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan. The next section discusses the US and UK media, i.e. how they are similar or different.

The US media has an interest in international crises and conflicts such as wars. Kellner (2004:137) contends that “the mainstream media […] favour official government sources for their stories, especially in times of crisis. Thus, they tend to be conduits for US government policies and actions, though there are significant exceptions”. In the same vein, Detmer (1995:91) suggests that the US media is “highly tilted in favour of official US government perspective especially in its treatment of foreign nations”. According to Arman (2009), “while media around the world (including the Middle East) are arguably reaching new heights in promoting unprecedented political openness, the quality of news coverage of the American mainstream media is losing its credibility" (cited in Bilawi, 2011:130).

The British Press is widely distributed in the UK and all over the world, so its attitudes are important and effective in giving space to cover international issues such as wars, conflicts, crises, etc. Tunstall (1996:2) points out that the British press is “highly idiosyncratic” similar to other national presses. This makes the British press “an extreme case within Europe in the extent to which it is dominated by national newspapers published in one city”, London. Kevin Williams (2010:1) exemplifies that newspapers at certain times “have been seen as midwives to democracy in Britain; at other times they have been accused of debating political, ethical and moral standards”. He further explains that “the British newspaper is regarded; it has been a matter of argument and disagreement through its history”. Franklin (2005:139) explains that “the local press in Britain is comprised of a cluster of newspapers distinguished by their size of circulation, periodicity of publication and the proportion of revenue they derive from advertising rather than sales”.

2.5.2 US and UK Media: Similarities and Differences

There are similarities and differences between the US and UK media which give the audiences in both countries a wide range of views, coverage, reports and representations of the same war events and actors. However, claiming of similarities in attitudes towards international crises, e.g. war in the US and UK media should be, I think, *cautiously* made because the US and the UK have differences in the economic, cultural and political systems that assumingly lead to differences in the way that the press in the two countries cover events around the world. Below, I discuss some of the similarities and differences between the US and UK press.

The US and the UK have democratic governmental systems that can provide good backgrounds and contexts for comparative study in media. "The press in each nation is greatly admired for its tenacity regarding the ideals of freedom of the press and for embracing its role as the fourth estate" (Dardis, 2006:411). Hallin and Mancini (2004:87) argue that the US and the UK "fall under the Anglo-American or Liberal Model of the mass media because of their similarities in key areas of the media systems: the development of media markets, political parallelism, journalistic professionalism, and the role of the state".

The US and the UK are different in some points. First, both countries have different (cultures and political) environments that influence how the citizens deal with and view various issues related to society and events around the world. In consequence, this difference leads to various notions of media professionalism and delineates the basic philosophies of the role of media in each society, and their media dealing with and covering international issues. "This can be partially attributed to the development of the mass circulation press that accounts for distinct differences in the nature of media outlets, their relation to audiences, and their role in social and political communication" (Hallin and Mancini, 2004:87).

Second, the difference is in the distribution and size of readership. Tunstall (1996:7-11) explains that the British press mostly is based in London; which is the home of the largest national newspapers in Western Europe. UK press enjoys readership very much along social class lines. It is known internationally for its tabloid newspapers (see also Williams, 2010:231-233). In the US, the press is “predominantly regional and, with a few exceptions, contains regional monopolies which are not subject to the same competitive pressures” (Goddard, Robinson and Parry, 2008:12).

Third, UK press is recognised by the publication on Sunday. Kevin Williams (2010:8) explains that the press in the UK is distinguished by “Sunday newspapers which sell in large numbers with Western Europe, where there is no tradition of such newspapers, and the United States, where Sundays are the same publications that appear on every other day of the week”.

Fourth, the difference is in the local and international markets of the press in both countries. "The US is characterised by a distinct local newspaper market where local newspapers cater to cross-class readership of a particular local". UK market is "a class-stratified market with a separation between quality papers with mainly middle- to upper-class readership and the sensationalist tabloids” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004:206).

2.5.3 The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in US and UK Media

Both US and the UK media have a direct and/or an indirect-national connection to events in the Middle East in general, and particularly in the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. The main concern of this study is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general, and how the US and UK media covered the Gaza war of 2008-09 in particular. Khoury-Machool (2009:6) states that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict "has dominated mainstream Western and international news since the Nakba of 1948". He further claims that "media coverage of the conflict remains a continual site of struggle, with both parties accusing the media of bias toward the opposition".

Kamalipour (1995:38-40) explains four reasons contributing to the Palestinian image in the US media. First is the disappearance of the Palestinians and Palestine from American coverage. He refers this disappearance to the birth of Israel as a state in 1948, in addition to the special relations between US and Israel as "the Jewish aspiration becomes part of the American electoral agenda" (p.38). The second reason is that the special relations "served to push the Palestinian voice into the background" as the American media relied on, and quoted heavily the American politicians tending to be supportive of Israeli viewpoints and the Israelis. The third reason is the Arab label of the Palestinians, calling them Arab Palestinians, so they lost their own national distinction. This portrays the conflict to be between Israel as one country and between Arab masses. The fourth and last reason is the image of voiceless and leaderless Palestinian refugees and thus the absence of a Palestinian leader.

In contrast to the Palestinian image in US media, the Israelis have a different image. Bilawi (2011:133) explains, Israel "has already poured hundreds of millions of dollars into funding for producing information marketed to the outside world; in particular, they have used the media in the United States effectively over a long period of time". In the same vein, according to Schechter (2003:163), Israel features "high on the international

news list of main television channels in the United States and the United Kingdom, Germany, and South Africa". He further explains that "among all countries, Israel is reported most on in the United States and rates second on television news channels in the United Kingdom".

Atawneh, (2011:113) demonstrates that "although in many Arab countries, the Palestinian narrative of a dispossessed people dominates the scene, in the United States; however, the narrative that dominates is that of Israel, which is portrayed as a democracy under siege". Mast, et al. (2003:18) state that "the US government has consistently supported Israel and Israeli policy". They explain such support come in different shapes, e.g. "giving several billion dollars of aid each year to Israel in the form of direct aid, weapons shipments, loan guarantees, and weapons contract". Also, the US government has vetoed US Security Council resolutions criticising Israel (see section 7.5.1).

UK media has paid particular interests to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It could be argued that the UK is responsible for the catastrophe that happened to the Palestinians in 1948 which has still affected the whole situation during the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see Philo and Berry, 2004 and 2011). British media represent the Palestinians in a negative image in their conflict with the Israelis. In a study on TV news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and how this coverage relates to the understanding, beliefs and attitudes of the television audience, Philo and Berry (2004) finds that the British people have a wrong idea about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The study suggests that television coverage of the Israel/Palestinian conflict confused viewers and was one sided, mostly featuring the views of the Israeli government.

According to Barkho (2008:281), BBC journalists and editors follow a strict guideline of facts and terminology recommended by the BBC governor's independent panel report on the impartiality of BBC's coverage of the conflict. This report includes the BBC's College of Journalism's

online-module –Israel and the Palestinians – specially designed for journalists who intend to cover the region. Khoury-Machool (2009:10) holds out that in the UK, the reporting of the Palestine-Israel conflict "is subject to especially strict controls and news that would portray Israel in a negative way is typically expurgated". He exemplifies that Sam Kiley resigned from *The Times* in 2001, when executives ordered him to suppress a follow-up story involving the death of Muhammad al-Durra, shot dead by Israeli soldiers.

This short synopsis of differences leads to possible expectations that both the US and UK media provide different coverage of events around the world. Also, the US and UK media give an interest and prominence to the international political news such as wars and conflicts in the Middle East. The question remains how the US and UK media cover the Gaza war of 2008-09. This is the core point in this dissertation.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter highlights a theoretical framework of CDA as an interdisciplinary approach explaining various conceptions of CDA, criticisms and key terms in CDA. The chapter discusses discourse in relation to media, representation and ideology. It also presents conceptions of war reporting, and how news is selected in reporting wars. The chapter then summarises researching war reporting in CDA and media studies. Furthermore, the chapter includes a discussion on the international news and war reporting focusing on US and UK media mainly. It explains the image of the Middle East in general, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the US and UK media.

In this study, CDA is the main approach and method in examining the coverage and reporting the Gaza war of 2008-09. War reporting in context assuming language as a medium for transformation and representation of news is a multi-functional task that reflects different

practices. These practices compose and form discourse, and thus shape an image on the war being covered and reported. In this regard, war reporting differs accordingly, and thus, it is important to examine the coverage of war in different dimensions. From these principles, studying war and its reporting by different disciplines is vital to understand how it is reported, represented and covered. The next chapter outlines a methodological framework to analyse how the US and UK media cover the Gaza war of 2008-09 and represent the social actors.

Chapter Three: Methodological Framework

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the study's methodological framework based on critical discourse analysis to examine the representation of social actors in the US and the UK media coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09. It also states the research questions. The methodological framework depends on both qualitative and quantitative methods. Qualitative analysis employs critical discourse analysis (CDA) which is the main approach in the dissertation (see section 2.2.2). Quantitative analysis aims to calculate the percentages of frqeuncy distributions of social actors. Both qualitative and quantitative analyses target the analysis of all headlines of news stories, and the body texts of the sampled news stories and editorials. This study uses transitivity model as proposed by Halliday (1985/1994) to analyse the headlines. Also, this study applies Van Leeuwen's (1996) socio-semantic inventory to analyse the body text of the sampled news stories and editorials. Further, this study applies Richardson's (2007) classification of quotation patterns to examine the sources and quotations.

3.2 Research Questions

CDA and media studies in section (2.4) on war show differences in reporting same events in addition to the censorship and control of media by governments during times of war. For this difference, journalists *possibly* use different linguistic features and discourse practices. The news from the Gaza Strip is considered to be foreign and international (see section 2.5.1) for the selected newspapers. In this regard, this study aims to answer the following broad question:

RQ1) How do the US and UK newspapers discursively represent the social actors in reporting the Gaza war of 2008-09?

The study intends to answer this broad question by providing answers to the following secondary questions:

RQ2) How do transitivity selections represent the social actors in the news headlines?

RQ3) How are the representational categories used to construct the social actors in news stories and editorials?

RQ4) How are quotation patterns and sources used to cover the social actors?

RQ5) What conclusions can be drawn from the representation of the social actors?

For answering the research questions, the study applies certain procedures to collect and analyse the sample data.

3.3 Data Collection: Decisions and Procedures

The general agreement among most CDA scholars is that CDA is not considered as one single method (see section 2.2.2), but it is viewed as an approach consisting of different perspectives, methods and various tools for studying the language use (discourse) and different contexts (see Van Dijk, 2013; and Wodak and Meyer, 2009:27). However, the study sets up a method to answer the research questions. The study sample includes news stories and editorials published mainly on the Gaza war of 2008-09, an event with wide coverage around the world, and various views and representations in the media (see section 1.4.2). The sample is selected from four US and UK newspapers demonstrated in the next section.

3.3.1 The Selected Newspapers

The study chooses to examine two British newspapers (*The Guardian, The Times London)* and two American newspapers (*The New York Tim* and *The Washington Post*). The selection of these newspapers is not random. It is based on the large circulation in their countries and their popularity around the world, and this makes them international. Accroding to Audit Bureau of Circulations (UK)[25], April 2011, the daily circulation of *The Times* (*Lodon*) is 449,809 copies and *The Guardian* is 263,907 copies. Alliance for Audited Media[26] shows that the circulation of *The New York Time* is 1,865,318 copies and *The Washington Post has* 474,767 copies.

The selected newspapers are also chosen for their political orientation and ideological stances, i.e. liberal and conservative. They are available at the research engines: LexisNexis[27] and Microfilm. It is worthy to mention that the USA and the UK are directly and indirectly involved in some issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, i.e. negotiations of peace process between Israel and the Palestinians (see section 2.5.3). Both countries were not involved directly in the Gaza war of 2008-09, and thus, the news covered by their newspapers is considered as foreign news for them (see section 2.5.1). The four selected newspapers are considered elite and prominent publications on the international level.

- *The Guardian* is published in London. It is a daily broadsheet British newspaper. It is considered a liberal newspaper that supports the left wing of the political spectrum in the UK (see Kaposi, 2014). "*The Guardian* has become the world's third most read newspaper website, with 30.4 million readers in June 2012, according to industry analyst ComScore" (Guardian Press Release[28], 2012 and modified 2014).

[25] http://www.abc.org.uk
[26] http://auditedmedia.com
[27] LexisNexis does not have complete records/archives of all newspapers. For this, I used Microfilm available at the library of Hamburg University.
[28] http://www.theguardian.com/gnm-press-office/8

- *The Times London* is published in London. It is a British daily broadsheet newspaper with a high number of readers inside and outside the UK. It is widely considered to be a conservative newspaper supporting the right wing (see Kaposi, 2014).

- *The New York Times is* a daily broadsheet and national US newspaper, founded and published in New York City. According to AAM's survey[29] (2013) on U.S. Daily Newspapers, *The New York Times* is considered to be the most influential newspaper in the USA. This makes its news one of the most popular news in the USA and all over the world. *The New York Times* is considered one of liberal US newspapers that support the Left wing press in the USA. It expresses "a variety of more or less liberal opinions and ideologies depending on the issues at hand" (Van Dijk, 1998b:23).

- *The Washington Post* is a US daily newspaper, found and published in Washington D.C., one of the biggest cities in the world. It is also considered as one of the highest read newspapers in the USA. *The Washington Post* is considered one of conservative US newspapers that support the Right wing press in the USA. Similar to NYT, Van DiJk (1998b:23) states that WP is "more conservative".

[29] Alliance for Audited Media, check http://auditedmedia.com/news/research-and-data/top-25-us-newspapers-for-march-2013/

3.3.2 Representative-Purposive Systematic Sample

This section explains the procedures for collecting the data. I searched, collected, and classified materials on the Gaza war of 2008-09 between December 26, 2008 and January 18, 2009 (24 days). I collected the data from LexisNexis and Microfilm engines[30]. For all materials from LexisNexis and Microfilm, I extracted all the materials related to the Israeli war on Gaza in 2008-09 (for description of all data gathered, see appendix 3.1). The materials (all news articles[31]) are classified according to the four newspapers and to the page of publication. Each news article then is placed in a separate word file chronologically starting from the first date to the last date (see appendix 3.2).

The study follows a purposive sample that reflects and supports the purpose of examining and analysing the data. Seale (2012:237) explains that when using purposive sampling, items are "selected on the basis of having a significant relation to the research topic". Purposive sample seeks to be "reflective (if not strictly representative) of the population". The sample *arguably* represents the texts of the four selected newspapers from which it is chosen systematically. The sample is divided into two parts: hard news presented in news stories, and opinion news presented in editorials. For the news stories, I focus on all headlines (146). From these news stories, I select forty (40) news texts based on systematic criteria. Opinion news includes seven (7) editorials selected from the four newspapers, and are mostly chosen on similar criteria in choosing news stories (see next subsections). Figure 3.1 shows the number of news articles chosen for the sample.

[30] On the LexisNexis research engine, articles have been researched online. *The Times* newspaper is not available at LexisNexis; for this, I use the microfilm available at Hamburg University's library to collect materials of *The Times* (London) newspaper. Since the LexisNexis sorts only the material published on the print version of newspapers, microfilm has solved the problem in getting the material of *The Times (London)*.

[31] By news articles, I mean all news genres, e.g. editorials, Op-ed articles, news stories, etc.

Figure 3.1: the Sample of this Study



3.3.3 Corpus Description

3.3.3.1 Headlines

The news headlines are the first clauses or sentences that possibly readers read in newspapers. Headlines could be a decision guide for the readers to continue reading the news text or to move to another article. Reah (1998:14) explains that "a reader can skim the headlines and have an outline of the news of the day and some idea of its relative impact and importance" (see also MacRitchie and Seedat, 2008). This means that aim of headlines is to “imprint certain key messages and perspectives on the readers’ mind” (MacRitchie and Seedat, 2008.339). Thus, “authors of headlines generally know pretty well what they want to say” LaRocque (2003:10) specially the headlines are first and on top and for that reason are markers that monitor attention, perception and the reading process (Van Dijk, 1988a:141).

In this context, headlines are not merely summaries of the news reports, but they are, as mentioned by Fairclough (1992b:180), “promotional phrases or clauses, likely to be imbued with ideological implications derived from the choices made by text producers”. Ludwig and Gilmore (2005:107) claim that "the best headlines both tell and sell; that is, they tell the reader

quickly what the news is and persuade the reader that the story is worth reading". For Richardson (2007:197), there are two functions for headlines. One is a semantic function regarding the referential text, and a pragmatic function regarding the reader (the receiver) to whom the text is addressed.

In choosing the sample, the study includes all headlines[32] of the news stories published on *all* news pages of each newspaper. The number of these headlines is (146). This number is, however, more than the number of news stories which are taken into consideration to calculate the average when I choose (40) news stories for the analysis of representation of social actors. I do not see this way as a problem for two reasons exclusively for this dissertation. First, I am focusing on all headlines of the newspapers, so I do not see any justification to exclude any headlines of news stories published on any pages inside the newspapers. Second, the current study is more qualitative discourse analysis than quantitative analysis. For this, few headlines (2 in GU and 6 in TL) would not change or affect the overall findings of the analysis.

Table 3.1: Number of Headlines of News Stories in the Selected Newspapers

NP	No. of headlines
GU	33
TL	49
NYT	34
WP	30
Total	146

3.3.3.2 Hard News: News Stories

Hard news in this study refers to all news stories published on the Gaza war of 2008-09. News stories have specific textual characteristics. First, they inform readers about the events happening in the world or in local areas. White (1998:243) explains that news stories are "grounded in communicative events such as speeches, interviews and press releases, and act primarily to represent, not activity sequences, but the points of view of

[32] See Appendix 4.1 for the list of headlines analysed in the dissertation

various external sources". Similarly, Lavid, Arús and Moratón (2010:83) indicate that "a news report should strive to remain objective and should use neutral language while presenting a diversity of opinions, voices, and perspectives of the event, incident, or issue under discussion". From such definitions, a news story is mainly informative, and presents factual information about events.

In sampling news stories, the study chooses a purposive-representative systematic sample to refine news stories and editorials[33] following systematic criteria.

1. News stories are published[34] on homepages, news pages and international pages of each newspaper. These pages are the relevant pages to the news stories published on wars, conflicts or international issues, and they are related to the field of the study. That is, the choice excludes the Op-Ed and commentary articles. Apart from the headlines, these types of news articles are simply not written by war reporters/correspondents or editors in chief.
2. News stories cover the Gaza war of 2008-09, and excluding the news which just mentions war without focusing on it.
3. The number of words of the report, and this is done by calculating the average of words of news stories according to each newspaper because the word numbers of news stories are different in the newspapers. The calculation is done only on the news stories that match the previous two points of the criteria. This helps in the selection of news stories that are (mostly) *equal* in length in each newspaper[35].

[33] See the descriptive table of the news articles in appendix 3.1
[34] The publishing pages have different names across the newspapers but largely these pages have the same purposes.
[35] To see the number of words of news stories, see the descriptive table of the news articles in appendix 3.1)

Table 3.2: Words Number of News Stories and their Average in the Selected Newspapers

Newspaper	Number of news stories	Total of word numbers of the news stories	Average
The Guardian	30	21223.6	684.6
The Times	49	29237.7	584.7
The New York Times	34	39009.5	1114.5
The Washington Post	30	40862.1	1318.1

4. Based on these criteria, ten (10) news stories are selected from each newspaper that approximate the average. That is, five (5) news stories with more words than the average, and five (5) news stories with less words than the average are chosen in consecutive order. This means (40) news stories are selected systematically in purpose to represent all data published on the the Gaza war of 2008-09 in the specified period. These criteria are used only to choose the representative sample, and specify the news stories.

3.3.3.3 Opinion News: Editorials

This study considers opinion news as the editorials of the newspaper written, and related to the Gaza war of 2008-09. As leading articles (Fowler, 1998:208; Van Dijk, 1998a:230), editorials contain opinions of the writers regarding specific events. They represent the position of newspapers. These opinions "may vary considerably in their ideological presuppositions" (Van Dijk, 1998a:21). Further, Van Dijk (1995b:21) shows that the opinions in the editorials express ideologies that help “in the formation and change of public opinion, in setting the political agenda, and influencing social debate, decision making and other forms of social and political action”.

Fowler (1991:208) asserts that editorials “have an important symbolic function, seeming to partition off the opinion components of the paper, implicitly supporting the claim that other sections, by contrast, are pure fact or report”. The main function of editorials is “the expression and persuasive communication of opinions” (Van Dijk, 1996:13). Therefore, they make up a relevant body of text for the examination of predominant

ideological assumptions in a society (Van Dijk, 1992). In brief, the main purpose of editorials is analytical, evaluative and persuasive.

To explain the textual differences between news stories and editorials, the study refers to a study by McCabe and Heilman (2007). These differences are presented in table (3.3).

Table 3.3: Differences between News Stories and Editorials

Item	News story	Editorial
Purpose	• To inform, to report	• To argue for a line of thoughts on a given situation and to persuade
Mission/ Function	• To present events that took place out in the world as objective way as possible	• To express purpose of providing commentary, or evaluating events
Objectivity	• Attempt to provide the aura of objectivity	• Put forth as opinions
Assumption	• Be straightforward to present the facts, as it were and facts we would expect to be presented as monoglossic, as not open to debate • Encode any contentious proposals through attribution to other sources	• Make recourse to other heteroglossic devices, such as modality and modal adjuncts • Play down projection, as editorialists present their own views on a topic • Editorialists provide their opinions on behaviors and artifacts through attitudinal language, especially within the systems of judgement and appreciation

The sample also includes seven (7) editorials out of twenty (20) editorials from the four newspapers. These editorials[36] are written by the editors-in-chief published on the Gaza war of 2008-09, and selected by systematic criteria.

1. Editorials published on the homepage or relative section of each newspaper

2. Editorials covering the Gaza war and exclude the editorials which do not deal with the Gaza war of 2008-09

3. The number of words of the editorial is calculated from the average of words of editorials according to each newspaper because the word numbers

[36] See appendix (3.1).

of editorials are different in the selected newspapers. The calculation is done only on the editorials that match the two previous points.

Table 3.4: Words Number of Editorials and their Average in the Selected Newspapers

Newspaper	Number of Editorials	Total number of words	Average
The Guardian	9	6371	707.8
The Times	6	3661	610.1
The New York Times	1	509	509
The Washington Post	4	2389	597.2
Total	20	12930	

Based on these criteria, seven (7) editorials are chosen, i.e. one editorial with more words than the average and one editorial with less words than the average chosen by consecutive order. This is similar to the criteria by which the news stories are selected. The 7 editorials represent almost 1/3 of the number of editorials, and represent one editorial from December 2008 and one editorial from January 2009. That is, 2 from GU, 2 from TL, 2 from WP and 1 from NYT. NYT publishes only one editorial on the Gaza war of 2008-09. This is why there are no other options to include two editorials from NYT.

3.4 Transitivity Analysis

3.4.1 Transitivity Model: Concept and Main Principles

Transitivity means choices of processes and roles of participants. Halliday (1985:101) suggests that transitivity specifies the types of processes that are recognised in language, and structures by which they are expressed. Richardson (2007:54) states that the study of transitivity is "the realisation that in producing texts there is a range of choices to be made, and every text which has been produced could have been produced differently"; that is, there is a choice to shape actors, and there is a choice to represent the event in the way it is presented. Halliday (1985:101) claims that the semantic framework for the representation of process consists of three components: the process itself, the participants in the process and the circumstances

associated with the process (see Ex1-Ex2, section 3.4.2). From these components, transitivity studies what processes appear in the text and to whom these processes contribute and/or are aimed at.

Some CDA scholars[37] apply transitivity to examine headlines. For example, Richardson (2007:197) examines the reporting of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 by analysing the content of 2107 headlines from four tabloids and four broadsheets. Barkho (2008:289) analyses how the BBC employs transitivity and nominalisation in headlines and then moves to how the two concepts are applied in the body of the stories.

The choice of transitivity to analyse the headlines is based on several reasons. Transitivity could shape the representation and describe the relationships between participants and the roles they play in the processes. Richardson suggests that transitivity "forms the very heart of representation, describing the relationships between participants and the roles they play in the processes described in reporting" (2007:54). In studying the clause, Halliday (1985) refers transitivity to the way the meaning in the clause is represented and encoded in language by human beings i.e. news producers or text writers "to build a mental picture of reality, to make sense of their experience of what goes on around them and inside them" (p.101, see also Simpson, 1993:88).

Further, transitivity is a strategy that permits "text producers to make decisions on the focus of the participants within the clause" (Halliday, 1985; Fairclough, 1992b: 178). This is relevant to "the informative function of headlines in attracting the attention of the reader towards the text" (Valdeon, 2006:409). Transitivity highlights foregrounded and backgrounded meanings in clauses (see Simpson, 1993). This is relevant to headlines as they are mostly clauses. Iwamoto (1995:5) states that Halliday's (1985) transitivity "provides a useful linguistic framework for analysing how an

[37] For the details of these studies, see section 2.4.1.

undesirable reality is transformed". In brief, analysis of transitivity aims to answer the following questions.

a) Who are the participants (social actors) found in the headlines?
b) What are the configurations[38] / characteristics of each participant in the headlines?
c) What are the process types and participant roles accompanied with each participant in the headlines?
d) What are the dominant groups of social actors (participants)?
e) Who is considered to be causing what to whom (i.e. agent or victim)?

3.4.2 Transitivity Processes and the Roles of Actors

This section defines the different types of processes and the roles allocated to each process as proposed by Halliday (1985/1994).

1. Material processes are processes of doing. These processes express the notion that some entity does something against another entity. This shows that there is a doer of the process itself. These processes can be abstract doings and happenings. To illustrate, Simpson (1993:89) subdivides material processes into action processes that happen when "the process is performed by an animate actor"; i.e. agent and event processes that happen when the process is performed "by an inanimate actor". The roles of actors are agents who do the deed or actions or goals or patients upon whom the actions are directed at, and thus, they suffer or undergo the process (see Halliday, 1985: 103-104). For example,

1. **Israeli Attack** Kills Scores Across Gaza(GA-NYT-28-DEC-01[39])
2. **Gaza rockets** put Israel's nuclear plant in battle zone (GA-TL-02-JAN-01)

In these headlines, we can see *Israeli Attack* and *Gaza rockets* as actors; that is, they are responsible for targeting the goals: Palestinian *scores* in headline 1 and *Israel's nuclear plant* in headline 2.

[38] See the following section 3.4.3
[39] This code refers to Gaza-Name of the Newspaper-Date-Number of the News Story in the Descriptive Table (Appendix 3.1)

2. Mental processes are known as a process of sensing. According to Halliday (1985/1994), these processes refer to feeling, thinking and perceiving. Mental processes have three sub-types: perception that includes seeing, hearing, etc.; affection includes linking, fearing, etc., and cognition includes thinking, knowing, understanding, etc. Halliday (1985:108-112) distinguishes mental process from material process in five points:

a. There is always a human participant in a mental process who has senses, i.e. feels, thinks, or perceives.
b. The position is in a sense reserved for the other main element in a clause of mental process, i.e. the element that is felt, thought or perceived.
c. The marked tense is the simple present.
d. Mental process is a two-way-process, i.e. it is realised in two directions. For example, Mary liked the gift or the gift pleased Mary.
e. Material processes are probed or substituted by actions, e.g. doing something against others.

The role of actors in mental processes is 'sensor' and 'phenomenon'. Sensor refers to the conscious being that is feeling, thinking, or seeing. The phenomenon is that which is sensed – felt, thought or seen.

3. As **troops** enter Gaza city, Israel sees an opening (GA-NYT-12-JAN-01)
4. We'll kill Jews abroad, **Hamas** warns (GA-TL-06-JAN-01)

These headlines show that Israel and Hamas do not make actions. Israel expresses its views as entering Gaza city is an opening for a solution, at least from the Israeli viewpoint. Hamas *warns* of conduct operations against Jewish people all over the world. In both examples, Israel and Hamas are Sensors.

3. Relational processes are known as processes of "being" (Halliday, 1985:112). He classifies three subcategories within relational processes in the English language: intensive, circumstantial and possessive. Each of these comes in two modes: attributive or identifying. Halliday (1985:113) explains that in attributive mode, an attribute is ascribed to some entity; either as a quality (intensive), as circumstances – of time, place, etc. (circumstantial), or as a possession (possessive). In the identifying mode, Halliday explains that one entity identifies another. In this mode, the relationship between the two entities is one of token and value (intensive), of phenomenon and circumstance of time, place, etc. (circumstantial), or of owner and possession (possessive). Halliday states that the fundamental difference between the two modes is that identifying clauses are "reversible, whereas attributives are not"; also in attributive clauses there is one participant; whereas in identifying clauses there are two" (1985:114).

In the intensive type, Halliday (1985:114) explains that the relationship between the two moods is "one sameness". This means that one is the other. In circumstantial types, the attributive mode is an attribute that is being ascribed to some entity. The identifying mode takes the form of a relationship between two entities. This means one entity is being related to another in terms of a feature of time, or place or manner. In the possessive type, the relationship is ownership. That is, one entity owns another. The following examples illustrate roles of actors according to the subcategories of relational processes.

subcategories	**Example**	**Role of Actors**
Intensive	Mary is wise. Tom seems foolish.	Attributive
Possessive	Gill has a guitar. John owns a piano.	identifying and possessive
circumstantial	Bill is at home. The queen was in the parlor.	identifying and accompaniment

Examples adapted from Simpson (1993:89)

4. Behavioural processes refer to physiological and psychological behaviours, like breathing, dreaming, smiling and coughing (see Halliday, 1985:128). According to Halliday, this process includes consciousness as forms of behaviour, e.g. *look, watch, listen, think.* This process mediates between material and mental processes. Usually, behavioural processes have one participant (the behaviour) who is typically a conscious one. The behaviour is similar to sensor, i.e. conscious and similar to agent, i.e. does things to others. Martinm et al. (1997:110) divides behavioural processes into several sub-processes, and explains the difference between behavioural and mental/verbal processes with examples.

Process types	**Behavioral**	**Mental/verbal**
Perception	look at, watch, stare, gawk, view, look over, observe	see, observe
	listen to	hear, overhear
	sniff, smell	smell
	taste	taste
	feel	feel
Cognition	ponder, puzzle, solve, work out, mediate, ruminate, think	think, know
Affection (subtype emotion)	smile, frown, laugh, pout, gasp, grin, scowl, shake, shudder, tremble	fear, enjoy, like, frighten, scare, alarm, disgust, please, amuse, upset
Verbal	whine, mumble, stammer, stutter, mutter, moan, chatter, gossip, talk, speak, sing; frown, grimace, snort, cough, slander, insult, praise, flatter	say, tell, ask

Examples adapted from Martin et al. (1997:110)

5. **Verbal processes** are processes of saying that cover all kinds of symbolic exchange of meaning. Verbal processes borderline between mental and relational processes. The participant is sayer, the one who speaks. Another role in this process is receiver, i.e. the one who is being addressed (target). There are different types of verbal processes such as: saying, asking, offering, stating, etc. as they can be shown in the following headlines.

5. **Israel** Issues an Appeal to Palestinians in Gaza (GA-NYT-26-DEC-01)
6. It's time for a third intifada, say **West Bank youths** (GA-TL-29-DEC-05)
7. Hamas Provoked Attacks, **Bush** Says; President Accuses Group of Adding to Civilian Deaths From Israeli Strikes (GA-WP-03-JAN-01)

6. Existential Processes indicate existence or happening. Halliday (1985:130) exemplifies that the word *there* in the following example, *There seems to be a problem*, represents the process. *There* does not have a representational function, but there is a need for a subject in the clause. Such clauses "typically have the verb be, so some other verbs expressing existence, such as exist, arise, followed by a nominal group functioning as Existent" (Halliday, 1985:130).

8. Rich and poor are the same. **There's** no electricity' (GA-TL-01-JAN-02)

Upon the explanation of the transitivity processes and roles of actors, Halliday states that "it is important to recognise that there may be more than one kind of process in the grammar of a language, and that the functions assumed by the participants in any clause are determined by the type of process that is involved" (1985:102). The following table shows a summary of the types of processes and the roles of participants.

Table 3.5: A Summary of Process Types and Role of Actors

Process Type	Category meaning	Participants
Material: action event	'doing' 'doing' 'happening'	agent, goal
Behavioural	'behaving'	behaviour
Mental: perception affection cognition	'sensing' 'seeing' 'feeling' 'thinking'	senser, phenomenon
Verbal:	'saying'	sayer, target
Relational: attribution identification	'being' 'attributing' 'identifying'	token, value carrier, attribute identified, identifier
Existential	'existing'	existent

(Adapted from Halliday, 1985:131)

3.4.3 Analysing Transitivity Selections in Headlines: Procedures

This section specifies certain procedures to examine the transitivity selections in the headlines of all news stories. The initial step is to categorise the main participants[40] focusing on their specified configurations: nationality, professionalisation[41]. Besides processes, and participants, there is an examination of the voice of the sentence as another main variable, i.e. whether the sentence is active or passive (see appendix 4.2 for the analysis sheet of headlines).

Further, the study calculates the percentages of frequency distributions of inclusion of participants, and of types of processes assigned to the subgroups of the participants. In calculating the percentages, the number of each subgroup of participants is counted. The number of participants is divided on the total number of headlines in each newspaper. Furthermore, the number of processes is counted and divided on the total number of headlines in each newspaper. The percentages are calculated by Excel 2007. The statistical estimation aims at supporting the qualitative observation to provide a more comprehensive image on the transitivity selections. The main focus is on the highest percentages in the total of processes in each newspaper and the highest percentages in the total of processes. Further, the highest percentages of processes in the newspapers are compared.

In examining the processes and roles of participants, the study compares how each subgroup of participants is assigned types of processes and roles in dominant and frequent themes, e.g. ground invasion, the ceasefire negotiations, the humanitarian relief, etc. This way shows the differences and similarities among the groups of participants in addition to

[40] Main participants mean those actors who are the subjects in the headlines.
[41]This term is used by Reisigl and Wodak (2001:52) as a strategy and part of actionalisation overlapping with other categories, e.g. politicisation

showing the comparison of each group according to the processes. In coding the themes, I followed these steps,

- devide each text into clauses
- specify which topic each clause is about
- concentrate on a dominant/frequent theme for each subgroup by compaing the themes
- compare the social actors in the same theme to show similarities and differences between the social actors systematically

At the end, the study discusses and summaries the observations and findings. This is followed by discussion of some ideological implications. To do so, major concentration is paid to the most apparent and frequent processes across the newspapers with an explanation of the meaning. Some of the implications are the highest frequencies attributing to specific subgroups of the participants and assigning specific types of processes specific subgroups of participants. These implications are discussed in chapter 7 in detail.

3.5. Socio-Semantic Inventory Analysis

3.5.1 Socio-Semantic Inventory: Concept and Main Principles

The second part of the methodological framework utilises a socio-semantic inventory systematically to show how the social actors are represented in the texts. As a CDA approach, Van Leeuwen's (1996) model analyses "how social and political inequalities are manifested in and reproduced through discourse" (Wooffitt, 2005: 137). It is presented as a "pan-semiotic" system for doing critical analysis of verbal-visual media texts (Van Leeuwen, 1996:34).

Van Leeuwen (1996:32) builds his model on two general questions: what are the ways in which social actors can be represented in English discourse? And which choices does the English language give us for referring to people? He asks specifically how the relevant social actors are represented in an instance of a particular kind of racist discourse, i.e. discourse on immigrants in Australia. Van Leeuwen (1996:35) gleans most of his sample from *Our Race Odyssey* text, published on *Sydney Morning Herald*, a conservative broadsheet newspaper. He analyses the subject of schooling focusing on the transition from home to school. Van Leeuwen describes his model as "a socio-semantic inventory" (1996:32) and "a sociological grammar" (1995:82). It assumes that "meaning belongs to culture rather than to language" (Van Leeuwen, 1996: 32).

3.5.2 Representational Categories

The inventory has ten categories as shown in figure (3.2). To examine linguistic features and discursive practices implied in the body texts of the sample news stories and editorials, the analysis of representation of social actors in this study employs six categories discussed in the following section. I choose these representation categories[42] because they are the most suitable, relevant and applicable processes to examine how the social actors are represented.

Figure 3.2: Representational Categories of Socio-Semantic Inventory



Van Leeuwen (1996:66)

[42] See also Farrelly (2015)

1. The socio-semantic inventory starts a discussion of dichotomy of **inclusion and/or exclusion**. In brief, exclusion has two subcategories: *radical* (total) and *less radical* (partial). Radical exclusion means total/complete suppression. In this case, there is no trace or reference to the social actors, and their actions/activities anywhere in the text. This can be suitable for a critical comparison of different representations of the same event and practice within different sources. According to Van Leeuwen (1996), there are four ways to realise suppression. The first way is passive agent deletion. For example,

9. **Two World Food Programme drivers** were killed (GA-TL-08-JAN-02).

In this way, the agent social actors are deleted completely in the text. This makes the readers confused about the agency and responsibility for killing the drivers.

The second way is realisation through non-finite clauses (e. g. infinitival clauses). For example, *to maintain this policy is hard.* In this example, the down ranking of the process (maintain) makes the fact that exclusion as taken place a little less accessible, the trace a little less clear" (p.40). In this case, the clause functions as a grammatical participant. It is embedded to function as the carrier of an attributive clause. This way excludes the actors responsible for the activity, and makes the realisation of social actors less accessible or realisable for the readers. The social actors could have been included.

The third way is nominalisation and process nouns. In the following example the word *support* functions as nominal, although they refer to an activity.

10. **Support for Israel's ultra-nationalist rightwing parties** is growing as the Jewish state and Hamas, the Islamists who rule Gaza, lurch closer to a major confrontation. GA-GU-27-DEC-01

This nominalisation allows exclusion of the social actors as it makes no trace or reference to the social actors. The excluded social actors could be for example, Israeli government, Israeli religious leaders, etc. They could have been included, for instance “through post modifying phrases with by, of, from, etc., but they haven't been” (p.40).

The fourth way shows that the processes are realised as adjectives. For example, the adjective *dispirited* does not mention the doer of the action i.e. the person(s)/institution(s) that dispirit and kill Hamas militants.

11. Hamas fighters were **dispirited**, the official added, and hundreds had been killed (GA-TL-14-JAN-02).

We cannot be sure who is responsible for the action. The context could infer social actors, e.g. Israelis or Palestinians, are involved but there can be no certainty.

The less (partial) radical exclusion means backgrounding of social actors. Social actors are mentioned not immediately in the activity but somewhere in the text. This means that social actors are not explicitly referred to or traced in the text. Backgrounding does not mean complete or partial exclusion of social actors in text, but it de-emphasises the social actors. It is important to note that by suppression, social actors are not mentioned or referred to in any part of the text whereas in backgrounding they appear later in other parts of the texts.

Effectively, partial suppression and backgrounding reduce explicit references to agent and responsible social actors for their activities in text. In this context, it is important to point out journalists and editors specify who and/what to be included, and who and/or what to be suppressed or backgrounded to be suitable with their ideological stances.

2. **Role Allocation** distinguishes between activated and passivated roles allocated with social actors. Activated roles mean representing the social actors as active and dynamic in the activities. For example,

12. **Israeli air strikes** hit 40 smuggling tunnels that had been dug under the border fence to alleviate Israel's blockade of the overcrowded strip. GA-GU-29-DEC-01
13. **Palestinian militants** continued to launch salvos of rockets at southern Israel on Friday, with several hitting the coastal city of Ashkelon, lightly injuring two Israeli women there. GA-NYT-03-JAN-01

Passivated roles mean social actors are presented as undergoing the activity (object) or at receiving end of the activity in the text. In the latter case, social actors are represented as beneficialised either negatively or positively. For example,

14. **A 3-month-old child in Gedera**, about 25 miles north of **Gaza**, was lightly wounded. **GA-WP-06-JAN-01**
15. **Two Palestinian brothers** -- ages 5 and 7 -- were killed when an Israeli tank fired on a United Nations school in northern **Gaza** that had been serving as an emergency shelter for an estimated 1,600 people. GA-WP-06-JAN-01

By this category, authors of news texts can "reallocate roles, rearrange the social relations between participants" (Van Leeuwen, 1996:43). This means they redistribute agency in accordance with their interests and purposes. It considers what kinds of roles social actors are allocated to play in an activity in the text. In this category, there is no necessary connection between the roles the social actors play in an activity, and grammatical roles they occupy in the same activity. That is, active voice structure/grammar in a clause does not mean necessarily the roles of social actors are activated. For examples,

16. In total at least **541 Palestinians** have died since Israel's operation began, with more than 2,400 injured. GA-GU-06-JAN-03

The grammatical structure of the clause is active voice, but the role allocated to *541 Palestinains* is passivated as they were undergone the activity, i.e. killed in the war operations. They received the effect of the activity (killing in war operations).

From these types of roles, this representation category is important because readers can see whether the roles of social actors are foregrounded or backgrounded. This means that social actors are put explicitly (activated), or presented implicitly (passivated). Also, passivated roles demonstrate if social actors are treated as objects or they receive benefit from the processes/activities in a positive or negative way. Readers also can have one image on a particular specific group either positively or negatively depending on their roles. Also, they can see legitimisation and justification for specific actions and activities.

3. Genericisation and Specification indicate how the authors of texts use either generic reference or specific reference to the social actors. Specific reference refers to "identifiable" individuals (Van Leeuwen 1996: 46). This means they are real people living in a real world. Social actors are represented as generic classes of people. For this, there are four ways to distinguish the genericisation: a) plural without article (Ex17-18); b) by adding a definite article to singular social actors (Ex19); c) indefinite article (Ex20), and d) mass nouns without adding articles (Ex21-22). Mass noun means that the article will be absent if mass nouns are used for generic reference to a group of participants. In this case, the name of country *Israel,* and the name of movement *Hamas* are coded as mass nouns. They refer to groups of participants, and they are not accompanied with articles.

17. **Israeli officials** claim Iran is the source of some of the longer-range rockets being fired from Gaza into Israel and smuggled across the Egyptian border during the six-month ceasefire that ended in mid-December. GA-GU-05-JAN-08
18. In this conflict, **many Palestinians** praise Hamas as resisters, but Israel contends the group has purposely endangered civilians by fighting in and around populated areas. GA-NYT-05-JAN-02

19. **The official** said ground forces had surrounded Gaza's main population centers and were methodically tightening the noose. Going in is a definite possibility, he said, but so is a prolonged siege.

20. **A Red Cross surgical team** is on standby to fly in as well, as soon as it receives permission from the Israeli authorities. GA-GU-31-DEC-02

21. However, for several months **Israel** has allowed only limited supplies of humanitarian goods into Gaza and no other imports or exports. GA-GU-31-DEC-02
22. **Hamas** wants the border crossings to be opened, which Israel will only agree to if they are manned on the Palestinian side by Fatah, Hamas's bitter rival, with whom Israel is in slow-moving peace talks. GA-TL-01-JAN-01

4. Individualization and Assimilation are strict parts of specification of social actors. This means in specification, the social actors are either specified as individuals or as a group of participants. However, in this category the main emphasis is on the social actors as single entities. This means that social actors are not only considered singular entities, but also they represent their institutions. For example, Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas are singular individuals, but they also represent Israel and the Palestinian authority as evident in the following clauses.

23. **Ehud Olmert**, Israel's prime minister, reportedly told a cabinet meeting the fighting in **Gaza** would be "long, painful and difficult". GA-GU-29-DEC-01
24. But Palestinian president, **Mahmoud Abbas**, accused Hamas of provoking the Israeli raids by not extending the ceasefire. GA-GU-29-DEC-01

Assimilation specifies social actors as a group of participants. According to Van Leeuwen (1996), assimilation can be classified as aggregation or as collectivisation. Aggregation quantifies groups of participants, treating them as statistics. For example,

25. On the Israeli side **13 people** have been killed, three of them civilians. GA-GU-12-JAN-03
26. In total at least **541 Palestinians** have died since Israel's operation began, with more than 2,400 injured. GA-GU-06-JAN-03

Collectivisation does not have specific number of actors, i.e. there is no statistics of social actors.

27. **The main security headquarters in Gaza City** [were] hit again and four were killed when most of its buildings were flattened. GA-GU-29-DEC-01

The assimilation of social actors helps in building concrete opinions by presenting the numbers as facts, and thus, this way regulates the practice and show reporting objectively.

5. **Nomination and Categorisation** refer to social actors in terms of their unique identity as being nominated or as functionalised. In the socio-semantic inventory, nomination is a way of addressing people and generally realised by proper nouns. Van Leeuwen (1996) suggests three ways: 1) *Formal nomination*, i.e. surname only with or without honorific (Ex28), 2) *Semi-formal*, i.e. given name and surname (Ex29-31), and 3) *Informal way*, i.e. given names only (Ex32). In these nominations, social actors can be associated with forms of honorification, e.g. Dr., Mr., Ms., etc.

28. **Rice** said it was designed to ensure Gaza would "never again be used as a launching pad against Israeli cities". GA-GU-02-JAN-03
29. **Ehud Barak, Israel's defence minister,** told Fox News on Saturday when the bombing began: "For us to be asked to have a ceasefire with Hamas is like asking you (the US) to have a ceasefire with al-Qaida." GA-GU-02-JAN-03
30. "We thought we were in a critical situation in the past, but when we saw this we realised what had gone before was nothing," said **Dr Nabil Shawa, head of orthopaedics.** GA-GU-02-JAN-03
31. **Shlomo Brom, a retired Israeli general and a military analyst** at the Institute for National Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv, said the point of the conflict was for Israel to exact the best conditions for a future ceasefire with Hamas, the Islamist movement which controls Gaza after winning Palestinian elections three years ago. GA-GU-30-DEC-02
32. When asked his view of the situation, **Yousef** took an unusual stand for someone in Gaza, where Israel is being cursed by most everyone. GA-NYT-31-DEC-01

6 Functionalisation and Identification are part of categorisation of social actors. Functionalisation refers to activities, occupations and roles of social actors. Van Leeuwen (1996) suggests several ways how functionalisation can be realised: 1) by a noun formed from a verb, through suffixes (Ex33-34), and by compounding of nouns denoting places or tools (Ex35). In brief, functionalisation examines what activity the social actors do.

33. The rocket **launchers**, which sent deadly projectiles into Ashdod and Ashkelon, Israeli cities due north, were placed among the potatoes and peppers, explosive devices around them to prevent their dismantling. GA-NYT-16-JAN-02
34. Israeli **bombers** and artillery pounded buildings for a fifth straight day, as Palestinian militants continued to fire rockets ever deeper into the Jewish state. GA-TL-01-JAN-01
35. Last night, Israeli **warplanes** targeted the Hamas-affiliated Islamic University. GA-GU-29-DEC-01

Identification refers to prominent features. It refers to what the social actors are referred to, i.e. how they appear rather than their activities. Van Leeuwen (1996) distinguishes three types of identification: *classification, relational identification* and *physical identification.* In classification, social actors are referred to in terms of the major categories by means of which a given society or institution differentiates between classes of people. Relational identification represents social actors in regard to their personal, kinship or work relation to each other. Possessives, genitives and post-modifying prepositional phrase with *of* are indicators to realise this identification. Physical identification presents a good deal in stories; sometimes only when a character is introduced or sometimes throughout a story. See the following examples:

36. The first to be carried in was **a boy**, his face masked in blood from a head wound, as medics hurried him into the overcrowded emergency rooms. GA-TL-05-JAN-08
37. **Two young cousins** and **a 5-year-old boy** from another family were killed by shrapnel as they played on the flat roofs of **their** apartment buildings. GA-NYT-05-JAN-02
38. As the relatives carried Mr. **Abu Daf's body** from the morgue on a stretcher for burial, they suddenly started to shriek. GA-NYT-05-JAN-02

Van Leeuwen's (1996) socio-semantic inventory is considered suitable for the examination of the representation of the social actors in reporting the Gaza war of 2008-09 in the international press for several reasons. It provides principles and accurate representation choices. KhosraviNik (2008:14) suggests that the socio-semantic inventory “certainly lays the ground for an explanatory framework for CDA studies" (see also KhosraviNik, 2010). The inventory examines language in the context that "reveals specific attitudes, ideologies and worldviews which are encoded through language" (Adampa, 1999:3).

KhosraviNik (2008:14) claims that "the socio-semantic categories needs to be the starting point of discourse analysis, and representations of different social actors are accounted for by linking these socio-semantic categories with their linguistic realisations". Van Leeuwen (1996:32-33) puts two reasons to justify to start with socio-semantic inventory rather than the linguistic categories. There is no one-to-one correspondence between sociological categories and linguistic categories, and the categories proposed should not been viewed as tied to any specific semiotic. Sahragard and Davatgarzadeh (2010:71) point out that it is "the only comprehensive framework in CDA studies that lend itself very nicely to the analysis of discourse when representations of actors are looked at from a social standpoint". For these reasons, the use socio-semantic inventory is rationalised in examining the representation of social actors specifically in war reporting.

3.5.3 Analysing Representation of Social Actors: Procedures

In analysing the representation of the social actors in the texts of the sampled news stories and editorials, certain procedures are applied. Each text is divided into clauses. The social actors are specified and classified into groups according to their nationality and subdivided into subgroups according to their professional references: political, military, civilian, etc. Further, application of the selected representational categories is applied on each clause where it is appropriate. In this application, the frequency distributions of social actors are calculated. It is important to note that only when social actors are included in the text, can we realise other representational processes, such as role allocation, specification, genercisation, nomination and categorisation.

The frequency distributions of the social actors are compared between the newspapers taking into consideration the highest percentage of each subgroup of social actors. Similar to transitivity, Excel 2007 is used to calculate the percentages of the frequency. Inclusion and exclusion of the social actor are counted[43], i.e. how many social actors are included and how many are excluded. This number is divided on the total number of clauses in each newspaper. The reason is that the number of clauses is different in each newspaper. This makes the total numbers of clauses different.

In terms of qualitative analysis, I examine how the social actors are excluded and included by applying certain procedures. Specifying and comparing the themes are carried out to highlight in which themes the social actors are excluded or included. In other words, the subgroups of social actors are generally allocated different representational processes. However, it is informative to analyse in what theme(s)[44] the social actors are represented. This way shows differences between the social actors

[43] The calculation of the percentage is based on the number of clauses. In doing so, I exclude all clauses that contain direct or indirect quotations because they are used in chapter 6.
[44] See section 3.4.3 for procedures to specify the themes

systematically, i.e. to compare the social actors in the same theme. For this, the study concentrates on a dominant/frequent theme for each subgroup, i.e. ceasefire (for political actors), targeting Hamas and firing rockets (for military actors), and facing consequences of war (for civilian actors).

The analysis would not only focus on what is stated directly, but also it focuses on what is implied in the representation patterns of the actors. The discussion follows and shows how the subgroups of the social actors are constructed by the representational processes. Also, in the examination, lexical choices of words or verbs are examined.

It is important to say here that some categories are combined together, e.g. individualisation and assimilation with specification. This is because specification is a base for individualisation and assimilation. Also, functionalisation and identification are merged with categorisation. In categorisation, social actors are functionalised and/or identified. Furthermore, the major focus is only on dominant themes.

In summary, and in the light of applying and analysing Van Leeuwen's (1996) categories mentioned above, I discuss the representation categories attributed to the social actors stating their implications on the representation of each subgroup of the social actors (see appendix 4.3 for analysis sheet of the sampled texts of news stories and editorials).

3.6. News Production Practices: Sources and Quotation Patterns

3.6.1 Sources and Quotation Patterns

News reporters use sourcing widely in their reports to quote people. Peng (2008:363) refers most of the media biases and orientation of frames to "influences of the sources". Further, Van Dijk (1998b:5) considers sourcing as a way to achieve hegemony, because access to news media is not available to everyone, but “members of more powerful social groups and institutions, and especially their leaders (the elites) have more or less exclusive access”. Herman and Chomsky (1988:18) explain that the mass media "are drawn into a symbiotic relationship with powerful sources of information by economic necessity and reciprocity of interests". Critcher (2005:185) states that “journalists' use of sources suggests that the vested interests of pressure groups and politicians are likely to be treated as expert testimonies justifying definitions of threat and calls for action”.

Quotation refers to the people cited or quoted in the news texts. In the quotation patterns, readers may accept the quoted person as an authority; therefore, the quoted voices are attributed with some authoritative quality to legitimise the journalist’s claims in the news story (e.g. Van Dijk, 1988b). Elite people whose voices are used in the news stories are assigned credentials (or titles) that embody their claims to news value. Examples of such accreditation are PM, MP, informed source, a witness, doctor, professor, an expert, etc. However, reporters can still insert their own voices even in the direct quotation and align their positions with or against what the source is saying.

In examining the quotation patterns, the study follows an updated classification by Richardson (2007) from Fairclough’s (2003) intertextuality framework. He called it internal intertexutality: quotation and reported speech (p. 101). Richardson’s (2007:101-106) adaptation has five patterns of quotations:

1. **Direct Quotation** means that “exact words are included in quotation marks, often with a reporting clause” (Richardson, 2007:102). That is, anything between the quotation marks is necessarily the exact words of the speakers (see Ex39-40). Direct quotes in this context present “the news as a fact that is invulnerable to questioning because it is coming from an official, an informed source or a witness. It also helps to distance the reporter’s voice from the event presentation" (Pasha, 2011:121).

39. "The issues that we so much wanted to stress in this election campaign will be getting maximum attention even without our messages," **Netanyahu** told Ha'aretz newspaper. GA-GU-27-DEC-01
40. "Israeli threats won't make Hamas leaders fear, and won't break our stand. It is Israel who is responsible for the escalation," **Fawzi Barhoum, a Hamas spokesman**, said. GA-GU-27-DEC-01

2. **Strategic Quotation** refers to “writing or thoughts of others and are often placed in quotation marks in order to indicate their contentious nature” (Richardson, 2007:102).

3. Indirect quotation means that “the reporter provides a summary of the content of what was said or written, not the actual words used” (Richardson, 2007:103). This pattern of quotation shows the reporter’s voice, i.e. how writers/speakers (re)phrase what someone said/wrote.

41. **Ban** said that he believed a truce could soon be reached.GA-GU-16-JAN-02

4. **Transformed indirect quotation** dispenses with quotation marks, but it also drops reporting clause like said, accused, alleged and so on, and replaces them with transitive actions (e.g. discovered, revealed) or mental state verbs (e.g. believes).

5. Ostensible direct quotation shows that the structure of the clause entails direct speech but it is conceptually different from direct quotation by inventing similar direct quotations by the newspaper.

Among the five patterns of quotations, the examination focuses on direct and indirect quotations in the reported speech. However, explanation of the other patterns will be done whenever it is necessary. The reasons behind this focus are that the direct and indirect quotations are the most common patterns in the news texts. Other quotation patterns are mostly used in news headlines especially the strategic quotation. Ostensible direct quotation mostly depends on the researcher's subjective judgments whether the quotation includes the actual words of the speaker or it is "in as much as it is made up" and the line between the direct and ostensible quotation in practice is "blurry". Also, it is difficult to judge whether the quotation is invented by the newspaper as is the case of ostensible quotations to be "better than the real one" (Richardson, 2007:105).

3.6.2 Analysing Quotation Patterns and Sources: Procedures

The analysis applies the following procedures. In examining the quotation patterns, the analysis extracts all quoted clauses[45] in the texts of news stories, classifies the social actors to subgroups taking into consideration their nationalities and professional roles and determines patterns of the quotations (direct and indirect). Further, frequency distributions of quotation patterns are calculated. This aims to support the qualitative analysis of the quotations and sources by giving statistical estimation. The percentages of the direct and indirect quotations are calculated[46] and compared according to the classification of the subgroups.

Moreover, the media sources are specified to analyse how the journalists get their information by answering the following questions: which medium are used as sources? e.g. TV, radio, internet? And are they Israeli, Palestinian or international sources? Also, the analysis examines the reporting expressions (verbs) used to introduce the quotations (direct or

[45] See appendix 4.4 for the analysis sheet used for the analysis of the quotation clauses
[46] The calculation depends on counting the clauses and the percentages are calculated by Excel 2007.

indirect). Bednarek and Caple (2014:93) make distinctions between different ways of reporting speech (see the following table 3.6).

Table 3.6: Reporting Expressions Associated with Quotation Patterns

Type of Expression	Example	Definition
Neutral	say, tell, according to	It does not give any additional information other than identifying something as hearsay
Illocutionary	demand, promise	It gives information on the speaker's purpose
Declarative	acquit, plead guilty	It refers to an institutionalized linguistic act.
Discourse signalling	add, conclude,	It makes explicit the relation to previous or following discourse.
Paralinguistic	whisper	It gives information on the quality of speech.

The analysis investigates and compares the themes evident in the quotations. The analysis further examines source specifications, i.e. the representation of speakers (quoted sources), i.e. how the quoted social actors are represented by certain categories as suggested by Van Leeuwen (1996). These categories are categorisation (classification, relational identification and physical identification); nomination (formal, semi-formal or informal) and genericisation and specification (individualized or assimilated). For the detail explanation of these categories, see section (3.5.2). At the end, the section summarises and compares the findings of the analysis, and shows how the sourcing contributes to the representation of the social actors. It also shows similarities and differences in the representation of social actors.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter posed the research questions and presented the methodological framework adapted from three models within CDA which can be shown in figure (3.3).

Figure 3.3: Methods in the Analytical Framework



The chapter also explained the criteria used in systematically selecting a purpose-representative sample. In details, the chapter specifies the analytical procedures to examine the linguistic features, representational processes and quotation patterns. The next chapter examines the transitivity selections in the headlines of the news stories.

Chapter Four: Transitivity Selections in News Headlines

4.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the transitivity selections in all headlines[47] (146) of the news stories from two UK newspapers (*The Guardian*, GU and *The Times London*, TL) and two US newspapers[48] (*The New York Times*, NYT and *The Washington Post*, WP) in their representation of social actors in the coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09. To do so, the study applies a transitivity model proposed by Halliday (1985/1994, see section 3.4.3).

Through the transitivity system, we can analyse who is considered to be a causal agent and who is depicted as a victim. Also, by using the model, we can identify what is emphasised or de-emphasised. Since the war happens in a cycle: actions and reactions on the part of both warring sides, headlines of news stories assumingly put the burden of responsibility of action and reaction on both warring sides. It should be noted that there is not much linkage between some grammatical structures, e.g. nominalisation, and their ideological function. This is realised through the context of the structures (for detailed analytical procedures, see section 3.4.3).

4.2. Representation of Actors in Frequency

Examining the frequency distributions[49] focuses on the main actors in the headlines, i.e. the actors who are considered as the subjects or are put in the first positions of the headlines. This is because clauses in English language could have one or in some cases more than one participant. That is, the examination draws on the key participants in examining the transitivity processes and roles of agents.

[47] For the list of all headlines of news reports, see appendix 4.1.
[48] See section (3.3.1)
[49] For the procedures of calculation of frequencies, see section 3.4.3

Broadly speaking, Israeli political actors (henceforth IPA) are the most frequent group followed by Israeli military actors (IMA) among the Israeli subgroups of social actors. However, there is no focus on Israeli civilian actors (henceforth ICA). On the contrary, among Palestinian actors it is civilian actors (PCA) who are the most frequent group, followed by Palestinian political actors (PPA) and Palestinian military actors (PMA) respectively.

4.2.1 Frequencies of Israeli and Palestinian Actors

Israeli and Palestinian actors have various distributions of frequency across the headlines of the news stories, as we can see in table (4.1).

Table 4.1: Frequency Distributions of Israeli and Palestinian Actors in Headlines

NP	HL	IPA		PPA		IMA		PMA		ICA		PCA	
		No	%	No.	%	No	%	No.	%	No	%	No.	%
GU	33	13	39%	3	9%	6	18%	0	0%	0	0%	6	18%
TL	49	10	20%	3	6%	11	22%	3	6%	0	0%	12	24%
NYT	34	10	29%	3	9%	12	35%	0	0%	0	0%	2	6%
WP	30	10	33%	3	10%	8	27%	1	3%	0	0%	3	10%
Total	146	43	**29%**	12	**8%**	37	**25%**	4	**3%**	0	**0%**	23	**16%**

Table (4.1) illustrates the dominance of IPA among the Israeli actors by (29%) over (25%) for military and (0%) for civilians. The table also shows the dominance of PCA among Palestinian actors (16%) over the politicians (8%) and the military actors (3%). From these distributions and in regard to the total of percentages, we can observe that PMA and PCA are more frequent in the UK newspapers than in the US newspapers. IPA, PPA and IMA are more frequent in the US newspapers than in the UK newspapers. This means that the US newspapers cover Israeli actors more than Palestinian actors, whereas the UK newspapers include Palestinian actors more than Israeli actors.

The frequency distributions indicate Israeli dominance over all the headlines of the news stories which may indicate a bias towards the Israeli political view (see section 7.4). The discourse analysis reveals also 'discursive absences' (KhosraviNik, 2010), i.e. who is excluded (the Israeli civilians) in the corpus (see also section 5.2.3 on the exclusion of the civilian actors). In other words, the most striking observation is the complete absence of ICA across the sampled headlines. This exclusion leads to a mystification which results in missing an essential piece of information and which is unlikely to be generated by readers. This mystification is so crucial that it leads, to say the least, to the misinformation of readers about the case of ICA and how much they suffer and their views on the war.

4.2.2 Frequencies of Other Actors

The analysis of frequencies of participants also focuses on actors other than Palestinians and Israelis. The following table (4.2) demonstrates the frequency distributions of other actors.

Table 4.2: Frequency Distribution of Other Actors in Headlines

NP	No. of headlines	US		UK		UN		EU		Arab		International		Iranian	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
GU	33	1	3%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	4	12%	0	0%
TL	49	1	2%	2	4%	1	2%	2	4%	2	4%	2	4%	0	0%
NYT	34	0	0%	0	0%	1	3%	0	0%	3	9%	1	3%	2	6%
WP	30	2	7%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	3	10%	0	0%
Total	146	4	**3%**	2	1%	2	1%	2	1%	5	**3%**	10	**7%**	2	1%

Table (4.2) shows that international actors are the dominant actors (7%) among the subgroups of other actors. They are followed by US (3%) and Arab actors (3%). The table shows that the UK newspapers include UK, EU and international actors. In contrast, the US newspapers include US, UN, Arab and Iranian actors. This difference in frequency distribution appears to reflect the political interests of the newspapers. That is, the newspapers are loyal to their national officials, i.e. UK actors are more frequent in UK

newspapers, and US actors are more frequent in US newspapers. This loyalty influences war reporting (see section 7.5 on factors influencing war reporting). With these frequency distributions, the way in which Israeli, Palestinian and other actors are assigned processes will be compared and discussed in the next section.

4.2.3 Frequencies of Processes Associated with Social Actors

This section demonstrates the frequency distributions of processes. To do so, the percentage of frequency distributions is calculated to support the qualitative analysis. Generally speaking, material, mental, verbal and behavioural processes are the most frequent processes attributing to the subgroups of actors in the headlines of the news stories. Table (4.3) indicates how the transitivity processes are attributed to IPA in the headlines of the news stories.

Table 4.3: Frequency Distribution of the Processes Assigned to IPA in Headlines

NP	HL	Material		Mental		Relational		Behavioural		Verbal		Existential		Total	%
		No	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%		
GU	33	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	10	30%	3	9%	0	0%	13	**39%**
TL	49	0	0%	0	0%	1	2%	4	8%	3	6%	2	4%	10	20%
NYT	34	0	0%	0	0%	1	3%	6	18%	3	9%	0	0%	10	29%
WP	30	0	0%	1	3%	2	7%	5	17%	2	7%	0	0%	10	33%
total	146	0	0%	1	1%	4	3%	25	**17%**	11	8%	2	1%	43	29%

Table (4.3) shows IPA are mostly associated with behavioural processes (17%) and verbal processes (8%) across the headlines (see examples 1-7). The comparison reveals that GU allocates the highest percentage of processes to IPA (39%). The table also shows similarity between the newspapers in assigning behavioural and verbal processes. From this comparison, we can observe that the newspapers mostly use similar processes to represent actions of IPA. These frequencies mean that by behavioural processes, the newspapers concentrate on Israeli procedures in the war. By verbal processes, the newspapers quote IPA in reference to information on war events. Verbal processes provide admissible evidence for the claims of the authors.

Palestinian political actors (PPA) are assigned different types of processes and roles across the newspapers, as we can see in table (4.4).

Table 4.4: Frequency Distribution of the Processes Assigned to PPA in Headlines

NP	HL	Material		Mental		Relational		Behavioural		Verbal		Existential			Total	%
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.		
GU	33	0	0 %	2	6 %	1	3 %	0	0%	0	0 %	0	0 %	0	3	9%
TL	49	0	0 %	0	0 %	0	0 %	1	2%	1	2 %	1	2 %	0	3	6%
NYT	34	0	0 %	0	0 %	1	3 %	0	0%	0	0 %	2	6 %	0	3	9%
WP	30	1	3 %	0	0 %	1	3 %	1	3%	0	0 %	0	0 %	0	3	**10 %**
total	146	1	1 %	2	1 %	3	**2 %**	2	1%	1	1 %	3	**2 %**	0	12	8%

The table shows that PPA are mostly assigned relational and existential processes (see examples 8-11). In contrast to IPA, WP has the highest percentage (10%) of allocating processes to PPA. The newspapers allocate PPA different processes from those assigned to IPA. In particular, GU gives them the highest percentage of mental processes. TL has the highest percentage of verbal processes, whereas the highest percentage of existential processes is in NYT and of material and behavioural processes in WP. This suggests that GU senses the roles of PPA, whereas TL focuses on what PPA say regarding the war events. NYT focuses on existing events and WP focuses on the procedures and actions. Noticeably, the table also shows similar percentages of allocating relational processes in GU, NYT and WP. This means that they relate events to other events foregrounding attributing actors. Table (4.5) reveals the different types of processes assigned to Israeli military actors (IMA).

Table 4.5: Frequency Distribution of the Processes Assigned to IMA in Headlines

NP	HL	Material		Mental		Relational		Behavioural		Verbal		Existential		Total	%
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%		
GU	33	2	6%	1	3%	3	9%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	6	18%
TL	49	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
NYT	34	9	26%	0	0%	2	6%	1	3%	0	0%	0	0%	12	**35%**
WP	30	5	17%	0	0%	1	3%	0	0%	2	7%	0	0%	8	27%
total	146	16	**11%**	1	1%	6	4%	1	1%	2	1%	0	0%	26	18%

Table (4.5) shows that IMA are mainly allocated material processes. As indicated in the table, NYT has the highest percentages (35%). By comparison, GU has the highest percentage of relational processes followed by mental processes, whereas TL does not allocate any processes to IMA. NYT has the highest percentage of material processes, followed by relational processes. WP has the highest percentage of material processes, followed by verbal processes.

These frequencies indicate that GU senses actions of Israeli military and relates them in attribution to other actions. NYT and WP focus on Israeli procedures and operations. By verbal processes, WP quotes IMA, allowing them to speak on and clarify their operations (see Ex20-22 and Ex 26-31). Palestinian military actors are mostly assigned material action processes in role of actors, i.e. doers, as indicated in table (4.6)

Table 4.6: Frequency Distribution of the Processes Assigned to PMA in Headlines

NP	HL	Material		Mental		Relational		Behavioural		Verbal		Existential			Total	%
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No		
GU	33	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0	0%
TL	49	2	4%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	2%	0	0%	0	3	**6%**
NYT	34	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0	0%
WP	30	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	3%	0	0%	0	0%	0	1	3%
total	146	2	**1%**	0	0%	0	0%	1	**1%**	1	**1%**	0	0%	0	4	3%

In contrast to IMA, Table (4.6) demonstrates that the newspapers treat PMA in a converse pattern. TL has the highest percentage (6%) in attributing processes to PMA. TL mainly associates them with material processes followed by verbal processes. WP has (3%) of behavioural processes. Noticeably, GU and NYT do not have any references to PMA in their headlines. This shows a major focus on the actions of PMA in TL and WP. Such a representation foregrounds the agency of IMA and PMA.

Table (4.7) indicates the frequency distributions of processes assigned to Palestinian civilian actors (PCA).

Table 4.7: Frequency Distribution of the Processes Assigned to PCA in Headlines

NP	HL	Material		Mental		Relational		Behavioural		Verbal		Existential		Total	%
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%		
GU	33	3	9%	0	0%	3	9%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	6	18%
TL	49	4	8%	0	0%	3	6%	0	0%	3	6%	2	4%	12	**24%**
NYT	34	1	3%	0	0%	1	3%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	2	6%
WP	30	1	3%	1	3%	1	3%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	3	10%
total	146	9	**6%**	1	1%	8	5%	0	0%	3	2%	2	1%	23	16%

Table (4.7) demonstrates that PCA are mainly assigned material processes followed by relational processes (see examples 34-40). TL has the highest percentages (24%) in allocating the various types of processes. In comparison, the highest percentages are distributed as follows: material and relational processes in GU, material followed by relational processes in TL, and material processes in NYT, and material, mental and relational processes in WP. This reflects similar interests for the newspapers in relation to PCA.

These percentages may attract sympathy to PCA and also allocate more processes. Table (4.8) demonstrates the frequency distribution of the processes attributed to the subgroups of other actors.

Table 4.8: Frequency Distribution of the Processes Assigned to Other Actors in Headlines

NP	HL	Material		Mental		Relational		Behavioural		Verbal		Existential		Total of processes	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No	%
GU	33	0	0%	2	6%	1	3%	2	6%	0	0%	0	0%	5	15%
TL	49	1	2%	1	2%	4	8%	3	6%	1	2%	0	0%	10	20%
NYT	34	2	6%	0	0%	0	0%	3	9%	2	6%	0	0%	7	**21%**
WP	30	0	0%	0	0%	3	10%	1	3%	1	3%	0	0%	5	17%
total	146	3	2%	3	2%	8	**5%**	9	**6%**	4	3%	0	0%	27	18%

Table (4.8) shows that NYT has the highest percentage (21%) in allocating various processes to other actors. GU has the highest percentage in allocating mental and behavioural processes, TL in relational processes, NYT in behavioural and WP in relational processes (see examples 41-48). Such frequency distribution of mental, relational, behavioural and verbal

processes gives other actors the textual space to express their opinions and views, but at the same time these points restate that other actors have not taken any practical procedures to prevent or stop the war.

Overall this section, attributing high frequency to specific groups of social actors, varies the types of processes they are allocated. The examination finds that Israeli politicians and Palestinian civilians have the highest relative frequency. Israeli actors are allocated mainly behavioural, verbal and material processes, whereas Palestinian actors are assigned relational and material processes. These choices of processes are ideological. This variety of processes foregrounds or backgrounds the agency of the social actors, rendering either clear or obscure any attributions of causality and responsibility. The next section investigates how social actors are allocated and assigned various transitivity processes.

4.3. Representation of Actors: Processes and Roles

The analysis of the transitivity processes reveals that the social actors are assigned various processes within different themes[50]. The following sections examine how they are assigned processes within the most common themes.

4.3.1 Israeli and Palestinian Political Actors

This section compares the themes, and examines the processes allocated to the political actors within these themes (see table 4.9)

Table 4.9: Themes of Political Actors in Headlines of the News Stories

NP	IPA	PPA
GU	Ceasefire Ground invasion Objectives of the war Internal affairs	Ceasefire Internal affairs Targeting of Hamas
TL	Ceasefire Ground invasion Objectives of the war Internal affairs	Ceasefire Calling for violence
NYT	Ceasefire Ground invasion Objectives of the war	Ceasefire Internal affairs
WP	Ceasefire Ground invasion Humanitarian relief	Ceasefire Targeting Hamas

The discussion below examines the ways in which Israeli and Palestinian political actors are assigned transitivity processes within three dominant themes: *ceasefire, ground invasion, and calling for violence* as seen in table (4.9). Targeting of Hamas will be discussed in operations of military actors in the following section (4.3.2).

The first theme I examine is ceasefire in which both IPA and PPA are included. IPA are represented mostly as doing procedures and behaviours for ceasefire. In this theme, IPA are mainly assigned behavioural processes across the newspapers as exemplified in the headlines (1-4).

[50] See appendix 4.2 for the analysis sheet of headlines

1. Israel mulls temporary halt to Gaza bombing campaign (GA-GU-31-DEC-01)
2. Israel considers a 48-hour lull to allow in humanitarian aid (GA-TL-31-DEC-02)
3. Israel rejects Gaza cease-fire, but offers aid (GA-NYT-01-JAN-01)
4. Israel Rejects Proposal for 48-Hour Truce; Ground Incursion Looms as Hamas's Rockets Hit Farther (GA-WP-01-JAN-02)

These headlines (1-4) emphasise Israeli behaviours towards ceasefire, presenting Israeli actions towards a halt of operations in the Gaza Strip. In relation to behavioural processes, the US and UK newspapers assign different patterns presented in the underlined verbs (processes). These headlines show that while IPA consider a temporary lull in GU and TL, they reject it in NYT and WP. Nonetheless, among these behavioural processes we can see an emphasis on IPA's offering and allowing humanitarian aid in TL and NYT, e.g. *allow in humanitarian aid*, (headline 2) and *but offers aid*, (headline 3). This reflects a positive role for Israel. In WP, IPA's rejection of a humanitarian ceasefire is further associated with a 'justification', headline (4). The newspaper emphasises that Hamas fires rockets deeper into Israel. This is a material action process and Hamas is presented as an agent (see next section 4.3.2).

The newspapers use active clause structures that conceal their agency. Note the underlined transitive verbs (*mulls*, *considers* and *rejects*). These patterns emphasise Israeli positive procedures and reflect Israeli benevolence[51]. In this representation, Israeli behaviours for ceasefire are linked with offering aids to weak, backward and often violent Palestinians in TL and NYT. This representation shows Israel as making typical and persistent efforts to create appropriate conditions for Palestinians in Gaza to obtain aid and relief.

[51] see Bishop et al. (2007:1)

IPA are also associated with verbal processes in TL, NYT and WP. This pattern emphasises Israeli behaviours towards ceasefire (headlines 5-7). In brief, verbal processes aim to establish "symbolic relationships constructed in human consciousness and enacted in the form of language, like saying and meaning" (Halliday, 1994:107). The following headlines provide examples of how IPA are assigned verbal processes within the theme if ceasefire in TL, NYT and WP.

5. 'Shocked' Hamas leaders ready to accept a ceasefire to avoid all-out assault on heart of Gaza, say **Israelis** (GA-TL-14-JAN-02)
6. **Israel** declares Gaza cease-fire; U.N. site struck(GA-NYT-18-JAN-01)
7. **Israelis** Announce Cease-Fire In Gaza; Olmert Declares Success; Hamas Vows to Fight On (GA-WP-18-JAN-01)

These examples show Israeli behaviours in a positive way within verbal processes. Also, the verbal processes include justification and express voices as we can see in the underlined verbs. These verbs have an assertive use, i.e. they make assertions to affirm the Israeli intention that directly concerns the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas. This is evident in these verbs, *say, declares* and *announce.* These verbs present the Israeli perspectives with convincing voices of the speakers (see also section 6.3.3).

One major difference lies in the justification. While TL focuses on Israeli expectations of Hamas' willingness to accept the ceasefire with Israel in a way of avoiding further attacks against Hamas members, NYT and WP lack in essence the context of the Israeli declaration of ceasefire. NYT reports the Israeli declaration of the ceasefire, while it backgrounds the agency of those responsible for striking a UN site in Gaza by using a passive form ([is] struck). WP sheds light on Israeli announcement of the ceasefire and Israeli Prime Minister Olmert's declaration of the success and achievement of the Israeli goals. However, WP asserts Hamas' decision to continue fighting presented as a verbal process. The verb *vows* represents the voice of Hamas and gives evidence of Hamas' negative procedures to keep fighting.

By assigning roles of sayer in these headlines, this study claims that the editors enable IPA to express their procedures and opinions on the ceasefire. Consistent with Halliday's argument that the sayer of a verbal process is not necessarily a human participant, the sayer roles of the verbal processes are presented in *Israel*. Israel is personified as an individual declaring a ceasefire. In brief, the editors of headlines draw on far more instances of behavioural and verbal processes from IPA compared with their Palestinian counterparts in the US and UK newspapers.

In contrast to Israelis, PPA are assigned different processes. GU assigns only mental processes, whereas TL, NYT and WP assign relational processes, as we can see in the headlines (8-11).

8. Defiant leaders dismiss calls to reinstate ceasefire (GA-GU-29-DEC-03)
9. Hamas braced as Israel pledges (GA-TL-30-DEC-02)
10. No early end seen to 'all-out war' on Hamas in Gaza (GA-NYT-30-DEC-01)
11. Progress Reported in Gaza Truce Talks; Palestinian Toll Exceeds 1,000 (GA-WP-15-JAN-02)

These headlines show a relationship between the collapse of the ceasefire and Hamas' behaviours. While GU and TL focuses on Hamas' discourse of ceasefire rejection by using active structures, NYT and WP use passive structures that completely do not show Hamas' efforts to achieve ceasefire. PPA are represented as a voice of violence. The verbs *dismiss* and *braced* carry a negative semantic charge. GU indicates behaviours of Hamas' leaders in refusing calls to extend the ceasefire with Israel. This seems to imply blame for Hamas. In a relational process, TL relates Hamas' behaviour for ceasefire to Israel's promises of ceasefire. This can be seen in the word *braced*, a past participle verb which is used like an adjective in headline (9). This portrays that Hamas is *braced*, *i.e.* ready for fighting, while Israel *pledges*, i.e. promises to invade Gaza.

NYT does not show any ceasefire procedures by Hamas, but it generalises the expectation that there is no end to the war which is depicted as being against Hamas. In the same vein, WP uses passive structure to

report on the ceasefire progress. This progress is related to the high number of Palestinians killed in the war rather than to the procedures of Palestinian political actors, mainly Hamas. In these examples, procedures by PPA are not clearly stated as being an attempt to achieve a ceasefire. The adjective *braced* and the verb *dismiss* imply that Hamas does not take steps to achieve ceasefire. This pattern conceals Palestinian efforts towards the ceasefire.

The second theme I am examining is the ground invasion, which is represented as a result of the collapse of the ceasefire. I choose to examine this theme because it is frequent in all headlines across the newspapers. In this theme, IPA are assigned behavioural processes (headlines12-15) across the newspapers.

12. **Israel** considers ground attack as it mobilises more troops: Olmert: fighting in Gaza will be 'long and painful' (GA-GU-29-DEC-01)
13. **Israel** masses forces for ground assault on Gaza (GA-TL-29-DEC-01)
14. As Talks Falter, **Israel** Warns Gazans of Stepped-Up Attacks (GA-NYT-11-JAN-03)
15. **Israel** Poised for Long Fight; Palestinian Deaths Near 300; Hamas Calls for Suicide Strikes (GA-WP-29-DEC-02)

With the physical manifestation of mental processes, these behavioural processes show that Israel is preparing for ground invasion. The active voice structures of these processes foreground Israeli agency in preparation for the ground invasion rather than reporting the actual operations on the ground. All the processes (*mobilises, masses and warns*) and the adjective *poised* show progress in preparations for the ground invasion. These verbs are transitive except *poised* which leave agency obscured and involves only Israel in 'conscious behaviour'.

GU and TL in (headlines 12 and 13) demonstrate Israeli preparation of the ground invasion in Gaza for which Israel calls and mobilises thousands of reserve soldiers. In headline (12), the behavioural process is associated with a verbal process in a role of sayer materialised in what Olmert tells his cabinet regarding the length and pain expected of the war. Between the behavioural and verbal processes, there is a mental process represented in

Israeli consideration of the ground invasion. Headline (14) focuses on the Israeli warning to people in Gaza of behaviours, e.g. more attacks on Gaza because of failure of talks.

Headline (15) sheds light on the Israeli preparation for a long war in the Gaza Strip. This can be seen in the adjective *poised* as it "implies self-control and dignity in relation to fight when referring to the Israeli stand in the conflict when in fact Israel declares war on the other" (El-Bilawi, 2011:135). The headline implies a role of sayer presented in Hamas' call for its members to conduct suicide attacks in Israel. It also demonstrates an existential process shown in the increasing number of Palestinian deaths to almost 300 people. This process depicts Hamas as responsible for leading Palestinian people to a more destructive war. Also, in this headline, the words "suicide strikes" link Hamas' behaviour to terrorism (see also Ex3, next chapter). In supporting Israeli behaviours in the ground invasion, IPA are also assigned verbal processes in TL, NYT and WP.

16. **Israel** reinforces army before 'third phase' Fighting will go on for some days yet, Olmert indicates (GA-TL-12-JAN-01)
17. **Israel** Issues an Appeal to Palestinians in Gaza (GA-NYT-26-DEC-01)
18. Israeli Gaza Strip; 'This Will Not Be Easy or Short,' **Top Official** Says; Hamas Calls for Suicide Attacks (GA-WP-04-JAN-02)

The verbal processes enable the Israelis to clarify their objectives and messages of the war by expressing their opinions on the ground invasion. Headline (16) focuses on what the Israeli prime minster *indicates* regarding the Israeli reinforcement of its army before the actual ground invasion as a further escalation of the Gaza war of 2008-09. Headline (17) shows the Israeli prime minister's *appeal to Palestinians* to reject the militant leadership of Hamas and stop firing rockets at Israel. The role assigned to the Palestinian civilians *Palestinian in Gaza* is 'target'. NYT includes Israeli appeal to the Gazans to leave their homes to avoid war troubles. In headline (18), a verbal process is presented in the speech of Israeli politicians on the intention of the ground invasion as it will not be easy.

The underlined verbs present Israeli comments and reaction towards Hamas' actions and emphasise the presupposition that Hamas' activities are threatening Jews, as we can see in the following example (headline19). This threat would of course be seen as unacceptable by the TL's readership. It follows that there is a need to initiate various behaviours and actions against Hamas, presented mainly in the form of ground invasion in these examples.

The third theme is Palestinians calling for violence. PPA are also included in calling for violence only in TL as explained in headline (19).

19. We'll kill Jews abroad, **Hamas** warns (GA-TL-06-JAN-01)

The process attributed to Palestinian politicians represented in Hamas here is verbal, in a role of sayer. This verbal process represents Hamas as a threat, *kill Jews.* This is evident in the verb *warns* associated with a transitive verb (*kill*). These verbs are accompanied by explicit reference (*We'll*). They foreground the agency of Hamas that is shown as being directed against all Jews rather than only Israelis (see section 7.3.1).

Through verbal processes, the Palestinians' supposed anti-Israeli attitudes are highlighted to portray them as a threat to Israel. Moreover, representing Israeli actors as being responsible for most of the saying as the sayers who make statements to discredit Hamas, or to settle the threat, especially the threat of firing rockets helps construct Israel as a powerful, united nation and a decision-maker.

Through this comparison, we can see how the newspapers conceal the Palestinian voice in the ceasefire negotiations, as they are not assigned verbal processes, while they are assigned relational and mental processes. There is an absence in that the Palestinians are not viewed in the context that they have been under occupation since 1948. Hamas is mainly portrayed as a "responsible provocative force behind the conflict" (Philo and Berry, 2011:355), see also (section 7.2.2).

The analysis suggests that an overall image of IPA and PPA, by allocating behavioural and verbal processes to IPA, is an indicative way to justify the Israeli behaviours and procedures in the war. These processes show sensing and *intransitivity* of Israeli procedures. The role of Israelis is a mostly positive voice of peace. Linking the roles of Israeli actors with the expressions of opinions on the war actions clarifies the purpose of the war from the Israeli viewpoint, whereas hiding the voices of Palestinians omits their views from the headlines. The processes and roles associated with Israeli actors provide them with perceptive and cognitive abilities to consider, analyse and observe, while the sayer roles permit their voices to be reported repeatedly. Thus, these actions/methods background the Palestinians' views and opinions.

4.3.2 Israeli and Palestinian Military Actors

Israeli military actors are most frequently assigned actor roles in material action processes in common themes, as shown in table (4.10).

Table 4.10: Themes of Military Actors in Headlines of the News Stories

NP	IMA	PMA
GU	Targeting of Hamas Targeting of civilians Internal affairs War with Lebanon	Firing rockets
TL	Ground invasion Shelling white phosphorous	Firing rockets Targeting of Hamas Calling for Violence
NYT	Targeting of Hamas Ground invasion Targeting of civilians Targeting of tunnels Targeting of UN Objectives of the war	----------
WP	Targeting of Hamas Ground invasion Targeting of civilians Targeting of tunnels Targeting of UN	Ground invasion

Israeli and Palestinian military actors are assigned processes mainly in three dominant themes: *targeting of Hamas*, *ground invasion* and *fringing rockets.* In the first theme, targeting of Hamas, IMA are assigned material action processes that serve to realise actions and events, i.e. Israel takes actions against Hamas actors in GU, NYT and WP.

20. **Israeli bomb** kills Hamas leader (GA-GU-02-JAN-02)
21. In a Broadening Offensive, an **Israeli Strike** Kills a Senior Hamas Leader (GA-NYT-02-JAN-01)
22. **Israeli Warplanes** Pound Gaza; Hundreds Killed **in Reprisal Airstrikes Targeting Hamas Security Facilities**(GA-WP-28-DEC-01)

GU and NYT in headlines (20-21) represent Israeli actions in the killing of the Hamas leader, Nizar Rayyan, and some members of his family (human entities) by *Israeli bomb*, *warplanes* and *reprisal airstrikes* (non-human entity). In the material process (headline 22), WP relates the killing of hundreds of Palestinians and Hamas members to Israeli pounding and bombing of Gaza and of Hamas' facilities in the Gaza Strip.

In these headlines, there is a fundamental consistency in the syntactic position and semantic roles used in representing IMA as agents in material processes. This means the British and American newspapers show significant differences in their representation of the Israeli actions against Hamas. It seems quite plausible that the US and UK headlines use similar language to reflect Israeli opposition towards Hamas by attributing the role of 'agents' to Israelis.

To explain, IMA are associated with material action processes in the roles of agents. Hamas members are represented as goals, i.e. victims of Israeli actions. The transitive verbs *kill* and *pound* ascribe power to the agent and weakness to the goal. These verbs foreground Israeli agency in targeting Hamas. That is, mentioning of the Israeli actors responsible for the actions in the clauses foregrounds the Israeli agency exclusively against Hamas members rather than all Palestinians (see section 7.6.1). This representation seems to justify Israeli actions because Hamas fires rockets.

In these themes, Palestinian actors, mainly politicians, are mostly assigned goal roles either in material actions or material events in Israeli targeting of Hamas members in GU, TL and WP.

23. **Nizar Rayan: Senior Hamas leader and cleric** considered a hero on the streets of Gaza (GA-GU-03-JAN-04)
24. **Hamas leader** killed in **airstrike** as Israel reject ceasefire initiative (GA-TL-02-JAN-03)
25. **Senior Hamas Leader** Killed; Israelis Stand Ready to Invade Gaza by Land (GA-WP-02-JAN-04)

GU in headline (23) shows the Palestinian view of Hamas leader, Nizar Rayan, assassinated by an Israeli warplane, as a hero in the Gaza Strip. The process here is mental in a role of phenomenon attributed mainly to the Palestinian politician and Hamas senior, Nizar Rayan. TL and WP in headlines (24-25) explain the killing of Siam, after Israeli jets target Jabaliya camp in the northern Gaza Strip. The processes are material actions in the role of agent assigned to the Israeli military represented in Israeli airstrikes and in the role of goal assigned to the Hamas senior leader, Siam.

These comparisons illustrate the dominance of the material processes associated with the Israeli military actors. The material processes highlight the decisiveness and the absence of hesitation in going for a war to achieve the purposes of targeting Hamas. The passive forms used in the headlines, are noteworthy in that they do not follow the transitivity order (who does what to whom). A close investigation into the action process shows that the three newspapers had no opposing tendencies, i.e. the headlines background the Israeli agency in the war.

It is important to note in these processes that PMA are accompanied with epithets and labels (*Senior Hamas leader* in GU and WP, headlines 23-25), *Hamas leader* in TL, headline (24). This representation reminds readers of the military status of the Palestinian target actors. This might shape readers' opinion on Israeli targeting of Hamas and could suggest justifications for Israeli actions.

The second theme is the ground invasion. IMA are allocated behavioural processes in TL, NYT and WP (headlines 26-28) and verbal processes in TL and WP (headlines 30-31). Similar to the Israeli targeting of Hamas, the following headlines show a consistency in the syntactic position and semantic roles in the representation of IMA in the ground invasion, as evident in the following examples:

26. **Troops** gather as Israel prepares iron fist to deliver devastating blow (GA-TL-13-JAN-03)
27. As **troops** enter Gaza city, Israel sees an opening (GA-NYT-12-JAN-01)
28. Israeli Forces Push Deeper Into Gaza Strip; International Critics Warn of Worsening Humanitarian Crisis (GA-WP-05-JAN-01)
29. **Hamas** Pulling Back Into Crowded Cities, Beckoning Israelis; For Army, Pursuit Is Tempting but Risky (GA-WP-08-JAN-01)

The behavioural processes are represented as responses to the Palestinian rockets fired from the Gaza Strip. The headlines present the ground invasion as a solution to the firing of rockets as evident in *deliver devastating blow*, *an opening* and *Deeper Into Gaza Strip*. TL in headline (26) points to the gathering of the Israeli troops because Israel is preparing a war against Hamas in the heart of Gaza. Later, we learn that further to this action, Israeli soldiers invade Gaza and cut it into three parts. This is evident in the material action process in this headline. We know about the Israeli behaviour rather than the actions they will do, apart from invading Gaza which becomes clear in the second part of the headline. *Elite Israeli forces cut region into three in drive to eliminate Hamas* (GA-TL-05-JAN-06).

In the same vein, NYT reported on the Israeli invasion of Gaza as exemplified in headline (27). The process is the material action *enter*, further explained in another material process in another headline: *Israel deepens Gaza incursion as toll mounts* (GA-NYT-06-JAN-03). The author of the headline uses the verb *enter* rather than *invade*. EL-Bilawi (2011:137) explains that the verb *enter* in WP's "understates the Israeli actions. Normally the word used in reporting such events is *to invade* or *to occupy*

rather than enter". Headline (28) shows that WP has the same reporting, material action processes on Israeli ground invasion.

From these headlines, we know that the ground invasion has started and the Israelis have entered Gaza. The behavioural processes in both sides use transitive verbs. These verbs conceal the Israeli agency as they do not only give adequate information, but also they misrepresent the actions (*push*, *enter*).

In the accounts of the ground invasion, PMA are associated with behavioural processes as can be seen in headline (29). WP materialises the Hamas behavioural action in retreating and hiding in *crowded cities* of the Gaza Strip. The process is a material action with a role of agent that focuses on action. Such material processes reproduce a sense of negativity. By placing Hamas in the subject position, the headline emphasises their roles in negative actions such as firing rockets and retreating in crowded areas. This representation attributes the responsibility for targeting of civilians.

It is noticeable that only WP focuses on the Israeli accusation that Hamas is using civilians. This pattern reproduces the discourse of the Israeli military investigation that Hamas uses Palestinian civilians as human shields. In fact, Kaposi (2014:10) points out that "neither Amnesty International [...] nor the Goldstone Report (2011) found much evidence of Palestinian civilians having been forced into providing cover for Hamas militants or Hamas fighters using civilian or UN premises to launch attacks".

IMA are associated with verbal processes in TL and WP. By these processes, journalists enable Israelis to support their claims and clarify their operations. This is evident in headlines (30) and (31).

30. Israel's rain of fire on Gaza Phosphorus shells screen ground assault. All munitions used are lawful, says army (TL)
31. **Israeli Forces** Enter Gaza Strip; 'This Will Not Be Easy or Short,' Top Official Says; Hamas Calls for Suicide Attacks (GA-WP-04-JAN-02)

The verbal processes relate the sayer to procedural behaviours, but they do not convey negative intentions by using *say*. The verb *say* implies defence of Israeli actions, e.g. shelling white phosphorous or invading Gaza.

The third theme is Palestinians' firing of rockets. Consistent with IMA actions against Hamas, the analysis reveals that PMA are assigned material actions in firing rockets in GU and TL, whereas they are not allocated processes in NYT and WP. In these processes, they are assigned the role of an agent performing military actions against Israel, as the following headlines illustrate:

32. Israeli far right gains ground as Gaza rockets fuel tension **Misfired missile** kills two young Palestinian sisters (GA-GU-27-DEC-01)
33. **Gaza rockets** put Israel's nuclear plant in battle zone (GA-TL-02-JAN-01)

The material processes pertaining to the actions of PMA are realised with the underlined verbs. These verbs *kills* and *put* carried negative connotations as killing Palestinian civilians and making a threat to Israel. Headline (32) expresses the growth of ultra-nationalist right-wing parties in Israel (represented by Beiteinu) as a result of the confrontation between Hamas and Israel. I would like to argue that the headline suggests the confrontation is due to Gaza rockets, as it clearly foregrounds 'Gaza rockets' in a role of agent. It also foregrounds the killing of two young Palestinian sisters (represented as goal) by a rocket fired accidentally from Gaza into Israel which struck a Gazan house.

Headline (33) sheds light on the increasing fear in Israel as the *Gaza rockets* could reach Israel's nuclear facility at Dimona[52], the location of Israel's nuclear reactor. PMA are assigned a material action process in a role of agent that accompanies the Israeli military participants with a role of goal in the same material action process. The Palestinian violence (*firing rockets* or *breaking the ceasefire*) is treated as high-impact events amplified and assigned transitivity order that reflects the causality or causing of the

[52] http://www.jpost.com/Operation-Protective-Edge/Rocket-alert-sirens-sound-in-Zichron-Yaakov-120-km-north-of-Gaza-362087

violence. In this regard, the Palestinians are represented as causal/causing agents (firing rockets), whereas the Israelis are represented as responsible actors who want to bring about the end of this bitter conflict. This pattern of representations emphasises negative anti-Israel actions conducted by Hamas.

These examples clearly demonstrate the exact order of transitivity, i.e. who does what to whom with information to illustrate the war events/actions. These headlines show clearly *Misfired missile* and *Gaza rockets* (non-human entities) and Hamas as reasons for the war actions and for Israeli rejection of the truce, e.g. *fuel tension, kills two young Palestinian sisters, continues attacks, put Israel's nuclear plant in battle zone, to defeat Israel, hit farther, pulling back into crowded cities* and *beckoning Israelis*.

The overall representation shows that in the material, behavioural and verbal processes, we can see that the actions of Israeli military actors are made with the intention to target Hamas. Hamas is represented as a transitive agent who is responsible for firing rockets (for intention in material processes, see Simpson, 1993:89). One possible explanation is that newspapers rely on Israeli sources of information in referring to the events (see also section 6.3.1). It is clear from the headlines in this section that the relationship between the two parties (Israelis and Hamas) is antagonistic. It is a "hero-villain" relationship between victim and aggressor (see Richardson, 2007:209). That is, Hamas as an aggressor fires rockets and refuses ceasefire, and Israel as a victim receives and faces rockets fired by Hamas. This portrayal highlights the agency attributions (see section 7.3.1).

4.3.3 Israeli and Palestinian Civilian Actors

Human suffering is an important aspect of war reporting. A large disparity in the number of casualties of the war emerges "a rough 100 Palestinian casualties for every Israeli casualty" (Shreim, 2012:148). In this context, the four newspapers focus only on Palestinian civilians in the headlines of the news stories (see table 4.1). PCA are mainly represented as facing consequences of war. They are assigned material event processes in roles of agent and goal across the newspapers.

34. **Besieged Palestinians** battle to find burial spaces (GA-GU-02-JAN-03)
35. **Girls** die as militants' rockets fall short (GA-TL-27-DEC-01)
36. **More than 225** die in Gaza as Israel strikes at Hamas (GA-NYT-28-DEC-02)
37. **Food and Medical Supplies** Grow Scarce in the Gaza Strip (WP)

In these headlines, we can see TL and NYT are similar in using the verb *die*. In contrast, there is no use of the verb kill. GU and WP also do not use agent (transitive) verbs that show the agency of killers. These lexical structures (re)produce a minimal realisation or comprehension of the transitivity processes assigned by the newspapers.

In GU, headline (34), the processes of Palestinian civilian actors do not show the agents responsible for their suffering situation, e.g. finding burial places. In TL and NYT, we can see that the headlines attribute the death of Palestinians to Hamas. This foregrounds Hamas' agency. In TL, headline (35), a Palestinian misfired rocket fails and falls short. In headline (36), Israel strikes Hamas' facilities, and thus, some people are killed. This means that the strike was not against PCA, but it is directed against Hamas. Assigning material event processes hides the Israeli actions in targeting, or causing suffering for, Palestinian civilians. This pattern backgrounds the Israeli agency in GU, TL and WP.

We may also notice that the headlines use intransitive verbs, e.g. *to die,* in reporting how Palestinian civilians face consequences of war. This form of representation does not clarify 'who does what to whom', especially in the case when the Palestinians are the goal. This means the headlines do

not attribute Palestinians' deaths to Israeli agency. It can be anything else other than war operations. This also exemplifies a 'carelessness' in telling who commits what (transitivity order, see section 3.4.1). This leads to vagueness about the agency that is responsible for the actions.

The absence of Israeli civilian actors from the headlines ensures the exclusion of their voice and their suffering from the war (see section 7.4.1). Moreover, the analysis shows that PCA are allocated sensor roles in WP (38), the role of phenomenon in NYT (39) and the role of sayer in TL (40).

38. **Family** Mourns 5 Daughters as Civilian Death Toll Mounts (GA-WP-30-DEC-04)
39. Warnings Not Enough for **Gaza Families** (GA-NYT-06-JAN-01)
40. Spent shells prove use of phosphorus, say **doctors** (GA-TL-15-JAN-02)

Headline (38) shows a mental process in a role of sensor. It is presented in mourning a killing of 5 sisters from a Palestinian family. This number increases the death toll. Headline (39) shows a phenomenon implied in warning Palestinian civilians (*Gaza families*) to leave their homes in order to avoid consequences of war. In headline (40), Palestinian doctors speak about the Israeli use of white phosphorus in Gaza.

In the headlines (34-40), we do not see any indication of Israeli operations as we would expect in objective war reporting (see section 2.3.1). Here, the perpetrators/agents of the action are not found in their normal position at the beginning of the sentence (transitivity order, see section 3.4.1), consistently among the newspapers. They are completely excluded. PCA in headlines (34-38) are foregrounded and positioned at the beginning of the clause. NYT was the only newspaper that mentioned Israeli agency (headline 37). These agency realisations reverse when Hamas is reported as firing rockets (see headlines 23-33).

4.3.4 Other Actors

Other actors are associated mostly with mental and verbal processes across the headlines in various themes, as we can see in the following table (4.11)

Table 4.11: Themes of Other Actors in Headlines of the News Stories

NP	US	UK	UN	EU	ARAB	INTERNATIONAL	IRANIAN
GU	ceasefire		Criticism of war			Media coverage	
TL	ceasefire	Ceasefire		Ceasefire Humanitarian relief	Ceasefire Criticism of the war	ceasefire	
NYT	------				Ceasefire Humanitarian relief	Criticism of the war Humanitarian relief	Supporting Hamas Criticism of War
WP	Ceasefire Criticism of War					Ceasefire Criticism of War	

The table shows that other actors are frequently in the theme of ceasefire. In this theme, US actors are represented in GU, TL and WP. UK, EU, Arab and international actors are represented in TL. International actors are also presented in WP, and Arab actors are also presented in NYT. They are all allocated behavioural processes, as we can see in the following examples.

41. **US** steps up peace effort with pact to police Egyptian border: Washington talks address smuggling concerns Israel's security cabinet may discuss ceasefire (GA-GU-17-JAN-02)
42. **US** to support resolution on Gaza ceasefire (GA-TL-09-JAN-01)
43. As **U.S.** Abstains, U.N. Security Council Calls for Cease-Fire (GA-WP-09-JAN-01)
44. **Brown** breaks with the US to call for an immediate ceasefire (GA-TL-05-JAN-03)
45. **EU founders** as squabbling countries lose chance to lead (GA-TL-05-JAN-04)
46. **Envoys** draw up plan to carve out foothold for peacekeepers (GA-TL-10-JAN-03)
47. **Diplomatic Efforts** Toward Gaza Truce Intensify (GA-WP-17-JAN-01)
48. **Egypt** Cites Progress Toward Truce as Gaza Toll Exceeds 1,000 (GA-NYT-15-JAN-01)

Headline (41) expresses the US agreement to provide Egyptians with technical and intelligence assistance to police Egypt's border with Gaza. This procedure is related to the concerns and conditions of Israel's security cabinet. US actors are accompanied by a mental process with a role of sensor in the main headline, and with a verbal process presented in *address* and assigned a role of sayer that concerns Israel in the sub-headline.

From such a perspective in headline (42), we see that the US is willing to support a UN decision on having a ceasefire in Gaza and end the war. But in headline (43), the USA abstains in a UN resolution, while the

UN calls for ceasefire. Headline (44) refers to the split between the US and UK and to the call from the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown for an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The process allocated to Brown is mental with a role of sensor and with a phenomenon role attributed to the US. The process in headline (45) is mental cognition in a role of sensor that represents the EU division about the Israeli war on Gaza, as the EU fail to have a united response, and thus lose the chance to lead an initiative for truce.

Headlines (46-47) show a mental process presented in intensified international diplomatic efforts for ceasefire. Headline (48) presents Egyptian efforts for progress in bringing about a ceasefire as a result of the increasing death toll in the war. Other participants are presented mainly as sensor and sayer roles to express their views on the war. On the whole, they make efforts towards the ceasefire, calling on the two warring parties to stop the war and to find a solution to the conflict.

4.4 Summary and Conclusion

This section summarises the answer to the research question on how transitivity selections are used in constructing representational patterns of the social actors in media coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09 in the headlines of four newspapers.

The most frequent groups are IPA among Israelis and PCA among the Palestinians. This demonstrates the dominance of Israeli political views and sympathy for Palestinian civilians. The analysis of transitivity selections reveals that the newspapers allocate different processes to Israeli, Palestinian and other actors. We can find similarities in processes allocated to Israelis and to Palestinians. The difference is clear in the percentages of frequency distributions of processes. From the comparisons of percentages of inclusion of social actors, the study concludes two findings.

The first finding is that there is a difference in the distributions of frequency. While GU and WP have the highest percentage of IPA, TL has the highest score for PCA and NYT for IMA. The frequency distributions show an absence of ICA in all headlines (see table 4.1). In regard to other actors, there is also a difference between the newspapers. GU and WP have the highest percentage of international actors, followed by US actors. TL has equally included UK, EU, Arab and international actors. NYT pays more attention to Arab and Iranian actors. These differences lead to bias in reporting one side over the other (see section 7.4. on bias and objectivity).

The second finding relates to the comparison between the UK and US newspapers. The UK newspapers include Palestinian actors more than Israelis. By contrast, the US newspapers include Israeli actors more than Palestinians (see table 4.1). The UK newspapers include UK, EU and international actors, whereas the US newspapers include US, UN, Arab and Iranian actors (see table 4.6). This pattern influences the reporting of the war and reflects the loyalty of newspapers to their national actors (see section 7.5.1).

In examining the frequency of transitivity processes, a prominent finding is that the highest percentages allocated to social actors differ between the newspapers. One reason for such differences in frequency distributions is the number of headlines[53], as this is higher in the British newspapers (31 for *The Guardian* and 43 for *The Times-London*) than in the American one (34 for *The New York Times* and 30 for *The Washington Post*). Also, the editorial policies of the newspapers could be another reason for the difference in the transitivity selections (see section 7.5.2).

By contrast, there are strong similarities between the newspapers in allocating processes to Israelis, and differences in allocating processes to Palestinians. The analysis of transitivity processes and roles of agents

[53] See appendix (4.1)

reveals that material, mental, behavioural and verbal processes are the most frequent processes attributing to the subgroups of participants in the headlines. Table (4.12) shows similarities and differences in transitivity processes and roles in their themes associated with the categories of participants.

Table 4.12: Processes and Roles Associated with Israeli and Palestinian Actors

Actors	Themes	Roles	Verbs	Headlines
IPA	Ceasefire	Behaviour across HLs	*mulls, considers, rejects*	1-4
		Sayer in TL, NYT and WP	*say, declares* and *announce*	5-7
	Ground invasion	Behaviour across HLs	*considers, mobilizes, masses, warns and poised*	12-15
		Sayer across TL, NYT and WP	*indicates, issues, says*	16-18
PPA	Ceasefire	Sensor in GU	*dismiss*	8
		Relational across HLs	*passive forms*	9-11
	Calling for violence	Sensor in TL	*warns*	19
	Targeting of Hamas	Goal in GU, TL and WP	*kills, Killed*	23-25
IMA	Targeting of Hamas	Agent across GU, NYT and WP	*kill, pound*	20-22
	Ground invasion	Behaviour (agent) in TL, NYT and WP	*gather, enter, push*	26-28
		Sayer in TL and WP	*says*	30-31
PMA	Ground invasion	Behaviour (agent) in WP	*pull back*	29
	Firing rockets into Israel	Agent in GU and TL	*kills, put*	32-33
PCA	Facing consequences of war	Agent in Material Event across HLs	*battle, die, grow*	34-37
		Sensor in WP Phenomenon in NYT Sayer in TL	*mourns* *(being warned)* *warning* *say*	38-40
Others	Ceasefire	US actors in TL (attribute) UN actors in WP (sayer) UK in TL(Attribute) EU in TL(Attribute) International in TL and WP(Attribute) Arab in NYT (sayer)	*steps, Support* *calls* *breaks* *lose* *intensify* *cites*	41-48

The above table demonstrates that the newspapers have, to a wide extent, consistent transitivity selections in the headlines of the news stories. The

transitivity processes vary the roles of the social actors. Moreover, they foreground or background the agency of the actors. Based on analysis of these processes, the headlines emphasise Hamas actions and Israeli reactions. This means that Israel is represented as a potent responder, and thus, Israel targets Hamas only in order to respond to its rockets. This analysis of transitivity processes and roles of participants reveals three images: Israeli benevolence, Hamas causality and critical concern by other actors (see section 7.3.1).

The first image is Israeli benevolence[54] in taking attitudes towards ceasefire and allowing humanitarian relief and aid to Palestinians living in Gaza. This is clearly shown in assigning behavioural processes in all headlines and verbal processes in TL, NYT and WP.

The second image is Hamas' causality and initiating violence (war). This can be extracted from the behavioural processes assigned to Hamas as refusing ceasefire across all newspapers and from the verbal processes as calling for violence and fighting Israel. By these representational patterns, Israeli actions are justified, as their agency is foregrounded as being directed against Hamas. This is clearly shown in assigning behavioural and verbal processes in Israeli preparation of the ground invasion or in targeting Hamas. In contrast, Hamas is foregrounded as a causal agent making and calling for violence. This is obvious in representation patterns of military actors. The representation ascribes strong-impact violent actions to Hamas. This implies that backgrounding the Israeli actions against the Palestinian civilians conceals the agency of their actions. Further, it implies that foregrounding the agency of Hamas by emphasising its actions presenting the Israeli participants as respondents to Hamas' actions (violence), and thus justifies the Israeli actions (for detailed discussion on agency, see section 7.3.1).

[54] See also Bishop et al. (2007:1)

The third image is the critical concern by other actors. Their mission is mainly to mediate a ceasefire between Israelis and Palestinians. Finally, Hamas are depicted as violent in refusing ceasefire and firing rockets, while Israelis react to Hamas' behaviours.

In brief, we see that the transitivity selections foreground Israeli reactions against Hamas and foreground Hamas' actions against Israel. Moreover, the majority of the headlines put the burden of responsibility on the Palestinian side for Israeli reactions and their consequences of killing or displacing people. To sum up, the overall image created by transitivity processes and roles is that the war is against Hamas (see section 7.6.1).

The analysis of news headline is particularly important to guide and draw the attention of readers to the topic of each news story (see also Bignell, 1997:96). However, we need also to consider examining how journalists report the event in the body texts of news stories and editorials. Further to the analysis of transitivity selections, in the following chapter the analysis examines the representation of social actors in the body texts by applying Van Leeuwen's representational categories.

Chapter Five: Socio-Semantic Representation of Social Actors in News Stories and Editorials

5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the question of how representational categories construct the social actors in four newspapers; two American and two British[55]. The analysis applies six of Van Leeuwen's (1996) socio-semantic categories[56] to the texts. This model provides a starting point in critical discourse analysis to examine how social actors are constructed. The model links these socio-semantic categories with their linguistic realisations (see section 3.5.1). Section 5.2 is an examination of frequency distributions and representation of the four groups of social actors (political, military, civilian and others) in the news stories, while 5.3 looks at how they are treated in the editorials. Section 5.4 summarises similarities and differences between the news stories, and editorials and section 5.5 concludes the chapter.

5.2 Social Actors in News Stories

5.2.1 Political Actors in News Stories

This section analyses how Israelis and Palestinians are included and excluded in the sampled news stories. Table (5.1) shows the frequency distributions[57] of inclusion and exclusion across the sampled news stories.

Table 5.1: Percentage of Inclusion and Exclusion of Political Actors in News Stories

NP	No. Clause	Israeli Political Actors				Palestinian Political Actors			
		Inclusion		Exclusion		Inclusion		Exclusion	
		No.	%	No.	No.	No.	%	No.	%
GU	**141**	29	20.5%	1	0.7%	12	8.5%	2	1.4%
TL	**124**	25	20.1%	2	1.6%	12	9.7%	0	0.0%
NYT	**178**	8	4.4%	0	0.0%	15	8.4%	0	0.0%
WP	**192**	43	22.4%	0	0.0%	18	9.4%	3	1.6%
Total	**635**	105	**67.6%**	3	**2.3%**	57	**36.0%**	5	**3.0%**

[55] For the text of news stories and editorials, see appendix (5.1) and (5.2)

[56] See section (3.5) for the representational categories and the reasons to choose them

[57] For the procedures of calculation of frequency, see section 3.5.3

Table (5.1) shows that Israeli political actors (henceforth IPA) are included with frequency (67.6%); almost twice as often as Palestinian political actors (PPA) (36%). IPA are excluded (2.3%) less than PPA (3%). In regard to the total of these frequencies, it is interesting to see that while the UK newspapers include IPA more than US newspapers, there is no major difference between the selected UK and US newspapers in the inclusion of PPA. The UK newspapers exclude IPA more than the US newspapers, but there is no great difference between the UK and US newspapers in excluding PPA. This indicates that Israeli politicians are attributed representational categories much more frequently than Palestinian politicians. This means their appearance in the news stories is obvious to readers of the newspapers. This *probably* leads to a bias towards a certain side of the warring parties (see section 7.4.1).

Since Palestinian politicians are more excluded, the responsibility of Israeli actors is either backgrounded or suppressed. Backgrounding means a delay in mentioning of social actors immediately in the actions. This way de-emphasises social actors to serve certain objectives of writers (journalists in this study). Suppression means social actors are deleted from the text to highlight or hide an occurrence (see section 3.5.2). Israeli and Palestinian political actors are excluded in four themes as shown in table (5.2): ceasefire, internal affairs, ground invasion and the targeting of Hamas.

Table 5.2: Themes and Processes of Exclusion of Political Actors in News Stories

NP	Israeli Political Actors	Palestinian Political Actors
GU	Backgrounding-internal affairs	Backgroundin-internal affairs Suppression in ceasefire
TL	Backgrounding in ceasefire Backgrounding in ground invasion	----------
NYT	----------	----------
WP	----------	Suppression-ceasefire Suppression-targeting of Hamas

This table suggests that the selected newspapers use different processes in excluding Israeli and Palestinian political actors in ceasefire and similar processes to exclude them by backgrounding them in internal affairs. Moreover, IPA are backgrounded in ground invasion, and PPA are suppressed in targeting Hamas. Because of limited space, I have selected only ceasefire for detailed examination. It is the most suitable theme and relevant for roles of political actors mainly in war time, where we can see political and diplomatic efforts. Also, it is the most frequent theme in three newspapers (GU, TL and WP). Israeli politicians are represented as making efforts to achieve a ceasefire, whereas Palestinian politicians are represented as reluctant to agree to ceasefire. This is shown clearly in the following examples.

1. **Israel** is expected to announce a unilateral ceasefire tonight that will end its three-week war in Gaza. GA-TL-17-JAN-01
2. **Hamas** is prepared to commit to a year and then consider renewing it. GA-GU-17-JAN-02
3. **Hamas** was excluded from the talks because it is labelled a terrorist group by the United States. GA-WP-03-JAN-01

IPA are presented in *Israel* while PPA are presented in *Hamas*. In examining the process of exclusion, IPA and PPA are represented similarly in the clause structure in passive forms. Their attitudes and efforts towards a ceasefire are opposed. In Ex1, there is no clear reference in the text to the social actors who expect Israel to announce a ceasefire as evident in *Israel is expected to announce*. In this case, social actors could be Israelis themselves, Palestinians or the international community. But, later in the text, the author mentions that the announcement relies on the agreement of the Israeli security cabinet. This announcement is intended to stop the war in Gaza.

In the treatment of Palestinians, GU in Ex2 represents *Hamas* as hesitant in agreeing to a ceasefire .The verb *consider* does not show certainty to renew or stop the ceasefire as it was clear in the phrase *Hamas is prepared to commit to a year*. In this way, GU uses passive agent deletion

by which there is no trace for those social actors who prepared Hamas to commit a ceasefire. In a previous part in the text, the author writes that Hamas had *talks* with Egyptian officials, and later in the text he follows "Israel wants it to be indefinite". In this case, it is not clear who made Hamas commit to a ceasefire: are they Israelis, Palestinian authority officials, Hamas itself, or even the Egyptians who mediate the agreement of ceasefire?

WP shows Hamas was negatively constructed as a terrorist group that does not seek ceasefire. In Ex3, Hamas is being suppressed, i.e. excluded from ceasefire negotiations without reference to who excluded it. In this case, it could be Israel, the USA, the EU, Egypt or even the Palestinian Authority. The author's justification of this exclusion is the labelling of Hamas as a terrorist organisation by the United States. Also, it links targeting Hamas to the United States' War on Terror. This is clearly shown multiple times in the text. "Bush has generally supported Israeli military actions during his eight years in office, while strongly condemning Hamas, the Lebanese Hezbollah movement and other anti-Israel groups that are considered terrorist organizations by the U.S. government".

This construction by exclusion incorporates a negative sentiment towards Hamas. The term terrorism "conjures up images in the minds of the public of foreign religious extremists, generally with fundamentalist Islamic religious beliefs, intent on killing civilians" (Frank and Carlisle-Frank, 2008:88). This representation calls and evokes negative and irrational judgements towards Hamas (see Richardson, 2007:205), and influences reporting the Gaza war of 2008-09 (see also section 7.5). The comparison suggests that Israelis are excluded when they declare a unilateral ceasefire. This declaration is followed by efforts leading to a ceasefire. These efforts foreground the Israeli agency and its commitment to achieve a ceasefire (see section 7.3.1).

Now, I turn to examine the inclusion of Israeli and Palestinian political actors by firstly focusing on the themes[58] associated with them (see the following table 5.3).

Table 5.3: Themes of Inclusion of Political Actors in News Stories

NP	Israeli Political Actors	Palestinian Political Actors
GU	**1)** Ceasefire **2)** Explanation of Objectives of the War **3)** Humanitarian Relief **4)** Ground Invasion Internal Affairs	**1)** Ceasefire **2)** Internal Affairs Calling for Violence
TL	**1)** Ceasefire **2)** Explanation of Objectives of the War **3)** Humanitarian Relief **4)** Ground Invasion Prevention of Foreign Journalists Targeting of Hamas	**1)** Ceasefire **2)** Internal Affairs Claim of Victory
NYT	1)..... **2)** Explanation of Objectives of the War **3)** Humanitarian Relief **4)** Ground Invasion Israel Media Coverage	**1)** Ceasefire **2)** Internal Relations Iranian-Middle East Relation Protesting against the War Targeting of Hamas
WP	**1)** Ceasefire **2)** Explanation of Objectives of the War **3)** Humanitarian Relief **4)** Ground Invasion Internal Affairs Targeting of Hamas Prevention of Foreign Journalists	**1)** Ceasefire **2)** Internal Relations Claim of Victory Protesting against the War

Table (5.3) shows IPA are included in four dominant themes and PPA are included in two dominant themes across the newspapers (see the numbered themes). To examine how the political actors are included, this section starts by looking at the roles allocated to the political actors. Social actors can be allocated activated roles, i.e. active and dynamic forces in actions, or passivated roles, i.e. recipients of the actions, and thus, they are treated as the object of the actions, or they beneficialise either in negative or positive ways (see section 3.5.2). My intention is to focus only on the theme of ceasefire for the same reasons mentioned above in examining the exclusion

[58] The speaking situations on the war events and operations are discussed in detail in chapter (6).

of social actors. The following clauses exemplify how IPA are included in ceasefire as they are activated only in GU, TL and WP.

4. **Israel's envoy to Cairo** returned to Jerusalem last night with details of Hamas's position. GA-GU-16-JAN-02
5. **Israel** welcomed an Egyptian proposal for a truce with Hamas, the Islamists rulers of Gaza, yet its security Cabinet voted to push ahead with its ground offensive while it worked out the details with international envoys. GA-TL-08-JAN-02
6. **An Israeli Defense Ministry official, Amos Gilad,** was negotiating with the Egyptians by phone Monday and was expected to travel to Cairo later in the week. GA-WP-13-JAN-01

GU, TL and WP activate Israeli roles and efforts to achieve a ceasefire agreement in Egypt. This can be shown in the underlined verbs: *returned, welcomed* and *was negotiating*. These efforts come into contexts in the full texts, e.g. *An Israeli foreign minister travelling to USA to sign an agreement with US foreign minister* (GU), reference to Israeli security concerns, e.g. *its security Cabinet voted to push ahead with its ground offensive* (TL), and progress in the ceasefire negotiations e.g. *the moves came as negotiators in Cairo sought to reach a cease-fire agreement, hoping to put a halt to violence* (WP).

In these examples, it is clear that TL and WP report Israeli demands for a ceasefire presented in the Israeli condition[59] for Hamas to lay its weapons down. Generally, GU, TL and WP foreground Israelis as a dynamic force in making efforts to achieve a ceasefire with Palestinians whose attitudes towards ceasefire are opposite. They reject or put conditions on ceasefire.

7. **The Islamist group** also wants Gaza's crossings into Israel reopened after three years of economic blockade. GA-GU-17-JAN-02
8. **Khaled Meshal, the exiled Hamas leader in Damascus,** rejected the ceasefire demands yesterday, insisting that Israel should withdraw its troops and immediately open Gaza's borders and lift the blockade it imposed after Hamas seized power there in 2007. GA-TL-17-JAN-01
9. **Hamas officials, who have been involved separately in negotiations with Egypt,** reacted coolly to the cease-fire plan. GA-WP-08-JAN-02
10. **The Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, whose Fatah Party opposes Hamas,** was in Cairo pressing a call for a cease-fire, and he discussed with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt the idea of international troops along the Gaza-Egypt border. GA-NYT-11-JAN-04

59 See the news report (GA-WP-18-JAN-01) in appendix (5.1) as an example of Israeli detailed demands for ceasefire.

Hamas' stance (discourse) towards the ceasefire can be shown in the underlined verbs, e.g. *wants*, *rejected*, *reacted* and *was [...] pressing*. These verbs come in the context of demandings to open the crossings in the Gaza Strip, and to end the Israeli blockade of Gaza (GU), *an immediate Israeli withdrawal, the end of Israel's blockade of Gaza and the opening of all crossings* (TL[60]), and cool reactions to ceasefire efforts by international community. This is in contrast to NYT which focuses on the President of the Palestinian Authority by allocating an activated role in discussing possibilities of the ceasefire with the Egyptian president, Mubarak. This pattern of representation contrasts with the roles allocated to Israeli politicians, as they make efforts to bring about a ceasefire. In these examples, Hamas is represented as dynamic in rejecting a ceasefire and placing conditions and demands to agree on ceasefire terms, while the Palestinian Authority President makes great efforts to agree to, and puts pressure on Hamas to accept, the Egyptian ceasefire plan. This way conceals Hamas' efforts to negotiate a ceasefire (see section 7.3.1).

In examining how social actors are included, examination of genericisation and specification is also essential to see how the newspapers refer to, and represent, Israeli and Palestinian political actors (see section 3.5.2) in their efforts to achieve a ceasefire. This is quite variable and depends largely on their efforts at seeking peace, making efforts, specific objectives and expectations of the negotiators to achieve a ceasefire. IPA are genericised by the use of mass nouns presented mainly as *Israel* (Ex11-13).

11. **Israel** wants to ensure that an internationally brokered ceasefire (GA-GU-16-JAN-02)
12. **Israel** welcomed an Egyptian proposal (see Ex5[61], GA-TL-08-JAN-02)
13. **Israel** brushed aside.....to broker a cease-fire in the Gaza Strip (GA-WP-06-JAN-01)

60 See report (GA-TL-14-JAN-02), appendix (5.1)

[61] In such cases, I quote only the relevant parts of the examples with a reference to the number of full examples.

These genericisation processes identify IPA as provenance presented in *Israel* in GU, TL and WP. Furthermore, GU and WP genericise IPA by plurals without articles, e.g. *Israeli governmental officials* (Ex14) and negotiators (Ex15).

14. s**ome senior Israeli officials** were optimistic (GA-GU-17-JAN-02)
15. the moves came as [Israeli] **negotiators** in (GA-WP-13-JAN-01).

In these genericisations, IPA are functionalised by adding suffixes to verbs in TL and WP as evident in the word ***negotiators*** (see Ex15 and Ex26). These practices clarify the Israeli efforts on the national level (Israel) and on individual level (political actors). Behind this apparent Israeli concession of offering and making ceasefire, Palestinians are represented as passive recipients presented mainly in *Hamas*[62].

PPA are genericised by mass nouns and plurals without articles. GU, TL and WP genericise PPA in mass nouns mainly as *Hamas* when they refer to Hamas' demands or the decision to reject the ceasefire or being excluded from the ceasefire talks. For example,

16. **Hamas** had hoped the ceasefire would lead to the lifting of the blockade (GA-GU-27-DEC-01)
17. **Hamas** opposes the deployment of an international force on that border and particularly abhors an Egyptian proposal (GA-TL-14-JAN-02)
18. **Hamas** was excluded from the talks (Ex3, GA-WP-03-JAN-01)

These genericisations identify PPA by provenance of *Hamas* in GU, TL and WP. NYT and WP genericise PPA in plural forms as Hamas actors when they refer to Hamas involvement in the negotiation process itself, in Cairo, For example,

19. **Hamas representatives** were also there, but the plan, also urged by the French, seemed to be losing steam (GA-NYT-11-JAN-04)
20. **Hamas officials**.... reacted coolly (Ex9, GA-WP-08-JAN-02).

[62] See also Bishop et al. (2007) on similar findings in examining representation of Israelis and Palestinians in American and Canadian media on Palestinian elections in 2006

These patterns of representation exclude reference to members of the Palestinian Authority and focus more on Hamas' officials. PPA are also categorised by functionalisation by adding suffixes to a verb in TL as evident in the word negotiator in the following example.

21. **Five Hamas negotiators** from Gaza and Damascus have spent the past few days in Cairo (GA-TL-14-JAN-02).

The analysis of the genericisation process discovers a similarity between genericising Israeli and Palestinian political actors by mass nouns and by plural forms without articles in GU, TL and WP. The examination of the specifications of political actors reveals that they are specified as individuals and as assimilation, i.e. groups (see section 3.5.2). As individuals, Israeli politicians are represented as governmental actors in GU, TL and WP. Those actors are presented as taking genuine steps to achieve a ceasefire. For example,

22. **the Israeli foreign minister, Tzipi Livni,** was due to fly to Washington to finalise an accord (GA-GU-16-JAN-02)
23. **Tzipi Livni, [...]** signed an agreement with Condoleezza Rice (GA-TL-17-JAN-01)
24. **Olmert** did not say when Israeli troops would withdraw from **Gaza** [….] raising the possibility that the cease-fire could be short-lived (GA-WP-18-JAN-01).

In this pattern, IPA are nominated in a semi-formal way in GU and TL, e.g. ***Tzipi Livni,*** while they are nominated formally in WP, e.g. ***Olmert.*** These nominations of Israeli official leaders illustrate the newspapers' insistence that those actors are determined to bring about a ceasefire. These efforts are represented in assimilating IPA by aggregation in GU and TL. The authors refer to numbers of Israeli social actors using quantifiers, *three* and *two* in these clauses,

25. **the three** have reportedly been in disagreement (GA-GU-16-JAN-02)
26. **two top Israeli negotiators** spent a day in Cairo discussing how Egypt could stop weapons (GA-TL-17-JAN-01).

There is a substantial consistency in the syntactic position and semantic roles, PPA are specified as Hamas individuals in TL, NYT and WP when they reject a ceasefire (Ex27-29), and as individuals of the Palestinian Authority in NYT in making efforts to achieve a ceasefire (Ex30).

27. **Khaled Meshal, the exiled Hamas leader in Damascus,** rejected the ceasefire demands. (Ex8, GA-TL-17-JAN-01)
28. **Moussa Abu Marzouk, the exiled deputy to the Hamas political chief Khaled Meshal,** told Al Jazeera television on Tuesday that while the organization had "serious reservations" about the Egyptian cease-fire plan, he believed that it might be accepted if changes were made. (GA-NYT-14-JAN-02)
29. **Ahmed Youssef, a Hamas spokesman in Gaza,** said the group would not stop firing rockets into southern Israel until the Israeli military withdrew from the Palestinian territory and ended the economic blockade, which has left Gaza's 1.5 million people dependent on smugglers and relief organizations for their basic needs. (GA-WP-08-JAN-02)
30. **The Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas** [.....] was in Cairo pressing a call for a cease-fire. (GA-NYT-11-JAN-04)

These specifications present similar nomination forms (semi-formal way) as evident in ***Khaled Meshal, Moussa Abu Marzouk, Ahmed Youssef and Mahmoud Abbas*** in TL, NYT and WP. Here we can see similarity in genericising and specifying the political actors mainly as *Israel* on one side and *Hamas* on the other side. By this finding, the newspapers arguably represent the Gaza war of 2008-09 as a war between Israel and Hamas (see section 7.6.1).

Overall this section, IPA are included and excluded mostly as *Israel*, governmental and non-governmental[63] actors, whereas PPA actors are included and excluded as *Hamas* or Hamas members. IPA are represented mainly as making efforts to achieve a ceasefire, whereas PPA mainly Hamas reject or impose demands to agree on a ceasefire. The choice of representation patterns risks generating an imbalance in war reporting and "has the potential of characterising people in different ways (Barkho and Richardson, 2010). This pattern represents Hamas as a threat to a ceasefire in the war, and thus, foregrounds their agency, i.e. responsibility in initiating the violence (see chapter 7.3.1).

[63] Non-governmental actors are actors with no relation to the government but they have a political role and dimension in the war news reports.

5.2.2 Military Actors in News Stories

This section examines how Israeli military actors (IMA) and Palestinian military actors (PMA) are represented across the selected newspapers. Table (5.4) shows the frequency distributions of the military actors.

Table 5.4: Percentage of Inclusion and Exclusion of Military Actors in News Stories

NP	No. Clause	IMA				PMA			
		Inclusion		Exclusion		Inclusion		Exclusion	
		No.	%	No.	No.	No.	%	No.	%
GU	141	25	17.7%	3	2.1%	5	3.5%	4	2.8%
TL	124	22	17.7%	1	0.8%	3	2.4%	0	0.0%
NYT	178	26	14.6%	0	0.0%	11	6.2%	1	0.6%
WP	192	31	16.1%	1	0.5%	24	12.5%	0	0.0%
Total	635	104	**66.2%**	5	**3.5%**	43	**24.6%**	5	**3.4%**

In this table (5.4), IMA are included (66.2%) more than twice as often as the inclusion (24.6%) of PMA. Obviously, the table shows that Israeli and Palestinian actors are almost excluded similarly. The inclusion of IMA makes them more apparent than PMA. Also, the similar frequencies in excluding the military actors balance the exclusion of the responsibility of military actors. The table indicates that the UK newspapers tend to exclude the agency of IMA and PMA more than US newspapers. Also, the UK newspapers pay more attention to the inclusion of IMA, whereas the US newspapers include PMA more than the UK newspapers. These frequencies represent military actors as agents or goals in various themes. The following table (5.5) shows the themes in which military actors are excluded.

Table 5.5: Themes and Processes of Exclusion of Military Actors in News Stories

NP	Israeli Military Actors	Palestinian Military Actors
GU	Suppression and backgrounding-ground invasion	Backgrounding- targeting of Hamas and firing rockets
TL	Backgrounding-ground invasion	--------
NYT	--------	Suppression-internal affairs
WP	Suppression-ground invasion	----------

In table (5.5), we can see two dominant themes in the exclusion of military actors: the ground invasion and the targeting of Hamas. The analysis discovers that the exclusions underestimate the Palestinian responsibility in

killing Israeli soldiers on the ground in GU, TL and WP (Ex31-33), and background Israeli agency in targeting Hamas in GU (Ex34).

31. **Israeli forces** were locked in heavy fighting in northern Gaza last night with intensive artillery strikes and jet bombing in the north and across Gaza City as the military pledged to press on with its attack. GA-GU-06-JAN-03
32. **Her soldier** son had just left Gaza and several of his comrades had been injured. GA-TL-13-JAN-03
33. **One Israeli soldier** was killed Tuesday, bringing to six the total dead since Israel launched its ground offensive Saturday night. GA-WP-07-JAN-02
34. **The main security headquarters in Gaza** City were hit again and **four** were killed when most of its buildings were flattened. GA-GU-29-DEC-01

In these examples, the authors use passive structures in excluding agent actors, e.g. *were locked*, *had been injured*, *were killed* and *were killed*. These patterns of passive structures seem to equalise the power of both warring sides portraying Hamas as powerful as the Israeli military. IMA and PMA are syntactically backgrounded by deleting responsible actors for the violence immediately in these clauses. In this backgrounding, the verbs *were locked* and *were killed* show ferocity of fighting. These exclusions conceal responsibility of the military actors (see section 7.3.1).

In Ex31, GU suppresses the social actors by passive agent deletion as the author did not mention the responsible agents for locking Israeli forces on the ground either immediately in the clause or in any part of the text. Possible readings can show that *Israeli forces were locked* because Hamas fighters were very close to them, or because they were firing a lot of rockets and mortars at them. Also possibly they did not know the place well, and thus, they got stuck and *locked* in the crowded area in northern Gaza Strip.

Ex32 backgrounds the social actors responsible for the targeting of Israeli soldiers by agent deletion. Israeli soldiers are described as being injured in the ground invasion without immediate reference to the agent social actors in the clause. We can interpret the agent actors from the context *soldier son left Gaza*. It can be extracted from reading the text, e.g. *one of her students was killed by a rocket last March.*

WP in Ex33 also suppresses the social actors responsible for the killing of an Israeli soldier by passive agent deletion. We understand that they were fighting on the ground. However, the exclusion in this case could refer responsibilities to Palestinians or to Israelis. The author further writes that “of those, four were killed in friendly fire incidents”. This means the Israeli soldiers were not only killed by Palestinians, but also they were killed by their colleagues. This makes the agency ambiguous.

By passive agent deletion, GU in Ex34 backgrounds the agent actors who are responsible for the targeting and hitting of Hamas' *main security headquarters* and killing *four* Palestinian militants. The author does not mention the responsible actors immediately in the clause. However, by reading the text, we can see the author refers to Israeli raids that hit places of Hamas. The author writes in the same text "a predawn raid destroyed the headquarters of the Hamas TV channel, al-Aqsa".

These findings show that the deliberate obfuscation of agency results in leaving attributions of causality and responsibility unclear. Now, I turn to examine how the military actors are included. This is done firstly by specifying the themes as shown in table (5.6).

Table 5.6: Themes of Inclusion of Military Actors in News Stories

NP	Activated Roles		Passivated Roles	
	Israeli Military Actors	**Palestinian Military Actors**	**Israeli Military Actors**	**Palestinian Military Actors**
GU	Targeting Hamas Ground Invasion Targeting Civilians Targeting UN Sites Targeting Tunnels Ceasefire Humanitarian Relief	Firing rockets	Ground Invasion	Targeting Hamas
TL	Targeting Hamas Ground Invasion Targeting Civilians Targeting UN Sites	Firing rockets	Ground Invasion	----------
NYT	Targeting Hamas Ground Invasion Targeting Civilians Targeting Tunnels	Firing rockets Internal Affairs	----------	Targeting Hamas
WP	Targeting Hamas Ground Invasion Targeting Civilians Targeting UN Sites Prevention of Journalists Humanitarian Relief	Firing Rockets	Ground Invasion	Targeting Hamas

The table indicates that IMA are mostly allocated activated roles in similar war operations, e.g. targeting Hamas, ground invasion and targeting civilians across the newspapers. Israeli targeting of UN sites is a similar theme in GU, TL and WP. PMA are allocated activated agent roles in firing rockets into Israel across the newspapers. The analysis focuses on two themes: Israeli targeting of Hamas and Palestinian firing of rockets. These themes are the most common themes and related to the war between Israel and Hamas. The following examples show how IMA are allocated activated roles.

35. **Israel** struck at the heart of Hamas yesterday, killing one of its most senior leaders and pushing deeper into Gaza City, as moves towards a temporary ceasefire inched forward. GA-GU-16-JAN-02
36. **Israel's offensive** has killed 1,100 Palestinians including, on Thursday, Saeed Seyyam, Hamas interior minister. GA-TL-17-JAN-01
37. **Israeli warplanes** pounded Hamas targets in Gaza for a seventh day on Friday while Israel allowed hundreds of foreigners, many of them married to Palestinians, to leave the enclave, raising fears there that Israel was planning to escalate its week-old campaign. GA-NYT-03-JAN-01
38. **Israeli warplanes** pounded Hamas installations across the Gaza Strip on Saturday and early Sunday in retaliation for rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel. GA-WP-28-DEC-01

These examples reflect a causal relationship between IMA and Hamas. It is implied in activating the Israeli agency to target Hamas. This can be noticed in the underlined verbs *struck*, *has killed* and *pounded*. This causal relation foregrounds the agency of the military actors in causality aspects (see chapter 7.3.1). In Ex35-38, the concrete processes presented in the double underlined verbs reflect and signal Israeli war actions focused on Hamas, e.g. *heart of Hamas* (Ex35), *Saeed Seyyam, Hamas interior minister* (Ex36), *Hamas targets* (Ex37) and *Hamas installations* (Ex38). The focus on Hamas implies responses to Hamas' actions as can be seen in the activated roles allocated to Palestinian military actors as firing rockets into Israel (Ex39-42).

39. Over the past three days, **Hamas** has pounded Israel's neighbouring southern townships with 36 rockets, 30 of which were fired on Wednesday, hitting a waterpark, a house and a factory. GA-GU-27-DEC-01
40. **Rockets** repeatedly streaked out of Gaza towards the settlements of Sderot, Beersheba and Ashkelon just across the border. GA-TL-10-JAN-03
41. Hamas continued to fire longer-range rockets at Israel, shooting deep into the city of Ashdod for a second day as well as into Beersheba, a major city in Israel's south, where one landed in an empty kindergarten classroom. GA-NYT-31-DEC-01
42. **Hamas** has fired hundreds of rockets, most of them crude and unguided, into southern Israel since a six-month truce between the group and Israel expired Dec. 19. GA-WP-08-JAN-02

In Ex39-Ex42, the underlined verbs show firing of rockets into Israel as a dynamic activity, i.e. the main action of Hamas is to fire rockets into Israel. Moreover, these agent roles convey the idea of aggression and superior force, especially *pound* and *strike*. Through allocation of activated roles, the authors of the texts use mostly similar syntactic words (verbs) associated with Israelis in conveying the idea of aggression. They implicitly carry actions that expect reactions. This representation indicates that PMA are the causal agents of the violent actions expressed in the clauses. Therefore, we see foregrounding of their actions. In this context, Hamas is represented as exclusively responsible for initiating attacks on Israel. This is evident in contexts across the newspapers as follows:

the group [Hamas] fired at least 13 rockets into Israel yesterday alone" (GA-GU-17-JAN-02), *there is a flash, and a Qassam rocket trailing smoke arcs up towards Sderot, Ashkelon or one of the other settlements of southern Israel* (GA-TL-13-JAN-03), *Palestinian militants continued to launch salvos of rockets at southern Israel on Friday* (GA-NYT-03-JAN-01), and *Palestinian fighters have fired more than 7,000 of the rockets since 2005* (GA-WP-18-JAN-01).

Besides the activated roles, the analysis of role allocations shows that Israeli and Palestinian military actors are allocated passivated roles. IMA are also allocated passivated roles in ground invasion in which Hamas target and kill Israeli soldiers in GU, TL and WP. Evidence can be shown in the following examples: ***Israeli forces*** *were locked in heavy fighting in northern Gaza last night* (GU, Ex31), ***her soldier*** *son had just left Gaza and several of his comrades had been injured* (TL, Ex32) ***six Israeli soldiers*** *have died in five days of ground operations, although only two were killed by Palestinians* (GA-WP-08-JAN-01).

PMA are passivated in Israeli targeting of Hamas in GU, NYT and WP, e.g. ***four were killed*** (GU, Ex34), *a week ago, after Israel began its air assault,* ***hundreds of Hamas militants*** *were taken to the hospital* (GA-NYT-05-JAN-02) and ***most of the homes of Hamas operatives*** *targeted Friday were apparently empty* (GA-WP-03-JAN-01).

Overall in these passivated roles, Israeli soldiers are presented as objects that are subjected to Hamas' actions against them. Similarly, Hamas actors are represented as objects to the Israeli actions. This means that there is no big difference between Israeli and Palestinian military actors in the linguistic features. However, the difference is implied in the themes in which both Israelis and Palestinians were either activated or passivated as shown in table (5.6). In other words, the language used to represent both Israelis and Palestinians is quite similar. This pattern represents the war as being between two equal powers: Israel and Hamas (see section 7.6.1).

Further to the role allocation, the examination analyses genericisation and specification of the military actors. This means the authors of texts use either generic reference or specific reference to the social actors (see section 3.5.2). The analysis reveals that in the targeting of Hamas, Israeli military actors are genericised in mass nouns without articles presented mainly as *Israel* in GU, TL and WP. In this genericisation, the focus is on Hamas in general, *heart of Hamas* (Ex43), *local leaders of Hamas* (Ex44) and *on Hamas* (Ex45).

43. **Israel** struck at the heart of Hamas yesterday (see Ex35, GA-GU-16-JAN-02);
44. **Israel** has briefly delayed its all-out assault on the heart of Gaza's population centers..... local leaders of Hamas have been shocked by the ferocity of Operation Cast Lead (GA-TL-14-JAN-02)
45. **Israel** began its military offensive with a surprise attack on Hamas (GA-WP-13-JAN-01).

IMA are represented as military equipment genericised by plural forms without articles across the newspapers. In these genericisations, GU and WP focus on specific targets presented as Hamas individuals and members (Ex46 and Ex49), whereas TL and NYT focus on the Israeli targeting of Hamas' general targets (Ex47 and 48).

46. **Israeli jets** yesterday bombed a house ….. killing the Hamas interior minister, Said Siam (GA-GU-16-JAN-02)
47. **Apache helicopter gunships** attack unseen targets (GA-TL-13-JAN-03)
48. **Israeli air and naval forces** pummeled more bases of Hamas (GA-NYT-03-JAN-01)
49. **Israeli forces** bombed the home of Nizar Rayyan, a Hamas cleric ..... killing him, his four wives and 11 of his children (GA-WP-03-JAN-01).

IMA are also genericised by the use of the singular with indefinite articles in GU and TL. Their action focuses on specific target of Hamas, i.e. *Hamas TV*. This is evident in the following clauses:

50. **A predawn raid** destroyed the headquarters of the Hamas TV channel (GA-GU-29-DEC-01)
51. **an Israeli plane** blew up a car, killing a Palestinian man and his three children (GA-TL-08-JAN-02).

These genericisations point out that IMA are not nominated in any newspapers, but they are mainly categorised. In categorisation, NYT and WP functionalise IMA as a compound noun, e.g. ***Israeli warplanes*** (see Ex37 and 38). TL functionalises IMA by adding suffixes to verbs as evident in the word *bombers* in the following example, ***Israeli bombers and artillery*** *pounded buildings for a fifth straight day (*GA-TL-01-JAN-01). In these patterns of genericisation, Israeli military actors are referred to as instrumental, i.e. non-human entities (see Van Leeuwen, 1996:60 on instrumentalisation). These patterns marginalise the agency of the actors.

Regarding the theme of firing rockets, PMA are genericised by mass nouns as *Hamas* in GU, NYT and WP (Ex52 and Ex53). Furthermore, PMA are genericised by plural forms without articles across newspapers (Ex54-58).

52. **Hamas** has pounded Israel's neighbouring southern townships with 36 rockets (GA-GU-27-DEC-01)
53. **Hamas** continued to fire longer-range rockets at Israel (GA-NYT-31-DEC-01)
54. **Hamas** has also fired mortar shells at soldiers (GA-WP-08-JAN-01).
55. **Palestinian militants in Gaza** continued to fire rockets into southern Israel (GA-GU-29-DEC-01)
56. **Palestinian militants** continued to launch salvos of rockets at southern Israel (GA-NYT-03-JAN-01)
57. **Rockets** repeatedly streaked out of Gaza towards the settlements of Sderot (see Ex20)
58. **Rockets from Gaza** have killed three Israeli civilians and one soldier (GA-WP-08-JAN-01).

GU and NYT genericise PMA in *Palestinian militants, i.e.* human entities without referring to Hamas members (Ex55 and Ex57), whereas TL and WP genericise them as rockets, i.e. non-human entities (Ex56 and Ex58). PMA are genericised as singular with a definite article in GU (Ex59), and as singular with an indefinite article in TL (Ex60). In genericisations, PMA are categorised and functionalised by adding suffixes as in the verb fight in WP (Ex61).

59. **the group** fired at least 13 rockets into Israel (GA-GU-17-JAN-02)
60. there is a flash, and **a Qassam rocket trailing smoke arcs up towards Sderot** (GA-TL-13-JAN-03).
61. even though **Hamas fighters** largely have avoided battling Israeli soldiers, they keep firing rockets (GA-WP-08-JAN-01).

In examining the specification of military actors, only PMA are specified as individual in NYT (Ex62), and as assimilation by collectivisation in GU (Ex63).

62. It was the mosque where **Nizar Rayyan,** the senior Hamas militant leader killed in an Israeli strike (GA-NYT-03-JAN-01).
63. **Seventy mortars** were also fired (GA-GU-27-DEC-01).

These practices shows the Palestinian "militancy" (Barkho 2010:132), and illustrate that Palestinians mainly Hamas have initiated violence and fired rockets. Stating the number of rockets draws the attention to the high numbers of rockets.

Overall in this section, Israeli military actions are presented as being mainly against Hamas members and targets in the Gaza Strip. These actions are foregrounded as responses to Palestinian military actions presented mainly as Hamas firing rockets (see also section 7.3.1). From the representational practices, the main focus on the Israeli operation is to target Hamas. This conveys that the war is being directed against Hamas rather than against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. This also supports the Israeli claim that they attack Hamas because it fires rockets into Israel as evident in representation of PMA. Through these practices, we can see that Israeli hard-line responses to the Hamas violence are "represented as logical and neutral, the natural response to Palestinian action not an independent escalation of belligerence" (Bishop et al., 2007:6).

5.2.3 Civilian Actors in News Stories

This section focuses on how the civilian actors are represented. Generally speaking, the treatment of civilian actors is different from the treatment of political and military actors. The difference is Palestinian civilian actors (henceforth PCA) are included and excluded across the sampled news stories more than Israeli civilian actors (ICA), as we can see in the following table (5.7).

Table 5.7: Percentage of Inclusion and Exclusion of Civilian Actors in News Stories

NP	No. Clause	Israeli Civilian Actors				Palestinian Civilian Actors			
		Inclusion		Exclusion		Inclusion		Exclusion	
		No.	%	No.	No.	No.	%	No.	%
GU	**141**	3	2.1%	3	2.1%	18	12.8%	17	12.1%
TL	**124**	12	9.6%	3	2.4%	14	11.3%	5	4.0%
NYT	**178**	2	1.1%	1	0.6%	53	29.8%	14	7.9%
WP	**192**	8	4.1%	1	0.5%	16	8.3%	4	2.1%
Total	**635**	25	**17.1%**	4	**5.6%**	101	**62.2%**	40	**26%**

Table (5.7) indicates that Israeli civilians are included (17.1%) and excluded (5.6%) two times less than inclusion (62.2%) and exclusion (26%) of Palestinian civilians. These frequencies show that ICA are included and excluded in the UK newspapers more than in the US newspapers. PCA are included more in the US newspapers, whereas they are excluded in the UK newspapers more than in the US newspapers. The low focus on Israeli civilians leads to the concealing of their voices, while the focus on Palestinian civilians may attract sympathy as they are the major casualties. Table 5.8 shows how the newspapers exclude civilian actors.

Table 5.8: Themes and Processes of Exclusion of Civilians Actors in News Stories

Theme	Israeli Civilian Actors	Palestinian Civilian Actors
GU	Suppression-facing consequences of war	Suppression and backgrounding in facing consequences of war
TL	Backgrounding facing consequences of war	Backgrounding in facing consequences of war
NYT	Suppression- facing consequences of war	Backgrounding and Suppression-facing consequences of war
WP	Suppression- facing consequences of war	Backgrounding and Suppression-facing consequences of war

Table (5.8) shows that facing consequences of war is a dominant theme in exclusion of the civilian actors. ICA are suppressed in GU, NYT and WP. They are also backgrounded in GU and TL. PCA are suppressed in GU, NYT and WP. Also, they are backgrounded across the newspapers. This comparison suggests that the authors most portray the suffering of Israelis and Palestinians equally in facing consequences of war, with little difference in the linguistic structure, either in backgrounding or suppression, as we can see in the following examples.

64. On the Israeli side **eight people**, including five soldiers, have died and about 60, mostly soldiers have been hurt. GA-GU-06-JAN-03
65. **Others** were clearly distressed. GA-TL-13-JAN-03
66. **Thirteen Israelis** have died, including 10 soldiers.GA-NYT-14-JAN-02
67. **Thirteen Israelis** have been killed, three of them civilians.GA-WP-13-JAN-01

GU in Ex64 suppresses the killing or wounding of Israel civilians. The text itself does not trace social actors who are responsible for killing Israeli civilians. In Ex65, there is no clear trace of the social actors who cause the distress, and why they have already done so to the Israelis. But, reading the quotation before this clause, we can see that Hamas was responsible for such effect on Israelis. The author connects this effect with Hamas as exemplified in the following clause: *the ones who co-operate with Hamas - that's their problem*.

Ex66 does not have reference to the responsible social actors for the death of Israeli civilians and soldiers. Similar to GU, NYT in Ex66 uses the verb *die*. This verb does not show they were killed by Palestinians. The association of the number of civilians with the word *soldier*, in the same clause, shows that there was military operation in which those people were killed. In any case, if they are killed, the author does not mention the reason they were killed, or the social actors responsible for the killing. WP in Ex67 uses the verb *killed* in a passive form structure. The author suppresses the agent social actors responsible for the killings. This representation mystifies the Palestinian agency. From these examples, we can see that GU and NYT

use similar structures (active voice), whereas TL and WP use a passive voice structure. In both cases, the social actors are excluded. The following examples (68-71) show how PCA are excluded across the newspapers in facing consequences of war.

68. At least **27 Palestinians** were killed. GA-GU-12-JAN-03
69. **Almost 400 Palestinians** have been killed, a quarter of them civilians, according to the United Nations. GA-TL-01-JAN-01
70. In Tuesday's fighting, 18 Palestinian fighters and **seven civilians** were killed, part of the 971 Palestinians who have died, according to **Gaza's** Hamas-run Health Ministry. GA-NYT-14-JAN-02
71. **More than 2,500 people** were reported wounded. GA-WP-06-JAN-01

Ex68-Ex71 show the exclusion of Palestinian civilian actors by passive agent deletion in a passive voice presented in *were killed* (GU and NYT), *have been killed* (TL) and *were wounded* (WP). In these examples, there is no immediate guidance or reference to the responsible agents for the killing or wounding of Palestinian persons. The social actors could have been included, so readers would be clearly aware of who is responsible. In these examples (68-71) we can see similarities in the theme in which Palestinian civilians are excluded. GU and WP use suppression, while TL and NYT use backgrounding.

Overall, the exclusions obscure the responsibility for the deaths of civilians. The exclusion of the Israeli civilians leads to the concealing of their voice. The intensive inclusion of Palestinian civilians promotes and creates empathy and sympathy towards them in the majority of the coverage. Also, the exclusions create an equivalence between both sides in suffering consequences of the war. The examination of social actors reveals that Israeli and Palestinian civilian actors are included in the same theme, facing consequences of war as we can see in table (5.9).

Table 5.9: Themes of Inclusion of Israeli and Palestinian Civilian Actors in News Stories

NP	Israeli Civilian Actors	Palestinian Civilian Actors
GU	Facing consequences of war Ceasefire Criticism of Israel's use of force	Facing consequences of war Protesting against the war
TL	Facing consequences of war Praising Israeli operations	Facing consequences of war Protesting against the war
NYT	Facing consequences of war	Facing consequences of war Praising Hamas Protesting against the war Internal affairs
WP	Facing consequences of war Supporting Israeli objectives of the war	Facing consequences of war Internal affairs Hope for ceasefire

The table shows that ICA and PCA are included similarly in facing consequences of war across the newspapers. In this theme, they are mainly allocated passivated roles in facing consequences of war across the newspapers. Israeli civilians are passivated in facing Hamas' rockets across the newspapers as exemplified in the following clauses.

72. On the Israeli side 13 people have been killed, **three of them civilians**.GA-GU-12-JAN-03
73. **Most** are worn out by the 15-second warnings that send them rushing to shelters several times each day. GA-TL-13-JAN-03
74. **Three Israeli civilians and one soldier** have been killed in rocket attacks in the past week, as Hamas deployed its more advanced, longer-range projectiles capable of hitting Israeli cities more than 20 miles away. GA-NYT-03-JAN-01
75. **Four Israelis** have been killed by rocket attacks since Israel launched the offensive, but no serious injuries were reported Friday. GA-WP-03-JAN-01

The examples (72-75) show similarly as the authors use passive forms to refer to the killing of Israeli civilians, e.g. *have been killed* in GU, NYT and WP and to refer to rocket warnings in TL. This means that the newspapers share similar linguistic features and convey similar discourses and meanings to their audiences. These discourses serve to reinforce the Israeli message that they are only defending themselves, and reacting in response to Hamas' rockets. In the same vein, PCA are allocated passivated roles in facing consequences of war in the Gaza Strip across the news stories.

76. **Several young people** were killed in **Gaza** City on Saturday in a busy street by an Israeli air strike. GA-GU-29-DEC-01
77. The announcement came after **a Palestinian employee** was killed and **two others** were injured when a UN- flagged convoy was hit by Israeli tank shells near the Erez crossing on Gaza's northern border. GA-TL-09-JAN-02
78. **Two sisters,** ages 4 and 11, were killed in a strike in the north as concern was growing around the world that the assault was taking a terrible toll on civilians. GA-NYT-31-DEC-01
79. **More than 40 Palestinians** were killed in Gaza on Monday, almost half of them children, and five civilians were killed early Tuesday when a shell fired by an Israeli ship hit their house, according to local medical workers. GA-WP-06-JAN-01

Ex76-Ex79 show that PCA are passivated in killing situations. In TL and NYT, limited numbers of civilians are killed, while in GU and WP the words *several* and *more than* are vague. This demonstrates similar suffering on both sides even though there is a big difference in the number of casualties in both sides. This may influence the whole image of the war in a way that is biased to one version of reality (see section 7.4.1). This pattern reflects empathy mainly to Palestinian casualties as they are presented more than the Israelis. Also, the authors of news stories seem to use similar linguistic features.

In facing consequences of war, Israeli and Palestinian civilian actors are genericised and specified. ICA are genericised by plurals without articles in GU, TL and WP (Ex80-82), and as singular with the indefinite article in WP (Ex83).

80. there were no serious **casualties** (GA-GU-27-DEC-01)
81. **others** were clearly distressed (Ex65, GA-TL-13-JAN-03)
82. **Israeli casualties** have been lighter than the military had expected (GA-WP-08-JAN-01).
83. **a 3-month-old child** in Gedera, about 25 miles north of **Gaza**, was lightly wounded **(GA-WP-07-JAN-02).**

From these genericisations, ICA actors are identified and classified in GU, NYT, WP, e.g. *Israelis*, *Thirteen Israelis*, *Israeli casualties* and by age *A 3-month-old child*, and by class, *Four Israelis* only in WP and GU, *13 people*. PCA are genericised as plurals without articles in GU, TL and WP (Ex84-87), and genericised by a definite article GU, TL and NYT (EX88-90).

84. After two days of air raids, **more than 290 Palestinians** have been killed, and more than 600 injured. (GA-GU-29-DEC-01)
85. **many people** were reported still trapped under the rubble of collapsed buildings (GA-WP-28-DEC-01)
86. **almost 400 Palestinians** have been killed (GA-TL-01-JAN-01).
87. **Sanitation workers** constantly mop up blood (GA-NYT-05-JAN-02)
88. **the Palestinian death toll** rose to around 870 dead (GA-GU-12-JAN-03)
89. **the driver** left his vehicle in the forecourt as he jumped out to help to carry the critically ill patient inside (GA-TL-05-JAN-08);
90. **the Nakhala family**...was inspecting the damage (GA-NYT-31-DEC-01).

Palestinian civilians are categorised by more identifications than Israeli civilians. They are identified as being categorised by class in GU, e.g. ***another 20 students*** (GA-TL-05-JAN-08); according to gender in TL, NYT, e.g. *the first to be carried in was* ***a boy*** **(**GA-TL-05-JAN-03)*;* ***another woman*** *found only half of the body of her 17-year-old daughter in the Shifa morgue* (GA-NYT-05-JAN-02).

PCA are identified by relational identification (kinship) in NYT and WP, e.g. ***Two young cousins*** *and a 5-year-old boy from another family were killed* (GA-NYT-05-JAN-02).

In examining the specification of civilian actors, Israeli civilians are specified by aggregation across the newspapers (Ex91-94). In these specifications, they are nominated in a semi-formal way in TL, e.g. e.g. *Rafi Twitto, Osher, David Kunin and Tanya Zaltzman*. Palestinian civilians are specified by assimilation only, e.g. *seven of the dead* (Ex95) and *15,000* (EX96).

91. On the Israeli side **13 people** have been killed, **three of them** civilians. (GA-GU-12-JAN-03)
92. **One of her students** was killed (GA-TL-13-JAN-03)
93. **thirteen Israelis** have died (GA-NYT-14-JAN-02);
94. **four Israelis** have been killed by rocket attacks (GA-WP-03-JAN-01).
95. **seven of the dead** were students (GA-GU-29-DEC-01)
96. the number of displaced Palestinians flooding into the schools had reached **15,000** (GA-WP-07-JAN-02).

The analysis shows that only PCA are specified as individuals in TL, NYT and WP. These specifications show that PCA are nominated in a semi-formal way in GU, TL, NYT and WP, e.g. *Salim Abu Sadaq, Izz el-Deen Aboul Aish, Fida Basal, and Ala Zumu* (Ex97-100).

97. **Salim Abu Sadaq** and six of his relatives scrabbled around in the soil of Gaza City's Sheikh Radwan cemetery for two hours yesterday. GA-GU-02-JAN-03
98. The agony of the war burst into Israeli homes last night as **Izz el-Deen Aboul Aish,** (GA-TL-17-JAN-01)
99. *Fida Basal, 20, was not there when it struck, Ala Zumu.* GA-NYT-05-JAN-02
100. **Ala Zumu,** a 27-year-old cameraman for al-Arabiya television, was one of the first on the scene (GA-WP-28-DEC-01).

PCA are also nominated formally in GU and NYT, ***Khalil*** *has visited the grave every day* (GA-GU-02-JAN-03); ***Mr. Abu Daf,*** *37, was hit and one of his children was wounded* (GA-NYT-05-JAN-02).

In brief, the genericisation of Israeli civilians shows that they are included in facing rockets in general, whereas Palestinian civilians are genericised as being killed or injured in the war in the Israeli operatios against Hamas. Moreover, ICA's expressive force stems from particular values they are assigned in association with other IMA as it can be seen in Ex32, Ex64 and Ex66. Comparing the numbers of civilians is not given attention by the journalists. As evidence, PCA are prominently specified by aggregation through high numbers in their specifications (Ex68-71).

This representation might attract more sympathy to PCA over ICA. These genericisations mystify the Israeli agency by avoiding specifying the responsible agent(s) for the death and destruction. Fairclough (1989: 116) argues that "a text's choice of wording depends on, and helps create, social relationships between participants". In contrast to political and military actors, one of the most salient types of representation encountered in the corpus is that of aggregation of civilian actors. In these comparisons, ICA are assimilated with numbers. The authors seem to provide readers of the newspapers with documented data. This shows the authors to be professional and objective in their reporting (see also Reisigl and Wodak 2001, Van Leeuwen 1995).

5.2.4 Other Actors in News Stories

This section examines the representation of other actors. They are mainly included in the news stories. Table (5.10) shows the frequency distributions of how they are included.

Table 5.10: Percentage of Inclusion of Other Actors in News Stories

NP	No. clauses	US		UK		UN		EU		Arab		International		Iranian	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
GU	141	4	2.8%	1	0.7%	1	0.7%	2	1.4%	3	0.02	5	3.5%	3	2.1%
TL	124	3	2.4%	1	0.8%	3	2.4%	1	0.8%	8	0.06	10	8.1%	0	0.0%
NYT	178	2	1.1%	0	0.0%	3	1.7%	1	0.6%	6	0.03	13	7.3%	20	11.2%
WP	192	13	6.8%	0	0.0%	8	4.2%	5	2.6%	9	0.05	5	2.6%	0	0.0%
Total	635	22	13.2%	2	1.5%	15	2.4%	9	1.4%	26	0.17	33	21.5%	23	13.4%

Table (5.10) shows that international actors have the highest percentage of inclusion (21.5%) among other actors. US and Iranian actors then follow with almost similar percentage (13%). The high percentage of inclusion makes the exclusion of other actors very low across themes of the sampled news stories (see table 5.11). This is because when social actors are included more, they are less excluded.

The table also shows the US newspapers pay attention to other actors more than the UK newspapers. US, UN, EU and Iranian actors are more frequent in the US newspapers, whereas UK and international actors are more frequent in the UK newspapers. This means that the newspapers pay attention to their national actors as we see with the US and UK actors.

Table 5.11: Themes and Processes of Exclusion of Other Actors in News Stories

Actors	US	UK	UN	EU	ARAB	INTERNATIONAL	IRANIAN
GU	---------	------	Backgrounding in Israeli targeting of UN sites	------	------	----------	----------
TL	Backgrounding in ceasefire	------		------	------	Suppression in killing situation	----------
NYT	---------	------	----------	------	--------	Backgrounding in prevention of reporters	----------
WP	---------	------	----------	------	--------	----------	----------

The table (5.11) shows GU excludes UN actors in Israeli striking UN sites. TL backgrounds US actors in ceasefire and suppresses international actors in killing situation. NYT backgrounds international actors in prevention of international actors from entering Gaza Strip. The following examples demonstrate how those actors are excluded.

101. **The UNRWA compound** was one of several civilian institutions hit as troops moved into Gaza City, taking control of three neighbourhoods. GA-GU-16-JAN-02
102. **Two World Food Programme drivers** were killed. GA-TL-08-JAN-02
103. On Tuesday **the reporters** were told to not even bother going to the border. GA-NYT-07-JAN-03

Ex101 backgrounds the social actors responsible for striking the UN compound in the Gaza Strip. The clause shows the hitting of the place happened during the movement of Israeli troops. But, it does not show clear reference to the agents for hitting UN sites. It is true that the clause shows Israeli control of parts close to the UN site in Gaza, but it is not clearly stated that Israel is responsible for hitting UN sites. One possible reading of the clause could be that the hitting of UN sites is resulted from Hamas fighting Israeli soldiers. Later in the text, the author writes that "shells struck a hospital and a building house of international media" which are civilian institutions including UN sites. By this clause, we can realise that Israel is the actor responsible for hitting UN sites rather than Hamas.

In Ex102, we can see suppression of the responsible actors for killing of two drivers by passive agent deletion. It does not mention the agent social actors in the clause or in the text. We do not know who killed the drivers. Possible readings can be that either Palestinians or Israelis as responsible for the action. Ex103 excludes social actors who told foreign reporters not to enter Gaza. In this case, the social actors could be Israelis, Palestinians or the media agencies in which the reporters work.

The analysis of role allocation shows that other actors are allocated activated agent roles in speaking situations (see chapter 6). They are also allocated activated roles in making efforts to achieve a ceasefire agreement and in humanitarian relief. The following clauses exemplify how other actors are allocated activated roles in ceasefire.

104. **Condoleezza Rice, the US secretary of state, and Tzipi Livni, Israel's foreign minister,** signed the agreement for Washington to provide technical and intelligence co-operation, as well as logistical support, for monitors on the Egypt-Gaza border - a move designed to address one of the principal Israeli demands: that any truce with Hamas includes measures to stop it from rearming by smuggling weapons. GA-GU-17-JAN-02
105. **Britain** proposed another press statement calling for an immediate and permanent ceasefire and setting out criteria for a durable truce. GA-TL-05-JAN-03
106. The idea was in an early stage, a result of a conversation **between Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner of France** and Defense Minister Ehud Barak of Israel seeking at least a temporary pause in the fighting that would allow humanitarian relief to be delivered to the besieged coastal strip. GA-NYT-31-DEC-01
107. **Arab foreign ministers** began arriving at U.N. headquarters Monday to show support for the Palestinian diplomatic push to step up international pressure on Israel to halt its military operation in Gaza. GA-WP-06-JAN-01
108. **The rescuers** evacuated 18 of the wounded and 12 others who were suffering from exhaustion. GA-TL-09-JAN-02
109. **Iran** supports Hamas's demand that the blockade of Gaza be lifted and border crossing points into Egypt be permanently opened. GA-GU-05-JAN-08

In these examples, US (Ex104), UK (Ex105), EU (Ex106) and Arab (Ex107) actors are allocated activated roles in making efforts towards a ceasefire. Ex108 is an example how international actors, presented in *the rescuers,* are allocated active roles in providing humanitarian relief to the civilians in the four newspapers. In Ex109, Iranian actors are activated roles in supporting Hamas. These examples show that the major roles allocated to other actors, apart from Iranian actors, are as participants in ceasefire negotiations and attempts to stop the war between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

In regard to ceasefire, other actors are both genericised and specified across the newspapers. In examining genericisation, other actors are genericised as mass nouns without articles, plurals without articles, and as singular with indefinite articles.

GU genericises US as singular with a definite article, EU and Arab actors as plurals without articles (Ex110-112). TL genericises US actors as singular with definite articles, and UK actors as mass nouns without article (Ex113-114).

110. **the US** agreed to provide technical and intelligence assistance on Egypt's border with Gaza (GA-GU-17-JAN-02).
111. **Western donors**, not Israel, are likely to pick up the reconstruction bill (GA-GU-17-JAN-02) and **Egyptian officials** have held talks in Cairo separately with Hamas (GA-GU-17-JAN-02).
112. **A UN Security Council** resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire (GA-GU-12-JAN-03).
113. **The US** insists that a ceasefire must be accompanied by assurances (GA-TL-05-JAN-03)
114. **Britain** proposed another press statement calling for an immediate and permanent ceasefire (GA-TL-05-JAN-03).

NYT genericises Arab actors as mass nouns without articles (Ex115). WP genericises Arab actors as plurals without articles, and as mass noun without article and EU actors as plural without article (Ex116-118).

115. **Egypt** talks to Hamas (GA-NYT-14-JAN-02)
116. **Arab foreign ministers** began arriving at U.N. headquarters (GA-WP-06-JAN-01)
117. **Egypt** mediated a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel this summer (GA-WP-07-JAN-02).
118. Most of the pressure was exerted by **European leaders** (GA-WP-06-JAN-01).

In these categorisations, other actors are identified as classified by provenance. That is, they are mostly represented as the name of their countries or as individual names. US Actors are genericised by the name of country, ***the US*** in GU and TL. UK actors are identified as ***Britain*** in TL. Arab actors are identified as ***Egypt*** in TL, NYT and WP. UN actors are identified as ***the UN Security Council*** in GU and WP.

In regard to specification, NYT specifies UN actors in individuals, e.g. *the idea was in an early stage, a result of a conversation between* ***Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner of France*** *and Defense Minister Ehud Barak of Israel seeking at least a temporary pause* (GA-NYT-31-DEC-01). NYT also specifies US actors as official individuals, e.g. ***President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice*** *made phone calls to Israeli and Arab leaders* (GA-NYT-31-DEC-01). TL specifies **EU and Arab actors**

also as individuals, e.g. *the plan is being negotiated as part of the Egyptian peace initiative, announced by* ***President Mubarak after talks with President Sarkozy of France*** (GA-TL-10-JAN-03).

In these specifications, GU specified US and UK actors as individuals, e.g. ***He [Obama]*** *vowed to act quickly after his inauguration to position the US as a trusted third party* (GA-GU-12-JAN-03); ***Gordon Brown*** *also condemned Israel for the attack* (GA-GU-16-JAN-02). **TL** individualises Arab actors, e.g. *the plan is being negotiated as part of the Egyptian peace initiative, announced by* ***President Mubarak*** *after talks with President Sarkozy of France* (GA-TL-10-JAN-03). **NYT** specifies only US and EU actors as individual, e.g. ***President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice*** *made phone calls to Israeli and Arab leaders* to explore (GA-NYT-31-DEC-01). *The idea was in an early stage, a result of a conversation between* ***Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner of France*** (GA-NYT-31-DEC-01). **WP** individualises US actors, e.g. ***Bush*** *vowed to finalize a Middle East peace plan* (GA-WP-03-JAN-01).

Through the comparisons of representation categories, other actors are mainly represented as making efforts regarding the ceasefire. Mostly they are represented by their names, i.e. nominated by a semi-fomal way. These examples demonstrate the characterisation that the other actors have brought efforts for ceasefire between the Israelis and Palestinians.

5.3 Social Actors in the Editorials

This section analyses the representation of the social actors in the selected editorials. Editorials express opinions and attitudes by summarising, evaluating and providing conclusions on specific issues of the day, e.g. the Gaza war of 2008-09 (see section, 3.3.3.3). Fowler (1992:221) suggest that editorials "illustrate a discourse of institutional power in the sense that it emanates from and in turn helps to construct, the newspaper's claimed authority".

5.3.1 Political Actors in Editorials

This section analyses how the Israeli and Palestinian political actors are included and excluded in the sampled editorials. Table (5.12) shows the frequency distributions.

Table 5.12: Percentage of Inclusion and Exclusion of Political Actors in Editorials

NP	No. Clause	Israeli Political Actors				Palestinian Political Actors			
		Inclusion		Exclusion		Inclusion		Exclusion	
		No.	%	No.	No.	No.	%	No.	%
GU	**16**	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	2	12.5%	0	0.0%
TL	**46**	14	30.4%	0	0.0%	18	39.1%	0	0.0%
NYT	**20**	7	35%	0	0.0%	4	20.0%	0	0.0%
WP	**47**	22	46.8%	0	0.0%	16	34.0%	0	0.0%
Total	**129**	43	33.3%	0	0.0%	40	31%	0	0.0%

Table (5.12) indicates that IPA are included (33.3%) more than PPA (31%). These frequencies show that IPA and PPA are more frequently included in the US newspapers than in the UK newspapers in regards to the total of the percentages. To see how the political actors are represented, this section examines the themes in which they are included (see table 5.13).

Table 5.13: Themes of Inclusion of Political Actors in Editorials

NP	IPA	PPA
GU	------	Ceasefire
TL	Ceasefire Arab-Israel peace process Criticism of Hamas Objectives of the War Israel's use of force Israeli right of self-defence Israeli siege of Gaza Internal affairs Targeting of Hamas White phosphorous	Ceasefire Criticism of Hamas Firing rockets Internal affairs Arab-Israel peace process
NYT	Ceasefire Targeting of UN sites Israel's use of force Israeli targeting of Hamas	Ceasefire Internal affairs
WP	Ceasefire Israel's use of force Objectives of the War Internal affairs Effect of War Iranian-Israeli relation	Ceasefire Objectives of the War Arab-Israel peace process Claim of Victory Internal Affairs Effect of War

Table (5.13) shows that achieving a ceasefire is a theme which is treated mostly in the same way across the selected editorials, apart from GU, which does not include Israeli politicians. The analysis reveals that IPA are allocated activated roles in TL, NYT and WP as exemplified in the following examples.

119. This is why, when a ceasefire ended last month with an onslaught of Hamas rockets aimed at civilian Israeli targets, **Israel** had no choice but to prosecute this war. GA-TL-16-JAN-01
120. As part of a cease-fire deal, **Israel** is right to demand a permanent halt to Hamas's rocket fire. GA-NYT-16-JAN-03
121. **Israel's** bet was that it could substantially reduce Hamas's military capacity and then force it to accept a cease-fire with improved terms for **Israel.** GA-WP-09-JAN-02

TL links the Israeli war with the collapse of the ceasefire resulting from Hamas firing of rockets into Israel. TL repeats the Israeli assertion that they were forced to respond to Hamas' unwarranted rockets. NYT presents the cessation of Hamas rockets as a condition of any ceasefire deal. WP states that Israel's objective was to force Hamas to agree to a ceasefire after inflicting severe damage on them. We see that the editors in TL, NYT and WP position themselves in defending Israeli actions and criticising Hamas

for firing rockets. In these examples, Hamas is held responsible for the war. The following examples show how Hamas is represented and allocated roles in ceasefire across the sampled editorials.

122. Earlier, **a Hamas delegation** held talks in Cairo with General Omar Suleiman, Mubarak's intelligence chief, who has brokered previous ceasefires in Gaza. GA-GU-07-JAN-03
123. That is why, as the world waits for **Hamas** to accept Israel and renounce violence, it also expects Israel to prosecute this war with greater respect for civilian life. GA-TL-16-JAN-01
124. **Hamas** used the last cease-fire to restock its arsenal with weapons ferried in through tunnels dug under the Egypt-Gaza border. GA-NYT-16-JAN-03
125. **It [Hamas]** demands an end to all Israeli (and Egyptian) restrictions on movement in and out of Gaza in exchange for more quasi-peace. GA-WP-28-DEC-02

These examples implicitly show Hamas' exploitation of, and demands for, a ceasefire. This can be shown in these examples, *who has brokered previous ceasefires in Gaza* (EX122), *the world waits for Hamas to accept Israel* (EX123) and *renounce violence and used the last cease-fire to restock its arsenal* (EX124) and *demands an end to all Israeli (and Egyptian) restrictions on movement* (EX125). In these activated roles, GU focuses on Hamas' talks with Egyptian officials about the ceasefire as the first meeting between Hamas and Egyptian officials after the start of the Gaza war of 2008-09. This is explained by GU's editor "*the meeting was Hamas' first contact with a main regional player since fighting began on 27 December"* (GA-GU-07-JAN-03). This is significant because the burden of responsibility is put on Hamas for the collapse of the ceasefire.

TL, while saying that Israel should avoid killing civilians, implies that Hamas' refusal *to accept Israeli and renounce violence* is what has led to the collapse of the peace. This is also stated in a previous clause in the same text, "*Hamas knew then that only its refusal to acknowledge Israel's right to exist stood in the way of a resumption of the peace process"*. NYT's example shows that Hamas has used other ceasefires as an opportunity to rebuild its military capacities and smuggle weapons. NYT is clearly critical of Hamas for restocking rockets and weapons.

WP focuses on Hamas' condition of opening the crossing passages in Gaza. This is, in the editor's view, difficult, considering the Israeli internal elections. This is clearly stated in this clause from the same text; "*one considerable obstacle to such an outcome is that Israel is engaged in an election campaign in which the various candidates -- including the serving defense and foreign ministers -- are staking out hawkish positions"*.

This representation shows similarities between TL, NYT and WP in the editors' representation patterns of the Gaza war of 2008-09. Those editors are also of the opinion that Hamas' rockets are responsible for the war. Thus, it is Hamas actions that attract responses from Israel, i.e. reactions.

Analysis of the representation of Israeli political actors in TL, NYT and WP reveals they are genericised by the mass noun as *Israel*. This occurs when the Israelis are presented as having no options other than responding to Hamas (Ex126), and defending their people (Ex127), and in seeing hope for ceasefire between Israel and Hamas (Ex128). IPA are categorised and identified by classifying them as Israel in TL, NYT and WP.

126. **Israel** had no choice but to prosecute this war (Ex118, GA-TL-16-JAN-01)
127. **Israel** is also right not to rely on Hamas's promises (EX119, NYT-16-JAN-03
128. When **Israel** and Hamas observed a semi-truce, politics was beginning to work (GA WP-09-JAN-02).

Palestinian political actors are genericised by mass nouns mainly as *Hamas* in GU, TL, NYT and WP when Hamas is presented as an obstacle to the ceasefire (see example 129-132). Also, Hamas is genericised as singular with an indefinite article in GU (Ex133). These genericisations indicate that PPA are only categorised and identified by classifying them mainly as Hamas in GU, TL, NYT and WP.

129. Israel's offensive against **Hamas** in the Gaza Strip is putting western-backed Arab governments under pressure (GA-GU-30-DEC-04);
130. That is why, as the world waits for **Hamas** to accept Israel and renounce violence (Ex123, GA-TL-16-JAN-01)
131. **Hamas** used the last cease-fire to restock its arsenal (Ex124, GA-NYT-16-JAN-03)
132. **Hamas**, predictably, has refused to play by those rules (GA-WP-09-JAN-02).
133. **A Hamas** delegation held talks in Cairo with General Omar Suleiman, (Ex121, GA-GU-07-JAN-03).

IPA are specified as individuals in NYT and WP when the editors refer to the efforts of Israeli officials to negotiate a ceasefire (Ex134-135). In these specifications, IPA are also nominated in a semi-formal way in NYT and WP, e.g. ***Tzipi Livni*** and in a formal way in WP, e.g. ***Olmert***.

134. the Israeli foreign minister, **Tzipi Livni**, is expected in Washington on Friday (GA-NYT -16-JAN-03)
135. The trap that **Olmert**, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni have created for themselves lies not just in Hamas's ability (GA-WP-09-JAN-02).

PPA are specified as individuals in NYT, e.g. "*with the support of the new American president, he or she must make an early downpayment on peace by ending settlement construction, cooperating seriously with **Mr. Abbas"*** (GA-NYT-16-JAN-03). In this specification, PPA are nominated in a formal way, e.g. *Mr. Abbas*.

The practices described above make the editorials supportive of the claims made in the news stories. In the representation of the political actors in the editorials, we can see similar discourses to those in the news stories. IPA are represented as making efforts to achieve a ceasefire, while PPA are obstructive. Most importantly, the analysis reveals that the editorials support the Israeli claim that the war is a response to the firing of rockets into Israel by Hamas. The general representation is that the war is being directed against Hamas rather than all Palestinians (see section 7.6.1).

5.3.2 Military Actors in Editorials

The analysis of the selected editorials focuses on inclusion and exclusion of military actors. Table (5.14) shows the frequency distributions of inclusion and exclusion of the military actors.

Table 5.14: Percentage of Inclusion and Exclusion of Military Actors in Editorials

NP	No. Clause	Israeli Military Actors				Palestinian Military Actors			
		Inclusion		Exclusion		Inclusion		Exclusion	
		No.	%	No.	No.	No.	%	No.	%
GU	16	1	6.2%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
TL	46	6	13.0%	0	0.0%	1	2.2%	0	0.0%
NYT	20	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
WP	47	4	8.5%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	129	11	8.5%	0	0.0%	1	0.8%	0	0.0%

Table (5.14) shows that IMA are included (8.5%), whereas PMA actors are included with a very low percentage (0.8%). The table shows that the UK newspapers include military actors more often than the US newspapers. Similar to the treatment of political actors, military actors are mainly included. Military actors are included in various themes as shown in table (5.15).

Table 5.15: Themes of Inclusion of Military Actors in Editorials

NP	IMA	PMA
GU	Ceasefire	---------
TL	Targeting of Hamas White phosphorous	Firing rockets
NYT	---------	---------
WP	Targeting of Hamas Ground Invasion	---------

Table (5.15) shows that IMA are included mainly in war operations. The targeting of Hamas is a frequent theme in TL and WP. PMA are mainly included in the theme of firing rockets in TL. To examine how the military actors are included, I turn now to analyse the allocation of roles. In the following examples (136-137), IMA are allocated activated roles in targeting Hamas in TL and WP. PMA are allocated activated roles in firing rockets in TL (Ex138).

136. On Saturday **it [the IDF]** did so, launching one of the deadliest series of air assaults in the history of the 60-year-old conflict. GA-TL-29-DEC-02
137. **The initial Israeli strikes** appeared to deal a punishing blow to the Islamic movement, reportedly killing several of its leaders and dozens of other militants and security force members. GA-WP-28-DEC-02
138. After eight days of rocket attacks from Gaza **the Palestinian group Hamas** seemed to have left Israel with little choice but to retaliate. GA-TL-29-DEC-02

Ex136-137 activate the role of Israeli defence forces in launching attacks in Gaza. However, in Ex138 TL makes it clear that the Israeli attacks were initiated by Hamas firing rockets into Israel. This presentation justifies the Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. This comparison of role allocation shows that in news stories and editorials, activating the roles of PMA in firing rockets and of IMA in targeting Hamas serve to support the Israeli message that they only target Hamas and then only in retaliation for the rockets. This pattern foregrounds the Palestinian agency and backgrounds the Israeli agency (see section 7.3.1).

The analysis of inclusion of military actors shows various genericisation and specification processes. IMA are genericised only by plural forms without articles in TL and WP using non-human entities as evident in *air assaults* and *Israeli strikes* in the following clauses (Ex139-140). PMA are genericised as a singular form with a definite article as can be seen in *the Palestinian gourp Hamas* in TL (Ex141).

139. launching one of the deadliest series of **air assaults** in the history of the 60-year-old conflict (GA-TL-29-DEC-02)
140. the initial **Israeli strikes** appeared to deal a punishing blow to the Islamic movement (GA-WP-28-DEC-02).
141. after eight days of rocket attacks from Gaza **the Palestinian group Hamas** seemed to have left Israel with little choice but to retaliate (GA-TL-29-DEC-02).

The comparison suggests that the generic reference is dominant in the representation of military actors. This obscures the agency of the actions. Israeli political and military actors are genericised in *Israel* and specified in governmental officials or military officials. This reflects an official view of the country rather than they refer to a specific Israeli party, e.g. Likud or

Kadima. This conveys that journalists have access to Israeli officials more than to Hamas members (see section 7.5.4).

In contrast, Palestinian political and military actors are genericised as *Hamas*, and specified as Hamas officials. This shows only one group of Palestinian political and military actors rather than reflecting all sides. It does not reflect the Palestinian national authority. This representation brings Hamas to the fore, and puts the Palestinian Authority in the background. This representation also reinforces the Palestinian-Palestinian division by focusing only on Hamas in the coverage of the war (see section 7.6.1).

Overall, the analysis of representation of military actors paints a negative picture of Hamas as a violent movement rather than a resistance movement. In contrast, IMA are represented as responding to Palestinian rockets fired into Israel. This arguably leads to the representation of military actors being favourable to the Israeli side (see section 7.4.1).

5.3.3 Civilian Actors in Editorials

The analysis of the inclusion and exclusion of civilian actors shows that Israeli civilian actors are included and excluded less than Palestinian civilian actors in the sampled editorials. The following table (5.16) shows the frequency distributions of civilian actors.

Table 5.16: Percentage of Inclusion and Exclusion of Civilian Actors in Editorials

NP	No. Clause	Israeli Civilian Actors				Palestinian Civilian Actors			
		Inclusion		Exclusion		Inclusion		Exclusion	
		No.	%	No.	No.	No.	%	No.	%
GU	16	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
TL	46	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	3	6.5%	1	2.2%
NYT	20	0	0.0%	1	5.0%	0	0.0%	1	5.0%
WP	47	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	2.1%
Total	129	0	0.0%	1	0.8%	3	2.3%	3	9.3%

Table (5.16) shows that ICA are not included, while PCA are included (2.3%). Also, ICA are excluded (0.8%) less than the exclusion (9.3%) of PCA. The table shows that ICA are excluded only in NYT, while PCA are excluded in the US newspapers more than in the UK newspapers. In contrast to political and military actors, Israeli and Palestinian civilian actors are mainly excluded from facing consequences of war.

142. **Thirteen Israelis** have died. GA-NYT-16-JAN-03
143. As a result, **innocent lives** are being destroyed. GA-TL-29-DEC-02
144. Already **more than 1,000 Palestinians** have died in the densely populated **Gaza** Strip, where an always miserable life has become unbearable. GA-NYT-16-JAN-03
145. Inevitably, however, **civilians** were among the more than 200 reported Palestinian dead, and renewed Palestinian rocket fire against Israeli cities killed at least one person. GA-WP-28-DEC-02

In Ex142, NYT suppresses the social actors responsible for the killing of 13 Israeli civilians as the clause uses the verb which is the same verb we use for death by natural causes. However from the context, we can understand they were killed rather than died. TL in Ex143 backgrounds the destruction of lives of civilians in Gaza. The editor did not mention the attributing agents in the clause. But, he writes in the same text that "civilian casualties were inevitable, and the deep burns that white phosphorus can cause are virtually untreatable". This shows that Israeli military firing white phosphorus is responsible for the action. Examples 143-145 radically suppress the agents responsible for killing Palestinian civilians. Similarly to the exclusion of Israeli civilians, the editor of NYT uses the verb, *have died,* without any indication of agency. They could be Palestinians or Israelis.

Suffering the consequences of war, ICA receive no attention in the editorials, apart from NYT. ICA are only presented in number, i.e. specified in assimilation (Ex144). In contrast, PCA get a lot of attention in the editorials of TL and NYT and WP. They are genericised through the use of plurals without articles (Ex146-Ex148).

146. **Thirteen Israelis** have died (Ex93, GA-NYT-14-JAN-02).
147. **Civilian casualties** were inevitable GA-TL-16-JAN-01);
148. Already **more than 1,000 Palestinians** have died in the densely populated Gaza Strip (GA-NYT-16-JAN-03),
149. **Civilians** were among the more than 200 reported Palestinian dead (GA-WP-28-DEC-02)

NYT's example (146) shows assimilation, i.e. the number of the Israeli civilians. This pattern generally provides facts. But, the genericisation of PCA as plurals (Ex147-149) leads to make the focus more general and ambiguous for readers of the editorials. This means that Palestinian civilians are not emphasised as individuals in the sampled editorials. Van Leeuwen (2008) emphasises that social actors are depicted in generic references so that they can be "symbolically removed from the readers' world of immediate experience" and being "treated as distant others rather than as people with whom "we" have to deal in our everyday lives" (p. 36). So, it is hard to understand who and in which place Palestinian civilians died or are killed during the war.

5.3.4 Other Actors in Editorials

This section examines the inclusion and exclusion of other actors. Table (5.17) shows only the percentages of the inclusion of the other actors.

Table 5.17: Percentage of Inclusion of Other Actors in Editorials

NP	No. of clauses	US		UK		UN		EU		Arab		International		Iranian	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
GU	16	1	6.3%	0	0.0%	2	12.5%	1	6.3%	8	0.5	0	0.0%	1	6.3%
TL	46	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	2	0.04	1	2.2%	0	0.0%
NYT	20	7	35.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
WP	47	3	6.4%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.02	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	129	11	**47.6%**	0	0.0%	2	1.6%	1	0.8%	11	0.56	1	2.2%	1	**6.3%**

Table (5.17) shows that US actors have the highest percentage (47.6%) of inclusion among other actors. They are followed by Iranian actors (6.3%). In inclusion of other actors, the table shows that US actors are more frequently included in the US newspapers, whereas the other subgroups are more frequent in the UK newspapers. Other actors are included mainly as

political actors. The inclusion varies according to nationality or the institution actors belong to. Table (5.18) shows they are included mainly in the theme of ceasefire.

Table 5.18: Themes of Inclusion of Other Actors in Editorials

	US	UK	UN	EU	ARAB	INTERNATIONAL	IRANIAN
GU	Ceasefire	--------	Ceasefire	Ceasefire	Arab-Arab Relation		Support of Hamas and Palestinians
TL	-------	------	Criticism of Hamas	-----	Arab-Israel peace process	--------	------
NYT	Israeli right of self defence Ceasefire				Arab-Arab Relation		
WP	Support of Israel				Arab-Arab Relation		

Other actors are mostly allocated active roles across the editorials in different themes according to the nationality of the actors. In examining these themes, ceasefire is a frequent and dominant theme in which most other actors are allocated activated roles as we can see in the following examples. GU and NYT activate the roles of US actors (Ex150 and Ex151).

150. Last weekend **Washington** blocked a Libyan-sponsored call for an immediate truce, arguing that it had to be "durable". GA-GU-07-JAN-03

151. **We** [the newspaper] are encouraged that a cease-fire finally seems to be gaining traction. GA-NYT-16-JAN-03

The editor activates the role of US actors in showing US support for Israel. This is achieved by the US' blocking of the Arab effort in the Security Council to have a resolution to stop the war and condemn Israel. In NYT in (Ex151), the editor takes a different position where he uses the pronoun *we* to express the views of his newspaper on the ceasefire. In the following examples, GU activates the role of UN actors (Ex152) and the role of EU actors (Ex153) in the theme of ceasefire.

152. **The UN Security Council** in New York last night became the stage for a war of words between the Israelis and Palestinians, amid frantic diplomatic efforts to secure a durable ceasefire within days. GA-GU-07-JAN-03
153. **Sarkozy** flew from Beirut back to Sharm el-Sheikh on the Red Sea for a second, unscheduled meeting with **President Hosni Mubarak**, a major player in international attempts to engineer a truce between Israel and the Palestinians. GA-GU-07-JAN-03

In Ex152, the editor portrays the efforts in the Security Council as a war of words where he activates the roles of all actors in the ways how they are arguing about how to secure a ceasefire. This example 152 shows the struggle to choose specific words to refer to the ceasefire terms. This implicitly includes different attitudes either in supporting Israel or Palestinians. In Ex153, the activated role is presented in Sarkozy's efforts in Egypt to secure a ceasefire. This example shows the importance of the Arabs' role, mainly Egypt, in achieving a ceasefire by practising pressure on Palestinians. This portrayal shows that the role of UN, EU and Arab actors is mainly to mediate the efforts between Israelis and Hamas.

A comparison of the gerencisation of other actors shows that US and UN actors are genericised as mass nouns, whereas EU actors are specified as individuals. In GU, US and UN actors are genericised by a mass noun (Ex154-Ex155). In NTY, US actors are also genericised by a mass noun (Ex156). EU actors are specified as individual and nominated in a formal way, whereas Arab actors are nominated in a semi-formal way (Ex157).

154. Last weekend **Washington** blocked a Libyan-sponsored call for an immediate truce (Ex00, GA-GU-07-JAN-03).
155. **The UN Security Council** in New York last night became the stage for a war of words (Ex00, GA- GU -07-JAN-03).
156. But **Washington** could have provided that assistance years ago (Ex00, GA-NYT-16-JAN-03).
157. **Sarkozy** flew from Beirut back to Sharm el-Sheikh on the Red Sea for a second, unscheduled meeting with **President Hosni Mubarak** (Ex153, GA- GU -07-JAN-03).

This pattern shows that the editors generalise the reference to US and UN actors. This generic reference foregrounds their role to achieve a ceasefire between Israelis and Palestinians. By specifying the reference to individuals, the editor shows the efforts of the French President Sarkozy and the Egyptian President Mubarak are a consequence of international efforts.

5.4 Comparison of News Stories and Editorials

The above sections have examined the question of how the representational categories are used in constructing the social actors. This section (5.4) summarises the main similarities and differences between the news stories and editorials across the newspapers. To do so, this section revisits the most common themes: ceasefire, targeting Hamas, firing rockets and suffering the consequences of war. Generally speaking, one consistent representation in the themes, in most of the news stories and editorials, is that Israeli political and military actors are represented as Israel and Israeli governmental officials, and Palestinian political and military actors are represented as Hamas and Hamas members.

In the theme of the ceasefire, one apparent difference is that most of the news stories activate Israelis' roles in making efforts to achieve ceasefire, whereas in the editorials, TL activates the Israeli roles in justifying the war which resulted from the collapse of a ceasefire, and NYT and WP focuses on Israeli demands to achieve a ceasefire. Another difference is shown in activating Palestinians' role in rejecting a ceasefire in most of the news stories, whereas only NYT focuses on the efforts of the Palestinian President. Different from the news stories where journalists report on Hamas' rejection of ceasefire, most of the editorials activate Hamas' roles in causing problems that lead to fallout of a ceasefire.

Turning to the targeting of Hamas and the firing of rockets, the analysis suggests that there is a substantial consistency between most of the news stories and editorials. The news stories and editorials show a causal relationship between the actions of Hamas and Israeli military actions, i.e. launching strikes on Hamas and firing rockets into Israel.

In the theme of facing consequences of war, Israeli and Palestinian civilians are similarly passivated in most of the news stories. Israeli civilians are passivated only in the editorial of NYT, whereas Palestinian civilians are passivated across most of the editorials.

5.5 Summary and Conclusion

The above comparisons between the news stories and editorials show several findings that can be summarised in the following points:

- There is a dominance of the Israeli perspective on the war evident in the frequency distributions. This arguably indicates that the newspapers are favourable to the Israeli side more than Hamas (see section 7.4.1).
- The Israeli message to stop Hamas' rockets is clear in the representation of social actors. This pattern arguably draws a negative impression (discourse) of Hamas and shows Hamas' causality, e.g. firing rockets.
- The consistence in representing Israeli actors as Israel and Palestinian actors as Hamas present the war to be against Hamas only (see section 7.6.1).
- The newspapers equalise the suffering of Israeli and Palestinian civilians from the consequences of war. This can be objective in terms of journalistic practice, i.e. news selection (see section 2.3.2), and un-objective in terms of discourse, i.e. Israeli and Palestinian civilians did not die in natural causes, but they were killed in the war operations.
- The role of other actors is limited to achieve a ceasefire. This makes them as mediators of ceasefire negotiations (see section 7.3.2).

In conclusion, the activities of the Israelis are to be viewed as an imperative national assignment responding and reacting to Hamas violence. To further examine the representation of social actors, my next chapter will examine the journalistic practices in using quotation patterns in news texts.

Chapter Six: Quotation Patterns and News Sources

6.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the quotation patterns and sources pertaining to the social actors, along with how they have been used in the domain of international news while reporting the Gaza war of 2008-09. The quotations, along with their sources, play a pivotal role in the selection of the news items in war reporting by identifying the actors and views which the newspapers consider to be important (see section 2.3.2). In this context, this chapter answers the research question of how quotation patterns and sources are generally used to cover the social actors.

To answer this question[64], this study applies Richardson's (2007) classification of quotation patterns (see section 3.6). This chapter examines the frequency distributions of quotation patterns associated with subgroups of the social actors (section 6.2). Further, it examines media sources from which journalists obtain their information (section 6.3). The chapter also examines the themes of the quotation clauses, and how the social actors are represented when they are quoted in the common themes (section 6.4). Section (6.6) summarises the main findings and concludes the chapter.

[64] See section (3.6.2), for the analytical procedures and how to calculate the percentages

6.2 Frequency of the Quotation Patterns

6.2.1 Frequencies of Israeli and Palestinian Actors

This section examines the frequency distributions of quotation patterns associated with the social actors. It focuses mainly on direct and indirect patterns. They are the most common patters in news texts. To keep neutrality in the analysis, the examination does not focus on ostensible quotations because they rely on researcher's subjective judgments whether the quotation includes the actual words of the speaker or paraphrasing of the words by journalists (see section 3.6.1).

In direct quotations, journalists quote the exact words of the speakers as it can be seen in the words between the quotation marks in the following example, *Vice-President Cheney said yesterday: "We think, if there's to be a ceasefire, you can't simply go back to the status quo ante, what it was a few weeks ago, where you had a ceasefire recognised by one side but not adhered to by the other"* (GA-TL-05-JAN-03).

In indirect quotations, the words of social actors are paraphrased and presented by journalists' own words as we can see in this example. *United Nations officials have said that three-hour daily humanitarian lulls are insufficient to provide enough food, medicine and other essentials to civilians* (GA-NYT-14-JAN-02). Bell (1991: 205) claims that "the main method by which all media handle newsmakers' speech [direct speech] is to turn it into indirect speech" (see also Van Dijk, 1988b).

Tables (6.1-6.4) provide detailed information on the frequency of quotation patterns for each newspaper. The calculation[65] of percentages is based on dividing the number of quotation clauses, associated with each subgroup of social actors, on the total number of quotation clauses in each newspaper. To do so, Excel 2007 is used to calculate the percentages of the

[65] See section (3.6.2) for the detailed analystical procedures.

frequency. More specifically, table (6.1) shows the frequency of quotation patterns associated with Israeli and Palestinian political actors.

Table 6.1: Frequency of Quotation Patterns Associated with Political Actors

NP	No. of clauses	Israeli Political Actors				Palestinian Political Actors			
		Direct		Indirect		Direct		Indirect	
		No.	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
GU	**101**	18	17,8%	10	9,9%	6	5,9%	6	5,9%
TL	**94**	10	10,6%	16	17,0%	2	2,1%	8	8,5%
NYT	**226**	13	5,8%	29	12,8%	5	2,2%	9	4,0%
WP	**282**	43	15,2%	42	14,9%	8	2,8%	13	4,6%
Total	**703**	84	**11,9%**	97	**13,8%**	21	**3,0%**	36	**5,1%**

Table (6.1) shows that Israeli political actors (IPA) are associated with direct (11.9%) and indirect quotations (13.8%). This is nearly three times the rate of Palestinian political actors (PPA). PPA are associated with direct (3%) and indirect quotations (5.1%). The table indicates that GU has the highest percentage of direct quotations in quoting Israelis (17.8%) and Palestinians (5.9%), whereas TL has the highest percentages of indirect quotations in quoting Israelis (17%) and Palestinians (8.5%), (see Ex29-42).

In examining the military actors, table (6.2) shows the frequency distributions of quotation patterns associated with Israeli and Palestinian military actors across the news stories.

Table 6.2: Frequency of Quotation Patterns Associated with Military Actors

NP	No. of clauses	Israeli Military Actors				Palestinian Military Actors			
		Direct		Indirect		Direct		Indirect	
		No.	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
GU	**101**	5	5,0%	7	6,9%	0	0,0%	1	1,0%
TL	**94**	1	1,1%	4	4,3%	0	0,0%	2	2,1%
NYT	**226**	14	6,2%	31	13,7%	2	0,9%	2	0,9%
WP	**282**	16	5,7%	25	8,9%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%
Total	**703**	36	**5,1%**	67	**9,5%**	2	**0,3%**	5	**0,7%**

Table (6.2) shows that Israeli military actors (IMA) are associated with direct (5.1%) and indirect quotation (9.5%) more than direct (0.3%) and indirect (0.7%) quotations associated with Palestinian military actors (PMA). In quoting IMA, WP has the highest percentage (5.7%) of direct quotations. NYT has the highest percentage (13.7 %) of indirect quotations.

In quoting PMA, the newspapers almost do not have direct quotations apart from the low percentage in NYT (0.9%). TL has the highest percentage (2.1%) of indirect quotations (see examples 43-53).

Further to the examination of political and military actors, Table (6.3) shows the frequency distributions of direct and indirect quotations associated with Israeli and Palestinian civilian actors.

Table 6.3: Frequency of Quotation Patterns Associated with Civilian Actors

NP	**No. of clauses**	**Israeli Civilian Actors**				**Palestinian Civilian Actors**			
		Direct		**Indirect**		**Direct**		**Indirect**	
		No.	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
GU	**101**	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	11	10,9%	7	6,9%
TL	**94**	2	2,1%	0	0,0%	12	12,8%	8	8,5%
NYT	**226**	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	28	12,4%	33	14,6%
WP	**282**	2	0,7%	0	0,0%	11	3,9%	17	6,0%
Total	**703**	4	**0,6%**	0	**0,0%**	62	**8,8%**	65	**9,2%**

Table (6.3) shows that Israeli civilian actors (ICA) are associated only with direct quotations (0.6%). Palestinian civilian actors (PCA) are quoted with direct (8.8%) and indirect quotations (9.2%). In quoting Israeli civilian actors, TL has the highest percentage in direct quotations associated with Israelis (2.1%) and with Palestinians (12.8%). NYT has the highest percentage of indirect quotations (14.6%) associated with Palestinian actors (see examples 54-58).

Overall, the frequency distributions of the quotation patterns suggests that indirect reported speech is the salient reporting pattern preferred in US and UK newspapers' journalistic practice. Moreover, by employing CDA, this study finds that quotations as a frequently practiced linguistic strategy shows Israeli actors more than Palestinian actors. This representation in the frequency distributions presents a particular version of social reality, i.e. it indicates a dominance of Israeli perspectives, arguments and claims in relation to the war events. This means, Israeli political and military actors are enabled by journalists directly and indirectly to express their views and opinions on war events more than the Palestinian actors (see

Van Dijk, 1988b). In other words, reliance on the Israeli elite promotes and reproduces their beliefs, objectives and messages of the war. This representation favours and manifests bias towards Israeli actors.

The high frequency of direct and indirect quotations of IPA and IMA could be a sign for an Israeli strategy in controlling the war information, and thus, this may influence reporting the Gaza war of 2008-09 in US and UK newspapers (see section 7.5.4). In this context, the difference in quoting Israelis and Palestinians could be an indication that these newspapers were unduly reliant on briefings from Israeli political and military spokespeople, and consequently tended to give their pronouncements to the press more weight than their Palestinian counterparts. Thus, this study draws home the claim that these asymmetries of frequencies in terms of quotations bring power and bias in reporting the Gaza war of 2008-09 (see section 7.4.1).

6.2.2 Frequencies of Other Actors

Other actors are quoted variously across the newspapers. Table (6.4) shows the percentages of frequency percentages[66] of direct and indirect quotations associated with other actors.

Table 6.4: Frequency of Quotation Patterns Associated with Other Actors

NP	No. of clauses	US		UK		EU		UN		ARAB		INTERNATIONAL		Iranian	
		Dir	Ind	Dir	Ind	Dir	Ind	Dir	Ind	Dir	Ind	Dir	Ind	Dir	Ind
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
GU	101	3,0 %	1 %	2,0 %	0,0 %	0,0 %	0,0 %	3,0 %	**8,9 %**	1,0 %	2,0 %	2,0%	2,0 %	1,0 %	4,0 %
TL	94	4,3 %	2 %	3,2 %	3,2 %	2,1 %	2,1 %	3,2 %	4,3 %	0,0 %	3,2 %	2,1%	1,1 %	0,0 %	0,0 %
NYT	226	1,8 %	1 %	0,0 %	0,4 %	0,0 %	1,3 %	3,5 %	2,7 %	0,9 %	2,2 %	0,0%	1,3 %	0,4 %	4,0 %
WP	282	**6,0 %**	3 %	0,0 %	0,4 %	1,1 %	1,8 %	**6,0 %**	4,6 %	0,4 %	0,7 %	3,2%	**8,9 %**	0,4 %	0,7 %
Total	703	4,0 %	2 %	0,7 %	0,7 %	0,7 %	1,4 %	**4,4 %**	**4,6 %**	0,6 %	1,7 %	1,8%	**4,4 %**	0,4 %	2,1 %

Regarding the total percentages of direct quotations, table (6.4) shows that UN actors have the highest percentage (4.4%) of direct quotations followed

[66] For the calculation of percentages, see appendix 6.1.

by US actors (4%). Also, UN actors have the highest percentage (4.6%) of indirect quotations followed by international actors (4.4%). In direct quotations, WP has the highest percentages (6%) attributed to US and UN actors. In indirect quotations, GU has the highest percentage (8.9%) for UN actors and WP has the highest percentage (8.9%) for international actors. These frequencies show the focus on specific subgroups of other actors, in particular UN and international actors, and the exclusion of others. That is to say, the selected newspapers found the UN actors' experiences newsworthy in most of the news stories published on the Gaza war of 2008-09.

These frequency distributions suggest a lack of reference to all other actors and noticeably to UK, EU and Arab actors. International actors are international organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Their work focuses on reporting and documenting human rights abuses by war parties in a conflict (see Kiss, 2014). Although this work is important and receives the highest percentage of frequency distributions, it is still very low and not noticeable in NYT in direct quotations. There are few references to the work of these NGOs in the other newspapers. This indicates a lack of emphasis in the newspapers to various roles that other actors could play in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see section 7.3.2)

6.3 News Sources and Reporting Verbs

Media sources refer to the routes through which journalists obtain their news and information about war events. Van Dijk (1998b:5) points out that "members of more powerful social groups and institutions, and especially their leaders have more or less exclusive access". This section focuses only on media sources used in quoting the social actors.

6.3.1 Israeli and Palestinian Actors

This section examines which media sources each newspaper uses to quote the social actors. Table (6.5) represents the distribution of these sources across the newspapers in direct and indirect quotations within four themes: ceasefire, targeting Hamas, calling for violence, and facing consequences of war (see section 6.4 for more details). These themes are the most common and frequent themes across the newspapers, and illustrate the background for the comparison between Israelis and Palestinians which I have discussed in the previous chapters.

Table 6.5: Media Sources Associated with Israeli and Palestinian Actors

NP	Pattern	Ceasefire		Calling for violence	Targeting of Hamas	Firing rockets	Facing consequences of war	
		IPA		PPA	IMA	PMA	ICA	PCA
GU	Direct	• Ha'aretz • Fox News • NBC's Meet the Press programme	•	• Al-Jazeera television A televised speech	• Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper	• --------	--------	--------
	Indirect	--------		--------	--------	--------	--------	--------
TL	Direct	• ABC		--------	--------	--------	--------	• The Times
	Indirect	--------		--------	--------	--------	--------	--------
NYT	Direct	------	• Al-Jazeera television	--------	• Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper	--------		• The Associated Press
	Indirect	--------		--------	--------	--------		• Reporters
WP	Direct	• Reporters • Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper		• Al-Jazeera television A televised speech	--------	--------	--------	
	Indirect	--------	•	--------	• Israeli Military	--------	--------	• The Associated Press

Table (6.5) shows that the media sources are American, British, Israeli, Palestinian and Arab. They are used in either direct or indirect quotations. In ceasefire, GU, TL and WP refer to news sources only in direct quotations to cover IPA and PPA. In quoting IPA, GU refers to an Israeli newspaper, *Ha'aretz* (Ex1), and to an American TV channel, *Fox News* (Ex2) and to NBC's Meet the Press programme (Ex3). TL refers to *ABC*, an American network broadcaster (Ex4). WP refers to reporters (Ex5) and the Israeli newspaper *Yedioth Ahronoth* (see Ex6). Only NYT refers to the Al-Jazeera channel to quote leaders of Hamas (Ex7) while citing PPA.

1. "The issues that we so much wanted to stress in this election campaign will be getting maximum attention even without our messages," **Netanyahu** told Ha'aretz newspaper. GA-GU-27-DEC-01
2. **Ehud Barak, Israel's defence minister,** told Fox News on Saturday when the bombing began: "For us to be asked to have a ceasefire with Hamas is like asking you (the US) to have a ceasefire with al-Qaida." GA-GU-30-DEC-02
3. "Our goal is not to reoccupy Gaza Strip," **she [Livni]** said on NBC's Meet the Press programme. GA-GU-29-DEC-01
4. **President Peres of Israel** told ABC that his country intended "neither to occupy Gaza nor to crush Hamas, but to crush terror. And Hamas needs a real and serious lesson. They are now getting it." GA-TL-05-JAN-03
5. "When Israel is targeted, Israel is going to retaliate," **Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni** told reporters as she held talks with European diplomats in Jerusalem. GA-WP-06-JAN-01
6. Far more common is the sentiment expressed by **columnist Guy Bechor**, writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel's largest daily, who declared a few days ago that "we have won." GA-WP-11-JAN-02
7. **Moussa Abu Marzouk, the exiled deputy to the Hamas political chief Khaled Meshal,** told Al Jazeera television on Tuesday that while the organization had "serious reservations" about the Egyptian cease-fire plan, he believed that it might be accepted if changes were made. GA-NYT-14-JAN-02

Regarding the targeting of Hamas, GU and NYT quote directly from Israeli sources, e.g. *the Yedioth Ahronoth* newspaper (Ex8-09). WP refers to the Israeli military in indirect quotation (see Ex10).

8. "If we don't do that we'll be missing an historic opportunity," **he [Major General Yoav Galant]** was quoted as saying in the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper.GA-GU-12-JAN-03
9. **Alex Fishman,** the military analyst of the popular daily newspaper Yediot Aharonot, wrote Friday, "Since the name of the game is killing and destruction, the ground operation has to be quick, with a lot of firepower at friction points with Hamas." GA-NYT-03-JAN-01
10. About 300 smugglers' tunnels exist along the border area between Gaza and Egypt, a nine-mile stretch known as the Philadelphia corridor, according to **the Israeli military.** GA-WP-06-JAN-01

On the topic of firing rockets, the newspapers do not refer to any media sources in quoting Palestinian or Hamas' actors. Meanwhile, in calling for violence, GU and WP refer directly to Al-Jazeera TV channel and to a televised speech broadcast by Hamas' TV channel in quoting Hamas' officials. For example,

11. "The blood of Said Siam will be a curse on the Zionist entity," **Muhammad Nazzal** told al-Jazeera television.GA-GU-16-JAN-02
12. Addressing Israel**, Meshal** said in a televised speech on Saturday: "You have destroyed the last chance for negotiations. No one will now believe you. What is needed is fierce resistance in Gaza and fierce support from the Arab, Islamic and International Street until the aggression ends and the enemy withdraws."GA-GU-12-JAN-03
13. "I call on you to carry out a third intifada," **he** told al-Jazeera television, according to the AP. GA-WP-28-DEC-01 (**Ismail Haniyeh, leader of the Hamas in Gaza)**
14. Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, speaking from an undisclosed location on the movement's television station, attempted Monday to rally supporters. "As we are in the middle of this crisis, we tell our people we, God willing, are closer to victory. All the blood that is being shed will not be in vain," **Haniyeh** said, while also acknowledging that the group is pursuing diplomacy. GA-WP-13-JAN-01

In facing consequences of war, the newspapers do not refer to any media sources in quoting ICA. In quoting PCA, TL refers to itself as a source of news. NYT refers to reporters. NYT and WP refer to the Associated Press.

15. "I never expected to see such a horrifying scene. I never saw anything like it in my life," **Abed el-Aziz Abu Aisha**, 22, told ***The Times***. GA-TL-09-JAN-02
16. **A resident of southwest Gaza City** on Monday showed a reporter a piece of metal casing with the identifying number M825A1, which Marc Garlasco, a military analyst with Human Rights Watch, identified as white phosphorus, typically used for signaling, smoke screens and destroying enemy equipment. GA-NYT-13-JAN-01
17. 'There is no water, no electricity, no medicine,''**Jawaher**, a 14-year-old who has United States citizenship, told **The Associated Press**. "It's hard to survive. **Gaza** is destroyed." Jawaher Hajji GA-NYT-03-JAN-01
18. On Sunday, Israeli bombs destroyed a mosque, **Palestinian officials** told the Associated Press. GA-WP-28-DEC-01

The analysis finds that the journalists rely more on Israeli sources in accounting for and reacting to war events mainly in GU, NYT and WP, and thus, they cover the main issues stated above. Also, they rely on Arab media - mainly Al-Jazeera - in quoting Hamas' top officials, e.g. *Khalid Meshal.* This finding indicates that the most powerful groups (Israelis) are the most accessed groups. Social, political and economic power is the crucial factor of access to newspaper discourse (see Van Dijk, 1996: 86 and Caldas-

Coulthard, 1994:303). This is similar to studies conducted by Philo and Berry (2004, 2011) on BBC and ITV coverage of the Palestinian second Intifada and the Gaza war of 2008-09. This finding corresponds to other media studies that reveal bias towards Israel. "In the case of the Western media and in the context of the Palestine-Israel conflict, newsworthy sources are invariably the Israeli authorities" (Khoury-Machool, 2009:6, see also section 7.4).

6.3.2 Other Actors

This section focuses on the media sources in the direct and indirect quotations associated with other actors concerning the theme of ceasefire. Table (6.6) shows the media sources used by the newspapers in quoting other actors.

Table 6.6: Media Sources Associated with Other Actors

NP	Pattern	ceasefire						
		US	UK	UN	EU	ARAB	International	Iranian
GU	Direct	ABC		The media		The Syrian news agency Sana		
	Indirect							
TL	Direct	The CBS programme Face the Nation	The BBC					
	Indirect							
NYT	Direct		The Associated Press	Palestinian reporters				
	Indirect					MENA, Egypt's state-owned news agency		
WP	Direct	Reporters		Reporters in Jerusalem	Reporters			
	Indirect							

In quoting US actors directly, GU refers to the ABC (Ex19), whereas TL refers to the CBC (Ex20). WP refers to reporters in general (Ex21). In quoting UK actors, TL refers directly to the BBC (Ex22), and NYT quotes the Associated Press (Ex23).

19. **The US president-elect, Barack Obama,** described the death of civilians in the conflict as heartbreaking after being asked if his silence over the crisis could be interpreted as callousness. "When you see civilians, whether Palestinian or Israeli, harmed, it's heartbreaking. Obviously what that does, it makes me much more determined to try and break a deadlock that has been going on for decades," **he [Barack Obama]** said on ABC television.GA-GU-12-JAN-03
20. "It has to be a sustainable, durable proposition. And Hamas has to stop rocketing Israel. I don't think you're going to have a viable ceasefire until they're prepared to do that," **Mr Cheney** told the CBS programme Face the Nation. GA-TL-05-JAN-03
21. "Hamas has used Gaza as a launching pad for rockets against Israeli cities, and has contributed deeply to a very bad daily life for the Palestinian people in Gaza and to a humanitarian situation that we have all been trying to address," **Rice** told reporters. GA-WP-03-JAN-01
22. Hours after the United States blocked an attempt by Britain to make the UN Security Council issue a ceasefire call, **Mr Brown** told the BBC: "We need an immediate ceasefire. The blame game can continue afterwards, but this dangerous moment, I think, requires us to act." GA-TL-05-JAN-03
23. **Tony Blair, a special international envoy for the Middle East, speaking from Cairo,** said the "elements of an agreement for an immediate cease-fire are there," The Associated Press reported, though a senior Israeli military official, Amos Gilad, postponed his trip to Egypt to discuss a possible truce. GA-NYT-13-JAN-01

In the treatment of UN actors, GU refers to *the media* without specifying who they are (Ex24), whereas NYT refers to *reporters from Palestine* (Ex25), and WP refers to *reporters in Jerusalem* (Ex26). For EU actors, WP refers to *reporters* without specifying their nationalities (Ex27). In quoting Arab actors, NYT refers to *MENA*, Egypt's state-owned news agency (Ex28).

24. "There are certain elements in place that would enable a ceasefire, but it hinges on the political will of both sides," **he [Ban]** told the media.GA-GU-16-JAN-02
25. **John Ging,** an Irishman who directs operations in Gaza for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, entered Gaza on Monday as journalists were kept out. He told Palestinian reporters in Gaza that the policy was a problem. GA-NYT-07-JAN-03
26. "Large numbers of people, including many children, are hungry," **Maxwell Gaylard,** the United Nations' humanitarian coordinator for the Palestinian territories, told reporters in Jerusalem. GA-WP-06-JAN-01
27. "This reinforces my determination for this to end as quickly as possible," **Sarkozy** told reporters in the southern Lebanese town of At Tiri after learning of the school attack. GA-WP-07-JAN-02
28. MENA, Egypt's state-owned news agency, quoted an unidentified **Egyptian official** as saying that talks between the nation's intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, and Hamas envoys were "positive." GA-NYT-13-JAN-01

From these comparisons of media sources, we can see that the newspapers do not refer to certain news agencies, but rather use general news outlets e.g. reporters. This could be an indicator for limiting the access to other actors, and thus, their involvement is not very apparent in the Gaza war of 2008-09.

6.3.3 Reporting Expressions: Verbal Processes

Reporting expression is an important aspect in selecting war news (see section 3.6.1). Most important is "the meanings expressed by the reporting expressions [...]. It is significant whether or not something is referred to as a threat or promise" (Bednarek and Caple, 2012:93). In this context, this section examines verbal processes and their meanings (discourses) which are accompanied by quotation patterns. Table (6.7) shows the widely circulated verbal processes used in introducing the quotations.

Table 6.7: Verbal Processes and Expressions Associated with Israeli and Palestinian Actors

NP	**Pattern**	**ceasefire**		**Targeting of Hamas**	**Calling for violence**	**Facing consequences of war**	
		IPA	**PPA**	**IMA**	**PMA**	**ICA**	**PCA**
GU	Direct	told said	said told	said was quoted	-----	-----	expressed says told said
	Indirect	said say	----	said	said	---	---
TL	Direct	said	stated	-----	-----	-----	said told
	Indirect	is expected to announce said has stayed reportedly favouring	is to address has said claimed rejected said	claimed said	say declared	said	said
NYT	Direct	said	said		said	---	screamed said told
	Indirect	said	expressed told said	expressed said repeated	issued	---	said asking yelled denounced showed identified was asked saying replied
WP	Direct	----	----	said	----	said	said added
	Indirect	said	said	----	----	----	said

Table (6.7) shows different types of reporting expressions, e.g. neutral and declarative. To clarify these types, I refer to classifications by Bednarek and Caple (2012:93; see also table 3.6 in section 3.6.2). Neutral verbs are used to illustrate opinions rather than to give any additional information. Declarative verbs refer to an institutionalised linguistic act. According to table (6.7), the most common verbal process is neutral, presented in saying and telling verbs.

The four newspapers use *saying* verbs with Israeli and Palestinian politicians in direct or indirect quotations on ceasefire. In this pattern, the reporters abstain from explicitly interfering in the reports (see Caldas-Coulthard, 1994:74). These verbs “present the author as simply conveying what others have said, and leave it up to the reader to accept or reject that material" (White, 2009:38). TL uses the verb to *report* with Israelis, and *claimed* and *rejected* with Palestinians in reportring a ceasefire. These neutral verbs imply an authoritative position of speakers that make assertions on motivating Palestinians to resist and fight Israel. In the case of *claimed*, the reporter does not "characterise the proposition as necessarily false or even dubious, but rather actively signals that it is still open to question, or is still in need of confirmation" (White, 2009:38).

Table (6.7) shows that there are differences in using other verbs; for example, in speaking on achieving a ceasefire, NYT uses the verb *expressed* in indirect quotation, ***a senior Hamas official, Ismail Haniya,*** *expressed openness to a diplomatic solution* (Ex41).

In calling for violence and challenging Israeli soldiers, TL uses declarative verbs, e.g. *declared* as it can be shown in this example, *In Gaza there was defiance as a spokesman [...] dared Israeli forces to enter his domain and engage in street fights with his men on their home turf [...]* ***Abu Unaeida*** *declared (GA-TL-29-DEC-05).* NYT uses the verb *issued* associated with Palestinians, ***Hamas militants*** *issued a taped statement vowing revenge for those killed in the Israeli air raids* (Ex53).

In facing consequences of war, GU uses *expressed* in direct quotations with Palestinians as we can see in this quotation, *after [...] the first chapter in the Qur'an, was read aloud to mark the end of a life,* ***Abu Sadaq*** *expressed misgivings about the shared grave* (GA-GU-02-JAN-03). NYT also uses *asking, yelled, denounced* as evident in these examples: *Four doctors raced out of the emergency room.* ***One of the men in the family*** *yelled in anger at a doctor* (GA-NYT-05-JAN-02); ***many*** *denounced the bombing of mosques and the deaths of civilians* (GA-NYT-03-JAN-01). WP uses the verb *added* as evident in this example, ***one woman*** *whose son was one of the graduates was shouting, 'Where is my son?' " At Shifa Hospital,* ***she*** *added, "I saw bodies and wounded people lying on the floors, as there are not enough beds"* (GA-WP-28-DEC-01).

In this way, the author indicates an attitude towards their reports (see Caldas-Coulthard, 1994:74). We can say that NYT gives more space to Palestinian civilians to express their views on the situations in which they suffer from the consequences and violence of war. These verbs include only declarations rather than explanations of responsibilities.

Table (6.7) shows that the GU and TL use passive forms in introducing some quotations from Israelis and Palestinians. For example, in ceasefire negotiations, TL uses passive structures, e.g. *is expected to announce* with Israelis. TL uses this structure *is to address* with Palestinians.

In theme of targeting Hamas, GU uses a passive structure *he was quoted as saying* (Ex8) in indirect quotation with Israelis. Bednarek and Caple (2012:88) suggest that the passive structures are used to "structure and foreground/background certain information, treating some of it as known and other parts as new". In this pattern, the verb to *announce* implies the speaker has a powerful position. "An announcement, when it comes from official sources, which the word usually implies, tends to be seen as true" (Floyd, 2000:45).

In brief, this study finds that neutral verbs such as *saying,* are common verbal expressions in introducing Israeli and Palestinian social actors (see also Bell 1991: 206 and 1994: 306). In this context, Bednarek and Caple (2012:94) suggest that "this can be linked to the aim of maintaining objectivity in news discourse". Caldas-Coulthard (1994:68) points out that "in using saying verbs, what the reporter is doing is to detach her/himself from the responsibility of what is being reported". In the same vein, the reporters use neutral verbs in introducing the quotations of other actors (see the following table 6.8).

Table 6.8: Verbal Processes and Expressions Associated with Other Actors

NP	**Pattern**	**ceasefire**						
		US	**UK**	**UN**	**EU**	**ARAB**	**International**	**Iranian**
GU	**Direct**	said	------	told	-----	-----	------	-----
	Indirect	-------	-----	called for said	------	said	called for	----
TL	**Direct**	said told	told outlined said	said	said called for	-----	-----	-----
	Indirect	-----	called proposed added	-----	said	wanted announced	said	-----
NYT	**Direct**	said noting	-----	-----	-----	said	-----	-----
	Indirect	made phone calls said	said	told	called for said	quoted said	say	-----
WP	**Direct**	said added	-----	said	told said	-----	-----	-----
	Indirect	said	said	-----	said outlined	-----	-----	-----

In regard to other actors, the examination of verbs used in introducing the direct and indirect quotations shows that GU, TL, NYT and WP use *said* with **US actors** (see Ex59). In addition, TL uses *told, e.g.* **Rice** told reporters (Ex22), while WP also uses *added*, e.g. *she [Rice] added, "The cease-fire must be restored immediately"* (GA-WP-28-DEC-01).

In quoting **UK actors**, TL uses *outlined* and *said, e.g.**Mr Brown,** [..], outlined a strategy to end the war, saying that* (see Ex61) in direct quotations. TL also uses *called, proposed* and *added* in indirect quotations. For example, ***Gordon Brown** called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza* (GA-TL-05-JAN-03), ***Britain** proposed another press statement calling for an immediate and permanent ceasefire* (GA-TL-05-JAN-03); and ***Gordon Brown** added to the international calls for a truce* (GA-TL-01-JAN-01).

Arab actors are introduced with the verbs *announced* and *called on* in TL, and *quoted* in NYT (see Ex28). See these examples, *The plan is being negotiated as part of the Egyptian peace initiative, announced by **President Mubarak** after talks with **President Sarkozy of France*** (GA-TL-10-JAN-03); *An emergency meeting of **the Arab League** in Cairo called on Hamas and Fatah to overcome their rift and form a unity government* (GA-TL-01-JAN-01).

International actors are introduced only in GU with *called for (Ex46),* and **EU actors** are introduced with *called for* in TL, e.g. ***France** called for a humanitarian ceasefire to allow aid into Gaza* (GA-TL-01-JAN-01).

UN actors are introduced with the verbs *told* in GU, he **[Ban]** *told the media (*Ex24), and in NYT, *He [**John Ging]** told Palestinian reporters in Gaza that (*Ex25). They are also associated with *called for* in GU, e.g. *The **UN Security Council** called for a halt to the violence in Gaza* (GA-GU-29-DEC-01).

This finding indicates that the verbal processes are relatively informative – telling readers about the limited roles of other actors. Through the comparison of these verbal processes, we can see the major role of other actors as mediator of efforts for ceasefire. They speak on and call for immediate ceasefire between Israelis and Palestinians (see section 7.3.2).

6.4 Themes of Quotation Patterns

This section focuses on themes of quotation patterns, and how the social actors are represented when they are quoted. The choice of quotation patterns not only marks the power and status of the speakers or the addressees, but also it "implicitly conveys the journalist's attitude toward and evaluation of the quoted utterance of the speaker" (Kuo, 2007:285).

6.4.1 Israeli and Palestinian Political Actors

Israeli and Palestinian politicians have mostly diverse themes in different representations. Quoting specific elite sources shows factuality and objectivity on the sides of the journalists. But this reliance promotes and reproduces dominant beliefs and opinions of the elite groups in society. Israeli and Palestinian political actors are quoted directly and indirectly in some themes as displayed in table (6.9).

Table 6.9: Themes of Quotations Associated with Political Actors

NP	Israeli political actors		Palestinian political actors	
	Direct	**Indirect**	**Direct**	**Indirect**
GU	- Ceasefire - Humanitarian situation - Objectives of the war - Ground Invasion - Targeting the UN - Effect of war on Hamas - Fighting with Lebanon - Country's Relations	- Ceasefire - Humanitarian situation - Objectives of the war - Ground Invasion - Blaming and Targeting Hamas	- Ceasefire - Calling for violence and revenge - Blaming Israel	- Ceasefire
TL	- Ceasefire - Objective of the war - Ground invasion - Claims of the war and right to defend - Effect of war on Hamas	- Ceasefire - Objective of the war - Ground invasion - Blaming and targeting Hamas	- Ceasefire - Response to Israel	- Ceasefire - Humanitarian situation - Ground invasion
NYT	- Ceasefire - Objectives of the war - The white phosphorous - Warning the civilians - Violations of the law - Targeting Hamas - Warning journalists to enter Gaza - Describing Hamas' fighters	- Ceasefire - Humanitarian relief - Objectives of the war - Injuring or killing of the Israeli soldiers - Right of self-defense - Blaming and targeting Hamas - Warning Gaza people and Hamas - Avoid targeting the civilians - Media coverage	- Ceasefire - The division between Hamas and Fatah - The people's reactions to the situation in Gaza	- Ceasefire - The number of killed people - Willingness to find solution - The effect of the division between Hamas and Fatah - Calling for support in the West Bank - The effect of war towards Hamas
WP	- The humanitarian relief - Ground invasion - Firing rockets necessity and awareness of war - Effect of the war - Balance of suffer - The media coverage - Medical Situations - Claiming for the winning of the war - Israeli accusation of UN - Country's Relations - Considering Hamas as a terrorist group	- Ceasefire - Humanitarian relief - Objective and necessity of war - Ground invasion - The killing of Israeli soldiers - The role of politics - War in the north of Israel - Firing rockets - Accusation of Hamas - The media coverage - UN's accusation of Israel	- Humanitarian situation - The unity between Hamas fighters and the Palestinians - Calling for violence calling to fight the Israeli soldiers - Defence and response to the war - The Israeli legitimation of war	- Ceasefire - Humanitarian situation - Calling for violence - The number of defence and response to the war - Killed people - Asserting of killing soldiers - The effect of war on Hamas - Calling for Palestinian unity

This table (6.9) shows varieties of themes in which Israelis and Palestinians are quoted directly and indirectly. In sequence following the previous analytical chapters 4 and 5, this section focuses on ceasefire because it is a dominant theme, and it is the most suitable for the role of political actors (for further explanation, see section 5.2.1). In ceasefire, IPA and PPA are quoted directly in GU, TL and NYT. For example,

29. **Ehud Barak, Israel's defence minister,** told Fox News on Saturday when the bombing began: "For us to be asked to have a ceasefire with Hamas is like asking you (the US) to have a ceasefire with al-Qaida." GA-GU-30-DEC-02
30. **Mark Regev, a spokesman for Ehud Olmert, Israel's Prime Minister**, said: "Giving Hamas a respite just to regroup, rearm, is a mistake. The pressure on the Hamas military machine must continue." GA-TL-01-JAN-01
31. 'The leading option right now is still a ground invasion, but the target of this operation is an improved cease-fire, and if that can come without the invasion, fine," said **a close aide to Mr. Barak,** speaking on the condition of anonymity because he is not Mr. Barak's authorized spokesman. "But, of course, Hamas has to agree, and there has to be a mechanism to make it work." GA-NYT-31-DEC-01

In Ex29 and Ex30, *Ehud Barak and* Mark *Regev,* nominated by a semi-formal way, speak of the difficulties of having ceasefire with Hamas. They portray this difficulty as comparable to having a ceasefire between the USA and Al-Qaida. This not only justifies ruling out ceasefire, but also associates Hamas with terrorism[67]. Israel further claims it wishes to avoid giving Hamas any chance to rebuild its military capacity. In Ex31, NYT quotes Israeli conceptions on ceasefire which relate to conducting an Israeli ground invasion to a condition to develop and make a better ceasefire with Hamas. In this example, the Israeli actor is genericised by an indefinite article associated with a singular, e.g. *a close aide to Mr. Barak.*

By this way, the authors are able to acknowledge the social actors involved in ceasefire. These conceptions on ceasefire are also quoted indirectly across the news stories.

32. **Israel** said the agreement would commit the US and Nato to track and intercept weapons shipments to **Gaza** from Iran or anywhere else. GA-GU-17-JAN-02
33. **Officials** said that the Israeli Security Cabinet will be asked to approve the surprise move after Israel secured commitments from Egypt and the US to stop Hamas re-arming by smuggling weapons into Gaza. GA-TL-17-JAN-01
34. **An Israeli official**, speaking on condition of anonymity because the negotiations were not yet public, said the delay was a matter of timing and not a breakdown in talks. GA-NYT-13-JAN-01
35. **A senior Israeli official** said Israel and Egypt are in basic agreement on a plan that would allow the European Union and the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority to share responsibility for monitoring the border and the crossing point at Rafah. GA-WP-13-JAN-01

[67] see Ex3, section 5.2.1 on discussing the word *terrorism*

In these indirect quotations, Israel makes efforts to achieve a ceasefire. These efforts include third parties which involve international communities, e.g. USA and NATO; regional parties, e.g. Egypt; and noticeably the Palestinian Authority. These efforts include agreements to prevent smuggling weapons from any place through mainly tunnels, prevent Hamas from rebuilding its military abilities and allow the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the EU to monitor the southern border of the Gaza Strip. The PA in this case is presented as a West Bank authority rather than an authority for all Palestinians. This point shows implicitly the Palestinian-Palestinian rift. In these examples, the Israeli politicians are genericised by a mass noun as *Israel* (Ex32), plurals without articles as *officials* (Ex33), indefinite article with a singular, *a senior Israeli official (Ex34)* and *a senior Israeli official* (Ex35). In such genericisation in direct quotations, there is a distance between the reporters and the quote (Fairclough 1995a).

These quotations fulfil a number of purposes. They provide evidence from governmental and authoritative figures, e.g. spokesmen. This makes them credible and newsworthy rather than citing individuals. Thus, this pattern shows professional opinions of experts in relation to ceasefire. These quotations demonstrate similarity in quoting Israeli justifications for Israeli attitudes towards the ceasefire with Hamas across the newspapers. Most importantly, these quotations carry Israeli explanations rather than declarative statements, as in the case of Hamas.

The quotations also carry implicit meanings towards Israeli efforts for ceasefire, but Hamas obstacles make ceasefire difficult as we see in examples (36-38). PPA are quoted directly in GU, TL and NYT as rejecting a ceasefire and imposing conditions for having a ceasefire.

36. **Khaled Meshal, the de facto Hamas leader,** said: "We will not accept any political movement that doesn't satisfy these demands."GA-GU-16-JAN-02
37. **He** stated: "We aren't closing the door to dialogue... Hamas will co-operate with any initiative that will bring about an end to the aggression, will bring about an [Israeli] withdrawal and will pave the way to opening the border crossings and removing the siege. We will relate to any such initiative positively, openly and responsibly." GA-TL-14-JAN-02 (Isamil Haniyyah)
38. 'You have destroyed the last chance for negotiations," **Mr. Meshal** said, according to Reuters. GA-NYT-11-JAN-04

The Palestinian politicians are nominated in a semi-formal way, e.g. ***Khaled Meshal*** *(see Ex36*) ***Isamil Haniyyah*** (Ex37), and by a formal way as ***Mr. Meshal*** (see Ex38). These examples reflect Hamas' rejection of the ceasefire, as it speaks on its demands and conditions. TL goes further than GU by giving more details of these demands: end the war, withdraw from Gaza, open the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, and end the Israeli siege on the Gaza Strip. NYT focuses on Hamas' accusation of Israel destroying the opportunities for a ceasefire. In the same context, indirect quotations lead to the same representation patterns. The following examples show how Palestinian political actors are quoted indirectly in ceasefire negotiations.

39. **Khaled Meshal, the leader of Hamas who lives in exile in Damascus,** said the offensive had ended any chance of a broader peace deal with the Palestinians.GA-GU-12-JAN-03
40. **Hamas** has said it would consider allowing observers at the border crossings with Egypt but opposes an international force. GA-TL-10-JAN-03
41. In a televised speech on Monday night, **a senior Hamas official, Ismail Haniya,** expressed an openness to a diplomatic solution but reiterated previous demands that any deal include the opening of Gaza's border crossings, which Israel and Egypt have kept mostly closed since Hamas violently pushed out its rival Fatah in 2007. GA-NYT-13-JAN-01
42. **Ahmed Youssef, a Hamas spokesman in Gaza,** said the group would not stop firing rockets into southern Israel until the Israeli military withdrew from the Palestinian territory and ended the economic blockade, which has left Gaza's 1.5 million people dependent on smugglers and relief organizations for their basic needs. GA-WP-08-JAN-02

These examples show that while GU and WP nominate Hamas members in a semi-formal way, e.g. *Khaled Meshal* and *Ahmed Youssef*, TL and NYT genericise them by a mass noun as *Hamas* and by a singular with indefinite article, e.g. *a senior Hamas official*. In this way, the journalists denote the members of Hamas involved in the ceasefire negotiations and indicate Hamas' conditions and demands for a ceasefire with Israel. Hamas claims

that Israeli operations end the chances for a ceasefire, and expresses the possibility of accepting monitors on the borders of Gaza rather than international forces. The demands also include Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.

These quotes signify that the conditions set by Hamas constitute, at an implicit level a rejection of the ceasefire efforts without recalling political contexts around these conditions. These quotations justify Israeli ruling out a ceasefire. This journalistic discourse points readers to Hamas' views on ceasefire, as the speakers are Hamas' official leaders, and thus, these quotations strengthen the representation of Hamas as refusing ceasefire (see section 5.2.1).

6.4.2 Israeli and Palestinian Military Actors

This section examines the themes in which Israeli and Palestinian military actors are quoted directly or indirectly. Table (6.10) shows the variety of these themes.

Table 6.10: Themes of Quotations Associated with Military Actors

NP	Israeli military actors		Palestinian military actors	
	Direct	**Indirect**	**Direct**	**Indirect**
GU	- Targeting Hamas - Ceasefire Negotiations	- Targeting Hamas - Targeting tunnels - Targeting UN sites - Ground Invasion - Friendly fire - Ceasefire negotiations	---	- Calling for fighting
TL	- Investigation of the IDF's conduct	- Targeting Hamas - Effects of war on Hamas	- ---	- Hamas' willingness for fighting
NYT	- Targeting Hamas - Ground invasion - Media coverage of the war - The Israeli objective of the war - Blaming Hamas and avoiding the war	- Targeting Hamas - Ground invasion - Targeting UN sites - Warning the civilians - The white phosphorous - Injuring and killing of Israeli soldier - Israeli assessment of war - The Israeli achievement of the war - The humanitarian relief	- Revenge of the killed people - Ground invasion	- Revenge for the killed people - Ground invasion
WP	- Targeting Hamas for firing rockets and fighting - Expansion of the war operations - The humanitarian relief - Effect of war on Hamas - Avoiding civilian causalities - Historical events-war operations	- Targeting Hamas - Targeting tunnels - Ground invasion - Targeting UN driver - The humanitarian relief - Israeli objective of the war	- ----------	- ----------

Table (6.10) shows that Israeli and Palestinian military actors are engaged in war operations. Here I examine two themes from direct and indirect quotations. These themes are Israeli targeting of Hamas and Palestinian calls for fighting and revenge. In the first theme, the targeting of Hamas, IMA are quoted directly in GU, NYT and WP and indirectly across the newspapers. For example,

43. "The military operation is changing the dynamic, making it clear to Hamas that it is going to pay a very high cost for violations of the ceasefire," GA-GU-30-DEC-02 **(Brom)**
44. "It doesn't matter what will be the end of this war. We know they know today that they have a problem. Will they put down their weapons forever? For sure, no, but I think they have learned a lesson from this war." GA-NYT-16-JAN-02 **(Colonel Herzi)**
45. "They're hitting here and there with antitank missiles and mortars. Overall, though, they're not confronting the Israeli presence in Gaza," said **retired Gen. Amnon Lipkin-Shahak**, former chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces. GA-WP-08-JAN-01

In these examples, IMA are nominated in a formal way, e.g. *Colonel Herzi* and *mnon Lipkin-Shahak*. These direct quotations show Israeli intention to target Hamas as a response to its violent actions. In GU, Israel considers *the military operation* a costly operation for Hamas because Hamas violates the ceasefire. NYT quotes Israelis speaking on their ultimate goal of the war, i.e. giving a lesson to Hamas, even though Israel realises that it will not lead Hamas putting their weapons down. WP's quotation focuses on Israeli justifications for targeting Hamas because Hamas hits the Israeli soldiers on the ground. However, Hamas is not able to prevent Israel from entering Gaza. These views are also reflected in indirect quotations across the news stories.

46. **Defence officials** said Hamas had been damaged but that it was unlikely ever to admit defeat. GA-GU-12-JAN-03
47. **Military sources** said that Israel was still broadening its range of targets, hitting a money-changer responsible for transferring funds to Hamas. GA-TL-01-JAN-01
48. Last week, as many as 43 people were killed near a United Nations school by an Israeli mortar strike that **the military** said was in response to a Hamas attack. GA-NYT-13-JAN-01
49. The soldiers were engaged in heavy clashes with Hamas fighters in densely populated neighborhoods in northern Gaza, **the military** reported. GA-WP-06-JAN-01

IMA are genericised by plural forms without articles, e.g. e.g. ***Defence officials*** (Ex46), ***Military sources*** (Ex47). Also, they are genericised by a singular with definite articles as ***the military*** *said* (Ex48) and (Ex49). These examples show Israeli quotations on the effects of Israeli actions against Hamas by targeting its facilities in the Gaza Strip as we can see in GU and TL. In this case, the continuity of operations is influential. In NYT, these operations lead to the killing of civilians. WP focuses on the density of fighting on the ground between the Israeli soldiers and Hamas' fighters. These quotations illustrate that journalists reproduce Israeli official lines and give minimal space to opposition sources, e.g. Palestinians express themselves.

Palestinian military actors are quoted directly in calling for violence and revenge who have been killed, and ground invasion only in NYT. They are also quoted indirectly in GU, TL and NYT. For example,

50. Another Hamas figure, **a recognised military spokesman called Abu Ubaida**, said thousands of Hamas fighters were waiting in Gaza to take on the Israeli military and said rocket attacks would increase.GA-GU-06-JAN-03
51. **The statement** added that if there was a ground invasion, "the children of **Gaza** will be collecting the body parts of your soldiers and the ruins of tanks." GA-NYT-31-DEC-01 **the statement from the military wing of Hamas**
52. **Hamas fighters** say they are waiting for Israeli troops to venture deep into built-up areas, and last night Gazan television broadcast morale-boosting footage of their resistance. GA-TL-14-JAN-02
53. In Gaza, **Hamas militants** issued a taped statement vowing revenge for those killed in the Israeli air raids since Saturday and warning that a ground invasion would prove painful for Israel. GA-NYT-31-DEC-01

GU nominates a Hamas' spokesman by a formal name, ***abu Ubaida*** (Ex55). PMA are genericised by a singular with definite articles as ***the statement*** (Ex51), and by plural forms without articles as ***Hamas fighters*** (Ex52) and as ***Hamas militants*** (Ex53).

GU focuses on Hamas' determination that it is ready for the ground invasion. In TL, Hamas is quoted as giving promises to increase the rockets fired upon the commencement of the ground invasion. This implicitly demonstrates Hamas violence in firing rockets. These examples also show

Hamas' warning to Israel from the ground invasion that it can make Israel fail in its operations. These direct quotations reproduce Israeli arguments that the purpose of their military operations came as a result of doing everything to stop the Palestinian rocket attacks on Israeli civilians. The quotations come from Israeli military officials and informed sources involved in the war. This conveys and presents the news as 'facts', and thus, they are not vulnerable to questioning. The quotations not only mark the power and status of IMA speakers, but also implicitly put the responsibility on Hamas for firing rockets and fighting. This pattern of representation carries justification and legitimisation for the Israeli actions against Hamas.

In quoting PMA, the quotations from Palestinians are assigned declamatory statements, e.g. "Gaza is a graveyard for Israel", or "Israel will face a dark destiny" (Philo and Berry, 2011:341). Notice the similarities here with the following examples: *waiting in Gaza to take on the Israeli military* (Ex50), *collecting the body parts of your soldiers* (Ex51), *waiting for Israeli troops to venture deep* (Ex52), and *would prove painful for Israel* (Ex53).

The nominations provide a positive association with IMA to explain their views and to give evidence on who is quoted, while in the case of Palestinians, genericisation obscures their status in terms of their responsibility. There is no specific reference to PMA in TL and NYT. From this comparison, we can see that Palestinian military sources are largely unnamed individuals except the top named senior Hamas leaders.

Overall the comparisons, this way of quoting Israeli military officials and Hamas' military actors, give a semblance of factuality and authenticity to the war reporting, which nonetheless conveys hidden messages. One apparent message is that Israel invaded Gaza as a response to prevent Hamas from firing rockets into Israel, and because Hamas refused ceasefire. This is by the same token similar to the Israeli politicians' message. This shows that the reporting of speech is never mere reproduction, but a

representation (see Fairclough, 1992a, b, c and 1995a, b). The above examples show that the quoted persons speak from their perspectives as they have official positions as leaders, e.g. Prime Minister. This colours their quotations with power, authority, and authenticity.

Like political actors, IMA are able to show evidence of the events. This evidence justifies and legitimises their actions (targeting Hamas). The obvious difference between the two sides reinforces the process of exclusion of Palestinian military actors in GU, TL and WP in direct quotations. An obvious remark in quoting military actors is that we see similarity with political actors in that the selected newspapers quote Israeli military officials and Hamas members. This would portray the war as a war between Israel on one side and Hamas on the other side, i.e. between two *equal* powers (see section 7.6.1).

6.4.3 Israeli and Palestinian Civilian Actors

The civilian actors are quoted in themes less frequently than the political and military actors. Table (6.11) shows different themes in which civilian actors are quoted directly and indirectly.

Table 6.11: Themes of Quotations Associated with Civilian Actors

NP	Israeli civilian actors		Palestinian civilian actors	
	Direct	**Indirect**	**Direct**	**Indirect**
GU	- ----------	- ----------	- Facing consequences of war - Medical situations	- Medical situations
TL	- Facing consequences of war	- ----------	- Facing consequences of war - Calling for violence - Praising of Hamas - Country's relations	- Medical situations - Facing consequences of war - Calling for violence
NYT	- ----------	- ----------	- Facing consequences of war - Support of Hamas - The division between Hamas and Fatah - Blaming the Palestinian Authority - Blaming Israel - The Israeli weapons used in the war	- Facing consequences of war - Blaming Hamas - Criticising the behavior of the Palestinian Authority - Calling for revenge
WP	- Israeli objective to liberate the Israeli soldier	- ----------	- Facing consequences of war - The abilities of Hamas - Calling the international community for ending the war	- Facing consequences of war - The Israeli awareness of the war - Hiding of Hamas fighters among civilians - The effect of pausing fighting

Table (6.11) shows ICA are quoted only directly in facing consequences of war in TL and in supporting Israeli objectives of the war in WP. In contrast, PCA are quoted directly and indirectly in facing consequences of war across the newspapers. For example,

54. “People in Israel are addicted to violence,” **Eran Shalev**, 27, a student, said as he surveyed the crowd on the hilltop. GA-TL-13-JAN-03
55. Nearby, **Muhammad Khalil, 47,** stood over the grave of his 19-year-old son, reading the Qur'an and crying. "I miss him," **Khalil** said of his son, who was a member of Hamas's military wing, the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades. GA-GU-02-JAN-03
56. "My girls were sitting at home planning their futures, talking, then suddenly they are being shelled," **he** said. GA-TL-17-JAN-01 **Deen Aboul Aish**
57. "I have nine children," he said. "Where can I go? I prefer to die at my own house." GA-NYT-11-JAN-04 (A Beach camp car mechanic named Hamdi Eki)
58. "I walked in and I saw bodies on the floor of the courtyard, policemen in their blue uniform suffocating. There was a pile of some 50 of them, some breathing, moaning, and some silent," he (**Ala Zumu**) said. GA-WP-28-DEC-01

One Israeli speaker is nominated in a semi-formal way as *Eran Shalev* in TL (Ex54). Palestinian civilians are nominated by a semi-formal way in GU, e.g. *Muhammad Khalil* (Ex55), and by a formal way, e.g. *Khalil* (Ex56). Ex54 shows the Israeli speaker's claims of facing Palestinian violence. Examples (Ex55-58) reflect humanitarian suffering that PCA face in war operations in the Gaza Strip. They are quoted in talking about personal stories, e.g. a Palestinian reading the Qur’an and crying for losing his son, a Palestinian talking about the killing of his daughters while they were preparing for their future at home, and a Palestinian expressing bewilderment about where possibly to escape with nine children from the war operations and describing the scenes of troubles.

Nominating Palestinian civilians leads one to recognise individual stories. This shows extensive interest in the Palestinian civilian actors and shows evidence of their suffering. This paves the way to coverage of certain beliefs, opinions, etc.: for example, a description of suffering of Palestinian civilians rather than stating the reasons for this suffering.

These examples show that quotation patterns are much more heavily weighted on the Palestinian civilians than the Israelis in terms of casualties. Their suffering comes naturally from the war operations and because Hamas hides among the civilians in the Gaza Strip. In these examples, the Israeli guy gives opinions, while the Palestinians give descriptions. Arguably, this

description is an indicator of a journalistic practice of including eyewitness accounts that make their information about the events presented by the newspaper appear to be more reliable, although the accounts may not necessarily be so.

6.4.4 Other actors

Other actors are quoted directly and indirectly mainly in six themes, as we can see in table (6.12) below. These themes are ceasefire, objection against the war, the humanitarian situation, bombing of the UN sites, call for supporting the Palestinians and the Israeli right of self-defence. I focus on ceasefire among these themes. It is the most frequent theme in the quotations. There are various reactions of other actors to a ceasefire, but in general, these reactions reproduce a unique discourse that the war should be ended. In other words, other actors are quoted in decrying the violent attacks by the two warring parties from the very early stages of the war. They also demand that a ceasefire should be implemented.

Table 6.12: Themes of Quotations Associated with Other Actors

NP	US		UK		UN		EU		ARAB		INTERNATIONAL		Iranian	
	Direct	Indirect	Direct	Indirect	Direct	Indirect	Direct	Indirect	Direct	Indirect	Direct	Indirect	Direct	Indirect
GU	- Ceasefire - Humanitarian situations	- Humanitarian situations	Objecting the war	- Ceasefire - Humanitarian situations	- Ceasefire - Objecting the war - Bombing the UN sites	----------	----------	----------	- Calling Arab countries to act	- Peace process with Israel	Humanitarian situations	- Calling for ceasefire - Using the white phosphorous -	- Calling for supporting the Palestinians	- Calling for supporting the Palestinians
TL	- Ceasefire - Objecting the role of the Security Council	- Israeli right of self-defence - Objecting the role of the Security Council	Ceasefire	- Ceasefire	- Ceasefire - Objecting the role of the Security Council - Suspending of UNRWA's work	- Condition of securing the border - US internal relations - Firing people and killing of civilians	Ceasefire	Humanitarian situation	- ----------	- Ceasefire - Calling for ending the division between Fatah and Hamas	Humanitarian situation	- Lull of operations -	- ----------	- ----------
NYT	- Ceasefire	- Ceasefire	----------	- Ceasefire	- Humanitarian situations - Control of information by Israelis - Humanitarian situations	- Humanitarian situations - Lull of operations	----------	Ceasefire	- Ceasefire the effect of war on Hamas	- Ceasefire Hamas reaction to the talks with the Egyptians	----------	- Ceasefire - Humanitarian situations	- Supporting Hamas - Blaming Israel	- ----------
WP	- Ceasefire - Israeli right of self defence - Criticizing Hamas - Humanitarian relief - US intervention in the conflict	- Ceasefire - Criticism of Hamas - Calling to avoid targeting civilians	----------	- Ceasefire	- Ceasefire - Humanitarian relief - Calling the UN to investigate the war	- UNRWA's services - Preventing the UN envoy	- ceasefire	- Ceasefire - Targeting of the UN school - Humanitarian situation - Criticism of Israel	Ceasefire	- Refusing international monitoring on the border	- Humanitarian relief - Targeting rescue workers - Civilian causalities	- Humanitarian relief - Resistance of fighters - Israeli neglect of the international law	----------	----------

Table (6.12) shows that the main theme is ceasefire in which other actors are quoted either directly or indirectly. The following quotations show US and UK actors' attempts at mediation of a ceasefire between Israelis and Palestinians.

59. **Rice** said it was designed to ensure Gaza would "never again be used as a launching pad against Israeli cities". The US was seeking "a sustainable end to hostilities, rather than one that collapses in a few days or weeks".GA-GU-17-JAN-02
60. **President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice** made phone calls to Israeli and Arab leaders to explore prospects for halting the fighting. GA-NYT-31-DEC-01
61. **Mr Brown,** speaking on the Andrew Marr Show yesterday, outlined a strategy to end the war, saying that a ceasefire should be accompanied by action to stem arms smuggling through tunnels under the Egyptian border and to reopen the crossings between Gaza and Israel: "I think the key is that the international powers are able to give guarantees about ending the tunnels, and that will require Egyptian action; about stopping the supply of arms, and that will require the Arab League to be united on that; and, about international monitoring of the crossings." GA-TL-05-JAN-03

The US and UK actors in these examples are nominated formally, e.g. *Rice* (Ex59), *President Bush* (Ex60) and *Mr Brown* (Ex61). These quotations reflect the US determination and desire to find and see a permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. For this, the US makes efforts, e.g. designing a ceasefire agreement to guarantee that Gaza would not be used as a pad to launch rockets against Israel calling Israeli and some Arab leaders. The British Prime Minister stresses the possibility of ceasefire with practical procedures on the ground. Implicitly he objects to the war by criticising Israel for targeting a UN site in the Gaza Strip. Tony Blair, a special envoy to the Middle East, pays attention to the terms of ceasefire agreement.

In the same context, EU actors are quoted directly only in TL and WP, whereas they are quoted indirectly in NYT and WP in calling for a ceasefire. They are also quoted in relation to efforts with Arab actors or with UN actors. Arab actors are associated with direct and indirect quotations in GU, NYT and WP in speaking on ceasefire. UN actors are quoted directly in GU, TL and WP and indirectly in NYT in calling for ceasefire. International actors are quoted only indirectly in calling for ceasefire in GU, TL and NYT. For example,

62. As **Sarkozy** visited Egypt late Tuesday, **President Hosni Mubarak** said he would propose an immediate cease-fire, followed by talks on the Israeli blockade of Gaza and on ways of keeping arms from being smuggled into Gaza via Egypt. GA-WP-07-JAN-02
63. **Ban** said that he believed a truce could soon be reached.GA-GU-16-JAN-02
64. **Oxfam** called for an immediate ceasefire to allow in sufficient humanitarian supplies. GA-GU-31-DEC-02

While *Sarkozy*, *Ban* and *Oxfam* are nominated by a formal way, *President Hosni Mubarak* is nominated in a semi-formal way. The most outstanding feature that these direct and indirect quotations intend to highlight is the discourse reproduced on calling for immediate ceasefire. These quotations show that they push the two warring sides towards ceasefire. The Arab actors and EU actors met to discuss ceasefire and the possibility of stopping the war. Ban Ki-moon, the secretary of the United Nations and Oxfam have called for ceasefire. These calls aim to allow humanitarian supplies to the people in the Gaza Strip.

The newspapers construct other actors as external and impartial observers of the conflict and mediators of ceasefire. This is much evident in the efforts made by US actors signing an agreement with Israeli officials on ceasefire, UK actors calling for ceasefire, the French president travelling to Israel and Egypt, Arabs calling on Hamas to accept ceasefire, the UN having meetings to discuss a resolution to end the war, and international actors making efforts to stop the war to provide humanitarian relief.

Throughout the examples and comparisons, this study points out that the major theme of other actors is ceasefire in a role as mediators who make efforts to achieve a ceasefire between the Israelis and Palestinians (see section 7.3.1). This reproduces discourse focusing only on positive attitudes rather than to focus on a clear criticism of Israel for attacking civilians or UN sites in the Gaza Strip. These results come in sequence with Philo and Berry (2011:2) that “there is less to fear criticising the Palestinians, but to criticise Israel can create major problems”. This is why we find efforts of other actors focus majorly on mediating efforts of ceasefire.

Overall, this section shows that it cannot be argued that any piece of news is valueless (Richardson, 2004). Thus, an objective report is not necessarily neutral. This means that journalists regularly add orientations or values to the news stories they report. The quotation patterns (direct and indirect) of Israeli actors reflect Israeli claims that the war was not against all Palestinians, but the main target was Hamas. These aims reflect positive attitudes towards Israel, which is depicted as making an effort to achieve a ceasefire with the Palestinians and respond to Hamas' actions.

6.5 Summary and Conclusion

This section summarises the findings of the analysis in answering the research question on quotation patterns. The high percentage of the frequency distributions attributes to IPA, IMA and PCA in the sampled news stories. The importance of these frequencies is the discourse set in the representation of social actors. Israeli political and military actors are the most frequently quoted news sources. This can be for two reasons: Israeli prevention of foreign journalists from entering the Gaza Strip, and Hamas members keeping away from the camera during the war. These patterns of quotation and access influence the reporting of the Gaza war of 2008-09 in the international press (see section 7.4.).

The reporters rely mainly on Israeli sources in covering the war events from the Israeli point of view. The most dominant Israeli source is the Israeli newspapers: *Ha'aretz* and *the Yedioth Ahronoth*. On the contrary, Palestinian actors are mostly associated with the Al-Jazeera channel as a source for their news. Such reliance on Israeli sources demonstrates a lack of information from Palestinian official sources. That is, there is not much reliance on international news agencies in covering the events. This happens as a consequence of the place (Israel mainly) from which the journalists report. It is worth mentioning that foreign journalists were warned and prevented from entering the Gaza Strip during the war (see section 7.4.2).

In brief, the direct quotations associated with Israelis have justifications for not having a ceasefire with Hamas (see Ex29-31), while the indirect quotations include Israeli efforts and diplomacy towards a ceasefire in cooperation with third parties (see Ex32-35). These justifications imply legitimisation of their actions and operations - mainly the ground invasion - and targeting Hamas. This also reflects positive attitudes towards Israel across the selected newspapers. This representation of quotation patterns gives the Israelis more opportunities to give reasonable assessments of the events and themes the journalists cover in their stories across the newspapers. Direct and indirect quotations associated with Palestinians include Hamas' demands without showing its efforts towards a ceasefire (Ex36-42). This implies refusal of the efforts for a ceasefire, and thus, this means that Hamas blocks the diplomatic efforts of the international community (see also section 5.2.1).

The analysis reveals that Israeli and Palestinian political actors are nominated in direct quotations and mostly genericised in indirect quotations. This suggests that the "referent[s] are easily identifiable" (Strauss and Feiz, 2012:99) in direct quotations. Genericisation of military actors makes them un-identifiable actors. This suggests that journalists obscure their references. It is, therefore, apparent that specific individuals who are mentioned tend to be political officials from Israel or leadership figures from Hamas who oppose the authorities, and they are invariably referred to in a positive manner (calling for violence, see Ex11-14).

The discourse in the quotation patterns does not differ substantially from the news stories and editorials (re)produced on the dominant themes: ceasefire, targeting Hamas, firing rockets and facing consequences of war. These quotations provide evidence and correspond to what we have seen in chapters 4 and 5. These findings are important to war reporting, as news is subjected to the selection practices by which journalists or editors decide on what to include or exclude and how to present the data. In war reporting,

this selection process of quotation patterns and sources helps journalists "legitimise [and justify] their claims in the news stories (see Van Dijk, 1988b). Quoting or sourcing one side of the warring parties leads to silencing or backgrounding the other side. These quotations show manifestations of bias in news reporting of war (see section 7.3.1).

The next chapter summarises the representation of the social actors in each newspaper. It demonstrates similarities and differences in the representation of the social actors in the selected newspapers and concludes the whole dissertation.

Chapter Seven: Conclusions

7.1 Introduction

The aim of this study has been to compare coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09 between two UK newspapers (*The Guardian* and *The Times London*), and two US newspapers (*The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*). The objectives included the exploration of different representation patterns of social actors and an explanation of factors which influence the discourse of the selected US and UK newspapers on the Gaza war of 2008-09. To this end, I employed Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA - see sections 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6). This chapter closes the study by answering the following question: what conclusions can be drawn from the representation of social actors in the news coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09? It briefly summarises the answers of the research questions (see section 3.2):

- How do transitivity selections represent the social actors in the news headlines?
- How are the representational categories used to construct the social actors?
- How are quotation patterns and sources used to cover the social actors?

Here I will compare the UK newspapers with their US counterparts with regard to their representation of social actors (section 7.2). It is important to note that this chapter refers to the discourse(s) found in the analysis of linguistic and representational processes, rather than simply focusing on more general differences between the newspapers (for detailed linguistic analysis, see chapters 4 and 5). Through critical discourse analysis (CDA), I will highlight causality aspects and agency of the social actors (section 7.3). I then examine manifestations of bias in discourse (section 7.4). The chapter focuses on factors that influenced reporting of the Gaza war of 2008-09 in the US and UK press, and attempts to summarise how the war was represented (section 7.5). Finally, the limitations and contributions of this study are identified, and recommendations for future research are presented (section 7.6).

7.2 Summary of Linguistic Representation: Similarities and Differences

This section briefly summarises the findings from my analysis of discourse practices in the selected newspapers, and illustrates their similarities and differences across the common themes: ceasefire, targeting Hamas, firing rockets, and facing consequences of war. These themes provide common ground to highlight comparisons across the sampled newspapers (see section 3.3.1).

The analysis of ceasefire in the headlines shows that the British and American newspapers associate Israelis with behavioural processes. GU is the only newspaper that does not attribute Israelis with verbal processes. The analysis of the sampled news stories shows that only TL backgrounds Israelis in announcing a unilateral ceasefire. Similarly, the four newspapers activate Israelis' roles. In this activation, obviously GU and NYT focus mainly on specific Israeli efforts, whereas TL and WP report on detailed Israeli demands for ceasefire, i.e. for Hamas to lay its weapons down. In a further examination, while the four newspapers genericise Israelis by a mass noun presented as *Israel*, GU and WP genericise Israelis by plurals without articles as in *negotiators* and functionalise them by adding suffixes to verbs, e.g. *bombers*. GU, TL and WP specify Israeli actors as individuals, e.g. *Olmert*, *Barak* and *Livni* (see section 5.2.1).

In the treatment of Palestinians in the headlines, the four newspapers allocate Palestinians inconsistent processes. While GU assigns mental processes to them, TL assigns relational processes. In addition, only NYT and WP use passive structures in material processes. The analysis of news stories reveals that regarding Palestinians, GU and WP exclude Hamas members, showing them as being hesitant to call a ceasefire, whereas TL and NYT do not exclude Palestinians. NYT is the only source that focuses on members of the Palestinian Authority as well as Hamas. Hamas is portrayed as rejecting a ceasefire, while the Palestinian Authority President makes a great effort to achieve it.

The four newspapers activate Hamas' roles as placing demands and conditions on the Israelis to accept the ceasefire terms. Further, Palestinians are genericised by a mass noun as *Hamas*, and are specified as named Hamas individuals, e.g. *Meshal* and *Taha* (see sections 4.3.1 and 5.2.1). Further, NYT and WP genericise Palestinians by means of plural forms without articles, and functionalise them by adding suffixes to verbs as in *negotiators* (see section 5.2.1).

Regarding the targeting of Hamas, there is a similarity between GU, NYT and WP in assigning Israelis material action processes and denoting Palestinians as targets by using passive forms. TL does not focus on Israeli targeting of Hamas in its headlines, and NYT does not refer to Israelis in general. The British and American newspapers are also similar in activating Israeli roles. Israelis are similarly genericised by plurals without articles across the newspapers and by mass nouns such as *Israel* in GU, TL and WP. GU and TL also genericise Israelis by means of singulars with indefinite articles, e.g. *a predawn raid* and *an Israeli plane*.

NYT and WP functionalise them in compound nouns such as *Israeli warplanes*, whereas TL functionalises Israelis by adding suffixes to verbs, e.g. *bombers*. GU and WP focus on specific targets in the form of named Hamas members, whereas TL and NYT focus on Israeli targeting of Hamas in general (see section 5.2.2).

When commenting specifically on the subject of firing rockets in the headlines, both GU and TL ascribe material actions to Palestinians, depicting them as responsible for initiating rockets, while NYT and WP do not report on firing rockets. The four newspapers activate Palestinian roles and genericise Palestinians by using plurals without articles and by mass nouns such as *Hamas* in GU, NYT and WP (for transitivity processes see section 4.3.2, and for representational processes see section 5.2.2). GU and NYT genericise Palestinians as *militants* without referring to Hamas

members, whereas TL and WP genericise them as *rockets* (non-human entities).

Regarding facing the consequences of war, Israelis are not included in all headlines. In contrast, the British and American newspapers assign Palestinians material event processes as the goal. In the news stories, the British and American newspapers exclude Israeli and Palestinian civilians, and make their roles in facing the consequences of war similarly passivated (see sections 4.33. and 5.2.3). Further, GU, TL and WP genericise Israelis by using plurals without articles. NYT and WP specify them by aggregation, e.g. *thirteen Israelis*, *seven of the dead*. Only TL nominates Israelis in a semi-formal way, e.g. *Rafi Twitto*. WP genericises Palestinians by using a definite article, and GU nominates[68] them formally. They are specified by assimilation in GU and by individuals in TL (see section 5.2.3).

Through this summary of similarities and differences in the linguistic features, the language used by the newspapers seems to be largely similar. However, it is hard to say that there are specific patterns in each newspaper in representing Israeli and Palestinian actors. In neither the British nor the American newspapers, it is hard to say that there is a systematic allocation of linguistic features for Israelis or Palestinians.

Most importantly, despite this arbitrary allocation of linguistic processes, the discourse reproduced in the representation of social actors is quite similar. These processes reflect causality and agency aspects in the representation of Israeli and Palestinian actors. In other words, these processes show Israeli efforts to achieve a ceasefire and foreground Israeli agency in the targeting of Hamas and Palestinian agency in the firing of rockets. Section 7.3 addresses some implications of these processes.

[68] Nomination is a way of addressing people rather than nominating them to a position or award (see section 3.5.2)

7.3 Causality Aspects, Response and Agency

This section deals with realisations of agency in media discourse around the Gaza war of 2008-2009, referring to theoretical outlines and conceptions discussed in chapter two. For example, the critical discourse analysis of the four newspapers corroborates the definition of discourse as a practice (textual, discursive and social) for evaluating and justifying what is happening (Fairclough 1995b, Van Leeuwen 2008; see section 2.2.1).

As a textual practice, the analysis focuses on linguistic features, as shown in 7.2, and finds that the similarities between the selected newspapers far outweigh the differences. As a discursive practice, the analysis examines production practices in the headlines, and the sampled texts of news stories and editorials. As a social practice, the analysis investigates a dialectical relationship between the discursive practices in producing coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09, and situations or contexts which frame this phenomenon. In this context, the discourse crucially creates and distributes ideologies, i.e. belief systems shared by social groups to construct core identity and determine the relations to other social groups (Van Dijk, 2006).

In this context, the analysis of representation patterns reveals two patterns of representation of social actors across the four newspapers: 1) Israelis responding to Hamas' violence and Hamas causal agents, and 2) response of other actors to the Gaza war of 2008-09 as mediators of ceasefire efforts.

7.3.1 Israeli Response vs. Hamas Causality

This subsection concerns response and causality aspects of Israel and Hamas. The Israeli response is portrayed in two major images: 1) benevolence in offering a ceasefire and allowing humanitarian aid to Palestinians, and 2) retaliation and response to Hamas' rockets fired into Israel.

On the topic of ceasefire, we have seen in section (7.2) that the four newspapers show substantial consistency in focusing on Israeli discourse regarding the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. This discourse focuses on efforts such as negotiations in Egypt (see section 5.2.1, Ex4-6), and declaring a ceasefire (see section 4.3.1, Ex5-7). This pattern highlights Israelis' efforts at ceasefire negotiations and shows a tendency among editors to produce a positive discourse, i.e. foregrounding the Israeli agency positively (compare Ackerman, 2001).

With regard to the retaliation and response to Hamas' rockets, the four newspapers prominently foreground Israeli agency in targeting Hamas. In this action, Israel targets high-profile individual leaders and members of Hamas. This is evident in assigning Israelis material processes and activated agent roles (see sections 4.3.2, Ex20-22, and 5.2.2, Ex35-38).

These linguistic features are substantially ideological in reproducing a general discourse that aligns with the Israeli message that they only target Hamas rather than all Palestinians (see genericisation of Palestinian actors, section 5.2.1) because Hamas fires rockets into Israel. "The officially stated Israeli goal of Operation Cast Lead[69] was to diminish the security threat to residents of southern Israel by steeply reducing rocket fire from the Gaza Strip, weakening Hamas" (Zanotti et al., 2009:7; see also Philo, 2012:155). This conveys positive attitudes towards Israel and possibly generates

[69] The Israeli name of the Gaza war (2008-09), see Gavriely-Nuri's (2013:42)

justifications for Israeli actions, which is evident from the fact that Hamas' views on ceasefire are not represented in these texts.

The causality aspects of Hamas are implied in two images: 1) Hamas' refusal of a ceasefire, and 2) their firing of rockets into Israel. In the context of ceasefire, Hamas is portrayed as imposing conditions before they will agree with the ceasefire terms (see section 4.3.1, Ex8-11 and 5.2.1, Ex7-10). Hamas members are quoted (see section 6.4.1, Ex36-42). This portrays Hamas as refusing a ceasefire.

With regard to the firing of rockets, Hamas is foregrounded in firing rockets by assigning material actions (see section 4.3.2, Ex32-33, and 5.2.2, Ex39-42) and activated agent roles. This pattern gives the impression that these rockets are fired almost exclusively to kill Israeli civilians (see also Zanotti et al., 2009:7). This raises the agency of Hamas in the violence.

In these patterns of representation, the newspapers reproduce a discourse of aggression on the part of Hamas, e.g. targeting cities in southern Israel, firing rockets into Israel (see section 5.2.2, Ex39-42, see also Almeida, 2011:1595). This representation shows a clear tendency to emphasise, and thus foreground Hamas' actions (refusal of ceasefire and firing rockets).

By employing CDA, the analysis reveals that the newspapers do not substantially explain *why* Hamas fires rockets into Israel (see section 5.2.2). The explanation is completely absent in the sampled texts of the news stories and editorials (see section 3.3.2; for similar findings, see Kandil, 2009; Downey, et al[70], 2006). According to Philo and Berry (2011: 341), "this lack of sufficient explanations on cause is critical given that it can have stern impact on audience belief and judgements". Readers of such a representation are likely to receive biased images giving only one version of reality (see section 7.4 on bias and objectivity), and to accept the Israeli

[70] This is a study conducted by Loughborough University Centre for Communication Research (2006)

reactions to Hamas' rockets. This is evident in Israeli claims that Hamas calls for suicide attacks and for killing Jews (see section 4.3.1, Ex18 and Ex19). Also, it is clear in targeting Israel's nuclear plant by Hamas' rockets (see section 4.3.2, Ex33 and section 5.2.2, Ex39-42).

In war reporting, relations between participants can be understood by asking how responsibility is attributed (see for example, Fairclough, 1989; Van Dijk, 1999). In these texts Palestinians, mainly Hamas, are represented as causal agents of violent action (firing rockets). Therefore, they are responsible for initiating attacks on Israel (see section 5.2.2, Ex52-58). This implies a tendency to blame Hamas for the failure of the ceasefire and the peace process. My findings here are consistent with those of other researchers (Bishop et al., 2007; Piner, 2007). Consequently, the discourse of these texts presents Israeli actions and operations as being directed only at Hamas (see section 7.6.1).

Overall Israel is positively represented through its openness to a ceasefire, whereas Hamas is portrayed as an agent and as responsible for initiating violence. This justifies the war as resulting from a failure of negotiations and the collapse of a ceasefire, and reiterates the newspapers' tendencies mainly to blame Hamas for the violence. The available evidence in this section suggests that American and British audiences are not likely to have an accurate representation of the Gaza war of 2008-2009 (see also Shreim, 2012, and Philo and Berry 2004). These aspects of the inability on both sides to achieve a ceasefire provoke efforts from the international community to mediate in order to bring about a peaceful resolution. This is discussed in detail in the next section.

7.3.2 Other Actors as Mediators

The patterns of representation show that other actors are mainly represented as mediators in ceasefire negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. Zanotti (2009:26) points out that “the worldwide response to the Gaza crisis was characterised by consistent calls for an end to the violence and by concern over the humanitarian situation in Gaza”. Other actors are allocated mainly mental processes and activated roles in implementing a ceasefire to end the war and find a solution. GU and TL show much interest in the roles of US actors. TL also focuses on the roles of the UK, the EU and international actors; WP only emphasises the roles of international actors, whereas NYT focuses on Arab actors.

This comparison reflects the interests of each newspaper in specific subgroups of 'other actors' (see section 4.3.4 and 5.2.4). Within these interests, foregrounding roles of other actors in ceasefire negotiations reflects and raises regional and international implications of the Gaza war of 2008-09. These roles are represented in the responses from different countries: both those with a relatively pro-western orientation, e.g. Egypt and Turkey, and others with a relatively anti-western orientation, e.g. Iran. Interestingly, for both types of countries, their roles were characterised by consistent efforts and calls for finding a solution to the violence and by concern over the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.

These efforts were eventually successful, in that Israel and Hamas agreed indirectly on ceasefire terms via the mediation of Egypt and the international community. Israel declared a unilateral ceasefire as we can see in this example: “Israel is expected to announce a unilateral ceasefire tonight that will end its three-week war in Gaza” (GA-TL-17-JAN-01; see also section 5.2.1).

Within these concerns, the main objective for other actors, mainly the EU, is to push forward the peace process and to get the two parties (Israel and Hamas) to agree on a ceasefire. Shreim (2015:5) points out that

“the attacks led to immediate responses from the international community; some, such as the European Union, called for an immediate ceasefire”. In this light, Voltolini (2013:79) specifies two trends which also constrain the roles of the international community and other actors in the analysis of the Gaza war of 2008-09. One is the EU position in two pillars, namely (a) the two-state solution and (b) respect for human rights, international law and international humanitarian law. The other trend is the expansion of policies at the EU's disposal: thus, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict becomes embedded within the economic dimension of EU external relations.

The representation of other actors' roles in mediating a ceasefire in the selected newspapers appears to be attributable to two facets. One is to reinforce Western values, e.g. democracy and human rights. Another facet is the link between this role as mediator and the role of Western governments “to brokering a sustainable ceasefire arrangement and to addressing the needs of the Gazan population” (Zanotti, 2009:x) in light of their positions towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

7.4 Manifestations of Bias in Discourse of International Press

This section sheds light on how the selected newspapers, as a sample of the international press, favour a specific version of reality by focusing on one of the warring sides over the other. It is worthy mentioning that having more frequency for one side of the warring parities does not mean always bias to this side in all reporting as we can see in the next section. Here, I re-visit the frequency distributions attributed to the social actors in the headlines and news stories.

7.4.1 Frequency Bias: Unbalanced Representation

This subsection revisits the percentage of inclusion of social actors in the headlines and body texts of the sampled news stories in addition to the frequency of quotation patterns. Generally speaking, the difference of frequency can be seen in the dominance of social actors with regard to the transitivity, representational categories and quotation patterns:

1) The analysis reveals that of the Israeli actors, the most frequently included actors are the Israeli politicians and military. This suggests dominance of the Israeli political perspective and a causal relation between Israel and Hamas. Interestingly, the comparison reveals a similarity between the UK and US newspapers in including Israeli political and military actors more than Palestinian ones (see for example table 4.1 and table 5.1).

In the transitivity selections in the headlines, the Israeli politicians are included 29% and military 25% more frequently than the Palestinain politicians 8% and the military actors 3%. The analysis of representational cateogires shows Israeli politicians and military are included with frequency 67.6% and 66.2%. Palestinian political and military actors are included 36% and 24.6%.

These frequencies show Israelis more prominently than Palestinians in the newspapers. This leads to a bias that gives the Israelis more opportunities to give reasonable assessments of the events and themes the

journalists covered in their stories across the newspapers. For example, in the theme of ceasefire in the headlines of the news stories, Israeli politicians are allocated behavioural processes, whereas the representation emphasises Israeli behaviours towards ceasefire, and offering and allowing humanitarian aid (see the headlines 1-4, section 4.3.1). To clarify Israeli behaviours, Israeli politicians are also associated with verbal processes (see headlines 5-7) that enable them to express their procedures and opinions on the ceasefire.

In the same context, an emphasis on Israeli military actors suggests that the newspapers depict the Israelis as respondents to Hamas (see section 5.2.2). For instance, the analysis reveals a causal relationship between Israel and Hamas (targeting Hamas vs. firing rockets). This is evident in the following quotes (Is*rael struck at the heart of Hamas , Israel's offensive has killed [...] Saeed Seyyam, Hamas interior minister, Israeli warplanes pounded Hamas*, see examples 35-38, section 5.2.2). In comparison, Hamas fires rockets as evident in Hamas *has pounded, Rockets repeatedly streaked out of Gaza* and H*amas has fired hundreds of rockets* (see examples 39-42, section 5.2.2).

2) The analysis shows a dominance of Palestinian civilians among Palestinian actors. Palestinian civilians are thematised much more often than Israeli ones. There is an absence of Israeli civilian actors in all headlines and the most sampled texts. In terms of occurances, it is clear that there is a focus on Palestinian civilian suffering more than Israelis. However, this does not mean that having more frequency means always a bias in favour of Palestinian civilians. For example, while the high percentages (see table 4.1 and table 5.7) may attract sympathy to the Palestinian civilians, attributing material event processes and passivated roles is ideologically significant in terms of news selection and processes (see headlines 34-37). They represent the actions as 'just happening' (see Nir and Roeh, 1992). This means the death of Palestinian civilians is represented as a result of targeting Hamas,

rather than the direct Israeli attacks on civilians (*Hundreds Killed in Reprisal Airstrikes Targeting Hamas Security Facilities***,** headline 22). Also, the passive forms are evidenet in the following quotes: ***27 Palestinians** were killed, **400 Palestinians** have been killed, **seven civilians** were killed, **More than 2,500 people** were reported wounded* (see examples 68-71, section 5.2.3).

This, arguably, decreases the degree of seriousness of killing, or destruction, as actions that happen in unspecified ways (see sections 4.3.3 and 5.2.3). Philo and Berry (2011:363) point out that "since the number of Palestinians killed was around 100 times than of the Israelis, the amount of coverage dedicated to the Israeli side is not proportional to the harm inflicted" (see also Philo 2012:158; Amer, 2009).

In this regard, the newspapers seem to be more sympathetic to ordinary Palestinians who are just trying to get on with their lives while the Israeli military is bombing them. Conversely, an absence of Israeli civilian actors suggests the newspapers hide the voice of Israeli civilians or their suffering from consequences of war (e.g. no mention of Israeli civilians in Sderot being shelled by Hamas which is what we have come to expect from the Western media). The frequencies show noticeably that Israeli civilians are marginalised.

With regard to direct quotations, the UK newspapers quote Israeli and Palestinian political and civilian actors more than the US newspapers. The American newspapers quote Israeli and Palestinian military actors more than the British newspapers. Deacon (2008:125) states that "the frequency with which sources are directly quoted in the coverage does provide a telling, if imperfect, indicator of the availability and/or perceived credibility of news sources by journalists". The high frequency of these direct quotations demonstrates that both the Israelis and the Palestinians are quoted in explaining their views on the war events in the British

newspapers, taking into consideration that Israeli actors are quoted more than Palestinian actors. This is evident in the following frequencies: (5.1%) direct quotations and (9.5%) indirect quotations attributing to Israeli military and (0.3%) direct quotations and (0.7%) indirect quotations associated with Palestinian military.

The US newspapers have various reasons for focusing on military actors. This might happen because of possible access to military sources (see section 7.4.2. on access to news). For example, in targeting Hamas, NYT and WP refer to nominated Israeli military actors: Colonel Herzi and retired Gen. Amnon Lipkin-Shahak (see examples 44 and 45). The UK newspapers provide more evidence to their readers of the views of political and civilian actors. In both cases, the direct quotations back up what the social actors say, i.e. claims of the social actors in direct quotation seem to be unquestioned facts.

Regarding indirect quotations, the American newspapers quote the Israeli politicians, Israeli military actors and Palestinian civilians more than the British newspapers. This is evident in such examples, *An Israeli official, speaking on condition of anonymity because the negotiations were not yet public, said the delay was a matter of timing and not a breakdown in talks* (GA-NYT-13-JAN-01, Ex34, section 6.4.1). *The soldiers were engaged in heavy clashes with Hamas fighters in densely populated neighbourhoods in northern Gaza, the military reported* (GA-WP-06-JAN-01, Ex49, section 6.4.2).

The British newspapers quote Palestinian political and military actors more than the American newspapers. Neither the British nor the American newspapers tend to quote Israeli civilians. Nonetheless Israeli actors are quoted more than Palestinians (see tables 6.1-6.3).

This higher prevalence of quotations is indicative of greater access, and is even seen to bring significant advantages. Richardson (2004) suggests objective reporting does not mean necessarily being neutral as there are

orientations and considerations that affect the policies of editors and journalists. Through comparison it becomes clear how the international press, presented in the selected newspapers, promotes a simplified reading of the war events by including specific group(s) of social actors, typically Israeli government officials and Hamas officials.

The analysis of the frequency distributions reveals larger discrepancies between the two sides. Israeli politicians and military actors are are more frequently quoted, both directly and indirectly, than Palestinian politicians and military actors. This fact supports the finding that Israeli actors are more prominent in the headlines and news stories than the Palestinian actors. In contrast, Palestinian civilians are quoted directly and indirectly more than Israeli civilians (see tables 6.1-6.3). This brings sympathy to their suffering from consequences of war. Also, this obscures conceptions on how Israeli civilians face consequences of war.

Many findings of this study confirm previous studies on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and show that the Western media generally support Israel more than Palestinians (e.g. Pappe and Chomsky and Barat, 2010; Shreim, 2015; Zelizer et al., 2002). Viser (2003) finds *the New York Times* is biased and pro-Israel more so than *Haaretz*, an Israeli newspaper. NYT focuses on US role on the conflict. Philo and Berry (2004) find that US politicians who support Israel were very strongly featured on BBC1, and thus, there was a prominence of official Israeli perspectives.

Also, this study is different from the studies mentioned above in its subdivision of the groups of social actors. This study finds differences between the depictions of civilian actors. This study reveals that the newspapers are biased to Palestinian civilian actors more than to Israeli civilian actors. Thus, it is arguably claimed that the newspapers are sympathetic to the Palestinian civilians.

7.4.2 Biased Sources

This section focuses on the manifestations of bias in sources how they are achieved, and their implications. This analysis reveals who is sourced and quoted, or mitigated and ignored in reporting the Gaza war of 2008-09. In line with this, the question is whether the selected newspapers are treating both warring parties in a way likely to achieve a balanced account. My examination of sourcing practices shows that the selected newspapers were likely to use Israeli sources, or pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian sources, rather than international news agencies, e.g. Reuters.

The British newspapers quote American media to refer to Israeli political actors as follows: Fox News (ceasefire), NBC's Meet the Press programme (objectives of the war) in GU, and ABC (objectives of the war) in TL. Only GU quotes the Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz* (internal affairs and blame of Hamas). GU also quotes al-Arabiya TV with regard to the Israeli ground invasion (see section 6.4.2).

Regarding the Palestinian actors, GU quoted Al-Jazeera channel (Hamas' response to Israel), and Hamas' television station (winning the war). Similarly, NYT and WP quote Al-Jazeera channel regarding Palestinians' attitudes towards ceasefire and when referring to Palestinians' calling for violence and revenge. WP also quotes Associated Press regarding Palestinians' call for support in the West Bank. Reliance on Arab media mainly Al-Jazeera is surprising because Al-Jazeera is often accused (by the right wing) of being biased against the US and Israel. Allan (2004:352) states that "the network's commitment to providing news coverage from an Arab perspective means that is ideologically compromised, and as such biased against US and Israel". Quoting and referring to Al-Jazeera enhances its legitimacy as an influential news network (see Radsch, 2015:61).

This analysis shows that the British newspapers quote Israeli media and international media more often than the American newspapers, which tend to quote Israeli political actors. However, the American newspapers

quote Arab media to refer to Palestinian actors more than the British newspapers. Consequently, the analysis of features of objectivity and bias leads to some observations:

- The presentation of Palestinian political actors as mainly Hamas members or leaders leads to the absence of the Palestinian Authority and its roles in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
- Israeli military actions are carried out mainly against Hamas members and targets in the Gaza Strip, which are responses to Palestinian military actions consisting of Hamas firing rockets.
- Bias in sourcing Israelis propagates their agenda and perspective (see section 7.5).

Consequently, although objectivity is one of the major professional justifications for the media's contribution to war (Roach, 1993), "it remains one of the greatest obstacles to their playing a more responsible and constructive role in public life" (Iggers, 1999:91). This shows that there is imbalance in the use of Israeli and Palestinian sources in the media to report the Gaza war of 2008-09 (see also Nir and Roeh, 1992; Philo and Berry, 2004; Rinnawi, 2007; Viser, 2003). In this regard, there is a limitation in news selection which cannot be neutral (see Richardson, 2004 and Bignell, 1997). In consequence, discourse is arguably not neutral because discourse is full of ideological stances that are motivated by certain perspectives (see Strauss and Feiz, 2014:3). This is particularly true of war reporting, as we will see in the following section.

7.5 Factors Influencing War Reporting in the International Press

The more newsworthy an event is considered to be, the more likely it is to be selected for publication and to be presented prominently. In international news, journalists and editors attribute certain values and characteristics to events that make them newsworthy, and that are emphasised in news reports (Eilders, 2005). With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Leep (2010:336) suggests that "although the conflict's violence, including the deaths of Palestinians and Israelis, is all too real, this reality is construed in different ways for particular purposes, governed by prior norms". In this vein, there are some factors that influence reporting the Gaza war of 2008-09 and reproducing the discourse or war reporting, as explained in the previous sections. This section explains "why is discourse like this?" (Fairclough, 2014) in the US and UK selected newspapers (GU, TL, NYT, WP) as examples of the international press (see section 3.3.1).

This study takes into consideration the fact that discourse is "a circular process in which social practices influences texts, via shaping the context and mode in which they are produced" (Richardson, 2007:37; see also section 2.2.1). Therefore, this study suggests that reporting the Gaza war of 2008-09 is influenced by the political orientation of the newspapers, ideological stances, editorial control of discourse structures, and journalistic practices - mainly quotations and sources in addition to other factors.

7.5.1 Political Orientation: Alignment with Foreign Policy

This subsection focuses on the similarity in the newspapers' representation of social actors in relation to the foreign policy[71] of the USA and UK on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For this similarity, there are different reasons such as the role of media, US public opinion supporting Israel, the location of Israel in the Middle East, and the Israeli lobby in the USA (Hansen,

[71] For detailed discussion of definition of foreign policy, see Voltolini's (2013) PhD dissertation.

2008; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006; Slater, 2007). The exploration of all these reasons in detail is behind the scope of this study. I will merely suggest that there are similar lines between the foreign policy of the USA and the UK on the one hand, and the media of those countries on the other hand, in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see also Kellner, 2004:137; Detmer, 1995:91; Bilawi, 2011:130). Generally speaking, the four selected newspapers (GU, TL, NYT and WP) operate within political spectrums in their countries that support Israel over the Palestinians.

US foreign policy is characterised by its support of Israel. In an interview[72] on US foreign policy and Israel, Jeremy R. Hammond[73] (2013) states that "the U.S. supported Israel from its birth". This support is prominent in the massive annual military and financial aid paid to Israel from the USA (Jeremy R. Hammond, 2013; see also Philo and Berry, 2011:76). It is also clear from the diplomatic support which protects Israel from being held accountable for its violations of international law and which vetoes United Nations Security Council resolutions that are critical of Israel (Jeremy R. Hammond, 2013; see also Philo and Berry, 2011:168; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006).

In the same vein, British foreign policy has substantial similarities with US foreign policy in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Voltolini (2013:222) points out that the British policy "has kept a strong link to Israel in line with the US stance" (see also Chomsky and Pappe, 2010, and Curtis, 2004). Furthermore, the United Kingdom and Israel have a strong and flourishing relationship. "Bilateral trade was £3.85 billion in 2011, making Israel the United Kingdom's largest individual trading partner in the Near East and North Africa region" (Voltolini, 2013:222). British foreign policy is typified by the statement by the British Foreign Secretary,

[72] An interview by Devon Douglas-Bowers on December 2013
[73] Founding editor of Foreign Policy Journal and author of a book on 'the US role in the Israeli Palestinian conflict'

William Hague[74], that "Israel has a right to defend itself", without questioning how Israel's borders should be defined or how a state can have "rights".

The Palestinians receive different treatment in US and UK foreign policies. In regard to US foreign policy and Palestinians, Karakoulaki (2013:4) points out that "while he [Barack Obama] has declared that during his presidency, he will seek a fair solution for both sides; his administration has disagreed with almost every Palestinian move". Also, US foreign policy focuses on blaming Palestinians for violence and requesting Hamas to end the violence and recognise past agreements and Israel's 'rights' (see Karakoulaki, 2013:9). Similar to the US blaming of Palestinians, British foreign policy focuses on blaming Hamas. Again, William Hague makes a typical pronouncement: "It is Hamas that bears principal responsibility for starting all of this" (Saleem, 2013).

The similar patterns of foreign policy in the USA and the UK lead to similar representation of Israelis and Palestinians in the selected newspapers. Jeremy R. Hammond[75] (2013) suggests that "the mainstream media makes no secret of [...] U.S. support for Israel, but it at the same time attempts to maintain the narrative of the U.S. as an honest broker". He considers this role as a farce. This role of the media misleads the US public about the nature of the conflict in terms of political contexts.

In terms of journalistic practices, while it is proper to include the perspective of both warring sides, it becomes problematic and biased when news coverage systematically includes a greater context for the violence perpetrated by one side and omits that context in covering the violence of the other. This is clearly shown in the way the papers in this study report the efforts towards a ceasefire. This pattern casts Israel as an active partner for peace, while Palestinian Hamas continually rejects a ceasefire and refuses to

[74] Speaking on 'Sixty years of British-Israeli diplomatic relations' in March 2011'
[75] Quoted from the same interview by Devon Douglas-Bowers, 2013

stop its violence (see section 5.2.1 and 7.3.1). This study also shows the newspapers' emphasis on Palestinian violence and their tendency to downplay Israeli violence (see section 4.3.2 and 5.2.2). The newspapers situate Israeli targeting of Hamas in the contexts of reaction and response to Hamas' rockets, i.e. in the context of Israeli security concerns.

In the case of Palestinian civilians, the focus on Palestinian casualties arguably attracts sympathy from American and British people. According to Jeremy R. Hammond (2013), despite the enormous amount of pro-Israel propaganda regarding Operation Cast Lead, many people were not persuaded by it and could not reconcile Israel's claim of self-defense with "the civilian Gazan death toll and wanton destruction of civilian infrastructure": In regard to the British media, Rich (2009) points out "the dominant images of the Gaza campaign in the British media were of civilian, usually child, casualties; distraught relatives and angry aid workers; of Israeli planes flying high above a captive, mostly civilian, population, dropping bombs on people incapable of fighting back". Moreover, these representations could be seen in mainstream media coverage that is largely biased towards an Israeli discourse. This media alignment with foreign policy arguably tilts US and UK media to support Israel, and thus, possibly reproduces ideological drives as evident in the representation of social actors as we have already seen in sections (7.2) and (7.3).

This finding is in line with previous studies on the relation between media and government during times of war. Robinson (2001:525) states that such a literature on manufacturing consent, as he calls it, "emphasises the ability of government to influence the output of journalists and the tendency of journalists to both self-censor and perceive events through the cultural and political prisms of their respective political and social elites" (see also Dimitrova et al., 2005, Handley and Ismail, 2010; Khoury-Machool, 2009; Kumar, 2006; Reese, 2004).

7.5.2. Ideological Stances: Liberal and Conservative

This study is based on the premise that linguistic choices in texts carry ideological meaning(s), (see section 2.2.6). Van Dijk (2006) demonstrates that discourse is not always ideologically transparent, as many producers of the discourse try to conceal their ideologies. Media discourse is, in fact, the main source of attitudes and ideologies of ordinary citizens (Van Dijk, 2000). One reason to choose GU, TL, NYT and WP is their different ideological standpoints, being liberal or conservative (see section 3.3). I am convinced that this ideological difference is an important factor that will lead to different representation patterns of social actors.

In contrast, revisiting the linguistic mechanisms, representational processes and quotation patterns reveals no major differences between the liberal newspapers (*the Guardian* and *the New York Times*) and the conservative newspapers (*the Times London* and *the Washington Post*), see summary above in section (7.2). For example, in regard to the topic of ceasefire, all the US and UK newspapers foreground the Israeli efforts to achieve a ceasefire with the Palestinians to end the war. This discourse is in line with the efforts of US actors as signing agreement with Israel, and the UK call for an immediate ceasefire to bring about a ceasefire between the Israelis and the Palestinians (see section 5.2.4; see also section 7.3.1 for similar patterns of representation).

These findings can be explained by Khoury-Machool's observation (2009:11) that “while British journalists may be privately sympathetic to Palestinians, their filed reports of the Palestine-Israel conflict are often neutralised versions of witnessed events or, in many cases, of events recounted by official (i.e. Israeli) sources”. The findings of this study are in contrast with a statement by Kaposi (2014:1) where he claims that “another [….] war is taking place in the British media to present and understand the events, with conservative publications taking it upon themselves to advocate Israeli interests and left-liberal ones supporting Palestinians”.

Generally speaking, ideologies, according to Van Dijk (1998a), determine the relations of a group to other social groups. In this study, the analysis of discourse practices was crucial to illuminate the representation patterns of the social groups. This study reveals that the supposed Palestinian danger and threat to Israel was prevalent across the four selected newspapers. This pattern paves the way to justify Israeli operations as self-defense (see also Allen's, 2013 dissertation on BBC coverage of the Gaza war 2013).

This representation falls into a pattern that Israel is the victim of the Gaza war of 2008-09, while Hamas is the aggressor (see section 4.4). Aguiar (2009:8) states that "the account of a victim is likely to attract more sympathy than a report of a journalist". In this context, examining representation patterns is pivotal to understanding how ideologies form the basis of specific arguments, assuming that "ideologies are at the basis of discourse" (Van Dijk, 2006:121), and thus, they may influence the reporting and also influence what is accepted as true or false. These ideologies formalise discourses taking into consideration that media are influenced by communicative situations and contexts of language users (see section 2.2.4, 2.2.5 and 2.2.6). The ideological stances of the newspapers, be they liberal or conservative, were not a factor in this study. The selected British and US newspapers produce, to a large extent, similar representational patterns of Israeli and Palestinian social actors in covering the Gaza war of 2008-2009, covering topics such as ceasefire, targeting Hamas, firing rockets, and facing consequences of war.

7.5.3 Editorial Control of Discourse

Another influential factor in reporting the Gaza war of 2008-09 is the editorial control and policy of the newspapers (for a detailed account of editorials, see section 3.3.3.3). Fowler states that editorials "illustrate a discourse of institutional power in the sense that it emanates from, and in turn helps to construct, the newspaper's claimed authority" (1991:221).

Despite the newspapers originating from two countries, they mostly reproduce similar discourse(s) on the Gaza war of 2008-09. This happens as a result of the editorial control that draws from the institutional powers.

To support this conclusion, let us briefly revisit the representation patterns of social actors in the editorials, and compare them with the news stories (see section 5.4). Generally speaking, the study finds differences in the allocation of representational processes; nevertheless, the editorials reproduce similar discourses to those of the news stories. This shows that the control of knowledge not only shapes individuals' interpretations of the world, but it also structures the types of discourse and actions individuals may engage in (see Van Dijk, 1993a:258).

The arguments in the editorials foreground Israeli positive discourse regarding ceasefire negotiations and justify the Israeli targeting of Hamas. Also, the newspapers foreground negative Hamas discourse on ceasefire. The representation patterns of Hamas in the editorials emphasise that they are responsible for the collapse of the ceasefire. In targeting Hamas, there is not much difference between the discourses reproduced in the editorials and those of the news stories in the conservative newspapers (TL and WP). On the topic of firing rockets, there is no mention in GU, NYT or WP. Only TL activates roles of Palestinians in firing rockets. In facing consequences of war, in the editorials as with the news stories, TL and WP passivate only the roles of Palestinians. NYT passivates roles of Israelis and Palestinians. GU does not include civilian actors. This means there is a marginalisation of Israeli civilians (see table 5.3.3).

This representation explicitly highlights Israeli justification in taking military action as it had no other choice, in a similar way to the headlines and sampled news stories. The selected editorials justify Israel in defending its civilians against Hamas' rockets. The argumentation within the representation patterns generally portray Israel reacting to Hamas' causality, and argue that Israel has a right to defend itself (see section 7.3.1). Thus, the

selected editorials arguably reproduce discourses which present positive Western values associated with Israeli actors seeking a ceasefire and peace, and negative attitudes associated with Palestinian Hamas refusing a ceasefire, across the selected newspapers.

The sampled editorials reflect the voices and views of the selected newspapers on the Gaza war of 2008-09. The analysis of the sampled editorials by means of CDA demonstrates why there are similarities between the selected newspapers. It is important to note that this study does not claim that the selected four newspapers are completely similar in their editorial policies. Nonetheless, in their coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09, their news editorials are similar in blaming Hamas in the ceasefire negotiations, foregrounding Israeli agency in targeting Hamas members, foregrounding Hamas in firing rockets and balancing the suffering of Israeli and Palestinian civilians in facing consequences of war.

Through CDA, this study of the editorials reflects inequality in political contexts of representation of Israeli and Palestinian actors. The Israeli government and military are dominant groups that seek to enforce and perpetuate their ideologies (Fairclough, 2001) and views on the war. In contrast, excluding Palestinian views on ceasefire negotiations and violent actions arguably controls what readers may know about them in the war. This editorial control of media coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09 could be affected by the foreign policy of the USA and the UK. Bazzi (2009:131) claims that “the media producers who work for a particular agency are well aware of the fact that the media depends on relationships with the government, politicians, market-oriented-profit sources, advertising, and of the need to maintain the image of credibility to their own audiences” (see also section 7.5.1).

7.5.4 Journalistic Practices: Access to News Sources

There are journalistic practices, as we have seen in chapter 6, that relate to the selection of quotation patterns, sources and access to the war actors. To understand these practices, I will summarise briefly the political context before and during the Gaza war of 2008-2009.

Israel closed all the borders of the Gaza Strip and prevented journalists from entering the Gaza Strip on 26.12.2008, and thus it became difficult to directly access information in covering the war (see section 1.4.2). Wolfsfeld (1997:216) argues that "the authorities' level of control over the political environment is one of the key variables that determine the role of the news media in political conflict".

In such a context, it is worthy mentioning that Hamas is considered as a terrorist movement. This refers to the geopolitical and global context in regard to the war on terror. Hamas is labelled as a terrorist organisation by USA administration and thus interviewing Hamas members in the British and American newspapers could be considered as *illegal* (see Atawneh 2009: 266). This simply links the Israeli war on Hamas to the global war against terror (see section 5.2.1 and 5.2.2).

In such a context of politics and Israeli procedures, we can see that sourcing practice in media coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09 faces some obstacles and challenges.

The first obstacle is access to sources. According to Van Dijk, access to news "is not available to everyone but to members of more powerful social groups and institutions, and especially their leaders (the elites) have more or less exclusive access" (1998b:5). In this regard, the study suggests that lack of access to Hamas leaders was one of the reasons for the dominance of Israeli perspectives in reporting the Gaza war of 2008-09. Hamas members and officials (political and military) tend to stay away from journalists, and Hamas uses only its own TV channel, Al-Aqsa. Hamas officials were being targeted for assassination by the Israelis, thus it was

difficult to interview its spokespeople; whereas "Israel is a more stable country and access to official military and political spokespeople is comparatively easy to arrange" (Shreim, 2012:116; see also Barkho, 2008 and 2010).

Besides these reasons, this study suggests that sourcing Palestinians and Hamas is not as frequent as sourcing Israelis in the international news. Thia study also shows that most Hamas officials and military figures were sourced indirectly, mainly through Arab media channels, e.g. Al-Jazeera (see section 6.4.2). In contrast, Israeli political and military actors were quoted both directly and indirectly. This means there were sources of information in reporting some events. Fairclough (1995a) suggests that in quoting sources, the actors become voices for the authors in the texts. In these sequences, we have seen many actors, mainly from the Israeli military, which were sources for the information on the war operations.

This reflects reliance on certain perspectives. The more privileged, powerful and dominant social groups have access to the media. As we have already seen in section (7.4.2) above, the sources are dominated by Israeli perspectives on the war events. This comes from reliance on the Israeli perspectives produced by an efficient public relations machine that supplies information for journalists (see similar finding by Phil and Berry, 2004). However, there is a lack of reliance on Palestinian sources (see reasons above).

The second challenge for news sources results from the location of reporting[76]. "Given that foreign journalists were banned from entering Gaza throughout the duration of the war, acquiring an interview with Hamas members was almost very tough to achieve" (Shreim, 2012:117). Tumber (2004:190) states that "the battle for information and contest over the winning of public opinion is a feature common to all conflicts".

[76] See the descriptive table of all data gathered for the Study in appendix (3.1) to see from which cities the journalists reported on the war events.

The prevention of foreign journalists from entering Gaza helped Israel to control and manage the information of the war. This control of information brings power "over the domain of meaning-making, to shape the cultural agenda, public opinion, and the nature of social discourse" (Jackaway, 1995:4). This is a power that determines how millions of people experience and see war. This leads me to say that the type and location of war events affect the manner of reporting and the consideration of war events as news.

The third challenge is the use of English as an international language. The statements and press releases by Hamas are all in Arabic. This suggests that they are not intended to address international audiences. Also, Hamas did not appoint a spokesman to speak in English and address international news outlets. Deprez and Raeymaeckers (2010:93-94) points out that "As many Middle East correspondents do not speak Arabic, they have no other choice but to base their stories on Israeli sources. This language gap renders Palestinian perceptions of occurrences virtually inaccessible".

Adding to these challenges in sourcing or selecting news is that the lack of using a modern communication strategy during the Gaza war of 2008-2009 in comparison to Israel. Modern media play a substantial role in constructing realties in general and particularly during the times of conflicts and crises (see for example Lewis, 2006 and Nossek, 2007).

Hamas or Palestinians do not have clear shaped institutions in the fields of politics, military forces, and apparently no modern communication strategy. Hamas mainly relies on Arabic language in publishing its news without regular publications in English. Also, Hamas during the war did not have an English language spokesman to reflect on its political views (see above). In comparison, Israeli is a stabled country with fully developed institutions, including military forces, but also professionalised communication strategies and public relations worldwide.

This imbalance in using modern communications leads to absence of Hamas' or Palestinians' views on the war and prominence of Israeli perspectives on the war. This can be evident in the themes (ceasefire, targeting Hamas and firing rockets) discussed in the empirical chapters 4, 5 and 6. Also, the imbalance could also lead the newspapers to rely on Israeli sources more than Palestinian ones. Thus, the selected newspapers are deliberately promoting the Israeli narrative in their coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09. In this perspective, Israel promotes its war to be directly only against Hamas and it wants to stop Hamas' rockets as moral motives and heroic behaviours to protects its citizens. Such a view and aim reaches acceptance in the international community or trigger an attack against Hamas. Furthermore, the imbalance in using modern communication draws a negative image of Hamas' motives, intentions and behaviours. As we have already seen, Hamas is represented as violent which aims to attack Israeli civilians (see sections 5.2.2 and 5.3.2).

In brief, sourcing a specific group of social actors or one side of warring parties (Israelis in this study) means that the media not only reproduce and disseminate their news, but also use the discourse of the authoritative actors and figures to exclude almost all others. This study concludes that this sourcing practice makes Israeli news credible, associated with attributes such as "truthfulness, plausibility, correctness, precision, or credibility" (Van Dijk 1988a:93; see also Bell, 1995). This credibility leads to people being persuaded about the war events and leads public opinion to specific discourses, such as: "Israel is fighting Hamas".

7.6 Conclusion

The critical discourse analysis of media coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09 reveals different patterns of representation of social actors from both warring parties in discursive features, representational categories and sources. On numerous aspects of coverage, all four newspapers resemble each other. These selected newspapers produce shared perspectives and discourses that were similar yet unevenly realised, across the transitivity selections and the categories of socio-semantic inventory. Putting it simply, the newspapers reproduce specific patterns of representation and discourses that are slanted in favour of Israel.

According to the concepts of news selection as discussed in section (2.3.2), it becomes clear that the communication of news events cannot claim to be objective. The events and the ideas must be transmitted through media outlets, i.e. newspapers in this study, with their own philosophies, attitudes and linguistic expressions. In all respects, the analysis of the representation of the Gaza war of 2008-09 points to the conclusion that the war is being represented as a war against Hamas and not against the Palestinians.

7.6.1 Overall Picture: an Israeli War against Hamas

This section recalls who is involved in media coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09, and how. The deployment of journalists' and news editors' power was manifested in the manipulation of textual cues explained in the previous chapters (4, 5 and 6). This power distorts and transforms the war from one against all Palestinians to one against Hamas. This is very much evident in the generic and specific references to the subgroups of Israeli and Palestinian actors included in the headlines and sampled texts (see section 3.3.3).

The analysis shows that the British and American newspapers are similar in including the Israelis and Palestinians in ceasefire negotiations, targeting Hamas and firing rockets. The patterns represent Israelis as *Israel* and Israeli governmental and non-governmental actors. The Palestinian actors are represented as *Hamas* and Hamas members (see sections 5.2 and 5.3).

From this analysis, there is no major or substantial difference between the British and American newspapers. It is simply clear that media representation plays a major role in constructing an image of justified Israeli actions responding to the Palestinians, mainly Hamas' actions such as firing rockets. Interestingly, the emergence of the Gaza war of 2008-09 was not mentioned as set in the context of a struggle or fight conducted by people who live under siege and military occupation. The British and American newspapers ignore the political contexts of the war, and instead support the Israeli official security and government discourses that portray Palestinians as security threats across the four sampled newspapers.

In regards to media power relations, on the Israeli side, we see an official view on the whole war. On the Palestinian side, we see only Hamas' views and no views either from the Palestinian Authority or from the Palestinian Liberation Organisation[77] (PLO), the overarching resistance organisation for all Palestinians. This is a reason why some might distinguish between Hamas and Palestinians, even though Hamas is a major party in Palestine and won the Palestinian elections (in the West Bank as well as in Gaza) in 2006 (see section 1.4.2). This is in line with a finding from a recent study by Philo and Berry (2011) which states that the war is perceived as "being directed only at Hamas, and this is certainly how Israel wished it to be seen" (p.155).

In this supposed war against Hamas, the clear message of the war is to stop Hamas' rockets from being fired into Israel from the Gaza Strip.

[77] See http://palestineun.org/about-palestine/palestine-liberation-organization/

What is absent in the media coverage is Hamas' terms for a ceasefire, namely lifting the Israeli siege on Gaza. Absence means the exclusion of views, in this case, those of Hamas (see section 3.5.2).

On the military level, the analysis shows that the newspapers portray Israel and Hamas as equal military powers. Khoury-Machool (2009:7) corroborates this statement by claiming that "the Western media tend to portray Palestinians and Israelis as military equals, thereby justifying the often excessive force Israel uses in response to Palestinian attacks". In terms of journalistic practice, this appears to be objective coverage. But, in reality, this is a biased representation, because Hamas does not have anything resembling the military capabilities of Israel.

Similar to the representation of military actors, the newspapers equalise the suffering of the civilian actors. The linguistic practices seem to be equal, but the discourse is not objective. This is evident in two predominant patterns: Firstly, Israeli civilians suffer from Hamas' rockets. This foregrounds Hamas agency as causal actors (see section 7.3.1). Hamas is portrayed mainly as a "responsible provocative force behind the conflict" (Philo and Greg, 2011:355). This discourse attracts reactionary responses to protect the Israelis. Bishop et al. (2007:7) state that "the pervasive future Palestinian threat provides discursive resources to justify pre-emptive Israeli military interventions to prevent harm to Israeli civilians" (see also Dunmire, 2005). Secondly, Palestinian civilians are killed during the Israeli operations against Hamas. This leads to predictable claims that Israel does not target civilians, as its war is being mainly directed at Hamas. The portrayal of hostilities as being targeted exclusively against Hamas conceals the moral and legal culpability of targeting Palestinian civilians. Put clearly, Israeli agency in targeting Palestinian civilians is hidden in the newspapers (see section 5.2.3).

Overall, the analysis suggests that the US and UK audiences (readers of the selected newspapers) did not have an adequate opportunity or sufficient information to learn about all sides of the war or to resist any single dominant interpretation.

7.6.2 Challenges of Utilising Critical Discourse Analysis

The role of CDA in this study lies in revealing the discourse practices of dominating groups against dominated and oppressed groups. In this study I have sought to expose the practices that construct or reinforce inequalities and conceal implications and connections in the representation of social actors in media coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09. In doing this role, this study has faced three challenges in applying CDA:

1. Subjectivity, i.e. using personal values in analysing coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09. One criticism of CDA is the alleged subjectivity of analysts in their treatment of texts. This refers to partial readings of texts and subjective interpretations aligned with the political attitudes of analysts (Widdowson, 1995a and b, see section 2.2.3). This can be seen in picking up certain aspects from texts and ignoring others, which may raise tensions between interpretations of different analysts (Widdowson, 2000). Wodak (1999:186) points out that "researchers do not separate their own values and beliefs from the research they are doing … [therefore]… researchers must be constantly aware of what they are doing". In such a debate, there is a risk of allowing and/or imposing our preconceptions, conceptions and hypotheses as individual researchers/analysts.

To avoid such subjectivity, this study has endeavoured to choose a representative sample by applying systematic criteria and to follow steps that are applied to all texts (see section 3.3.3.). This study builds its own analysis sheets (appendix 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4) in such a way as not to pick up particular stances of the analyst. In carrying out the analysis, CDA is

committed to make a change in society. This is one of the reasons why I was motivated to choose CDA (see section 1.5). Thus, it is arguably impossible to avoid political bias and influence completely (see for example Fairclough, 1996).

In this study on reporting the Gaza war of 2008-09 as a political case, CDA analyses aspects of representation and then mystification, absence, agency and causality. In this context, the interpretation of texts or explanation of the factors influencing the reporting could not be personal. This study looks at representational processes, e.g. exclusions, roles of actors, passivisation, etc. (see section 3.5.2.). In addition, these aspects presumably could not be inferred from elsewhere in hard news texts (news stories in this study). Then, "a social agent absence from such a text stands a good chance of being an absence for readers generally, particularly if they are reading for gist" (O'Halloran, 2005:1947).

To reduce the subjectivity of my analysis, this study has focused on common themes in the news reports across the four newspapers. In this focus, the study gives statistical estimation for the frequency distributions of social actors in headlines and the body texts of the sample news texts (see for example tables 4.1, 5.1, 5.4, 5.7, 6.1 and 6.2).

According to Van Dijk (1991a), there are some benefits for this procedure. For example, it provides an overview of what is covered or not covered in the press regarding the issue in question. This is a necessary step before delving into deeper analyses of specific issues. It also reveals and reflects what newsmakers consider to be the most newsworthy elements of a certain event. Themes represent the most important information in the text for readers.

Despite the application of CDA and keeping a spirit of objectivity in analysing each clause of headlines and texts throughout the study, there has been still a sort of subjective analysis. This subjectivity happened mainly in coding a few actors either as politician, military or civilian. Therefore, giving statistical estimations is used to deal with such issues in the analysis. This way of proceeding aims to avoid any expected bias in the analysis.

Any reporting of actual events in the world is inevitably selective (Feagin, 1996), and so it can be argued that there is no such thing as objectivity in the writing of history or the reporting of war (see Ramares, 2010; Dimaggio, 2008:53). Nonetheless it is at least possible to acknowledge one's own possible interests and consequent biases, although newspapers rarely do so. As a Palestinian researcher, whose family lives in Gaza (my parents, brothers and sisters), I feel obligated to acknowledge that I have my own personal relationship to the Gaza war and its protagonists. Nonetheless, in this thesis I have attempted to obtain a balanced sample of texts on which to base my analysis, and to justify my assertions by using research methods and systems of analysis (CDA) which are well-established within the field of discourse studies and which can be reproduced by other researchers.

2. The size of the sample. Most often, researchers conducting CDA in textual analysis choose a small number of texts. However, in my study, the size of the sample is 146 headlines, 40 news stories and 7 editorials (for the whole gathered materials, see appendix 3.2). Since the aim of the study is to give a qualitative textual analysis, the study arguably claims that the sample size is big enough to obtain a comprehensive image on the media coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09. The total number of words of news stories is **130332** (see table 3.2, section 3.3.3.2), and of editorials is **12930** (see table 3.4, section 3.3.3.2).

The sample of this study was chosen systematically, and thus the criteria limit the size of the sample rather than the analyst (see sections 3.3.3.2 and 3.3.3.3). Jørgensen and Philips (2002:120) suggest that “it is often sufficient to use a sample of just a few texts [...]. The reasons for this are that the focus of interest is language use rather than the individual, and that discursive patterns can be created and maintained by just a few people". Furthermore, this study is mainly qualitative rather than quantitative. It conducts a detailed analysis of each clause of headlines and sampled texts.

The study does not use "proper" quantitative methods to count words or collocations, e.g. corpus linguistics. Baker et al. (2008:274) state that corpus linguistics “utilises a collection of different methods which are related by the fact that they are performed on large collections of electronically stored, naturally occurring Texts”. This study does not use corpus linguistics because the size of sample in this study does not aim to gain a large amount of quantitative results. Moreover, a part of the sample (mainly the data gathered from *the Times London*) is only available on microfilm and not in electronic form (see section 3.3.). Fairclough (2014) considers the term corpus linguistics a “misnomer", stating "corpus linguistics is not analysis; it is a tool which can serve analysis”. This study looks at words or vocabularies in terms of their meanings rather than their number of counts.

3. The lack of CDA studies on war reporting. I have found that there are relatively few existing studies dealing with war reporting from a CDA perspective. This deficit makes my work challenging, but it also becomes more difficult to see how I can approach the study because I have to deduce the appropriate method from the theoretical description of CDA. On the one hand, there is a large number of books by reputable authors explaining what CDA is, and how it can be used to analyse discourse. On the other hand, it is (so far) surprisingly difficult to find any actual critical discourse analysis

conducted by experts on war reporting apart from Richardson's study (2007).

For this reason, I have devoted a considerable amount of effort to test methodological tools in order to compose a framework that utilises tools from three models of CDA. Among different approaches to CDA, Van Leeuwen's framework (1996), Halliday's (1985, 1994) transitivity model and Richardson's classification of quotations (2007) were utilised to analyse the representation of social actors. The models employed comprise various discursive features and tools to analyse and determine the ways in which social actors are represented through the texts of the headlines, news stories and editorials.

By using an eclectic approach, I was able to answer the research questions, achieve the objectives of the current research and avoid biases in analysing war reporting. There are three reasons why I combined these methods:

1. Fowler, Fairclough, Reah, Simpson and Halliday stress the relevance of transitivity for CDA as it identifies the different linguistic features embedded in the clause. Van Leeuwen's (1996) socio-semantic inventory draws considerably on Halliday's work on transitivity and specifically the division of activities into process types. Bazzi (2009:82) states that by means of transitivity analysis, analysts can be able to "analyse who is considered to be causing what to whom; what agents are consistently and actively incriminated; and who are the affected participants (i.e. are they the worthy victims?)".
2. An eclectic approach has been recommended by some CDA scholars, e.g. KhorsaviNik, 2010, Wetherell, 1998, Weiss and Wodak, 2003. KhorsaviNik (2010:56) states that "CDA considers its eclecticism as a useful academic necessity, which correlates with the validity of a good CDA study". I find an eclectic approach from CDA methods is suitable and manageable.

3. Such an eclectic approach offers the possibility of realising the ways in which texts work in different contexts, i.e. social, political, ideological, etc. Also, this helps me to pay closer attention, and thus avoids what Breeze (2011) claims as "[CDA researchers] sometimes [paying] insufficient attention to features of the immediate context, which [leads] to interpretations which are pragmatically inappropriate or remote from the concerns of the participants" (520).

These points show that the transitivity model and the socio-semantic inventory overlap with each other and form a good combination for analysing the discourse practices in reporting the Gaza war of 2008-09. Indeed, the analytical tools and CDA models I have used for my analysis are by no means comprehensive and may not allow for a broad understanding of the representation of social actors in media coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09. There are angles that have not been covered in the analysis because of the ways used to dissect and reconstruct the media texts.

Because the study follows CDA principles, theoretical lines (see section 2.2.2), and analytical procedures (see sections 3.4.3, 3.5.3 and 3.6.2), any subjectivity in the analysis is reduced. For example, I might have wanted the analysis to focus only on showing Hamas as a creator of a peace process, focusing on its merits and social works in Palestinian civil society. However, this is a theme that was not mentioned in the sampled texts, and thus the analysis could not include it. Also, I might have wished my analysis would to portray Israeli actors as criminals because they invade Gaza and kill civilians. But the analysis in this study only shows how they are represented, preventing me from giving personal opinions on the war events.

7.6.3 Limitations and Contributions of this Study

The study was restricted to the coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09 between 26.12.2008 and 18.01.2009. The study has focused only on print media: two newspapers from the USA (NYT and WP) and two newspapers from the UK (GU and TL). From these newspapers and within the period of the war, 146 headlines, 40 news stories and 7 editorials were extracted in a systematic way (see section 3.3.3). The study does not claim that it has tackled all the linguistic structures but it is confined to examining the representation of social actors in reporting the Gaza war of 2008-09.

It is crucial to have broad knowledge of the political history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to examine the role of print media in the US and UK newspapers in the coverage of the Gaza war of 2008-09. Accordingly, I might have missed some aspects of relevance in my interpretation and explanation. Also, in conducting the textual and multifaceted analysis, it is necessary to adopt eclectic and relevant analytical tools and investigative techniques.

On the whole, this study is not interested in highlighting who is right or wrong in their ideological stances, but in illuminating how meanings are reproduced and how social actors are represented. In this case, and within the scope of these limitations, this current work presents analysis of the representation of social actors in an original and concise manner. The study helps us understand discourses reproduced in reporting the Gaza war of 2008-09. According to the constructionist approach, without discourse there is no social reality, and without understanding discourse we cannot understand our reality (see section 2.2.1). In brief, the study's contributions can be summed up in four points:

1. The study examines not only the linguistic features, discursive strategies and representational categories, but also specific images and patterns of representations in media coverage. These examinations make this study different from several other CDA studies on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which focus mostly on linguistic features (see table 2.2). In other words, by employing CDA, the study contributes to the small body of CDA and linguistic studies on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which affects world peace and is a central issue on the globe (e.g. Kandil, 2009; Shreim, 2012; Kaposi, 2014). “Very little attention has been given by linguists or discourse analysts to studying the language used to talk about it” (Kandil, 2009:156).

2. Within CDA, the study seeks to uncover opaqueness and power relationships presented in the representation of agency and discovering overall conclusions drawn in covering the Gaza war of 2008-09. This CDA study contributes to the examination of absences and the mystification of social agents. Also within the field of CDA, the study proposes an eclectic framework combining quantitative and qualitative approaches. The lack of simple CDA models is obvious, so this study demonstrates a well-organised framework which can easily be applied to examining war reporting. Based on this conception, the study argues that CDA is on reasonably safe ground and suitable for analysing war reporting. This study also contributes to CDA studies on media discourse and war reporting.

3. This study contributes to an examination of the relationship between form and function. That is, the examination does not only focus on transitivity selections and socio-semantic categories as grammatical structures, but the study also continues examination of the discourses reproduced (functions of linguistic forms). This includes the way in

which the media texts produced play a significant role in conveying specific ideologies, such as representing the Gaza war of 2008-09 as being directed only against Hamas or mystifying and excluding the views of Israeli civilians.

4. The study provides a critical analysis of the Gaza war of 2008-09, leading to a better understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in relation to international print media from the USA and UK. Most studies have been conducted within either an American or a British media context. This study avoids "focusing on a single case and context" (Breese, 2011:6). The study focuses on the Gaza war of 2008-09 as a single case, but in US and UK newspapers as different contexts. Ozohu-Suleiman (2014:87) points out that "available studies on international news coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict are mostly focused on western, especially the US, media". In this context, the contribution of this work lies in its CDA examination of representing social actors in both American and British contexts.

I hope that this research study will draw the attention of readers and researchers towards linguistic and discourse research with the ultimate objectives of examining the roles of language in war reporting and media discourse.

7.6.4 Recommendations for Future Research

I consider my findings regarding the representation of social actors to be preliminary for deducing or conducting further studies in the future, on three counts. The first is the analysis of verbal and visual texts in analysing war reporting. This would help researchers find out more about the correspondence between the semantic content of images and texts when they are used together (see for example Martinec and Salway, 2005).

The second point is to consider, in analysis of war reporting, linkage between CDA and other disciplines, e.g. political studies, economics, etc. CDA is a useful approach for analysing textual features, but it cannot stand by itself to give a comprehensive approach to the investigation of verbal and visual features.

The third recommendation is to conduct more CDA studies on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and situations in the Middle East, such as critical examination of the audience perception of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the German media. I would also strongly suggest more studies on social media (e.g. Facebook and Twitter) discourse on wars or conflicts.

War Reporting is a sensitive topic of media profession and journalism. In reporting wars, each word, assign, picture count a lot as these components of texts in addition to others can cause tragic consequences. It is necessary not only to examine the linguistic features, discursive strategies and representational categories but also to do comprehensive evaluations that examine specific images of representations in media coverage. The role of foreign journalists and reporters is very crucial in delivering, transforming and presenting the information on the war events and in representing the war actors. War reporting is a daily process of decision-making and taking, i.e. a decision of choice what to include or exclude. In examining war reporting, CDA was very valuable.

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Appendices
Appendix 3.1: Descriptive Analytical Table of Data and the War Timelines

The *Guardian*

Article code	Newspaper Edition	Section	Writer/ Author	Article Genre	Place of article	No. of Words
GA-GU-26-DEC-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GA-GU-27-DEC-01	London-Final	International	Toni O'Loughlin	News report	Jerusalem	595
GA-GU-28-DEC-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GA-GU-29-DEC-01	London-Final	Homepage	Rory McCarthy	News report	Jerusalem	694
GA-GU-29-DEC-02	London-Final	Comment & Debate	Ali Abunimah	comment	-	888
GA-GU-29-DEC-03	London-Final	International	Rory McCarthy	News report	Jerusalem	462
GA-GU-29-DEC-04	London-Final	International	Ian Black: Middle East editor	Editorial	-	1031
GA-GU-29-DEC-05	London-Final	International	Toni O'Loughlin	News report	Jerusalem	455
GA-GU-29-DEC-06	London-Final	Leader pages	-	Comment	-	670
GA-GU-30-DEC-01	London-Final	Homepage	Rory McCarthy Ewen MacAskill	News report	Jerusalem Washington	754
GA-GU-30-DEC-02	London-Final	Homepage	Rory McCarthy	News report	Jerusalem	702
GA-GU-30-DEC-03	London-Final	Comment & Debate	Seumas Milne	Comment	-	1001
GA-GU-30-DEC-04	London-Final	Homepage	Ian Black, Middle East editor	Editorial	-	586
GA-GU-30-DEC-05	London-Final	Homepage	Simon Tisdall	Article Briefing	-	494
GA-GU-31-DEC-01	London-Final	Homepage	Rory McCarthy Ian Black	News report	Jerusalem	841
GA-GU-31-DEC-02	London-Final	Homepage	Rory McCarthy Hazem Balousha	News report	Jerusalem Gaza City	687
GA-GU-31-DEC-03	London-Final	Homepage	Rory McCarthy	News report	Jerusalem	246
GA-GU-31-DEC-04	London-Final	Homepage	Rory McCarthy	News report	Jerusalem	753
GA-GU-31-DEC-05	London-Final	Leader pages	A group of people	Reply Letters and emails	-	364
GA-GU-31-DEC-06	London-Final	Leader pages	-	Leading article	-	650
GA-GU-01-JAN-00	-	-	-	-	-	-
GA-GU-02-JAN-01	London-Final	Weekly	Guardian reporters	News Report	-	937
GA-GU-02-JAN-02	London-Final	Homepage	Rory McCarthy	News report	Jerusalem	928
GA-GU-02-JAN-03	London-Final	International	Hazem Balousha, Toni O'Loughlin	News report	Gaza Jerusalem	602
GA-GU-02-JAN-04	London-Final	Leader pages	Kirsty Hughes	Reply Letters emails	-	260
GA-GU-02-JAN-05	London-Final	Weekly	Ian Black, Middle East editor	Editorial	-	851
GA-GU-02-JAN-06	London-Final	Weekly	Ian Black, Middle East editor	Editorial	-	783
GA-GU-02-JAN-07	London-Final	Weekly	Simon Tisdall	Article	-	328

Article code	Newspaper Edition	Section	Writer/ Author	Article Genre	Place of article	No. of Words
GA-GU-02-JAN-08	London-Final	Weekly	-	Comment	-	491
GA-GU-02-JAN-09	London-Final	International	Ian Black, Middle East editor	Editorial	-	796
GA-GU-02-JAN-10	London-Final	International	Rachel Shabi,	News report	Tel Aviv	462
GA-GU-02-JAN-11	London-Final	Leader pages	Dr John Stevens	Reply Letters and emails	-	272
GA-GU-03-JAN-01	London-Final	International	Jeremy Bowen	Article analysis	-	891
GA-GU-03-JAN-02	London-Final	International	Rory McCarthy	News report	Ramallah	1124
GA-GU-03-JAN-03	London-Final	International	Rory McCarthy	News report	Jerusalem	527
GA-GU-03-JAN-04	London-Final	Obituaries pages	Trevor Mostyn	News report	-	675
GA-GU-03-JAN-05	London-Final	Comment & Debate	Jonathan Freedland	Comment	-	1056
GA-GU-04-JAN-	London-Final	-	-	-	-	-
GA-GU-05-JAN-01	London-Final	Comment & Debate	Sami Abdel-Shafi	Comment	-	692
GA-GU-05-JAN-02	London-Final	Homepage	Rory McCarthy,	News report	Jerusalem	973
GA-GU-05-JAN-03	London-Final	International	Hazem Balousha Chris McGreal,	News report	Gaza City Jerusalem	1071
GA-GU-05-JAN-04	London-Final	International	Faysal Shawal, businessman	Article	Gaza City	731
GA-GU-05-JAN-05	London-Final	Leader pages	-	Leading Article	-	655
GA-GU-05-JAN-06	London-Final	International	Ian Black, Middle East editor	Editorial	-	574
GA-GU-05-JAN-07	London-Final	International	Chris McGreal	News report	Jerusalem	819
GA-GU-05-JAN-08	London-Final	International	Rory McCarthy Ian Black	News report	Jerusalem	569
GA-GU-05-JAN-09	London-Final	Leader pages	A group of people	Reply Letters and emails	-	366
GA-GU-06-JAN-01	London-Final	Comment & Debate	Khalid Mish'al	Comment	-	814
GA-GU-06-JAN-02	London-Final	International	Richard Norton-	Article	-	742
GA-GU-06-JAN-03	London-Final	International	Rory McCarthy,	News report	Jerusalem	590
GA-GU-06-JAN-04	London-Final	International	-	Article	-	996
GA-GU-06-JAN-05	London-Final	Comment & Debate	Khalid Mish'al	Comment	-	814
GA-GU-06-JAN-06	London-Final	Homepage	Chris McGrea,l	News report	Jerusalem	1047
GA-GU-06-JAN-07	London-Final	International	Ian Black, Middle east editor Rory McCarthy	Editorial	Jerusalem	921
GA-GU-06-JAN-08	London-Final	International	Toni O'Loughlin	News report	Jerusalem	257
GA-GU-06-JAN-09	London-Final	Leader pages	Ron Scott	Reply	-	241
GA-GU-07-JAN-01	London-Final	Features pages	Avi Shlaim	Article	-	2523
GA-GU-07-JAN-02	London-Final	International	Reem Al-Ghassain	Article	Gaza	546
GA-GU-07-JAN-03	London-Final	International	Ian Black, Middle East editor Ed Pilkington	Editorial	New York	777
GA-GU-07-JAN-04	London-Final	International	Simon Tisdall	Article	-	635
GA-GU-07-JAN-05	London-Final	Comment & Debate	Jonathan Freedland	Comment	-	1249

Article code	Newspaper Edition	Section	Writer/ Author	Article Genre	Place of article	No. of Words
GA-GU-07-JAN-06	London-Final	Comment & Debate	Nick Clegg	comment	-	639
GA-GU-07-JAN-07	London-Final	International	Rory McCarthy	News report	Jerusalem	836
GA-GU-07-JAN-08	London-Final	International	Patrick Wintour,	Editorial	-	395
GA-GU-07-JAN-09	London-Final	Leader pages	-	Article	-	659
GA-GU-08-JAN-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GA-GU-09-JAN-01	London-Final	International	Simon Tisdall	Article	-	783
GA-GU-09-JAN-02	London-Final	Comment & Debate	Carlo Strenger	Comment	-	629
GA-GU-09-JAN-03	London-Final	International	Simon Tisdall	Article Briefing	-	783
GA-GU-09-JAN-04	London-Final	International	Peter Beaumont, Richard Norton-Taylor	Article	-	359
GA-GU-09-JAN-05	London-Final	International	Ian Black, Middle East editor	Editorial	-	369
GA-GU-09-JAN-06	London-Final	International	Peter Beaumont, Richard Norton-Taylor	Article	-	276
GA-GU-09-JAN-07	London-Final	International	David Pallister	Article	-	942
GA-GU-10-JAN-01	London-Final	International	Chris McGreal	News report	Jerusalem	497
GA-GU-10-JAN-02	London-Final	Leader pages	Bill Rammell MP	Reply	-	234
GA-GU-10-JAN-03	London-Final	Comment & Debate	Alan Dershowitz	Comment	-	386
GA-GU-10-JAN-04	London-Final	International	Rory McCarthy	News report	Jerusalem	847
GA-GU-11-JAN-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GA-GU-12-JAN-01	London-Final	International	Chris McGreal	News Report	Jerusalem	716
GA-GU-12-JAN-02	London-Final	Comment & Debate	Peter Beaumont	Comment	-	794
GA-GU-12-JAN-03	London-Final	International	Rory McCarthy Ed Pilkington	News report	Jerusalem New York	705
GA-GU-12-JAN-04	London-Final	Media pages	Peter Wilby	Article analysis	-	946
GA-GU-12-JAN-05	London-Final	Media pages	Alex Brummer	Article analysis	-	413
GA-GU-13-JAN-01	London-Final	International	Rory McCarthy, Ian Black	News report	Jerusalem	779
GA-GU-13-JAN-02	London-Final	International	Rory McCarthy	News report	-	369
GA-GU-14-JAN-0	London-Final	Homepage	Afua Hirsch, Legal affairs correspondent	Article	-	663
GA-GU-14-JAN-02	London-Final	Leader pages	-	Leading article	-	656
GA-GU-15-JAN-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GA-GU-16-JAN-01	London-Final	Comment & Debate	Jeremy Greenstock	Comment	-	787
GA-GU-16-JAN-02	London-Final	International	Toni O'Loughlin	News report	Jerusalem	733
GA-GU-16-JAN-03	London-Final	International	Ian Black, Middle East editor	Editorial	-	922
GA-GU-16-JAN-04	London-Final	Leader pages	A group of people	Reply	-	418

Article code	Newspaper Edition	Section	Writer/ Author	Article Genre	Place of article	No. of Words
GA-GU-17-JAN-01	London-Final	Comment & Debate	Sami Abdel-Shafi	Comment	-	329
GA-GU-17-JAN-02	London-Final	International	Chris McGreal	News report	Jerusalem	615
GA-GU-17-JAN-03	London-Final	Leader pages	Joshua Rowe	Reply	-	178
GA-GU-18-JAN-	-	-	-	-	-	-

The *Times* (London)						
Article code	**Edition newspaper**	**Section**	**Writer/Author**	**Article Genre**	**Place of report**	**No. of Words**
GA-TL-26-DEC-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GA-TL-27-DEC-01	-	World	Sheera Frenkel	News report	Jerusalem	432
GA-TL-28-DEC-01	-	-	-	-	-	-
GA-TL-29-DEC-01	-	Front page	James Hider	News report	Jerusalem	429
GA-TL-29-DEC-02	-	Leading articles	-	Editorial	-	615
GA-TL-29-DEC-03	-	News Gaza	Azmi Keshawi James Hider	News report	Gaza City Ramallah	175
GA-TL-29-DEC-04	-	News Gaza	Richard Beeston. Foreign Editor	Analysis	-	526
GA-TL-29-DEC-05	-	News Gaza	James Hider Azmi Keshawl	News report	Ramallah Gaza City	647
GA-TL-29-DEC-06	-	News Gaza	Tim Reid Sam Coates Chief Political Correspondent	article	Washington	598
GA-TL-29-DEC-07	-	News Gaza	Nicholas Blanford	News report	Beirut	333
GA-TL-29-DEC-08	-	Opinion	Mick Hume	Article Opinion	-	1043
GA-TL-29-DEC-09	-	Letter to editor opinion	RICf-IARD MURPHY D. ROBERTS RO BIN P. WILKINSON ROSLYN PINE	Letter	Winchester, Hants Tredegar. Gwent Ick leton	505
GA-TL-30-DEC-01	-	Front page	-	Photo	-	Photo
GA-TL-30-DEC-02	-	News Gaza	James Hider	News report	Jerusalem	961
GA-TL-30-DEC-03	-	News Gaza	James Hider	News report	-	670
GA-TL-30-DEC-04	-	News Gaza	Sheera Frenkel	News report	Ashkelon	478
GA-TL-30-DEC-05	-	Opinion	David Aaronovitch	Article	-	1081
GA-TL-31-DEC-01	-	Leading article	-	Editorial	-	632
GA-TL-31-DEC-02	-	News Gaza	James Hider	News report	Jerusalem	865
GA-TL-31-DEC-03	-	News Gaza	Richard Beeston, Foreign editor	Commentary	-	452
GA-TL-31-DEC-04	-	Opinion	William Sieghart	Article	-	989

The *Times* (London)						
Article code	**Edition newspaper**	**Section**	**Writer/Author**	**Article Genre**	**Place of report**	**No. of Words**
GA-TL-01-JAN-01	-	News	James Hider	News report	Jerusalem	642
GA-TL-01-JAN-02	-	News	Azmi Keshawi	News report	Burej, Gaza	484
GA-TL-02-JAN-01	-	Front page	James Hider	News report	Beersheba	494
GA-TL-02-JAN-02	-	Opinion	Gerard Baker	Comment	-	1121
GA-TL-02-JAN-03	-	World	James Hider	News report	Gaza, Beersheba	697
GA-TL-03-JAN-01	-	Front page	-	Photo	-	Photo
GA-TL-03-JAN-02	-	Leading article	-	Editorial	-	520
GA-TL-03-JAN-03	-	News	-	News report	-	166
GA-TL-03-JAN-04	-	News	James Hider Sheera Frenkel	News report	the Gaza border Jerusalem	680
GA-TL-03-JAN-05	-	Opinion	A group of people	Letters to Editor	-	651
GA-TL-04-JAN-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GA-TL-05-JAN-01	-	Front page	Sheera Frenkel Michael Evans	News report	Jerusalem	483
GA-TL-05-JAN-02	-	Leading article	-	Editorial	-	677
GA-TL-05-JAN-03	-	News	James Bone Francis Elliott	News report	-	554
GA-TL-05-JAN-04	-	News	David Cjarter Europe Correspondent	News report	-	334
GA-TL-05-JAN-05	-	News	James Bone	Commentary	-	514
GA-TL-05-JAN-06	-	News	James Hider	News report	Gaza Strip	973
GA-TL-05-JAN-07	-	News	Colonel Lior Lotan	Article analysis	-	574
GA-TL-05-JAN-08	-	News	Azmi Keshawi	News report	Gaza city	503
GA-TL-05-JAN-09	-	Opinion	KEN CAlDWELL, M. SHARIKH	Letters to editor	Oxford	126
GA-TL-06-JAN-01	-	News	James Hider	News report	Jerusalem	681
GA-TL-06-JAN-02	-	Opinion	David Aaronovitch	Article	-	1121
GA-TL-06-JAN-03	-	Opinion	Rachel Sylester	Article	-	1047
GA-TL-06-JAN-04	-	World	Azmi Keshawi James Hider	News report	-	977
GA-TL-06-JAN-05	-	World	Sheera Frenkel	News report	-	415
GA-TL-06-JAN-06	-	World	Bronwen Maddox Chief Foreign Commnetator	Article	-	697
GA-TL-06-JAN-07	-	Opinion	-	Letters to Editor	-	156
GA-TL-07-JAN-01	-	Front page	-	Photo	-	Photo
GA-TL-07-JAN-02	-	News	Azmi Keshawi	News report	Gaza City	1000

The *Times* (London)						
Article code	**Edition newspaper**	**Section**	**Writer/Author**	**Article Genre**	**Place of report**	**No. of Words**
			James Hider James Bone		Jerusalem New York	
GA-TL-07-JAN-03	-	News	Bronwen Maddox Chief Foreign Commentator	Comment	-	518
GA-TL-07-JAN-04	-	News	Azmi Keshawi	News report	Gaza City	699
GA-TL-07-JAN-05	-	News	Sheera Frenkel	News report	Soroka Hospital, Beersheba	349
GA-TL-08-JAN-01	-	News	Michael Evans, Defence Editor Sheera Frenkel	News report	Jerusalem	827
GA-TL-08-JAN-02	-	News	Azmi Keshawi James Hider	News report	Gaza City Jerusalem	554
GA-TL-08-JAN-03	-	News	Martin Fletcher Yonit Farago	News report	Ashkelon	849
GA-TL-08-JAN-04	-	Opinion	Anatole Kaietsky	Article	-	1190
GA-TL-08-JAN-05	-	Opinion	Matthew Parris	Article	-	737
GA-TL-08-JAN-06	-	Opinion	A group of people	Letters to Editor	Newcastle upon Tyne London WCI Bristol Crakehall, N Yorks Nutley, E Sussex	515
GA-TL-08-JAN-07	-	Opinion	-	Article	-	1155
GA-TL-09-JAN-01	-	News	James Bone	News report	New York	161
GA-TL-09-JAN-02	-	News	Martin Flechter Azmi Keshawi	News report	-	592
GA-TL-09-JAN-03	-	Opinion	Amir Taheri	Article	-	1153
GA-TL-09-JAN-04	-	Opinion	EDMUND MARSHALL	Letters to Editor	-	560
GA-TL-09-JAN-05	-	World	Richard Owen	Article	Rome	615
GA-TL-10-JAN-01	-	Leading Articles	-	Editorial	-	640
GA-TL-10-JAN-02	-	News	Azmi Keshawi, Martin Flechter, Sheera Frenkel	News report	Gaza City	791
GA-TL-10-JAN-03	-	News	James Bone Martin Fletcher	News report	New York Scherot	531
GA-TL-10-JAN-04	-	Opinion	DAVID HAWKSLEY	Letter to editors	-	537
GA-TL-11-JAN-00	-	-	-	-	-	-

The *Times* (London)						
Article code	**Edition newspaper**	**Section**	**Writer/Author**	**Article Genre**	**Place of report**	**No. of Words**
GA-TL-12-JAN-01	-	News	Martin Flechter	News report	Jerusalem	852
GA-TL-12-JAN-02	-	News	Will Pavia	News report	-	188
GA-TL-12-JAN-03	-	News	Azmi Keshawi Martin Flecher Sheera Frenkel	News report	Gaza City	1051
GA-TL-13-JAN-01	-	News	Bronwen Maddox	Article	-	474
GA-TL-13-JAN-02	-	World	Martin Flechter Sheera Fenkle	News report	Jerusalem	754
GA-TL-13-JAN-03	-	World	Martin Flechter Yonit Farago	News report	Sderot	586
GA-TL-13-JAN-04	-	World	Azmi Keshawi Martin Flechter	News report	Gaza City	374
GA-TL-14-JAN-01	-	World	Sheera Fenkel	News report	Gaza Border	826
GA-TL-14-JAN-02	-	World	Martin Fletcher	News report	Jerusalem	610
GA-TL-14-JAN-03	-	World	Michael Evans Sheera Frenkle	News report	Jerusalem	264
GA-TL-15-JAN-01	-	World	Martin Fletcher	News report		1029
GA-TL-15-JAN-02	-	World	Martin Fletcher Sheera Frenkle	News report	Jerusalem	449
GA-TL-15-JAN-03	-	World	Sheera Frenkle	News report	Jerusalem	444
GA-TL-16-JAN-01	-	Leading article	-	Editorial	-	577
GA-TL-16-JAN-02	-	News	Martin Fletcher	News report	Gaza	872
GA-TL-16-JAN-03	-	News	Sheera Frenkel	News report	Jerusalem	164
GA-TL-17-JAN-01	-	News	Martin Fletcher	News report	Jerusalem	560
GA-TL-17-JAN-02	-	News	Azmi Keshawi	News report	Gaza City	204
GA-TL-17-JAN-03	-	World	Nicholas Blanford	Article	Beirut	1562
GA-TL-18-JAN-00	-	-	-	-	-	-

The New York Times						
Article code	**Edition newspaper**	**Section**	**Writer/ Author**	**Article Genre**	**Place of Report**	**No. of words**
GA-NYT-26-DEC-01	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 15	REUTERS	News report	JERUSALEM	337
GA-NYT-27-DEC-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GA-NYT-28-DEC-01	The New York Times on the web	Section ; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg.	TAGHREED EL-KHODARY ISABEL KERSHNER	News report	Gaza Jerusalem	855
GA-NYT-28-DEC-02	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1	TAGHREED EL-KHODARY ETHAN BRONNER Isabel Kershner Robert Pear	News report	Gaza Jerusalem Netivot, Israel Crawford, Tex.	1390
GA-NYT-29-DEC-01	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1	TAGHREED EL-KHODARY ISABEL KERSHNER Nazila Fathi Rina Castelnuovo Khaled Abu Aker	News report	Gaza Jerusalem Beirut, Lebanon Tehran Israel-Gaza border Ramallah	1325
GA-NYT-29-DEC-02	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; NEWS ANALYSIS;	ETHAN BRONNER	News analysis	JERUSALEM	1128
GA-NYT-30-DEC-01	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1	ETHAN BRONNER TAGHREED EL-KHODARY Dina Kraft Mark Landler	News report	Jerusalem Gaza Ashkelon, Israel Washington.	1396
GA-NYT-30-DEC-02	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; NEWS ANALYSIS; Pg. 1	STEPHEN FARRELL	News analysis	RAMALLAH, West Bank	1098
GA-NYT-30-DEC-03	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 12	ISABEL KERSHNER	News report	JERUSALEM	710
GA-NYT-30-DEC-04	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Editorial Desk; OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR;Pg. 25	By BENNY MORRIS	Op-Ed		1296
GA-NYT-30-DEC-05	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Editorial Desk; LETTERS; Pg. 24	S. Izaz Haque Westford David P. Rountree Millbrook Judith Mahoney Pasternak June Brott Oakland	Letters	-	657
GA-NYT-31-DEC-01	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1	ETHAN BRONNER TAGHREED EL-KHODARY Mark Landler	News report	Jerusalem Gaza Washington	1112

The New York Times						
Article code	**Edition newspaper**	**Section**	**Writer/ Author**	**Article Genre**	**Place of Report**	**No. of words**
GA-NYT-31-DEC-02	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 10	STEVEN ERLANGER ; Nadim Audi contributed reporting.	News report	EL ARISH, Egypt	861
GA-NYT-01-JAN-01	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1	ETHAN BRONNER; Taghreed El-Khodary Steven Erlanger Mark Landler Robert Pear Alan Cowell Graham Bowley	News report	Jerusalem Gaza Cairo Washington Crawford, Tex. London New York	1343
GA-NYT-02-JAN-01	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 6	ISABEL KERSHNER; Taghreed El-Khodary Rina Castelnuovo Alison Smale	News report	Gaza Ashdod, Israel Paris	1296
GA-NYT-03-JAN-01	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 5	ISABEL KERSHNER and TAGHREED EL-KHODARY Reem Makhoul-Farrell Khaled Abu Aker Marc Santora Alan Cowell	News report	Jerusalem Gaza Jerusalem Ramallah United Nations London	1243
GA-NYT-03-JAN-02	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Editorial Desk; LETTERS; Pg. 18	-	Letter to editor	-	594
GA-NYT-04-JAN-01	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1	ISABEL KERSHNER and TAGHREED EL-KHODARY Rina Castelnuovo	News report	Jerusalem, Gaza the Israel-Gaza border	1631
GA-NYT-04-JAN-02	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; NEWS ANALYSIS; Pg. 1	ETHAN BRONNER	News analysis	EREZ ROSSING, on the Israel-Gaza border	971
GA-NYT-04-JAN-03	Late Edition – Final	Section WK; Column 0; Week in Review Desk; Pg. 1	STEVEN LEE MYERS	Article	WASHINGTON	1478
GA-NYT-05-JAN-01	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1	ETHAN BRONNER Taghreed El-Khodary Isabel Kershner and Steven Erlanger Dina Kraft Ellen Barry Marc Santora	News report	Gaza Jerusalem Sderot, Israel Moscow The United Nations.	1458

The New York Times						
Article code	**Edition newspaper**	**Section**	**Writer/ Author**	**Article Genre**	**Place of Report**	**No. of words**
GA-NYT-05-JAN-02	LateEdition – Final	Section A Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1	TAGHRED EL-KHODARY	News report	GAZA	1157
GA-NYT-05-JAN-03	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Editorial Desk; OP-ED COLUMNIST; Pg. 21	WILLIAM KRISTOL	Op-Ed	-	793
GA-NYT-05-JAN-04	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; NEWS ANALYSIS; Pg. 10	SCOTT SHANE	Article Analysis	-	999
GA-NYT-06-JAN-01	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 10	TAGHREED EL-KHODARY ISABEL KERSHNER	News report	Gaza Jerusalem	786
GA-NYT-06-JAN-02	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 11	STEVEN ERLANGER; Khaled Abu Aker	News report	NABLUS, West Bank	1221
GA-NYT-06-JAN-03	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1	ETHAN BRONNER	News report	THE ISRAEL-GAZA BORDER	1284
GA-NYT-06-JAN-04	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Metropolitan Desk; Pg. 19	JEREMY W. PETERS; Nicholas Confessore	News article	UTICA, N.Y.	964
GA-NYT-06-JAN-05	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Editorial Desk; LETTERS; Pg. 24	-	letter	-	983
GA-NYT-07-JAN-01	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Editorial Desk; OP-ED COLUMNIST; Pg. 2	THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN	Op-Ed	-	840
GA-NYT-07-JAN-02	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 12	TAGHREED EL-KHODARY and ISABEL KERSHNER Ethan Bronner Rina Castelnuovo Mark Landler Neil MacFarquhar Alan Cowell Graham Bowley	News report	Gaza, Jerusalem the Israel-Gaza border Ashdod Washington the United Nations New York	1350
GA-NYT-07-JAN-03	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 13	ETHAN BRONNER	News report	JERUSALEM	1077
GA-NYT-07-JAN-04	Late Edition – Final	Section ; Column 0; Editorial Desk; LETTERS;	-	Letter	-	1015

The New York Times						
Article code	**Edition newspaper**	**Section**	**Writer/ Author**	**Article Genre**	**Place of Report**	**No. of words**
GA-NYT-08-JAN-01	Late Edition – Final	Section ; Column 0; Editorial Desk; Pg	ROGER COHEN	Op-Ed	-	846
GA-NYT-08-JAN-02	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 10	ISABEL KERSHNER	News report	BEERSHEBA, Israel	836
GA-NYT-08-JAN-03	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Editorial Desk; OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR;Pg. 31	RASHID KHALIDI	Op-Ed	-	544
GA-NYT-08-JAN-04	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Editorial Desk; OP-ED COLUMNIST; Pg. 31	NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF	Op-Ed	-	823
GA-NYT-09-JAN-01	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1	ETHAN BRONNER, Neil MacFarquhar Rachel Donadio Isabel Kershner and Steven Erlanger Taghreed El-Khodary	News report	the United Nations Rome; Jerusalem Gaza	1300
GA-NYT-09-JAN-02	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Editorial Desk; LETTERS	-	Letter	-	962
GA-NYT-09-JAN-03	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 8	THANASSIS CAMBANIS; Hwaida Saad	News report	Beirut, Lebanon	811
GA-NYT-09-JAN-04	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Editorial Desk; Pg. 31	GIDEON LICHFIELD.	Op-Ed	Tel Aviv	678
GA-NYT-10-JAN-00	-	-	-	-	-	-
GA-NYT-11-JAN-01	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1	STEVEN ERLANGER; Taghreed El-Khodary	News report	Jerusalem Gaza	1516
GA-NYT-11-JAN-02	Late Edition – Final	Column 0; Week in Review Desk; GROUND INCURSION	-	Review	-	560
GA-NYT-11-JAN-03	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 14	STEPHEN FARRELL	News report	-	672
GA-NYT-11-JAN-04	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 6	ETHAN BRONNER; Taghreed El-Khodary	News report	Jerusalem Gaza	1023
GA-NYT-11-JAN-05	Late Edition – Final	Section WK; Column 0; Editorial Desk; THE PUBLIC EDITOR;Pg.10	CLARK HOYT	Op-Ed	-	1199
GA-NYT-12-JAN-01	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1	STEVEN ERLANGER and ETHAN BRONNER	News report	Jerusalem Gaza	1463

The New York Times						
Article code	**Edition newspaper**	**Section**	**Writer/ Author**	**Article Genre**	**Place of Report**	**No. of words**
GA-NYT-13-JAN-01	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 5	TAGHREED EL-KHODARY SABRINA TAVERNISE Steven Erlanger, William J. Broad	News report	Gaza, Jerusalem Jerusalem New York	985
GA-NYT-13-JAN-02	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 10	MICHAEL SLACKMAN Nazila Fathi	News report	CAIRO Tehran	1161
GA-NYT-14-JAN-01	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk;	NAZILA FATHI	News report	TEHRAN	222
GA-NYT-14-JAN-02	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 6	STEVEN ERLANGER;MICHAEL SLACKMAN; Taghreed El-Khodary Ethan Bronner; Sabrina Tavernise Neil MacFarquhar	News report	Tel Aviv;Cairo Gaza, Jerusalem The United Nations	1114
GA-NYT-14-JAN-03	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Editorial Desk; OP-ED COLUMNIST; Pg. 33	THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN	OP-ED	-	850
GA-NYT-14-JAN-04	Late Edition – Final	Section ; Column 0; Editorial Desk; LETTERS; Pg.	-	Letters	-	854
GA-NYT-15-JAN-01	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 6	ETHAN BRONNER; Sabrina Tavernise Souad Mekhennet; Michael Slackman	News report	Jerusalem; Frankfurt; Cairo	809
GA-NYT-15-JAN-02	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; NEWS ANALYSIS; Pg. 1	ISABEL KERSHNER	Article analysis	-	1246
GA-NYT-16-JAN-01	Late Edition – Final	Column 0; National Desk;	HELENE COOPER	Article	-	696
GA-NYT-16-JAN-02	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 12	ETHAN BRONNER	News report	Gaza	894
GA-NYT-16-JAN-03	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Editorial Desk; EDITORIA	-	Editorial	-	509
GA-NYT-16-JAN-04	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1	ISABEL KERSHNER; Taghreed El-Khodary; Neil MacFarquhar	News report	Gaza; Jerusalem United Nations	1598
GA-NYT-17-JAN-00	-	-	-	-	-	-
GA-NYT-18-JAN-01	Late Edition – Final	Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1	STEVEN ERLANGER	News report	-	1659
GA-NYT-18-JAN-02	Late Edition – Final	WK; column 0; Editorial Desk; LETTERS;	-	letters	-	598

The Washington Post						
Article code	**Edition newspaper**	**Section**	**Writer**	**Article Genre**	**Place of Report**	**No. of words**
GA-WP-26-DEC-00	-	-	-	-	-	-
GA-WP-27-DEC-00	-	-	-	-	-	-
GA-WP-28-DEC-01	Met 2 Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A01	Samuel Sockol; Special to The Washington Post	News report	JERUSALEM	1473
GA-WP-28-DEC-02	Regional Edition	EDITORIAL COPY; Pg. B06	-	Editorial	-	540
GA-WP-29-DEC-01	Met 2 Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A01	Sudarsan Raghavan and Islam Abdel Kareem; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	NIR AM, Israel	1670
GA-WP-29-DEC-02	Met 2 Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A01	Griff Witte; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	JERUSALEM	1692
GA-WP-30-DEC-01	Regional Edition	EDITORIAL COPY; Pg. A14	-	Editorial	-	496
GA-WP-30-DEC-02	Regional Edition	EDITORIAL COPY; Pg. A14	-	Letter to editor		594
GA-WP-30-DEC-03	Met 2 Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A01	Griff Witte and Sudarsan Raghavan	News report	JERUSALEM	1493
GA-WP-30-DEC-04	Met 2 Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A01	Sudarsan Raghavan and Islam Abdel Kareem; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	JERUSALEM	1205
GA-WP-31-DEC-01	Met 2 Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A01	Griff Witte; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	JERUSALEM	946
GA-WP-01-JAN-01	Regional Edition	EDITORIAL COPY; Pg. A13	Ephraim Sneh	Opinion	-	718
GA-WP-01-JAN-02	Suburban Edition	FOREIGN; Pg. A10	Sudarsan Raghavan; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1161
GA-WP-01-JAN-03	Met 2 Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A01	Griff Witte; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	RAMALLAH, West Bank,	1128
GA-WP-02-JAN-01	Regional Edition	EDITORIAL COPY; Pg. A14	-	Letters	-	461
GA-WP-02-JAN-02	Regional Edition	EDITORIAL COPY; Pg. A15	Charles Krauthammer	Opinion	-	798
GA-WP-02-JAN-03	Regional Edition	EDITORIAL COPY; Pg. A15	Michael Gerson	Op-Ed	-	732
GA-WP-02-JAN-04	Met 2 Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A01	Griff Witte; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	JERUSALEM	1098

The Washington Post						
Article code	**Edition newspaper**	**Section**	**Writer**	**Article Genre**	**Place of Report**	**No. of words**
GA-WP-03-JAN-01	Suburban Edition	FOREIGN; Pg. A08	Sudarsan Raghavan and Dan Eggen; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	JERUSALEM	1348
GA-WP-04-JAN-01	Met 2 Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A01	Sudarsan Raghavan and Griff Witte; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1773
GA-WP-04-JAN-02	Met 2 Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A01	Griff Witte; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1525
GA-WP-04-JAN-03	Regional Edition	OUTLOOK; Pg. B01	Yossi Klein Halevi	News report	Jerusalem	1313
GA-WP-05-JAN-01	Met 2 Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A01	Sudarsan Raghavan; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1525
GA-WP-05-JAN-02	Regional Edition	EDITORIAL COPY;	John R. Bolton	opinion	-	913
GA-WP-06-JAN-01	Met 2 Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A01	Craig Whitlock; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1313
GA-WP-06-JAN-02	Regional Edition	EDITORIAL COPY; Pg. A13	Richard Cohen	Op-Ed	-	736
GA-WP-07-JAN-01	Met 2 Edition	FOREIGN; Pg. A09	Craig Whitlock; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1196
GA-WP-07-JAN-02	Met 2 Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A01	Griff Witte and Sudarsan Raghavan; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1366
GA-WP-08-JAN-01	Met 2 Edition	FOREIGN; Pg. A10	Griff Witte; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1330
GA-WP-08-JAN-02	Met 2 Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A01	Craig Whitlock; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1283
GA-WP-08-JAN-03	Regional Edition	EDITORIAL COPY; Pg. A15	Jimmy Carter	Opinion	-	827
GA-WP-09-JAN-01	Suburban Edition	FOREIGN; Pg. A14	Griff Witte and Colum Lynch; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1494
GA-WP-09-JAN-02	Met 2 Edition	EDITORIAL COPY; Pg. A17	Jackson Diehl	Editorial	-	813
GA-WP-10-JAN-01	Regional Edition	EDITORIAL COPY;	-	Letters	-	1027
GA-WP-10-JAN-02	Regional Edition	EDITORIAL COPY; Pg. A12	-	Editorial	-	540
GA-WP-11-JAN-01	Suburban Edition	FOREIGN; Pg. A12	Craig Whitlock and Reyham Abdel Kareem; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1025
GA-WP-11-JAN-02	Suburban Edition	FOREIGN; Pg. A12	Griff Witte; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1247
GA-WP-11-JAN-03	Bulldog Edition	EDITORIAL COPY; Pg.	-	Editorial	-	540

The Washington Post						
Article code	**Edition newspaper**	**Section**	**Writer**	**Article Genre**	**Place of Report**	**No. of words**
		B06				
GA-WP-12-JAN-01	Met 2 Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A01	Griff Witte; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1231
GA-WP-13-JAN-01	Suburban Edition	FOREIGN; Pg. A10	Griff Witte; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1272
GA-WP-14-JAN-01	Suburban Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A01	Griff Witte; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	962
GA-WP-14-JAN-02	Regional Edition	STYLE; Pg. C12	-	Article	-	575
GA-WP-14-JAN-03	Regional Edition	EDITORIAL COPY; Pg. A16	-	Opinion	-	452
GA-WP-14-JAN-04	Suburban Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A11	Craig Whitlock; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1269
GA-WP-15-JAN-01	Met 2 Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A01	Griff Witte; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1572
GA-WP-15-JAN-02	Regional Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A01	Griff Witte; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1144
GA-WP-16-JAN-01	Suburban Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A11	Craig Whitlock; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1211
GA-WP-17-JAN-01	Suburban Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A11	Craig Whitlock; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1103
GA-WP-18-JAN-01	Met 2 Edition	A-SECTION; Pg. A11	Craig Whitlock; Washington Post Foreign Service	News report	Jerusalem	1489

Appendix 3.2 Classification of Gathered Materials According to Publishing Pages and Chronological Dates

Table 3.1: Number of News Articles on the Publishing Pages According to LexisNexis and Microfilm

Newspaper	Page	Number of Articles	Total
The Guardian	Guardian International Page	40	88
	Guardian homepage	13	
	Comment and debate	13	
	Guardian Leader page	13	
	Guardian weekly	5	
	Guardian obituary page	1	
	Guardian features	1	
	Guardian media page	2	
The Times	News	40	85
	Front page	6	
	Opinion	16	
	World news	16	
	Letter to editor	1	
	Leading articles	6	
The New York Times	Foreign desk	39	60
	Editorial desk	17	
	Week in review desk	2	
	Metropolitan desk	1	
	National desk	1	
The Washington Post	A-section page A01	30	47
	Editorial copy	15	
	Outlook	1	
	Style	1	
Total of news articles in all newspapers		280	280

Table 3.2: Distribution of All News Article According to the Date on Gaza War of 2008-09

Date	The *Guardian*	The *Times*	The *New York Times*	The *Washington Post*	Total
26.12.2008	0	0	1	0	1
27.12.2008	1	1	0	0	2
28.12.2008	0	0	2	2	4
29.12.2008	6	9	2	2	19
30.12.2008	5	5	5	4	19
31.12.2008	6	4	2	1	13
01.01.2009	0	2	1	3	6
02.01.2009	11	3	1	4	19
03.01.2009	5	5	2	1	13
04.01.2009	0	0	3	3	6
05.01.2009	9	9	4	2	24
06.01.2009	9	7	5	2	23
07.01.2009	9	5	4	2	20
08.01.2009	0	7	4	3	14
09.01.2009	7	5	4	2	18
10.01.2009	4	4	0	2	10
11.01.2009	0	0	5	3	8
12.01.2009	5	3	1	1	10
13.01.2009	2	4	2	1	9
14.01.2009	2	3	4	4	13
15.01.2009	0	3	2	2	7
16.01.2009	4	3	4	1	12
17.01.2009	3	3	0	1	7
18.01.2009	0	0	2	1	3
Total	88	85	60	47	280

Appendix 4.1: List of Headlines Analysed in the Dissertation

The Guardian

1. Israeli far right gains ground as Gaza rockets fuel tension: Misfired missile kills two young Palestinian sisters: Beiteinu party up in polls as calls grow for tough line (GA-GU-27-DEC-01)
2. Israel considers ground attack as it mobilises more troops: Olmert: fighting in Gaza will be 'long and painful' (GA-GU-29-DEC-01)
3. Defiant leaders dismiss calls to reinstate ceasefire (GA-GU-29-DEC-03)
4. Israel builds PR campaign to lay blame on Hamas (GA-GU-29-DEC-05)
5. Israel says its army is fighting war to the bitter end against Hamas: Defence minister rules out fresh ceasefire with Hamas: Closure of border area may signal ground offensive (GA-GU-30-DEC-01)
6. Tactics and long-term goals divide Israeli military analysts (GA-GU-30-DEC-02)
7. Israel mulls temporary halt to Gaza bombing campaign: Israel mulls temporary halt to Gaza assault (GA-GU-31-DEC-01)
8. Shortages put hospitals on the brink of collapse: Three operations-a-time in overstretched theatres: Call for Israel to let in most serious cases for treatment (GA-GU-31-DEC-02)
9. Foreign media challenge Gaza entry ban (GA-GU-31-DEC-03)
10. Gaza's bitter cycle: rockets, bombings and short-lived ceasefires (GA-GU-31-DEC-04)
11. Israel vows to fight Hamas 'to bitter end': Jets target official buildings, 'weapons stores' and university (GA-GU-02-JAN-01)
12. Israeli bomb kills Hamas leader and six of his family: Israeli bomb kills Hamas leader (GA-GU-02-JAN-02)
13. Besieged Palestinians battle to find burial spaces (GA-GU-02-JAN-03)
14. Special spin body gets media on message, says Israel (GA-GU-02-JAN-10)
15. Factional divide rules out show of solidarity from the West Bank: Despite a week of bombing, the long-standing rift between Hamas and Fatah prevents a united front against Israel (GA-GU-03-JAN-02)
16. 'Critical emergency' after air strike every 20 minutes (GA-GU-03-JAN-03)
17. Nizar Rayan: Senior Hamas leader and cleric considered a hero on the streets of Gaza (GA-GU-03-JAN-04)
18. Thousands flee guns and shells as Israel tightens grip on Gaza: Gaza City surrounded as territory is effectively divided: Palestinian death toll rises by over 40 and Israeli soldier killed: Hamas continues attacks with 30 rockets launched over border (GA-GU-05-JAN-02)
19. Tanks, rockets, death and terror: a civilian catastrophe unfolding: Incessant bombardment, no electricity, no water, and the hospitals full to overflowing - how Gaza was torn apart (GA-GU-05-JAN-03)
20. Hardliners play well to electorate but history shows that the rockets keep on coming: Israel: Former head of Mossad says talking to the enemy is the only answer GA-GU-05-JAN-07
21. Israel military keeps wary eye on northern border (GA-GU-05-JAN-08)
22. Civilian toll soars as troops and tanks press into Gaza (GA-GU-06-JAN-03)
23. Israel looks to drive out Hamas: Officials push for regime change: Islamist party 'fatally damaged': Both sides reject calls for ceasefire (GA-GU-06-JAN-06)
24. Deal to admit journalists aborted (GA-GU-06-JAN-08)
25. Homeless and terrified, 15,000 seek refuge in UN schools: Desperate civilians find shelter wherever they can but even the humanitarian agency's buildings are not safe: Last resort Schools on the frontline (GA-GU-07-JAN-07)
26. Ban on foreign journalists skews coverage of conflict (GA-GU-10-JAN-01)
27. UN human rights chief accuses Israel of war crimes: Official calls for investigation into Zeitoun shelling that killed up to 30 in one house as Israelis dismiss 'unworkable' ceasefire (GA-GU-10-JAN-04)
28. Ultimate aim remains unclear as government prepares or next move (GA-GU-12-JAN-01)
29. Fighting intensifies as Olmert says Israel is nearing its goal: Civilians in suburbs try to find shelter in city centre: Mortar shell that killed 43 in UN school was off target (GA-GU-12-JAN-03)
30. Israel sends in reservists as diplomacy falters: Deployment may herald next stage of offensive as negotiators struggle to find mechanism to end Hamas weapons smuggling (GA-GU-13-JAN-01)
31. Parliament blocks Arab parties from contesting general election (GA-GU-13-JAN-02)
32. Airstrike kills senior Hamas minister as Cairo talks inch towards ceasefire: Said Siam dies as Israeli jets target Jabaliya camp: UN anger grows over bombing of compound (GA-GU-16-JAN-02)
33. US steps up peace effort with pact to police Egyptian border: Washington talks address smuggling concerns Israel's security cabinet may discuss ceasefire (GA-GU-17-JAN-02)

The Times (London) (TL)

1. Girls die as militants' rockets fall short (GA-TL-27-DEC-01)
2. Israel masses forces for ground assault on Gaza (GA-TL-29-DEC-01)
3. Hospitals face catastrophe as Israeli firestorm is unleashed (GA-TL-29-DEC-03)
4. It's time for a third intifada, say West Bank youths (GA-TL-29-DEC-05)
5. Protests erupt in the Arab world against airstrikes (GA-TL-29-DEC-07)
6. Hamas braced as Israel pledges (GA-TL-30-DEC-02)
7. An all-out war to topple regime 'Prepare to be bombed': calls mark the start of psychological campaign (GA-TL-30-DEC-03)
8. Surge of support for 'genius' of politicians who took a gamble (GA-TL-30-DEC-04)
9. Israel considers a 48-hour lull to allow in humanitarian aid (GA-TL-31-DEC-02)
10. Israel rejects truce as rockets rain deeper (GA-TL-01-JAN-01)
11. Rich and poor are the same. There's no electricity' GA-TL-01-JAN-02
12. Gaza rockets put Israel's nuclear plant in battle zone (GA-TL-02-JAN-01)
13. Hamas leader killed in airstrike as Israe1 reject ceasefire initiative (GA-TL-02-JAN-03)
14. Russian women forced to leave the men behind GA-TL-03-JAN-03
15. Ground offensive expected as Israel allows foreigners to flee (GA-TL-03-JAN-04)
16. Israel's rain of fire on Gaza Phosphorus shells screen ground assault. All munitions used are lawful, says army (GA-TL-05-JAN-01)
17. Brown breaks with -the US to call for an immediate ceasefire (GA-TL-05-JAN-03)
18. EU f1ounders as squabbling countries lose chance to lead (GA-TL-05-JAN-04)
19. Elite Israeli forces cut region into three in drive to eliminate Hamas (GA-TL-05-JAN-06)
20. Doctors overwhelmed by procession of the dead and maimed GA-TL-05-JAN-08
21. We'll kill Jews abroad, Hamas warns (GA-TL-06-JAN-01)
22. 'We're wading in death, blood and amputees. Pass it on shout it out' (GA-TL-06-JAN-04)
23. 'We cannot let our children live under threat of rockets' GA-TL-06-JAN-05
24. Israel agrees to open corridor for relief aid after UN school is hit (GA-TL-07-JAN-02)
25. Fighting to the death 'to destroy the myth of invincible army' (GA-TL-07-JAN-04)
26. Injured eager to return to battle (GA-TL-07-JAN-05)
27. Victims' strange bums increase: concern over phosphorus shells (GA-TL-08-JAN-01)
28. Three-hour truce condemned as a tea break for the troops (GA-TL-08-JAN-02)
29. Joy and despair: baby given life because of the shells that rained death on Gaza (GA-TL-08-JAN-03)
30. US to support resolution on. '·,Gaza ceasefire (GA-TL-09-JAN-01)
31. Children huddle by mothers' bodies days after bombing' (GA-TL-09-JAN-02)
32. UN chief warns Israel over Gaza family 'herded' into house that was later shelled (GA-TL-10-JAN-02)
33. Envoys draw up plan to carve out foothold for peacekeepers (GA-TL-10-JAN-03)
34. Israel reinforces army before 'third phase' Fighting will go on for some days yet, Olmert indicates (GA-TL-12-JAN-01)
35. 'A different voice' from supporters of Gaza peace (GA-TL-12-JAN-02)
36. Tunnels, traps and martyrs: Hamas strategy to defeat Israel (GA-TL-12-JAN-03)
37. Troops gather as Israel prepares iron fist to deliver devastating blow (GA-TL-13-JAN-02)
38. The 'Hill of Shame' where destruction is a spectator sport (GA-TL-13-JAN-03)
39. No room for more graves in cemeteries (GA-TL-13-JAN-04)
40. We were told not to take chances, to shoot rather than ask questions'. Soldiers back from front lines reveal Israel's military tactics (GA-TL-14-JAN-01)
41. 'Shocked' Hamas leaders ready to accept a ceasefire to avoid all-out assault on heart of Gaza, say Israelis (GA-TL-14-JAN-02)
42. Soldiers and army at odds on phosphorus (GA-TL-14-JAN-03)
43. Nothing is normal any more, all the time we hear the Israeli war machine GA-TL-15-JAN-01
44. Spent shells prove use of phosphorus, say doctors (GA-TL-15-JAN-02)
45. Peace hopes grow as top negotiator prepares to fly to Cairo (GA-TL-15-JAN-03)
46. Town crushed by thunder of Israeli guns (GA-TL-16-JAN-02)
47. Aid compound hit by 'phosphorus shells' (GA-TL-16-JAN-03)
48. Israeli pulls back as war enters 'final act' (GA-TL-17-JAN-01)
49. How long will the quiet last? (GA-TL-17-JAN-02)

The New York Times

1. Israel Issues an Appeal to Palestinians in Gaza (GA-NYT-26-DEC-01)
2. Israeli Attack Kills Scores Across Gaza (GA-NYT-28-DEC-01)
3. More than 225 die in Gaza as Israel strikes at Hamas (GA-NYT-28-DEC-02)
4. Israel keeps up assault on Gaza; Arab anger rises (GA-NYT-29-DEC-01)
5. No early end seen to 'all-out war' on Hamas in Gaza (GA-NYT-30-DEC-01)
6. A Captured Israeli Soldier Figures in Military Assessments and Political Calculus (GA-NYT-30-DEC-03)
7. Amid a Build up of Its Forces, Israel Ponders a Cease-Fire (GA-NYT-31-DEC-01)
8. Egypt Offers Humanitarian Aid but Is Criticized for Refusing to Open Gaza Border (GA-NYT-31-DEC-02
9. Israel rejects Gaza cease-fire, but offers aid (GA-NYT-01-JAN-01)
10. In a Broadening Offensive, an Israeli Strike Kills a Senior Hamas Leader (GA-NYT-02-JAN-01)
11. Escalation Feared as Israel, Continuing Bombing, Lets Foreigners Leave Gaza (GA-NYT-03-JAN-01)
12. Israeli Tanks and Troops Launch Attack on Gaza (GA-NYT-04-JAN-01)
13. Israeli Attack Splits Gaza; Truce Calls Are Rebuffed (GA-NYT-05-JAN-01)
14. Israeli Attack Splits Gaza; Truce Called Are Rebuffed: Hospital Fills Up, Mainly With Civilians, and Struggles to Cope (GA-NYT-05-JAN-02)
15. Warnings Not Enough for Gaza Families (GA-NYT-06-JAN-01)
16. In Fatah-Governed West Bank, Solidarity With Hamas (GA-NYT-06-JAN-02)
17. Israel deepens Gaza incursion as toll mounts (GA-NYT-06-JAN-03)
18. Israeli Shells Kill 40 At Gaza U.N. School (GA-NYT-07-JAN-02)
19. Israel Keeping Reporters From Close Look at War (GA-NYT-07-JAN-03)
20. Israelis Honor Fallen Soldiers, While Seeing the Gaza Campaign as Justified (GA-NYT-08-JAN-02)
21. Aid Groups Rebuke Israel Over Conditions in Gaza (GA-NYT-09-JAN-01)
22. Rocket Fire From Lebanon Unsettles Israel, but Fears of a Hezbollah Attack Subside (GA-NYT-09-JAN-03)
23. A Gaza War Full of Traps And Trickery (GA-NYT-11-JAN-01)
24. Israeli Offensive Focuses on Web of Tunnels, a Lifeline for Gazans (GA-NYT-11-JAN-03)
25. As Talks Falter, Israel Warns Gazans of Stepped-Up Attacks (GA-NYT-11-JAN-04)
26. As troops enter Gaza city, Israel sees an opening (GA-NYT-12-JAN-01)
27. U.N. Warns of Refugee Crisis in Gaza Strip (GA-NYT-13-JAN-01)
28. Iran Gives Hamas Enthusiastic Support, but Discreetly, Just in Case (GA-NYT-13-JAN-02)
29. Israel Halts Ship to Gaza, Iran Says (GA-NYT-14-JAN-01)
30. Israeli Officials Say Main Goals in Gaza Are Still Unfulfilled (GA-NYT-14-JAN-02)
31. Egypt Cites Progress Toward Truce as Gaza Toll Exceeds 1,000 (GA-NYT-15-JAN-01)
32. Israel Lets Reporters See Devastated Gaza Site and Image of a Confident Military (GA-NYT-16-JAN-02)
33. Israel Shells U.N. Site in Gaza, Drawing Fresh Condemnation (GA-NYT-16-JAN-04)
34. Israel declares Gaza cease-fire; U.N. site struck (GA-NYT-18-JAN-01)

The Washington Post (WP):

1. Israeli Warplanes Pound Gaza; Hundreds Killed in Reprisal Airstrikes Targeting Hamas Security Facilities (GA-WP-28-DEC-01)
2. Food and Medical Supplies Grow Scarce in the Gaza Strip (GA-WP-29-DEC-01)
3. Israel Poised for Long Fight; Palestinian Deaths Near 300; Hamas Calls for Suicide Strikes (GA-WP-29-DEC-02)
4. 'All-Out War' Declared on Hamas; Israel Expands List of Targets to Include Group's Vast Support Network in Gaza (GA-WP-30-DEC-03)
5. Family Mourns 5 Daughters as Civilian Death Toll Mounts (GA-WP-30-DEC-04)
6. Israel Studies Truce Proposal; French Plan Is Part Of a Broader Push (GA-WP-31-DEC-01)
7. Israel Rejects Proposal for 48-Hour Truce; Ground Incursion Looms as Hamas's Rockets Hit Farther (GA-WP-01-JAN-02)
8. Israel's Attacks On Gaza Deepen Palestinian Rift (GA-WP-01-JAN-03)
9. Senior Hamas Leader Killed; Israelis Stand Ready to Invade Gaza by Land (GA-WP-02-JAN-04)
10. Hamas Provoked Attacks, Bush Says; President Accuses Group of Adding to Civilian Deaths From Israeli Strikes (GA-WP-03-JAN-01)
11. Invasion Offers Benefits but Also Risks to Both Sides (GA-WP-04-JAN-01)
12. Israeli Forces Enter Gaza Strip; 'This Will Not Be Easy or Short,' Top Official Says; Hamas Calls for Suicide Attacks (GA-WP-04-JAN-02)
13. As My Son Goes to War, I Am Fully Israeli At Last (GA-WP-04-JAN-03)

14. Israeli Forces Push Deeper Into Gaza Strip; International Critics Warn of Worsening Humanitarian Crisis (GA-WP-05-JAN-01)
15. Israel Rejects Intensified Push for Cease-Fire (GA-WP-06-JAN-01)
16. Mideast Mediators Seek Anti-Tunnel Plan; Hamas Fighters Could Use Underground Corridors to Rearm, Israeli Military Says (GA-WP-07-JAN-01)
17. Israel Hits U.N.-Run School in Gaza; 40 Die at Shelter That Military Says Hamas Was Firing From (GA-WP-07-JAN-02)
18. Hamas Pulling Back Into Crowded Cities, Beckoning Israelis; For Army, Pursuit Is Tempting but Risky (GA-WP-08-JAN-01)
19. Red Cross Reports Grisly Find in Gaza; Israel Accused of Blocking Aid to Wounded (GA-WP-08-JAN-02)
20. As U.S. Abstains, U.N. Security Council Calls for Cease-Fire (GA-WP-09-JAN-01)
21. Combat May Escalate In Gaza, Israel Warns; Operation in Densely Packed City, Camps Weighed (GA-WP-11-JAN-01)
22. The View From Israel: Victors in a Necessary War (GA-WP-11-JAN-02)
23. Israelis Push to Edge of Gaza City; Move Could Signal A Long Urban Battle (GA-WP-12-JAN-01)
24. Israel's Top Leaders Weighing Their Next Steps in Gaza (GA-WP-13-JAN-01)
25. Hamas May Survive Offensive, Israel Says; Group Is Weakened, Military Officials Assert; Goal Is to Apply Pressure and Force a Truce (GA-WP-14-JAN-01)
26. Israel, Aid Groups Have Long Feuded; Tensions Only Heightened by Gaza War (GA-WP-14-JAN-04)
27. Gaza War Generates Debate on Civilians; Questions Reflect Asymmetry of Fight (GA-WP-15-JAN-01)
28. Progress Reported in Gaza Truce Talks; Palestinian Toll Exceeds 1,000 (GA-WP-15-JAN-02)
29. On Day of Heavy Fighting, Moves Toward Gaza Peace (GA-WP-16-JAN-01)
30. Diplomatic Efforts Toward Gaza Truce Intensify (GA-WP-17-JAN-01)
31. Israelis Announce Cease-Fire In Gaza; Olmert Declares Success; Hamas Vows to Fight On (GA-WP-18-JAN-01)

Appendix 4.2: Analysis Sheet of Headlines of News Stories

An Example from the *Guardian* Newspaper (GU)

No.	Headlines	Voice of Structure	Theme	Participants	Participants' Configurations		Processes	Type of Processes	Roles
1	Israeli far right gains ground as Gaza rockets fuel tension: Misfired missile kills two young Palestinian sisters: Beiteinu party up in polls as calls grow for tough line	Active	Internal affairs	Israeli far right	Israeli	Political	gains	Behavioural	Behaviour
2	Israel considers ground attack as it mobilises more troops: Olmert: fighting in Gaza will be 'long and painful'	Active	Ground invasion	Israel	Israeli	Political	considers	Behavioural	Behaviour
3	Defiant leaders dismiss calls to reinstate ceasefire	Active	Ceasefire Negotiations	Defiant leaders	Palestinian	Political	dismiss	Mental	Sensor
4	Israel builds PR campaign to lay blame on Hamas	Active	Israeli Objectives of the war	Israel	Israeli	Political	builds	Behavioural	Behaviour
5	Israel says its army is fighting war to the bitter end against Hamas: Defence minister rules out fresh ceasefire with Hamas: Closure of border area may signal ground offensive	Active	Israeli Objectives of the war	Israel	Israeli	Political	says	Verbal	Sayer
6	Tactics and long-term goals divide Israeli military analysts	Active	Internal affairs	Tactics and long-term goals	Israeli	Military	divide	Relational	Attribute
7	Israel mulls temporary halt to Gaza bombing campaign: Israel mulls temporary halt to Gaza assault	Active	Ceasefire Negotiations	Israel	Israeli	Political	mulls	Behavioural	Behaviour
8	Shortages put hospitals on the brink of collapse: Three operations-a-time in overstretched theatres: Call for Israel to let in most serious cases for treatment	Active	Facing consequences of war	Shortages	Palestinian	Civilian	put	Material Event	Agent
9	Foreign media challenge Gaza entry ban	Active	Media coverage	Foreign media	International	Political	challenge	Mental	Sensor
10	Gaza's bitter cycle: rockets, bombings and short-lived ceasefires	Active	Targeting Hamas	rockets, bombings and short-lived ceasefires	Israeli	Military		Relational	Identifying

Appendix 4.3: Analysis Sheet of Texts of News Stories and Editorials: An Example from *the New York Times*

No. Clause	Clauses	Type of clause	Theme	Social Actors	Actors' configurations		Inclusion and exclusion	Role allocation	Genericisation and Specification (Individulisation and Assimilation)		Nomination and Ctegorization (Functionalisation and Identification	
1	A missile hit their uncle's house, which was made of concrete and so, the Basal family had thought in taking refuge there, safer than their more flimsy one.	Statement	Targeting of Civilians	A missile	Israeli	Military	Included	activated	Genericised	Singular with indefinite article	Categorized	
2	Fida Basal, 20, was not there when it struck.	Statement	Facing consequences of war	Fida Basal	Palestinian	Civilian	Included	passivated	Specified	Individual	Nominated-semi-formal	
3	But her sister, Hanin, 18, was.	Statement	Facing consequences of war	her sister, Hanin, 18	Palestinian	Civilian	Included	passivated	Specified	Individual	Nominated-informal	
4	On Sunday, the day after Israel began its ground invasion of **Gaza**, Fida found Hanin at Shifa Hospital in **Gaza** City.	Statement	Ground Invasion	Israel	Israeli	Military	Included	activated	Genericised	Mass noun without article	Categorized	
5	One of Hanin's legs, her sister was told, had been amputated.	Statement	Facing consequences of war	One of Hanin's legs	Palestinian	Civilian	Backgrounding	passivated	Genericised	Singular with indefinite article	Categorized	Idenfitication-relational-personal
6	'I want her leg now!" Fida screamed at her mother, blaming her for moving them to the concrete house. "God has no mercy! You get me her leg now!"	Direct Quotation	Facing Killing and War Troubles	Fida	Palestinian	Civilian	Included	passivated	Specified	Individual	Nominated	
7	Her uncle lost both legs in the missile strike on Sunday.	Statement	Facing consequences of war	Her uncle	Palestinian	Civilian	Backgrounding	passivated	Specified	Individual	Nominated	
8	Another woman found only half of the body of her 17-year-old daughter in the Shifa morgue.	Statement	Facing consequences of war	another woaman	Palestinian	Civilian	Backgrounding	passivated	Genericised	Singular with indefinite article	Categorized	idenfitication-classficiation-gender
9	'May God exterminate Hamas!" she screamed in a curse rarely heard these days.	Direct Quotation	Facing Killing and War Troubles	she (another woman)	Palestinian	Civilian	Included	passivated	Specified	Individual	Nominated	
10	In this conflict, many Palestinians praise Hamas as resisters, but Israel contends the group has purposely endangered civilians by fighting in and around populated areas.	Statement	Prasing Hamas	many Palestinians	Palestinian	Civilian	Included	activated	Genericised	Plural without article	Categorized	

Appendix 4.4: **Analysis Sheet of Quotation Pattersn: An Example from *the Guardian***

Article code	Quotation Clauses	speaker	Nationality	Professional Reference	Lexical Terms to describe the social	Nominated or Categorized	Speech Verbs	Type of Quotation	situation of Quotation	sources
GA-GU-27-DEC-01	"Israeli threats won't make Hamas leaders fear, and won't break our stand. It is **Israel** who is responsible for the escalation," Fawzi Barhoum, a Hamas spokesman, said. **GA-GU-27-DEC-01**	Fawzi Barhoum	Palestinian	Political	a Hamas spokesman	Nominated	said	direct	Response to the Israeli threats of war	
	Israel allowed the humanitarian delivery of fuel, food and clothing after the UN said it had run out of essential supplies including flour, cash, 100 critical medicines, surgical kits and other emergency food stocks. **GA-GU-27-DEC-01**	the UN	UN	Political		Categorized	said	indirect	Describing the humanitarian situation	
	The UN also said that 60% of Gazans were receiving running water once every five to seven days due to a lack of fuel to run the power plant. **GA-GU-27-DEC-01**	the UN	UN	Political		Categorized	said	indirect	Describing the humanitarian situation	
GA-GU-30-DEC-02	Israel has said the aim of the past three days of intense bombing in **Gaza** is to stop rockets being fired by Palestinian militants into southern Israeli towns. GA-GU-30-DEC-02	Israel	Israeli	Political		Categorized	has said	indirect	speaking on the Israeli objective of the war	
	Israeli officials, including the foreign minister Tzipi Livni, have spoken openly of their wish to topple Hamas in **Gaza**. **GA-GU-29-DEC-01**	Israeli officials, including the foreign minister Tzipi Livni	Israeli	Political	Israeli officials	Categorized	have spoken	indirect	paraphrasing the Israeli objective to topple Hamas	
	"The issues that we so much wanted to stress in this election campaign will be getting maximum attention even without our messages," Netanyahu told Ha'aretz newspaper. **GA-GU-27-DEC-01**	Netanyahu	Israeli	Political		Nominated	told	direct	Internal relations-elections	Ha'aretz newspaper
	The UN security council called for a halt to the violence in **Gaza** and the UN high commissioner for human rights, Navi Pillay, said Israel's use of force was "disproportionate". **GA-GU-29-DEC-01**	The UN security council	UN	Political		Categorized	called for	indirect	Calling for ceasefire	
		the UN high commissioner for human rights, Navi Pillay	UN	Political		Nominated	said	indirect	Describing the Israeli use of force	
	In the first repercussions of the Israeli attacks, Syrian officials said they were pulling out of indirect peace talks with Israel which have continued over recent months through Turkish mediation. **GA-GU-29-DEC-01**	Syrian officials	Arab	Political		Categorized	said	indirect	expressing withdrawal from talks with Israelis	

Appendix 5.1: Texts of the Sampled News Stories

News Stories

GA-GU-27-DEC-01
The Guardian (London) - Final Edition
December 27, 2008 Saturday
International: Israeli far right gains ground as Gaza rockets fuel tension: Misfired missile kills two young Palestinian sisters: Beiteinu party up in polls as calls grow for tough line
BYLINE: Toni O'Loughlin, Jerusalem
SECTION: GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES; Pg. 34
LENGTH: 595 words
Support for Israel's ultra-nationalist rightwing parties is growing as the Jewish state and Hamas, the Islamists who rule Gaza, lurch closer to a major confrontation.
Polling published in several Israeli dailies yesterday showed rising support for Israel Beiteinu, which takes a hard line on Gaza and advocates transferring predominantly Arab towns in Israel to a future Palestinian state. The surge in support for the far right comes amid growing tensions in Gaza since the official end to a six-month ceasefire a week ago.
Yesterday, a rocket fired from Gaza at Israel accidentally struck a Gazan house, killing two Palestinian sisters, aged five and 13, and wounding a third, medics said.
Hamas had hoped the ceasefire would lead to the lifting of the blockade which Israel imposed 18 months ago to weaken the Islamists who took control of Gaza after ousting their more secular Fatah rivals from the territory following elections and a breakdown in power-sharing.
But while both Hamas and Israel have expressed an interest in renewing the ceasefire, they have retreated to military action and bellicose talk.
"Israeli threats won't make Hamas leaders fear, and won't break our stand. It is Israel who is responsible for the escalation," Fawzi Barhoum, a Hamas spokesman, said.
Egypt, which brokered the truce and has called on both sides to refrain from violence, has reinforced security along its Gaza border fearing a confrontation.
Yesterday, Israel loosened its blockade on Gaza, ending an eight-day closure of its crossings into the besieged territory, ahead of a possible attack against the Palestinian militias.
Israel allowed the humanitarian delivery of fuel, food and clothing after the UN said it had run out of essential supplies including flour, cash, 100 critical medicines, surgical kits and other emergency food stocks. The UN also said that 60% of Gazans were receiving running water once every five to seven days due to a lack of fuel to run the power plant.
The wastewater treatment plant has also been unable to operate and as a result had doubled the amount of raw sewage it was siphoning into the Mediterranean to 40m litres a day.
Over the past three days, Hamas has pounded Israel's neighbouring southern townships with 36 rockets, 30 of which were fired on Wednesday, hitting a waterpark, a house and a factory. There were no serious casualties. The rest fell in open areas. Seventy mortars were also fired.
Israel attacked a rocket-launching site, killing one militant, on Wednesday but has refrained from further military strikes.
Growing support for the far right, in the lead-up to the February election, may have come at the expense of the Likud party, which is showing signs of losing ground as the frontrunner to Kadima, the ruling party. But with polls showing the Israeli public calling for harsher military strikes in Gaza, Likud's leader, Binyamin Netanyahu, is also expected to benefit from the darkening mood.
"The issues that we so much wanted to stress in this election campaign will be getting maximum attention even without our messages," Netanyahu told Ha'aretz newspaper.
Earlier this week, Israel's cabinet approved a possible operation that could last several days. "We have enormous power, we can do things which will be devastating and I keep restraining myself and keep restraining my friends all the time and I tell them: let's wait . . . give them another chance," Israel's prime minister, Ehud Olmert, who will leave politics at the election as a result of an ongoing corruption investigation, told the Saudi owned al-Arabiya TV.

GA-GU-29-DEC-01
The Guardian (London) - Final Edition
December 29, 2008 Monday
Front: Israel considers ground attack as it mobilises more troops: Olmert: fighting in Gaza will be 'long and painful'
BYLINE: Rory McCarthy, Jerusalem
SECTION: GUARDIAN HOME PAGES; Pg. 1
LENGTH: 694 words
Israel's cabinet yesterday approved the call-up of thousands of reservists as the military deployed tanks close to the border with Gaza while pressing on with air strikes, suggesting a major ground invasion was being considered to follow the biggest single day of conflict in Gaza since the 1967 war.

Ehud Olmert, Israel's prime minister, reportedly told a cabinet meeting the fighting in Gaza would be "long, painful and difficult". After two days of air raids, more than 290 Palestinians have been killed, and more than 600 injured. Gaza's hospitals, already short of supplies, had corpses lying on their floors as the morgues filled up.
In an attempt to escape the mayhem, hundreds of Gazans broke through the border fence with Egypt at Rafah, where Palestinian gunmen and Egyptian border guards traded gunfire, killing one Egyptian and one Palestinian.
Israeli air strikes hit 40 smuggling tunnels that had been dug under the border fence to alleviate Israel's blockade of the overcrowded strip.
There were also Palestinian protests across the occupied West Bank in which crowds threw stones at Israeli forces. In one demonstration near Israel's West Bank barrier in the village of Nilin, Israeli troops shot dead a Palestinian protester and critically injured another.
The UN security council called for a halt to the violence in Gaza and the UN high commissioner for human rights, Navi Pillay, said Israel's use of force was "disproportionate". But the US blamed Hamas, the Islamist movement which won Palestinian elections three years ago and then seized full control of Gaza last year, for the fighting. Israel and Palestinian militant groups in Gaza observed a ceasefire for six months which began to break down in November.
In the first repercussions of the Israeli attacks, Syrian officials said they were pulling out of indirect peace talks with Israel which have continued over recent months through Turkish mediation. There was condemnation of Israel's actions elsewhere in the Arab world.
Most of the dead in Gaza appeared to have been police officers but there have been civilian casualties. Several young people were killed in Gaza City on Saturday in a busy street by an Israeli air strike. Seven of the dead were students at a UN vocational college for Palestinian refugees. Another 20 students were injured in the attack.
Israeli air strikes continued yesterday. A predawn raid destroyed the headquarters of the Hamas TV channel, al-Aqsa, but the station later resumed broadcasting. The main security headquarters in Gaza City was hit again and four were killed when most of its buildings were flattened. Last night, Israeli warplanes targeted the Hamas-affiliated Islamic University.
Palestinian militants in Gaza continued to fire rockets into southern Israel, with two missiles reaching as far as Ashdod, an Israeli port 18 miles north of Gaza.
At a regular weekly cabinet meeting in Jerusalem, Olmert's government approved the call-up of 6,500 reservist soldiers. "Israel will continue until we have a new security environment in the south, when the population there will no longer live in terror and in fear of constant rocket barrages," said Mark Regev, a spokesman for the prime minister.
Israeli officials, including the foreign minister Tzipi Livni, have spoken openly of their wish to topple Hamas in Gaza. But most Israeli military analysts said they did not expect the military to seize full control of the Gaza strip again for fear it would cost the lives of hundreds of Israeli soldiers.
Israel's actions come just weeks before a general election, due on 10 February. Livni, who is running second in the polls to win the elections, appeared to rule out a major ground invasion. "Our goal is not to reoccupy Gaza Strip," she said on NBC's Meet the Press programme.
In Gaza the streets were largely empty yesterday. Most shops were closed and schools were shut. Hamas has sounded defiant in the face of the attacks with Khaled Meshaal, the group's political leader in exile, calling for a "third uprising" among Palestinians.
But Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, accused Hamas of provoking the Israeli raids by not extending the ceasefire.

GA-GU-30-DEC-02
The Guardian (London) - Final Edition
December 30, 2008 Tuesday
Gaza air strikes: Strategy: Tactics and long-term goals divide Israeli military analysts
BYLINE: Rory McCarthy, Jerusalem
SECTION: GUARDIAN HOME PAGES; Pg. 6
LENGTH: 702 words
Israel has said the aim of the past three days of intense bombing in Gaza is to stop rockets being fired by Palestinian militants into southern Israeli towns.
The rockets have claimed 19 lives in the past eight years, but have become an increasingly serious problem for the Israeli government.
To reduce the rocket fire, Israeli military analysts argue, is a modest goal. However, even within Israel there remain sharp differences of opinion about how to achieve that. Most believe the latest conflict will eventually end with a new lull in the fighting, or at best another short-term ceasefire agreement - the latest in a long line of temporary ceasefires in the conflict between Israel and militants in Gaza.
Although Israel has put in place some preparations for a ground invasion, including preparing a call-up of reserves and deploying tanks near the Gaza border, that is still not seen as an inevitable step.
Shlomo Brom, a retired Israeli general and a military analyst at the Institute for National Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv, said the point of the conflict was for Israel to exact the best conditions for a future ceasefire with Hamas, the Islamist movement which controls Gaza after winning Palestinian elections three years ago.
"The military operation is changing the dynamic, making it clear to Hamas that it is going to pay a very high cost for violations of the ceasefire," Brom said. "I think Hamas deluded itself by thinking Israel is kind of paralysed because of its political system or the possible reaction of its population to some suffering."

For nearly six months Israel and Hamas held a ceasefire in Gaza, although it broke down in the final weeks with violations on both sides. Now both Hamas and some Israeli leaders have said they are not willing to return to a ceasefire deal.
Ehud Barak, Israel's defence minister, told Fox News on Saturday when the bombing began: "For us to be asked to have a ceasefire with Hamas is like asking you (the US) to have a ceasefire with al-Qaida."
The reality is that a new ceasefire agreement is probably the best Israel could hope to achieve. As Alex Fishman, a columnist on the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper, put it bluntly yesterday : "The answer to the question of what we want is simple: To stop the fire. In order to stop the fire, we have to reach an arrangement, and in order to persuade Hamas to reach an arrangement, we are now breaking its bones - among other reasons, so that the price it demands will not be high. But we have not yet decided, amongst ourselves, what price we are willing to pay."
Yet there are others who raise broader questions about Israel's policy towards Gaza, particularly in the last three years since Hamas won the electoral victory.
Yossi Alpher, a former official at Mossad and a military commentator, agreed that Israel was seeking a ceasefire on more acceptable terms. But he was critical of the tough economic blockade Israel has imposed on the Gaza Strip in recent years, limiting imports to humanitarian supplies and preventing all exports, a policy that has all but wiped out private industry and brought Gaza's economy to collapse. "The economic siege of Gaza has not produced any of the desired political results," he said. "It has not manipulated Palestinians into hating Hamas, but has probably been counter-productive. It is just useless collective punishment."
He said that in future Israel would have to choose either to recognise Hamas was around to stay and to talk to the movement, however unpalatable that might be for most Israelis, or to fully reoccupy the Gaza Strip, topple Hamas and bear all the costs involved.
Some have even spoken publicly against the current bombing in Gaza. Tom Segev, one of Israel's most respected historians, has been particularly critical, arguing that the premise of bombing to secure a peace agreement was false.
"Israel has also always believed that causing suffering to Palestinian civilians would make them rebel against their national leaders. This assumption has proven wrong over and over," Segev wrote in yesterday's Ha'aretz newspaper. "Since the dawn of the Zionist presence in the land of Israel, no military operation has ever advanced dialogue with the Palestinians."

GA-GU-31-DEC-02
The Guardian (London) - Final Edition
December 31, 2008 Wednesday
Front: Gaza air strikes: Shortages put hospitals on the brink of collapse: Three operations-a-time in overstretched theatres: Call for Israel to let in most serious cases for treatment
BYLINE: Rory McCarthy, Jerusalem, Hazem Balousha, Gaza City
SECTION: GUARDIAN HOME PAGES; Pg. 4
LENGTH: 687 words
Emergency medical supplies were being flown to the Middle East yesterday to help Gaza's overstretched hospitals, where doctors say they are still struggling to cope with hundreds of injured patients.
Doctors at the Shifa hospital, a 585-bed complex which is the largest in Gaza, said they had treated patients on the floor and conducted operations with as many as three different patients and a dozen doctors crowded into each operating theatre.
All 25 intensive care beds were full, said Dr Hussain Ashaur, the hospital director, and there were still another 87 patients in a critical condition waiting to enter intensive care.
He said there were severe shortages of medical supplies, including gauze, sterilisation fluids and anaesthetics. In total 135 types of medical supplies were needed and 94 separate medicines. Sheets and cloth for intensive care beds were in such short supply that they were being washed three times a day.
Doctors said they were overwhelmed on Saturday, with the first rush of large numbers of injured patients, although pressure had eased slightly on Monday and yesterday. Still, the hospital was in a fragile state, Ashaur said. "We're close to collapsing if this situation continues. We have shortages of everything," he said.
The hospital was running on generators yesterday after a break in the electricity supply, and already one of its three generators had broken down and could not be repaired because of a lack of spare parts.
The International Committee of the Red Cross was to fly in 11 tonnes of supplies to Tel Aviv, which it hoped would then be allowed into Gaza. A Red Cross surgical team is on standby to fly in as well, as soon as it receives permission from the Israeli authorities.
The World Health Organisation is to fly 50 surgical kits from Norway to Israel, with enough supplies to treat 5,000 wounded people. Another nine basic health kits, enough for three months' treatment of 90,000 people with common illnesses, is also to be sent.
However, for several months Israel has allowed only limited supplies of humanitarian goods into Gaza and no other imports or exports. That has left Gaza's health system in a state of crisis, according to Physicians for Human Rights, an Israeli group.
It said even before Israel's latest bombing campaign began on Saturday that the Gazan health system was "operating under severe shortages and limitations". As well as shortages of medical equipment and trained personnel, there were shortages of medicine and a broader lack of knowledge and training in dealing with complex diseases and injuries.

Israel allowed around 100 trucks of humanitarian supplies into Gaza yesterday , a much higher number than usual but still a long way below the numbers passing through before the economic blockade was imposed last year.
Physicians for Human Rights said it knew of six patients in intensive care at the Shifa hospital who needed treatment outside Gaza but were too weak to travel the seven hours by road to Cairo.
The group said hospitals in Israel, as in the past, were ready to take the patients but the only crossing they would use out of Gaza, at Erez, had been closed since Friday. The group, together with other Israeli human rights groups, sent a letter to the Israeli defence ministry asking that patients be allowed out.
In the Shifa hospital yesterday , doctors described working 20-hour days just to keep up with the flood of patients.
"We thought we were in a critical situation in the past, but when we saw this we realised what had gone before was nothing," said Dr Nabil Shawa, head of orthopaedics.
"We're not prepared for this number of casualties. There were so many people I couldn't move freely from one room to the next. Besides, I have my family, and my children were at school and I was trying to reach them to know that they were safe. You can just imagine the effort, the worry. We're exhausted."
Oxfam called for an immediate ceasefire to allow in sufficient humanitarian supplies. "What is needed is an immediate ceasefire to end the terrible levels of human suffering in Gaza," said Jeremy Hobbs, director of Oxfam International.

GA-GU-02-JAN-03
The Guardian (London) - Final Edition
January 2, 2009 Friday
International: Gaza: Cemeteries: Besieged Palestinians battle to find burial spaces
BYLINE: Hazem Balousha, Gaza and Toni O'Loughlin, Jerusalem
SECTION: GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES; Pg. 17
LENGTH: 602 words
Salim Abu Sadaq and six of his relatives scrabbled around in the soil of Gaza City's Sheikh Radwan cemetery for two hours yesterday, searching for a space in which to lay his cousin to rest. In the end, he opened his grandfather's grave and moved the older man's remains aside to make space for the body of his grandson.
After "The Beginning", the first chapter in the Qur'an, was read aloud to mark the end of a life, Abu Sadaq expressed misgivings about the shared grave. "I feel very bad about it. It hasn't happened before, but there's no space."
At the entrance to the cemetery hangs a makeshift sign, written on fabric and strung up by the ministry of religious affairs. "It is forbidden to bury here," it says, directing mourners to the newer cemetery on Gaza's eastern outskirts near Jabalia, where there is still some open ground.
The Sheikh Radwan cemetery has been closed for years, as have the other two in Gaza's densely populated city.
But Abu Sadaq's family had no choice.
The Israelis' intensive bombing of Gaza's eastern perimeter has turned the newer cemetery into a lethal ground and as a result families are forced to reuse old graves in the closed one, despite Islamic law normally forbidding that.
After digging for hours, Abu Sadaq rang a sheikh. "He told us that we could dig up an old family grave and move the remains to one side. We have to bury the body as soon as we can," he said.
Burial space is not the only shortage. Israel's 18-month blockade of Gaza has created a severe lack of concrete and building blocks, so families have been unable to build proper graves. Last year, before the tunnel economy began to take off, there was also a shortage of white burial cloth, required for Muslim funerals, forcing families to wrap their dead in whatever they could find.
"We are lucky here because we have an old grave," said Abu Sadaq as he buried his cousin, who died from cancer.
Nearby, Muhammad Khalil, 47, stood over the grave of his 19-year-old son, reading the Qur'an and crying. "I miss him," Khalil said of his son, who was a member of Hamas's military wing, the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades.
Khalil has visited the grave every day since burying his son on Saturday after he was killed as he was firing rockets at Israel's southern towns.
The grave, one of many mounds of earth strewn at random around the cemetery, has a concrete block at either end, marking it out. "It was very hard to bury his body. We tried twice before this place to dig a grave. Finally we found this place. We spent four hours searching and digging before we could bury the body," Khalil said.
"This is a war against Islam," he said. "They want us to leave our land but we are not, we are standing here. It's our right."
In the neighboring Al-Shejehah district, where 27 mourning tents were set up to receive visitors within the first two days of Israel's strike, the streets are empty and few are paying their respects, which is normally obligatory in this deeply traditional society.
Fadil Samara, 42, has attended just two of the eight mourning tents that were erected by close relatives and friends.
"It's not easy to move around, it's dangerous to go out. I'm embarrassed, but my friends and relatives understand," Samara said, ducking as another bomb exploded over the city.
A little while later a funeral procession of 50 proceeded up a street. Some of the mourners travelled in cars, but most walked, carrying the body foisted above their heads on a stretcher. They were just a few minutes from the cemetery when more bombs exploded over the city. The crowd dispersed, leaving just 15 to fulfil the family's duty.

GA-GU-05-JAN-08
The Guardian (London) - Final Edition
January 5, 2009 Monday
International: Gaza: Lebanon: Israel military keeps wary eye on northern border
BYLINE: Rory McCarthy, Jerusalem, Ian Black

SECTION: GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES; Pg. 6
LENGTH: 569 words
Some of the thousands of extra reservists called up by the Israeli military are to be held ready in case of conflict on Israel's northern border with Lebanon, the scene of a long and costly battle two years ago.
As Israeli troops invaded Gaza on Saturday night, the defence minister, Ehud Barak, warned that the military was monitoring the northern border.
"While we are fighting in Gaza, we keep an open eye on the sensitive situation in our northern border," he said. "We hope the situation there will remain calm; nevertheless we are ready and alert to face any unwarranted development in that area."
Last week, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, said he had put his forces on alert. Israel believes Hezbollah has rearmed itself, yet there has been no sign that the group is ready for another conflict. Since the summer of 2006, when Hezbollah and Israel fought a bloody conflict that claimed the lives of more than 1,000 Lebanese and more than 100 Israelis, the border has been quiet, with a UN monitoring force patrolling in southern Lebanon.
Hezbollah is not seen to be in a strong enough position within Lebanon to launch another major confrontation. Parliamentary elections are due in May and few believe the movement would risk upsetting its position ahead of the ballot.
Hamas's key backer in the region, Iran, has stepped up its rhetoric in response to the ground invasion and is coordinating with Syria to rally support for Palestinians. Ali Larijani, the speaker of Iran's parliament, said yesterday that Gaza would turn into a "graveyard" for Israelis.
Iran's national security chief, Saeed Jalili, held talks in Beirut with Nasrallah, and on Saturday was in Damascus, meeting Hamas's exiled leader, Khaled Meshal.
Iran supports Hamas's demand that the blockade of Gaza be lifted and border crossing points into Egypt be permanently opened. Diplomats say Tehran is encouraging Hamas to oppose the Egyptian idea that the borders can be opened only if there is a monitoring role for the Palestinian Authority (PA), which controls the West Bank and is recognised internationally as the legitimate Palestinian government.
Iran and Syria support Hamas while all other Arab countries formally back the PA. But Egypt and Jordan, which have peace treaties with Israel, condemned the Gaza incursion yesterday.
Since Israel's offensive began on 27 December, Iran has called for the wholesale support of the Muslim world and condemned the silence of western-backed Arab states. "The failure of some countries to move effectively regarding Israeli terrorism, as well as silence over this terrorism, will have negative effects on the status of these countries," Jalili warned, said the Syrian news agency Sana.
Jalili underlined Iran's strategic link with Hezbollah and Syria by visiting the tomb of its military leader, Imad Mughniyeh, assassinated in Damascus last February in a killing blamed on Israel.
Israeli officials claim Iran is the source of some of the longer-range rockets being fired from Gaza into Israel and smuggled across the Egyptian border during the six-month ceasefire that ended in mid-December. Iran routinely denies transferring weapons to Hamas. But the former president, Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, said during Friday prayers: "The oppressed Palestinian people can stand up to Israel if they get political, (and) financial support, as well as weapons."

GA-GU-06-JAN-03
The Guardian (London) - Final Edition
January 6, 2009 Tuesday
International: Gaza: Fighting: Civilian toll soars as troops and tanks press into Gaza
BYLINE: Rory McCarthy, Jerusalem
SECTION: GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES; Pg. 5
LENGTH: 590 words
Israeli forces were locked in heavy fighting in northern Gaza last night with intensive artillery strikes and jet bombing in the north and across Gaza City as the military pledged to press on with its attack.
On the 10th day of the conflict, Israel's defence minister, Ehud Barak, insisted his country's troops had not finished their operation despite mounting Palestinian casualties and growing international calls for a ceasefire.
"Hamas has so far sustained a very heavy blow from us, but we have yet to achieve our objective and therefore the operation continues," Barak said.
Israeli forces have already pushed deep into Gaza but last night appeared to be stepping up their fight, with witnesses reporting wave after wave of bombing strikes across the north of the territory accompanied by gunfire from helicopters and artillery from land and sea. The military said it had bombed more smuggling tunnels across the border with Egypt in the south and hit more than 40 other sites across Gaza including buildings storing weapons and rocket launching areas.
As Israeli troops and tanks pressed deeper into Gaza, the toll of civilian casualties rose rapidly. The UN said at least 94 Palestinians had been killed since the ground offensive began on Saturday night. In one incident yesterday

a house in Zeitoun, south-east of Gaza City, was hit by tank shells killing at least nine people, including at least four children. In the Shamali district, north of the city, an Israeli bomb destroyed a three-storey house killing a family of seven, including four children.
In total at least 541 Palestinians have died since Israel's operation began, with more than 2,400 injured. Hospitals have been overwhelmed: morgues were crowded with bodies and injured patients had to be treated in hallways. On the Israeli side eight people, including five soldiers, have died and about 60, mostly soldiers, have been hurt. Early today the Israeli military said that three soldiers were killed and four injured when a tank shell was fired in error.
In Gaza, Mahmoud Zahar, the most senior leader of Hamas in the strip and a hardliner in the movement, appeared on the party's al-Aqsa television station and gave a defiant speech threatening attacks not only in Gaza but elsewhere.
"The Zionists have legitimised the killing of their children by killing our children. They have legitimised the killing of their people all over the world by killing our people," Zahar said. He urged Hamas fighters to "crush your enemy".
Another Hamas figure, a recognised military spokesman called Abu Ubaida, said thousands of Hamas fighters were waiting in Gaza to take on the Israeli military and said rocket attacks would increase. More than 40 were fired into southern Israel yesterday, including one that landed in an empty kindergarten, which has been closed since the conflict began, like all schools near the Gaza border.
Israeli troops are now deployed in and around the major urban areas of Gaza, particularly in the north, including Beit Hanoun, Beit Lahiya and Jabaliya. They have ordered residents in many areas to leave their homes with leaflets, telephone calls and radio announcements forcing at least 15,000 Palestinians to flee to safety elsewhere. At least 5,000 are staying in 11 different UN schools and shelters.
The UN said more than a million Gazans were still without electricity or water and that it was increasingly difficult for staff to distribute aid or reach the injured. It said more diesel was needed to reopen the strip's
sole power plant, shut for a week.

GA-GU-12-JAN-03
The Guardian (London) - Final Edition
January 12, 2009 Monday
International: Gaza: Fighting intensifies as Olmert says Israel is nearing its goal: Civilians in suburbs try to find shelter in city centre: Mortar shell that killed 43 in UN school was off target
BYLINE: Rory McCarthy, Jerusalem and Ed Pilkington, New York
SECTION: GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES; Pg. 14
LENGTH: 705 words
Israeli troops were last night pushing towards Gaza's towns and cities amid heavy fighting as Israel's prime minister, Ehud Olmert, said Israel was nearing its goals in the conflict.
Many Gazans in the outlying suburbs of Gaza City were moving into the centre, desperately looking for apartments or shelter to escape the combat. Israel and Egypt have refused to open their borders to allow Gazans to flee the fighting.
About a dozen Palestinians, among them several gunmen, were killed early yesterday in Sheikh Ajleen, close to the north of Gaza City, and troops were reported to be less than a mile from the city's southern neighbourhoods last night. Tanks had moved towards the city, but then pulled back by the end of the day. At least 27 Palestinians were killed.
In a sign that a new phase of the offensive was near, Israel's military last night sent reserve units into the Strip. Brigadier General Avi Benayahu, the top military spokesman, said the units were already in Gaza, but he would not say if this meant the next stage was imminent - an invasion deep into the main towns and cities.
Olmert said the war in Gaza, now in its third week, would continue and he spoke out defiantly against the growing international criticism of Israel's killing of hundreds of Palestinians, many civilians. A UN security council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire late last week did nothing to halt the conflict and diplomacy has moved only haltingly since.
"No decision, present or future, will deny us our basic right to defend the residents of Israel," Olmert told a cabinet meeting in Jerusalem.
Defence officials said Hamas had been damaged but that it was unlikely ever to admit defeat. Some Israeli generals were eager to invade Gaza's urban areas.
Major General Yoav Galant, head of southern command, said an escalation was a "once in a generation" opportunity to strike at Hamas. "If we don't do that we'll be missing an historic opportunity," he was quoted as saying in the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper.
Khaled Meshal, the leader of Hamas who lives in exile in Damascus, said the offensive had ended any chance of a broader peace deal with the Palestinians.
Addressing Israel, Meshal said in a televised speech on Saturday: "You have destroyed the last chance for negotiations. No one will now believe you. What is needed is fierce resistance in Gaza and fierce support from the Arab, Islamic and international street until the aggression ends and the enemy withdraws."
Palestinian militants continued to fire rockets into southern Israel, several hitting the town of Be'er Sheva, though there were no serious casualties.
The Palestinian death toll rose to around 870 dead, of whom nearly half were women and children, with about 3,700 injured. On the Israeli side 13 people have been killed, three of them civilians.

The US president-elect, Barack Obama, described the death of civilians in the conflict as heartbreaking after being asked if his silence over the crisis could be interpreted as callousness.
"When you see civilians, whether Palestinian or Israeli, harmed, it's heartbreaking. Obviously what that does, it makes me much more determined to try and break a deadlock that has been going on for decades," he said on ABC television.
He vowed to act quickly after his inauguration to position the US as a trusted third party that could act as an interlocutor between the Israelis and Palestinians.
Israel's military admitted its bombing of a UN school last week, which killed 43 and injured 100 others, was the result of an Israeli mortar shell that missed its target by 30 metres. Previously the military had said militants inside the school compound were firing at their troops and that the troops simply returned fire.
Military sources were reported as saying that the UN school was clearly marked on the maps used by the troops.
Human Rights Watch said its researchers had seen Israeli forces using artillery-fired white phosphorus over densely populated residential areas of Gaza in violation of international humanitarian law. The weapon, used as a smokescreen, can cause serious burns. Israel has refused to detail which weapons are being used in the Gaza war, but says all its weapons are used within international rules.

GA-GU-16-JAN-02
The Guardian (London) - Final Edition
January 16, 2009 Friday
Gaza crisis: Airstrike kills senior Hamas minister as Cairo talks inch towards ceasefire: Said Siam dies as Israeli jets target Jabaliya camp: UN anger grows over bombing of compound
BYLINE: Toni O'Loughlin, Jerusalem
SECTION: GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES; Pg. 18
LENGTH: 733 words
Israel struck at the heart of Hamas yesterday, killing one of its most senior leaders and pushing deeper into Gaza City, as moves towards a temporary ceasefire inched forward.
Hamas reportedly told Egypt, which is brokering talks, that it would agree a year-long renewable ceasefire in Gaza if Israel pulled out its forces within seven days and reopened border crossings immediately.
Israel's envoy to Cairo returned to Jerusalem last night with details of Hamas's position. After a meeting between Israel's leaders, the Israeli foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, was due to fly to Washington to finalise an accord aimed at delivering Israel's key condition for a ceasefire: preventing Hamas from rearming.
"This is not open ended, this is permanent," the Israeli government spokesman, Mark Regev, said.
Ayman Taha, a Hamas spokesman, said it wanted Israel to leave Gaza within two weeks, to end the siege and to open the crossings with European and Turkish observers looking on. Hamas also wants the Palestinian Authority and international monitors posted at the crossing into Egypt, at Rafah in Gaza's south.
Taha said that if Israel fulfilled these conditions it would reconsider extending the truce beyond one year.
Khaled Meshal, the de facto Hamas leader, said: "We will not accept any political movement that doesn't satisfy these demands."
Israeli jets yesterday bombed a house in the Jabaliya refugee camp, killing the Hamas interior minister, Said Siam, the most senior Hamas leader to be killed since 2004, when Israel assassinated Dr Abdel Aziz Al Rantissi, a founding member of the militant Islamist group.
A Hamas official vowed vengeance for Siam's death. "The blood of Said Siam will be a curse on the Zionist entity," Muhammad Nazzal told al-Jazeera television.
Earlier Israel shelled the main UN compound housing the Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). The aid agency distributes food to 750,000 of the 1.5 million Palestinians in Gaza.
Israel struck the compound where up to 700 Palestinians were sheltering shortly after the UN secretary general, Ban Ki-moon had arrived in Israel.
Ban, who was in the region to press for an end to the violence, described the two hits on the compound as "intolerable". "I conveyed my strong protest and outrage to the defence minister and the foreign minister. The defence minister said it was a grave mistake. He assured me that extra attention will be paid to UN facilities and staff and this will not be repeated."
Israel's prime minister, Ehud Olmert, said that Israeli troops had retaliated against Hamas militants who were firing from within the compound. He later apologised, saying the response was "harsh".
Gordon Brown also condemned Israel for the attack. "When the UN is doing such vital work - humanitarian work among women and children in Gaza - no one can defend this attack by Israeli forces on the compound," he said.
It was the second time in this conflict that Israel has alleged that militants have used a UN compound to launch attacks. UNRWA's head in Gaza, John Ging, said the claim "was nonsense".
The UNRWA compound was one of several civilian institutions hit as troops moved into Gaza City, taking control of three neighbourhoods. Shells struck a hospital and a building housing international media, even though the military reportedly checked the co-ordinates of the structure just hours before it was hit.
In a terse statement the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies said the damage to the al-Quds hospital was "completely and utterly unacceptable based on every known standard of international humanitarian law".
The US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, rang Israel's defence minister, Ehud Barak and the foreign minister, Livni, to say she was "deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation in Gaza".

Israel's envoy to Cairo, Amos Gilad, was due to brief Olmert, Livni and Barak last night. The three have reportedly been in disagreement all week about ending the three-week assault.
Having refused to negotiate directly with Hamas since it was elected in 2006, Israel wants to ensure that an internationally brokered ceasefire does not deliver the militants the recognition they crave.
Ban said that he believed a truce could soon be reached. "There are certain elements in place that would enable a ceasefire, but it hinges on the political will of both sides," he told the media.

GA-GU-17-JAN-02
The Guardian (London) - Final Edition
January 17, 2009 Saturday
Gaza crisis: US steps up peace effort with pact to police Egyptian border: Washington talks address smuggling concerns Israel's security cabinet may discuss ceasefire
BYLINE: Chris McGreal, Jerusalem
SECTION: GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES; Pg. 20
LENGTH: 615 words
The US agreed to provide technical and intelligence assistance on Egypt's border with Gaza yesterday to prevent weapons smuggling by Hamas as part of diplomatic moves to secure a ceasefire in Israel's three-week assault on the Palestinian enclave.
Israel said it believed the conflict was in the "final act" as talks in Washington and Cairo edged closer to a truce. But important differences remained and it was not clear if an agreement would be finalised this weekend to halt fighting that has cost more than 1,100 lives and destroyed much of Gaza's public infrastructure.
Israel's security cabinet is expected to consider an Egyptian ceasefire proposal, this evening including whether Israel should unilaterally call a truce or consider withdrawing its troops.
Condoleezza Rice, the US secretary of state, and Tzipi Livni, Israel's foreign minister, signed the agreement for Washington to provide technical and intelligence co-operation, as well as logistical support, for monitors on the Egypt-Gaza border - a move designed to address one of the principal Israeli demands: that any truce with Hamas includes measures to stop it from rearming by smuggling weapons.
Israel said the agreement would commit the US and Nato to track and intercept weapons shipments to Gaza from Iran or anywhere else. Rice said it was designed to ensure Gaza would "never again be used as a launching pad against Israeli cities". The US was seeking "a sustainable end to hostilities, rather than one that collapses in a few days or weeks".
The deal could lead to the reopening of Gaza's border with Egypt, a key Hamas demand. The Islamist group also wants Gaza's crossings into Israel reopened after three years of economic blockade. This is crucial to reviving the territory's economy but Israel is reluctant to allow it.
Egyptian officials have held talks in Cairo separately with Hamas and Israeli negotiators in an effort to overcome the main sticking points, including how long a ceasefire would last. Hamas is prepared to commit to a year and then consider renewing it. Israel wants it to be indefinite.
Some senior Israeli officials were optimistic. "The conditions have not come to fruition yet," said a security cabinet member, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer. "But this could well happen late on Saturday and we can put this story behind us." There were conflicting messages from Hamas. Its exiled political leader, Khaled Meshal, told Arab leaders in Qatar that his organisation would not accept Israeli conditions and would continue to fight until Israel ended its attack.
Whatever the agreement, both sides will want to claim victory. Israel will say that an end to the rocket fire and a halt to weapons smuggling is what it set out to achieve with its attack.
Hamas will say it was fighting to lift the blockade and that any agreement to end the rocket attacks was voluntary because Israel failed to stop them. Hundreds were fired despite the Israel's reoccupation of swaths of the Gaza Strip and heavy bombardment. The group fired at least 13 rockets into Israel yesterday alone. Israel may have gone a long way towards achieving another objective: to damage Hamas's control in Gaza with the long-term goal of toppling it from power. The group has proven to be militarily weaker than it had threatened, inflicting relatively few casualties. When the fighting ends , many Gazans may wonder whether the price exacted by Israel was worth the confrontation. The physical damage to the Gaza Strip is estimated at $1.4bn (£954m). Western donors, not Israel, are likely to pick up the reconstruction bill. An Israeli tank shell killed two children in Beit Lahiya yesterday; and air strikes killed three other Palestinians.

The Times (London)

GA-TL-05-JAN-03
Brown breaks with -the US to call for an immediate ceasefire
number of words: 554

Allies split as America insists that Hamas stop lunching rockets, rockets report James Bone and Francis Elliott
Gordon Brown called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza yesterday after a rare split with America at the United Nations.
Hours after the United States blocked an attempt by Britain to make the UN Security Council issue a ceasefire call, Mr Brown told the BBC: “We need an immediate ceasefire. The blame game can continue afterwards, but this dangerous moment, I think, requires us to act.”
The US insists that a ceasefire must be accompanied by assurances that Hamas will stop rocket attacks on Israel. Vice-President Cheney said yesterday: “We think, if there’s to be a ceasefire, you can’t simply go back to the status quo ante, what it was a few weeks ago, where you had a ceasefire recognised by one side but not adhered to by the other.
“It has to be a sustainable, durable proposition. And Hamas has to stop rocketing Israel. I don’t think you’re going to have a viable ceasefire until they’re prepared to do that,” Mr Cheney told the CBS programme Face the Nation.
The diplomatic stand-off bought time for Israel, which is believed to be using controversial white phosphorus shells over civilian targets, to continue its operation in Gaza, with peace efforts making no progress. President Peres of Israel told ABC that his country intended “neither to occupy Gaza nor to crush Hamas, but to crush terror. And Hamas needs a real and serious lesson. They are now getting it.”
A delegation of Arab foreign ministers will hold talks today with members of the Security Council and the UN Secretary-General in New York. Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, is to address the Security Council tomorrow after meeting President Sarkozy of France today.
Libya has circulated a draft resolution that Arab nations want adopted at the Security Council. Negotiations are continuing and it faces resistance, from the US in particular. At a closed-door meeting on Saturday night Washington blocked any effort by the Security Council to call for an immediate ceasefire, saying that Israel’s right to self-defence was nonnegotiable. Libya, the only Arab member of the council, wanted a formal statement repeating an earlier press statement by the president of the Security Council calling for an “immediate halt to all violence” and “all military activities”. Britain proposed another press statement calling for an immediate and permanent ceasefire and setting out criteria for a durable truce.
But the US said it did not want any “product” at all from the Security Council.
The council’s inaction provoked an outburst from the Nicaraguan president of the UN General Assembly. “Once again, the world is watching in dismay the dysfunctionality of the Security Council,” Miguel d’Escoto Brockman, said. Alejandro Wolff, the US envoy, retorted: “I would urge him to focus on the dysfunctionality elsewhere in the organisation.”
Mr Brown, speaking on the Andrew Marr Show yesterday, outlined a strategy to end the war, saying that a ceasefire should be accompanied by action to stem arms smuggling through tunnels under the Egyptian border and to reopen the crossings between Gaza and Israel: “I think the key is that the international powers are able to give guarantees about ending the tunnels, and that will require Egyptian action; about stopping the supply of arms, and that will require the Arab League to be united on that; and, about international monitoring of the crossings.”

Doctors overwhelmed by procession of the dead and maimed
Azmi Kishawi

Nobody knows what kind of shell it was that hit Gaza City's main vegetable market yesterday morning: the explosives were falling so thick and fast that it could have come from an Israeli naval vessel, an F16 fighter-bomber, an Apache helicopter gunship, an unmanned drone, an artillery cannon or a tank.
The results, however, were unmistakable.
With Gaza's ambulance service stretched far beyond its normal capacity, the first mangled bodies arrived in private cars as locals scrambled to save the lives of the shoppers caught up in the carnage.
The first to be carried in was a boy, his face masked in blood from a head wound, as medics hurried him into the overcrowded emergency rooms.
The next car delivered a girl, perhaps 12 or 13 years old, her entrails blown out through a hole in her back by shrapnel.
Soon afterwards, an ambulance arrived ferrying a man whose legs had been cut to pieces by the blast.
The driver left his vehicle in the forecourt as he jumped out to help to carry the critically ill patient inside — but almost immediately more ambulances started streaming in, their paths blocked by the first.
Chaos erupted outside the hospital entrance as a traffic jam of desperate ambulance and car drivers log-jammed the already restricted space.
Unable to find the first ambulance driver or the keys to the vehicle, people were forced to simply push it out of the way before the macabre procession of the dead and the maimed could resume.
Medics said five people were killed in the market bombing and 40 wounded.
Israel said it had no knowledge of a market being hit.

At the same time, victims from other areas of the bombarded city were streaming in, including two elderly women in housecoats.
Doctors at the hospital were exhausted by the constant stream of casualties and the ever-present fear that they would run out of medical supplies or diesel fuel for their generators, which would result in life-support systems shutting down.
Yet each minute they had to make life-or-death triage judgments.
“We are so tired we are probably making poor decisions about who to save and who not to,” said one drawn-looking doctor.
“I think we are losing patients because of this.”
A Norwegian volunteer doctor, Eric Fosse, working at al-Shifa, the central hospital of Gaza City, said that almost 30 per cent of the casualties he had seen were children.
He said two young boys had been hit by shrapnel when they were playing on the roof of their house because their parents had forbidden them from going on to Gaza's deadly streets.
One was killed and the other critically wounded, with one leg amputated.
Palestinian medics said a tank shell killed five members of the same family as they were driving in their car near Gaza City, as desperate civilians fled areas of fighting.
Among the dead was a 14-year-old girl, they said.
Through it all, the onslaught continued, with explosions and the menacing thud of heavy machinegun fire echoing across the strip as the day turned into yet another terrifying, sleepless night.

GA-TL-08-JAN-02
Three-hour truce condemned as a tea break for the troops
Azmi Keshawi Gaza City
James Hider Jerusalem
It was the briefest of reprieves. Within minutes of the three-hour ceasefire between Israel and Hamas ending gunfire rang out around the edges of Gaza City. Less than half an hour later, an Israeli plane blew up a car, killing a Palestinian man and his three children.
For a few hours though, shell shocked and hungry Palestinians scrambled into the streets to buy whatever they could, as tentative hopes for a more, lasting grew.

Israel “welcomed" an Egyptian proposal for a truce with Hamas, the Islamists rulers of Gaza, yet its security Cabinet *voted* to push ahead with its ground offensive while it worked out the details with international envoys.
It gave the army permission to carry out a full scale invasion of Caza’s surrounded cities. Sources said, however, that urban combat was not necessarily imminent "They have to know this has been approved and it’s a threat hanging over their heads,” an Israeli official said.
Even during the truce, there was sporadic fighting in the northern Gaza Strip, where some of the deadliest battles and airstrikes have been.
Aid agencies said that the short pause, which will be repeated between 1pm and 4pm each day, was not nearly enough to feed hundreds of thousands of people dependent on subsidised rations in Gaza.
"A three-hour ceasefire to go and see whether your mum and dad are alive is not a humanitarian corridor,” one Western aid worker said".
John Ging, head or the UN refugee agency in Gaza, said:"if it can be three hours, then why not four or five? Who for a minute thinks we can take care of one and a half million people in three hours when before it was a fulltime job for 10.000 pople?”.
UN officials said that before the truce an Israeli tank had fired a she within 10 metres of an aid convoy, despite prior co-ordination with the military. Two World Food Programme drivers were killed before the day before.
Both Israel and Hamas said that would study the latest ceasefire proposal, worked out by President Mubarak of Egypt and Nicolas Sarkozy, his French counterpart. The initiative gained momentum after Israeli shells landed outside a UN-run school in JabaJiya, northern Gaza, a shelter for hundreds of people displaced by the fighting.. As people flocked into the streets yesterday to stock up on basic supplies, relatives and mourners lined up the 43 bodies from the strike outside the school, where the survivors still live. If Israel does opt for escalation, the number of dead in the conflict already more than 700 - is likely to soar, with Israel also expected to suffer serious losses. Ehud Barak. the is said to be reluctant to order his forces into Gaza's overcrowded cities, but the Cabinet's decision not to halt the offensive implies that Israel does not believe it has achieved its goal of severely depleting Hamas's ability to fire rockets, or prevent it from rearming through smuggling tunnels. The Bush Administration, which leaves office in less than two weeks after seeing its promises of a peace deal by the end of its terms shattered, joined calls for a ceasefire. “We are supportive of the Mubarak initiative.... we are saying [to the Israelis] that it is an effort worth working on,” an aide to Condolezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, said.

GA-TL-09-JAN-02

Children huddle by mothers' bodies days after bombing

number of words:

Martin Fletcher, Azmi Keshawi

For four days Red Cross officials pressed the Israeli military for access to bomb-shattered home in the Znytun neighborhood of Gaza City. Finally Israel premised safe passage with the help of a Red Cross rescue team and four ambulances from the Palestinian Red Crescent Society. What they found exceeded their worst fears.

In one house they discovered four small children - alive but terrified, emaciated and too weak to stand - lying on mattresses next to 12 corpses including those of their mothers. In a second house they found three dead bodies. In a third they found 15 survivors of the Israeli bombardment, several of them wounded.

"I never expected to see such a horrifying scene. I never saw anything like it in my life," Abed el-Aziz Abu Aisha, 22, told *The Times*. "It was like a very ugly scene from a horror movie."

They had to drag the injured to the ambulances in a cart because barriers erected by the Israeli army made it impossible to bring the vehicles close enough. The rescuers evacuated 18 of the wounded and 12 others who were suffering from exhaustion. They took away two corpses and planned to return later to fetch 13 others.

The International Committee of the Red Cross did not mince its words. In an unusually blunt public statement yesterday it accused the Israeli military of "unacceptable" conduct and of breaching international humanitarian law. It demanded immediate access to the area to search for more wounded survivors sheltering in ruined houses.

"This is a shocking incident," said Pierre Wettach, the ICRC's head of delegation. "The Israeli military must have been aware of the situation but did not assist the wounded. Neither did they make it possible for us or the Palestine Red Crescent to assist the wounded."

Mr Aisha, the Palestinian Red Crescent worker, said the area was so devastated by the Israeli bombardment that he did not recognise it. He said the eight-man rescue team was taunted and threatened by Israeli soldiers as it brought out the survivors.

The wounds of the injured - some of them children- were putrefying, and the survivors were starving, parched and hysterical. "The scenes will be imprinted on my memory forever," Mr Aisha said.

In response the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) claimed that it was combating a terrorist organisation – Hamas - that was using civilians as human shields, and insisted that it was working closely with international aid organisations. "Any serious allegations made against the IDF's conduct will need to be investigated properly, once such a complaint is received formally, within the constraints of the current military operation," it stated.

Hours after the ICRC's statement, Israel's international standing suffered a second blow when the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) suspended its operations in Gaza because of the dangers posed by the Israeli offensive. The announcement came after a Palestinian employee was killed and two others were injured when a UN- flagged convoy was hit by Israeli tank shells near the Erez crossing on Gaza's northern border. The UN insisted that the Israelis had been told of the convoy's movements. The IDF would not comment last night.

Earlier this week the Israeli military struck a UN-run school it claimed was used by Hamas fighters, killing more than 40 Palestinians. "Operations will remain suspended until Israeli authorities can guarantee the safety and security of our staff," Christopher Gunness, an UNRWA spokesman, said.

UNRWA delivers relief supplies to 750,000 Gazans, and the suspension will deepen what international aid organisations describe as a humanitarian catastrophe in the territory.

GA-TL-10-JAN-03

Envoys draw up plan to carve out foothold for peacekeepers

James Bone New YOrk

Martin Fletcher Sderot

A plan to create a new foothold in Gaza for the Palestinian Authority and to bring in international monitors was being drawn up by diplomats yesterday as a UN ceasefire call was dismissed by both sides.

The plan would allow a return of the authority, led by the secular Fatah faction, to the territory 18 months after it was expelled by the Islamist Hamas. Diplomats are considering taking a triangle at the southern end of Gaza, including the Rafah crossing to Egypt and the Kerem Shalom crossing to Israel, to be policed by Turkish and French military monitors to stop arms smuggling into Gaza.

The zone would nominally be controlled by the authority, the internationally recognised Government. Such a plan would allow the crossings to reopen for the first time since Hamas seized power in Gaza in June 2007.

The plan is being negotiated as part of the Egyptian peace initiative, announced by President Mubarak after talks with President Sarkozy of France, which calls for an immediate ceasefire to be followed by talks on securing the Gaza-Egypt border and reopening the crossings.

It faces formidable obstacles. Diplomats said yesterday that the Egyptian efforts were getting bogged down because of disagreements over how to secure the border. Hamas has said it would consider allowing observers at the border crossings with Egypt but opposes an international force. It also claimed yesterday that a delegation of three Hamas leaders had crossed the border into Egypt to join talks.

Israel, however, is insisting on a robust international force to destroy smuggling tunnels under the border.

Egypt, for its part, does not want international troops on its territory. Instead, Cairo wants to revive the 2005 agreement on movement and access, under which EU monitors oversaw the passage of people through the Rafah crossing and vehicles through Kerem Shalom, a deal that fell through when Hamas came to power. The new plan came as the UN ceasefire proposal was flatly rejected almost as soon as the Security Council backed it 14-0, with the US abstaining.
The US had been expected to back the UN resolution but abstained at the last minute. Diplomats said Condoleezza Rice, the Secretary of State, changed her position after a call from President Bush.
Yesterday F16s continued to fire missiles at houses and apartment blocks in Gaza City, and the air reverberated with artillery fire. The fire was not all one way, though. Rockets repeatedly streaked out of Gaza towards the settlements of Sderot, Beersheba and Ashkelon just across the border.
Ehud Olmert, the Israeli Prime Minister, said: "Israel has never agreed for any outside influence to decide on its right to defend its citizens. The firing of rockets this morning only goes to show that the UN decision is unworkable and will not be adhered to by the murderous Palestinian organisations."
Israel's rejection of the resolution was no surprise. The offensive against Hamas is hugely popular: a poll in the Maariv newspaper showed 91 per cent of Israelis supporting it. "This is the time to back the commanders, soldiers and pilots working day and night to conduct a difficult, complex and entirely just war," Ari Shavit, of the left-of-centre Haaretz newspaper, said.

The 'Hill of Shame' where destruction is a spectator sport
GA-TL-13-JAN-03

Martin Fletcher, Yontt Farago Sderot
In times of peace Parash Hill is a beauty spot where Israelis from the nearby town of Sderot come to picnic and enjoy the magnificent view across a nature reserve and bright green fields to distant Gaza City and, beyond, the deep blue Mediterranean.
There are benches for sightseers, a swing, a sculpture of a man on horseback and fences to stop children tumbling down the steep northern slope.
Today the hill attracts a very different sort of visitor — the ghoulish and vengeful, the curious and anguished, not to mention television crews. They come not to enjoy the flowers or birdsong, but for a spectacular panoramic view of Israel's relentless bombardment of the Gaza Strip. It is, for those that like that sort of thing, the ultimate spectator sport.
Armed with binoculars and zoom lenses, they watch F16 aircraft streak across the sky, trailing flares, before unleashing their missiles on one of the distant white buildings.
Periodically the air reverberates with the boom of artillery fire and a few seconds later another plume of smoke rises amid the densely packed apartment blocks on the skyline. Apache helicopter gunships attack unseen targets. A whine betrays an unmanned drone circling overhead.
Now and again the fire comes the other way. There is a flash, and a Qassam rocket trailing smoke arcs up towards Sderot, Ashkelon or one of the other settlements of southern Israel. In no time Israeli shells rain down.
The disapproving have renamed Parash Hill the "Hill of Shame", and some visitors undoubtedly come for the thrill. "People in Israel are addicted to violence," Eran Shalev, 27, a student, said as he surveyed the crowd on the hilltop. "The way we try to resolve everything with force is not the right way to do it."
But most have been on the receiving end of the Hamas rockets. Most know people who have been killed, injured or had their homes destroyed by rockets over the past eight years. Most are worn out by the 15-second warnings that send them rushing to shelters several times each day.
Rafi Twitto was watching the offensive yesterday with his wife, Iris. From his belt hung a photograph of his son, Osher, nine, who had a leg blown off by a Qassam rocket 11 months ago. "I'm glad Hamas is being destroyed but sad that women and children are suffering," he said. "But when they grow up they'll also probably be terrorists. They are taught very early to hate Israelis and how to hold weapons." Iris agreed. "If I could have, I'd have gone in with our soldiers."
David Kunin, 26, an ultra-Orthodox Jew with long black beard and coat, had come to the hill to take pictures. He said that a rocket shattered the windows of his home in Ashdod last week. "Of course I'm happy," he replied when asked how he felt as he watched the bombardment.
"It would be better if innocent civilians weren't hurt, but the ones who co-operate with Hamas - that's their problem."
Others were clearly distressed. Tanya Zaltzman, 44, a teacher who emigrated from Russia 20 years ago, was there with her boyfriend. One of her students was killed by a rocket last March. Her soldier son had just left Gaza and several of his comrades had been injured. "I think Hamas is a terrorist organisation and there's no other way to treat it," she said, but continued: "When I see how many people and children are being killed in Gaza I feel very unhappy."

GA-TL-14-JAN-02

'Shocked' Hamas leaders ready to accept a ceasefire to avoid all-out assault on heart of Gaza, say Israelis

Israel

Martin Fletcher

Jerusalem

Israel has briefly delayed its all-out assault on-the heart of Gaza's population centers because it believes that local leaders of Hamas have been shocked by the ferocity of Operation Cast Lead and want to end the fighting

Ehud Olmert, the Israeli Prime Minister, remains determined to launch "phase three" of the operation if necessary but hopes that the prospect of an all-out assault will deepen the tensions emerging within Hamas and force it to accept Egypt's ceasefire plan.

Israeli officials and commentators have seized on a speech that the Hamas political leader in Gaza, Ismail Haniya, broadcast from an unknown location on Monday. Although his rhetoric was defiant, newspapers said he looked frightened and despairing.

He stated: "We aren't closing the door to dialogue... Hamas will co-operate with any initiative that will bring about an end to the aggression, will bring about an [Israeli] withdrawal and will pave the way to opening the border crossings and removing the siege. We will relate to any such initiative positively, openly and responsibly."

Amos Gilad, Israel's chief negotiator, has stayed away from talks in Egypt until the Hamas position becomes clearer but the Defence Ministry announced last night that he would go tomorrow for "decisive" talks on a ceasefire.

A senior Israeli military intelligence official said that Khaled Mashal, the exiled Hamas chief in Damascus, and the group's Iranian and Syrian backers wanted Hamas to keep fighting.

He claimed, however, that the movement's leaders in Gaza had been so shaken by the offensive that they wanted it to end swiftly.

Hamas fighters were dispirited, the official added, and hundreds had been killed. They were launching fewer than 30 rockets a day, compared with 70 or 80 when the war started.

Increasingly, they were having to fire them from built-up areas, and Palestinian civilians were turning on the rocket-launching teams because they knew that retaliation would follow.

"The leadership in Gaza is feeling the pressure. They feel they have to do something
to stop the fighting," he said.

The Israeli claims are impossible to verify because Israel has banned foreign journalists from entering Gaza but Palestinians inside the territory called them propaganda.

Hamas fighters say they are waiting for Israeli troops to venture deep into built-up areas, and last night Gazan television broadcast morale-boosting footage of their resistance.

Five Hamas negotiators from Gaza and Damascus have spent the past few days in Cairo discussing the ceasefire plan

They want an immediate Israeli withdrawal, the end of Israel's blockade of Gaza and the opening of all crossings but Israel opposes any measure that would confer legitimacy on Hamas. Israel is demanding an end to the rocket attacks, and to weapons smuggling - mainly in the tunnels that burrow beneath Gaza's border with Egypt. Hamas opposes the deployment of an international force on that border and particularly abhors an Egyptian proposal that the Palestinian Authority, which it expelled from Gaza in 2007, assumes that role.

Israeli troops continued to engage in fierce battles with Hamas fighters on the perimeter of Gaza City yesterday, and sources said they were seizing high-rise buildings in preparation for an assault on the centre.

For Israeli troops to fight their way into the heart of that Hamas stronghold would be a different proposition, however, and would probably lead to heavy casualties shortly before Israel's general election next month

The Israeli media says that Ehud Barak, the Defence Secretary and Tzipi Livni, the Foreign Minister, both privately want to end the offensive and declare victory. Mr Olmert is standing down, however, and an aide, asked if he was really prepared to launch phase three replied: "He is threatening with a loaded gun."

GA-TL-17-JAN-01

Israel pulls back as war enters 'final act'

Martin Fletcher Jerusalem

Israel is expected to announce a unilateral ceasefire tonight that will end its three-week war in Gaza.

Officials said that tile Israeli Security Cabinet will be asked to approve the surprise move after Israel secured commitments from Egypt and the US to stop Hamas re-arming by smuggling weapons into Gaza.

If the Cabinet agrees, Israeli troops will halt Operation Cast Lead - but if Hamas continues to fire rockets into southern Israel they will resume the action. The plan would allow Israel to stop fighting before Barack Obama's inauguration on Tuesday and avoid direct dealings with Hamas, which it regards as a terrorist group.

Khaled Meshal, the exiled Hamas leader in Damascus, rejected the ceasefire demands yesterday, insisting that Israel should withdraw its troops immediately. open Gaza's borders and lift the blockade it imposed after Hamas seized power there in 2007. Under the ceasefire plan, those issues would be discussed at a later date.

There was speculation last night that Ehud OImert, Israel's Prime Minister, would attend a ceasefire summit in Cairo tomorrow with Egyptian leaders, Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, and Ban Ki Moon, tile UN Secretary-General.

"Hopefully we're in the final act," said Mark Regev, the Israeli government's spokesman. "We want this to be over as soon as possible." In Washington yesterday Tzipi Livni, Israel's Foreign Secretary, signed an agreement with

Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, that focused on preventing arms meant for Hamas from Iran and elsewhere reaching Egypt.
"I have said that the end doesn't have to be in agreement with Hamas, but rather in arrangements against Hamas," Ms Livni said afterwards.
Two top Israeli negotiators spent a day in Cairo discussing how Egypt could stop weapons being smuggled through hundreds of tunnels beneath its nine-mile border with Gaza.
Egypt has little sympathy for Hamas and is seeking to restore the influence of Fatah in Gaza, which was ousted by Hamas. It wants the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority to help stop the smuggling and supervise Gaza's other border crossings jointly with Israel.
Israel's offensive has killed 1,100 Palestinians including, on Thursday, Saeed Seyyam, Hamas interior minister. It has wounded more than 5,000 and forced tens of thousands from their homes. It has prompted international condemnation but most Israelis believe the action has been justified.
The Israeli leadership argues that it has now established the principle of deterrence, restored the prestige of its military after its failure to crush Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006, and served a strong warning to Arab neighborus that they attack Israel at their peril.
Hamas will claim that it has resisted Israel for three weeks and continued to fire its rockets. But for all its boasting, it has killed only six Israeli soldiers, brought terrible destruction on its own people and secured little support from the rest of the Arab world. The agony of the war burst into Israeli homes last night as Izz el-Deen Aboul Aish, a Palestinian doctor popular on Israeli television, delivered his regular report through tears, telling Channel 10 that three of his daughters and a niece had been killed after an Israeli shell hit his home in Gaza.
"My girls were sitting at home planning their futures, talking, then suddenly they are being shelled," he said. "All that was ever fired out of our house was love and acts of peace, nothing else, ever."

GA-TL-29-DEC-05
It's time for a third intifada, say West Bank youths
Number of words: 647
James Hider Ramallah and Azmi Keshawl Gaza City
Israeli snipers in ski crouched behind concrete blocks at the checkpoint between Jerusalem and the Shuafat refugee camp in the West Bank yesterday as young boys, faces masked by scarves; used slingshots to hurl chunks of stone at soldiers hunkered down on rooftops. Every so often Israeli border police fired teargas or charged their teenage assailants among burning tyres and the cars smashed by a night's rioting. It may not be the start of the third intifada invoked by Khaled Meshaal, Hamas's leader in exile, but the simmering hatred was unmistakable.
Inside the West Bank, angry demonstrations flared in support of Gaza. In the flashpoint village of Naalin, a 22-year-old protester was killed and another man was wounded seriously when Israeli troops opened fire. The village, near Ramallah, is the site of frequent clashes between Israeli forces and protesters against the huge Israeli security fence being built there. In the rundown slum of Shuafat, about 100 masked youths lobbed rocks at Israeli troops, their little brothers smashing paving stones into projectiles for their slingshots.
“Yes, we want a third intifada,” one scrawny 13-year-old enthused. “We’ll fill their bodies with our bullets.” Asked whether they preferred the Islamist movement Hamas, with its doctrine of endless resistance and little offer of hope, or Fatah, which has been conducting fruitless peace talks with Israel for almost two decades, most of the group of would-be fighters squealed: “Hamas, Hamas.”
“Hamas is the only one attacking Israel. They are the only ones who will put bombs in buses,” one said.
At a small demonstration in down-town Ramallah, the capital of the Fatah-led administration in the West Bank, which called on Hamas yesterday to renew its ceasefire with Israel, there was a deep anger born of despondency.
“Israel has open war again,” one young man on al-Manara Square said as about 1,000 people rallied to denounce Israel’s deadly raids. “They talk about peace. We don’t want peace now. We want justice.”
He shrugs at the mention of a third intifada, which followed the uprising of 1987 that led to the 1993 Oslo Accords and the far bloodier 2000 campaign of suicide bombings and riots. This in turn led to Israel storming the West Bank and building a vast barrier inside the Palestinian territory to prevent further attacks.
“It is all the same intifada going on since 1932, when Britain allowed the first [Jewish] immigrants in. It’s all one struggle,” said a 30-year-old man, a documentary film editor who declined to give his name.
There was little sense yesterday of what another bout of widescale violence might achieve, just a gloomy fatalism that peace talks with Israel have led only to an increase in Jewish settlements on the West Bank.
“Palestinian blood is cheap. Nobody thinks we deserve to live, that we are human beings and not animals,” an older man, who identified himself only as al-Massoud, said.
In Gaza there was defiance as a spokesman for the military wing of Hamas dared Israeli forces to enter his domain and engage in street fights with his men on their home turf. “Then we’ll see who the real heroes are,” Abu Ubeida declared. The Israeli offensive has also sent shock waves through the Jewish state’s own million-strong Arab community, made up of Palestinians who stayed in their homes after Israel was created in 1948. Demonstrations were held in Nazareth, which is normally quiet, and a policeman was injured when rallies turned into riots in the more militant town of Umm El Fahm. More worrying for Israel, a group calling itself the “Imad Mughniyeh Squads of the Brigades of the Liberators of Galilee”, allegedly made up of Israeli Arabs, threatened to carry out attacks inside Israel.
“The crimes Israel carries out will not be ignored, and the Brigades will answer these crimes [with operations] inside Israel,” it said in a statement to a Palestinian news agency.

GA-TL-01-JAN-01

Israel rejects truce as rockets rain deeper

James Hider ...Jerusalem

Israel rejected mounting international pressure for a pause in its barrage of Gaza and stepped up preparations yesterday for a ground offensive.

Hamas said that its fighters had had their first skirmish with Israeli ground troops in the southern Gaza Strip. The claims of a clash with a unit of special forces were denied by the Israeli army.

Israeli bombers and artillery pounded buildings for a fifth straight day, as Palestinian militants continued to fire rockets ever deeper into the Jewish state. Almost 400 Palestinians have been killed, a quarter of them civilians, according to the United Nations.

Israel has authorised the call-up of 2,000 more reservists in preparation for a large-scale incursion.

France called for a "humanitarian ceasefire" to allow aid into Gaza, where food stocks are dwindling and medical necessities have all but run out. Gordon Brown added to the international calls for a truce. "It is vital that moderation must now prevail – there's a humanitarian crisis," he said.

A Palestinian aid worker said some families were foraging for wild plants to cook after the bombing led to the suspension of UN supplies. Israel has allowed some aid in, but Palestinian officials said it was not enough.

Mark Regev, a spokesman for Ehud Olmert, Israel's Prime Minister, said: "Giving Hamas a respite just to regroup, rearm, is a mistake. The pressure on the Hamas military machine must continue."

A Hamas spokesman in Gaza said that his movement had received no truce overtures. "If such a proposition is made to us, we will examine it as we are favourable to any initiative that will put an end to the aggression and totally lift the blockade," he said.

Senior Israeli officials have said that the aim of Operation Cast Lead is to obliterate the leadership of Hamas and have warned that the campaign could take weeks. So far, the operation has failed to achieve even its basic goal of halting Hamas rocket fire, with Chinese-made Grad missiles and a new type of Iranian-supplied Fajr-3 rocket penetrating ever farther into Israel. The town of Beersheba, 25 miles from the Gaza border, has been struck for the first time by at least five new rockets.

But Yuval Diskin, the head of Israel's internal security forces, said that Hamas's ability to rule the territory had been "badly impaired" and rocket factories had been wiped out. Bombardments along the southern border with Egypt had also hampered the Islamists' ability to smuggle in fresh munitions through their extensive tunnel network, he said.

Military sources said that Israel was still broadening its range of targets, hitting a money-changer responsible for transferring funds to Hamas.

There were signs of disagreement at the top levels of the Israeli command, with Ehud Barak, the Defence Minister, reportedly favouring a lull and Mr Olmert and the army's top brass wanting to press ahead. Preparations for an invasion have been completed, Israeli media reported, though poor weather could delay any military advance.

Many commentators worry that a ground invasion will be costly both to Israel and the Palestinians, with determined Hamas fighters well dug in among the civilian population and ready to fight to the death. Israeli officials said that they were not entirely closed to a truce but it had to be a lasting one to which Hamas was properly committed.

Such a truce will be difficult for mediators, led by Egypt, to arrange as both sides attach peripheral conditions. Hamas wants the border crossings to be opened, which Israel will only agree to if they are manned on the Palestinian side by Fatah, Hamas's bitter rival, with whom Israel is in slow-moving peace talks. Israel, on the other hand, considers Hamas's weapons smuggling a breach of any truce.

An emergency meeting of the Arab League in Cairo called on Hamas and Fatah to overcome their rift and form a unity government.

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Late Edition - Final
Amid a Buildup of Its Forces, Israel Ponders a Cease-Fire
BYLINE: By ETHAN BRONNER and TAGHREED EL-KHODARY; Ethan Bronner reported from Jerusalem, and Taghreed El-Khodary from Gaza. Mark Landler contributed reporting from Washington..
Ethan Bronner reported from Jerusalem, and Taghreed El-Khodary from Gaza. Mark Landler contributed reporting from Washington.
SECTION: Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1
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DATELINE: JERUSALEM

With its punishing air attacks on Gaza about to enter a fifth day, its gunboats gathering near the Gaza port and its ground forces poised for imminent action, Israel said Tuesday that it was considering a 48-hour cease-fire that would also require Hamas to stop its rocket fire. The idea was in an early stage, a result of a conversation between Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner of France and Defense Minister Ehud Barak of Israel seeking at least a temporary pause in the fighting that would allow humanitarian relief to be delivered to the besieged coastal strip. Aides to Mr. Barak said he was interested in exploring it and would do so with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and the rest of the cabinet on Wednesday. "The leading option right now is still a ground invasion, but the target of this operation is an improved cease-fire, and if that can come without the invasion, fine," said a close aide to Mr. Barak, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he is not Mr. Barak's authorized spokesman. "But, of course, Hamas has to agree, and there has to be a mechanism to make it work."

In Paris, where Mr. Kouchner was meeting with his European Union colleagues over the Gaza crisis, he called publicly for a permanent cease-fire. A similar call came from the so-called quartet of powers focused on the region -- the United Nations, the European Union, the United States and Russia.President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made phone calls to Israeli and Arab leaders to explore prospects for halting the fighting. They emphasized that any cease-fire should be "durable and sustainable," compelling Hamas to end its rocket attacks, a State Department spokesman said."That is different from the cease-fire that existed in the last six months," said the spokesman, Gordon Duguid, noting that Hamas had routinely violated the previous agreement by firing rockets into southern Israel.

The flurry of diplomacy appeared to be mostly byplay in Jerusalem and Gaza, as Israeli officials spoke of a continuing and expanding military operation, and Hamas vowed to step up its resistance. Israeli warplanes attacked tunnels used to smuggle supplies in southern Gaza and destroyed the home of a top militant leader. Mr. Olmert told the Israeli president, Shimon Peres, that the airstrikes were the first of several planned phases, according to spokesmen for the officials. It was also clear that the number of targets available from the air was declining, making the likelihood of a ground offensive greater.

In Gaza, Hamas militants issued a taped statement vowing revenge for those killed in the Israeli air raids since Saturday and warning that a ground invasion would prove painful for Israel. Palestinian officials say that more than 370 people have been killed, among them, the United Nations says, at least 62 women and children and an unknown number of civilian men. Two sisters, ages 4 and 11, were killed in a strike in the north as concern was growing around the world that the assault was taking a terrible toll on civilians. "It would be easier to dry the sea of Gaza than to defeat the resistance and uproot Hamas, which is in every house of Gaza," said the statement from the military wing of Hamas. It was played on Hamas's television station, which had been shut down by an Israeli missile but went back on the air by broadcasting from a mobile van. The statement added that if there was a ground invasion, "the children of Gaza will be collecting the body parts of your soldiers and the ruins of tanks."

Hamas continued to fire longer-range rockets at Israel, shooting deep into the city of Ashdod for a second day as well as into Beersheba, a major city in Israel's south, where one landed in an empty kindergarten classroom. There was a report of light injuries as well as a number of people in shock. Israeli warplanes, returning repeatedly to the same section of Gaza City overnight, pummeled the main government complex with about 20 missiles, residents said Tuesday. The building had been evacuated since the start of the operation on Saturday, which also hit nearly all of Hamas's security complexes, its university and other symbols of its sovereignty and power. The Nakhala family, which lives next to the compound, was inspecting the damage on Tuesday morning and recounting the utter fear and panic they all felt as the missiles hit. "We have no shelters in Gaza," said the father, Osama Nakhala. "Where shall we go? I also have to worry about my mother, who is 80 years old and paralyzed." His 13-year-old son, Yousef, was with him. When asked his view of the situation, Yousef took an unusual stand for someone in Gaza, where Israel is being cursed by most everyone. "I blame Hamas. It doesn't want to recognize Israel. If they did so there could be peace," he said. "Egypt made a peace treaty with Israel, and nothing is happening to them." His brother Amjad, 16, disagreed and blamed the Palestinian president in the West Bank, Mahmoud Abbas, saying that he had sided with Israel.

Gaza City was entirely without electricity for the first time, the result of an air attack that hit the system's infrastructure. Repair workers said they were afraid to work because of the possibility of more raids. The few open bakeries and grocery stores had lines stretching outside as people tried to stock up. But essentials, like diapers, baby food, bread, potatoes and fresh vegetables, were in short supply and costlier than normal. Israel sent in about 100 trucks with emergency supplies of food and medicine, the military reported. At the Hassouna Bakery near Shifa Hospital, about 100 men and 50 women waited in separate lines to buy bread. Amal Altayan was telling others in the line that she kept her cellphone in her pocket so that if an Israeli missile destroyed her house she

would be able to phone for help. The other women mocked her, saying that if a missile hit her house, she would be gone. Showing familiarity with the kind of knowledge circulating in Gaza these days, Ms. Altayan replied, "It depends. If it is an F-16 I will turn into biscuits, but if it is an Apache I may have a chance."

Osama Alaf, 41, said he spent four hours waiting in line to buy bread. "I bought flour until now," he said. "I don't have cooking gas, but I make a fire out of cartons and paper and make bread that way." Asked whom he blamed, he said, "Israel, which is slaughtering us, and whoever is cooperating with Israel, like Egypt." Anger at Egypt has grown across the Arab and Muslim worlds because it has declined to open its border with Gaza and is seen as cooperating with Israel.

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Israel Lets Reporters See Devastated Gaza Site and Image of a Confident Military
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DATELINE: GAZA

To the west, the Mediterranean sparkled and winked. To the east, columns of black smoke rose and gunfire pounded. In between, Israeli Merkava tanks plowed through potato and strawberry fields on Thursday as paratroopers guarded their ground, a mix of ruins that once were handsome two-story houses and farm fields that had been turned into rocket-launching pads against Israel by Hamas. On a day of unusually harsh Israeli attacks inside the center of Gaza City to the south, this neighborhood of Atatra, in northwest Gaza, was a scene of devastation on Thursday, filled with impromptu tank-track roads, rusting greenhouses and blown-up houses that had been booby-trapped with mannequins, explosive devices and tunnels. The area was a major site for Hamas launchers over the past eight years. But for the past 10 days, it has been a ghost town inhabited only by Israeli soldiers, many of them from a paratroopers' unit, the 101, founded in 1953 by Ariel Sharon, the former prime minister, as the first elite Israeli unit aimed at striking Palestinian guerrillas infiltrating from Gaza.

The fact that more than half a century later Israel remains at war with the children and grandchildren of those guerrillas has served as a kind of overpowering historical backdrop to the 20-day-old military confrontation that Israel says is aimed at ending Hamas rocket fire onto Israeli towns. No one believes this will be the last war.Israelis face harsh censure abroad for their tactics, but a visit by 10 foreign reporters to this position arranged by the Israeli military showed an army that feels serenely confident that it is doing the right thing. The army, which has banned foreign journalists from entering Gaza on their own, has begun taking small groups to outer positions for briefings with commanders in the field. "It is a very righteous war and has the full support of public opinion," said Brig. Gen. Avi Ronzki, the military's chief rabbi, a West Bank settler who spends most of his time these days on the battlefield encouraging the troops and who happened to be at a military campground in Israel earlier on Thursday. "Our army is showing the way to stop terrorists. And in order to win against terror we need to use a lot of force like the Americans are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan." Across the border region, Israel has lowered a kind of electronic curtain to prevent remote-control bombs, disabling even remote car locks well into Israel.

The paratroop brigade commander, Colonel Herzi (military rules forbid his giving a family name), was the chief briefer for the visit. He arrived late in a massive Merkava, popped out of a hatch and, M-16 and binoculars hanging from his neck and shoulders, expressed his regrets. "What you see here is not a pleasant scene," he said, looking down at a military-issued briefing book with talking points. "War is not pleasant. I don't like this environment. I don't like war." His soldiers took this area on the first night of the ground invasion a week into the war. The rocket launchers, which sent deadly projectiles into Ashdod and Ashkelon, Israeli cities due north, were placed among the potatoes and peppers, explosive devices around them to prevent their dismantling.

Colonel Herzi said the soldiers found improvised explosive devices in the houses and, on Wednesday, in a mosque. The typical ruse for the houses was a mannequin with an explosive nearby and a hole or tunnel covered by a rug. "I can say that one-third of the houses are booby-trapped," he said. "You get into the houses and you see many I.E.D.'s. We had one officer who got married one day before this operation started, and then five days into it he was badly wounded and is now between life and death after an I.E.D. exploded in a booby-trapped house."

Colonel Herzi showed large glossy pictures of what had been seen and captured, including mannequins and tunnels with ladders, I.E.D.'s and rocket launchers. The idea behind the setups in some of the houses, he and other officers said, was that Israeli soldiers would shoot the mannequin, mistaking it for a man; an explosion would occur; and the soldiers would be driven or pulled into the hole, where they could be taken prisoner. None have yet suffered that fate. That may be partly because shortly after taking this neighborhood, the soldiers found a hand-drawn map with the booby traps laid out. The elaborate nature of the snares impressed Colonel Herzi, but he and his men said they had grown increasingly less impressed with the Hamas fighters themselves. "They are villagers with guns," said Sergeant Almog, a gunner on an armored personnel carrier. "They don't even aim when they shoot." Seven members of his unit were wounded by a rocket-propelled-grenade attack on Wednesday, he said. But he added, "We kept saying Hamas was a strong terror organization, but it was more easy than we thought it would be." The war has been successful, but not necessarily decisive, from Israel's perspective, Colonel Herzi said, especially as talk of a cease-fire has grown. "I know that in the end Hamas will say they won," he said. "It doesn't

matter what will be the end of this war. We know they know today that they have a problem. Will they put down their weapons forever? For sure, no, but I think they have learned a lesson from this war."

GA-NYT-14-JAN-02
The New York Times
January 14, 2009 Wednesday
Late Edition - Final
Israeli Officials Say Main Goals in Gaza Are Still Unfulfilled
BYLINE: By STEVEN ERLANGER and MICHAEL SLACKMAN; Steven Erlanger reported from Tel Aviv, and Michael Slackman from Cairo. Reporting was contributed by Taghreed El-Khodary from Gaza City, Ethan Bronner and Sabrina Tavernise from Jerusalem, and Neil MacFarquhar from the United Nations.
SECTION: Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 6
LENGTH: 1114 words
TEL AVIV -- Despite heavy air and ground assaults, Israel has yet to cripple the military wing of Hamas or destroy the group's ability to launch rockets, Israeli intelligence officials said on Tuesday, suggesting that Israel's main goals in the conflict remain unfulfilled even after 18 days of war. The comments reflected a view among some Israeli officials that any lasting solution to the conflict would require either a breakthrough diplomatic accord that heavily restricts Hamas's military abilities or a deeper ground assault into urban areas of Gaza, known here as a possible "Phase Three" of the war. The intelligence officials said there were some signs that the military assault had undermined Hamas's political cohesion, and that Hamas's leaders in hiding inside Gaza were more eager for a cease-fire than group leaders in exile. They described this assessment as based on hard intelligence, presumably telephone intercepts.

A senior Egyptian official in Cairo said separately on Tuesday that representatives of Hamas had disagreed openly when participating in continuing Egyptian efforts to broker a cease-fire. Inside Gaza, the military wing of Hamas has been hit "to a certain extent" with "a few hundred" Hamas fighters killed during the ground offensive that began midway through the war, the intelligence officials said. They spoke on condition of anonymity in return for discussing internal assessments of the conflict. Hamas is still able to launch 20 to 30 rockets a day, including 5 to 10 missiles of ranges longer than 20 kilometers, or about 12 miles, down by a third from the start of the war, the officials said. Greater damage has been done to Hamas's capacity to run Gaza, with a large number of government buildings destroyed over the course of the operation, they said.

The Israeli Army's chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, speaking to Parliament on Tuesday, said that "we have achieved a lot in hitting Hamas and its infrastructure, its rule and its armed wing, but there is still work ahead." In Egypt, efforts to broker a cease-fire were complicated by bickering inside Hamas, the Egyptian official said. The official said that Hamas representatives in Gaza were eager for a cease-fire, but were being blocked because political decisions were being made by the group's leadership in Damascus, Syria. "Hamas is in a very difficult position," the Egyptian official said. "On the ground, their militants are not doing as good a job, not matching their rhetoric. But politically, they have been totally taken over by their sponsors. "The guys inside are holding their ground, but they don't want to continue the confrontation," the official said. Egypt talks to Hamas but is not eager to see the radical Islamic group succeed in running a small statelet next door.

Israeli officials said they were delaying any expansion of the war until the negotiations succeeded or failed. But journalists and photographers along the Israeli border with Gaza said they saw large numbers of Israeli reservists moving into the territory, suggesting preparation for an intensified phase of the conflict. On the eve of a visit to the region, the United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, demanded an immediate halt to the fighting in accordance with a Security Council resolution. "Too many people have died," Mr. Ban said, while Gazans are facing a humanitarian disaster. United Nations officials have said that three-hour daily humanitarian lulls are insufficient to provide enough food, medicine and other essentials to civilians. Israel said that 102 trucks carrying aid entered Gaza on Tuesday, with a total of 1,028 since the war began.

John Ging, director of operations in Gaza for the United Nations Refugee and Works Agency, who has been highly critical of the Israeli military action, said by video link that the fighting was extracting an unacceptably high toll on civilians. "Tragically, the horror continues overnight," he said. "Nineteen children killed and 52 injured last night. I would hope that would motivate those who can help." Israeli officials say their primary aim in the operation is to stop Hamas from firing rockets from Gaza into Israeli cities. Hamas is capable of building rockets with an advanced propellant that can go up to 18 miles, the intelligence officials said, using chemicals and parts smuggled in from Egypt. Hamas also is using 122-millimeter rockets that are Chinese-made and supplied by Iran that can go almost 25 miles, they said. But they assessed the probability that Hamas now has rockets capable of going farther than 25 miles as "very low."

On Tuesday, Hamas fired 11 rockets and six mortar shells into Israel, the Israeli Army said.
General Ashkenazi said that Israeli aircraft had carried out more than 2,300 strikes since the offensive began on Dec. 27. In Tuesday's fighting, 18 Palestinian fighters and seven civilians were killed, part of the 971 Palestinians who have died, according to Gaza's Hamas-run Health Ministry. Those figures are not thought to include many of the fighters killed since the ground war began. Thirteen Israelis have died, including 10 soldiers. The Israeli military said one Israeli officer was critically wounded and two Israeli soldiers suffered light wounds in fighting overnight. They were hurt, the military said, after a bomb exploded in a booby-trapped house that they were searching.General Ashkenazi said that Hamas fighters were using suicide bombers, sometimes women and sometimes dressed as Israeli soldiers, to try to get close to Israeli troops and kill them. One Israeli soldier was

killed last week by a Hamas suicide bomber, the Israeli intelligence officials said. The method of the attack that caused the death had not been disclosed before.

Moussa Abu Marzouk, the exiled deputy to the Hamas political chief Khaled Meshal, told Al Jazeera television on Tuesday that while the organization had "serious reservations" about the Egyptian cease-fire plan, he believed that it might be accepted if changes were made. "If the initiative is accepted, it will be in accordance with the position set out by Hamas at the start, namely an Israeli withdrawal, a cease-fire and the opening of the crossing points" between Gaza, Israel and Egypt, he said. The leader of Israel's opposition Likud Party, Benjamin Nentanyahu, said Tuesday that ultimately Hamas would have to be removed from Gaza and if the government chose to do so in this war, he would support it. "At the end of the day there will be no escape from toppling Hamas rule," he said at a meeting with the Foreign Press Association, adding that "Israel can not tolerate an Iranian base right next to its cities."

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The New York Times
January 13, 2009 Tuesday
Late Edition - Final
Iran Gives Hamas Enthusiastic Support, but Discreetly, Just in Case
BYLINE: By MICHAEL SLACKMAN; Nazila Fathi contributed reporting from Tehran.
SECTION: Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 10
LENGTH: 1161 words
DATELINE: CAIRO

Late last month, Iran's supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared that anyone killed defending Palestinians in the Gaza Strip would be rewarded in heaven as a martyr. Young men began lining up -- 70,000 in all -- to go off and die. A week later, however, Ayatollah Khamenei announced without explanation that no one was going anywhere to fight. "I thank the pious and devoted youth who have asked to go to Gaza," he said in a televised address. "But it must be noted that our hands are tied in this arena."

While the fighting continues in Gaza and negotiations for a cease-fire take place in Egypt, officials in Iran are treading carefully because they, too, have a great deal at stake. Iran is trying to position itself as the regional superpower, while also trying to generate maximum leverage before expected talks with the incoming Obama administration. To achieve those goals, though, Iran needs Hamas to declare at least a moral victory in its war with Israel. Then, Israel and Washington's Arab allies would be weakened, and without Iran's having to get involved in battle. Iran's leaders are leery of siding publicly with Hamas because of the potential consequences of an Israeli victory. A Hamas defeat by Israel would deprive Iran not only of a valuable proxy force on the border with Israel but of a trump card to play with Washington, and it would further alienate it from the leadership of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. "Iran wants to sit at the negotiating table with Obama with all the cards of the region in hand: Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, the relationship with Syria," said Mustafa el-Labbad, an Iranian expert based in Cairo. "They are also being smart. They're trying not to antagonize the U.S. very much, but with the Arabs they are going at it very hard, very roughly." For months, even before Israel invaded Gaza to stop rocket fire, Iranian officials and their proxies had been viciously attacking Egyptian and Saudi leaders for not doing enough to end the Israeli-imposed blockade of Gaza. But Iran does not function as a purely ideological state, and it does not operate from one center of power. When events started growing too hot, Ayatollah Khamenei stepped in and cooled talk of thousands of martyrs streaming to Gaza.

Commentators in Iran said that Ayatollah Khamenei decided it was time to act as a pragmatic brake on the ideologically radical president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The president and his allies had stoked rage across Iran over what they said was the failure of Arab leaders to do more to end the Israeli fighting. But there was a big difference between rhetorical support, even encouragement, and direct involvement. "Hamas is a very practical and useful tool for Iran, not an ideological one at all," said Saeed Leylaz, an economist and political commentator in Tehran. "It is a very good tool for Iran, especially in its dealings with the U.S. What is happening right now in Gaza has made it easier for Iran to promote anti-U.S. feelings among Muslims." Iran's policy toward Hamas and the Gaza fighting is also related to the country's own difficult domestic situation. Iran's economy is struggling, weighed down by rampant inflation and undermined by the precipitous drop in oil prices. The Gaza fighting served as a useful distraction from local problems, but it also threatened to backfire on the state if the public perceived that the country's now scarce resources were being used to help anyone other than Iranians themselves.

"Iran is going through a very sensitive internal situation," said Farzaneh Roostai, the foreign editor of the daily newspaper Etemad. "We are faced with major economic and political problems, such as falling oil prices, which are affecting the budget. The state media tried to divert people's attention from these problems by bombarding them with propaganda. But it hasn't worked."

Iran's relationship with Hamas is one of shared interests. By pedigree, the sides are unlikely allies, with Iran a Shiite theocracy and Hamas a fundamentalist Sunni organization. Hamas, for example, praises Saddam Hussein, while Iran views him as a psychotic killer. But Hamas, a pariah to Egypt and Jordan, has received money and training from Iran, while the group has provided Iran with a powerful surrogate to undermine American and Israeli interests in the region. While Iran is the primary patron of Hamas, the two do not enjoy the same seamless relationship that Iran has with Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite militia and political organization that Tehran helped to form.

Giving voice to these conflicting currents, Muhammad Mir Ali Mohammadi, Iran's spokesman at the Iranian consulate to the United Nations, said in an e-mail message that Iran's support is for the Palestinians in general, not specifically for Hamas. "I should repeat the Iranian position that our support is moral and humanitarian for the whole cause of Palestine and the Palestinian people," he wrote. "It means if Israel's attack was toward the West Bank, we would be also against that. I understand efforts to separate Hamas from other parts and Iran from Arabs." Even before the war in Gaza began, Iran started an aggressive public campaign attacking Egypt and Saudi Arabia for failing to bring an end to the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip. The attacks were aimed at King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. "King Abdullah, the puppet king of Saudi Arabia, is not expected to ignore the demands of his American and Zionist masters and frown at what is going on in Gaza," read a column in Iran's most conservative newspaper, Kayhan, which is aligned with Ayatollah Khamenei. The paper also said, "one cannot expect Hosni Mubarak, who has on several occasions demonstrated his subservience to the Zionists, to open the Rafah crossing for the disaster-struck people of Gaza."

On the ground, demonstrators gathered outside embassies in Tehran for 10 days, demanding an end to the killing of Palestinians. Events grew hotter still when protesters forced their way into the residential compound of the British Embassy in northern Tehran. That episode seems to be what convinced Iranian authorities that the president and his supporters needed to be reined in, political experts said. As the war continues to grind on, Iran and its Arab opponents continue to eye each other warily, with each side concerned the other will get the upper hand in negotiations over a cease-fire. For now, Iran is encouraging Hamas to hang on and refuse to give up. "With no doubt Hamas must continue resistance and it will definitely win," Kazem Moussavi Bojnerdi wrote in Monday's issue of Etemad Melli, a reformist Iranian newspaper. "The death toll that the Israelis are imposing on Hamas should not make them back down, and I am certain that they will not surrender. If they show any weakness, they will have to pay horrifying costs in the future."

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The New York Times
January 13, 2009 Tuesday
Late Edition - Final
U.N. Warns of Refugee Crisis in Gaza Strip
BYLINE: By TAGHREED EL-KHODARY and SABRINA TAVERNISE; Taghreed El-Khodary reported from Gaza City, and Sabrina Tavernise from Jerusalem. Steven Erlanger contributed reporting from Jerusalem, and William J. Broad from New York.
SECTION: Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 5
LENGTH: 985 words
DATELINE: GAZA CITY

Growing numbers of Palestinians are fleeing their homes for makeshift shelters in schools, office buildings and a park as the Israeli Army continues to press its military campaign deeper into Gaza City. According to the United Nations, about 30,000 people are living in schools it sponsors and an estimated 60,000 have fled to the houses of relatives. The figures still represent a small part of Gaza's 1.5 million population but have doubled in the past four days, United Nations officials said, raising concerns about the humanitarian impact of a broader war. "What began as very small, isolated numbers is now turning into a torrent," said Aidan O'Leary, deputy director for the United Nations agency that deals with Palestinian refugees. Maj. Jacob Dallal, an Israeli military spokesman, said units used leaflets to warn families to leave areas where they planned to operate. Aid officials say that with Gaza's borders closed, choices for shelters in the 140-square-mile strip are slim and the shelters are not completely safe. Last week, as many as 43 people were killed near a United Nations school by an Israeli mortar strike that the military said was in response to a Hamas attack. The Israeli military disputes the death toll.

Egypt continued to press for a cease-fire on Monday, the 17th day of Israel's military campaign in Gaza. MENA, Egypt's state-owned news agency, quoted an unidentified Egyptian official as saying that talks between the nation's intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, and Hamas envoys were "positive." Tony Blair, a special international envoy for the Middle East, speaking from Cairo, said the "elements of an agreement for an immediate cease-fire are there," The Associated Press reported, though a senior Israeli military official, Amos Gilad, postponed his trip to Egypt to discuss a possible truce. An Israeli official, speaking on condition of anonymity because the negotiations were not yet public, said the delay was a matter of timing and not a breakdown in talks.

In a televised speech on Monday night, a senior Hamas official, Ismail Haniya, expressed an openness to a diplomatic solution but reiterated previous demands that any deal include the opening of Gaza's border crossings, which Israel and Egypt have kept mostly closed since Hamas violently pushed out its rival Fatah in 2007. "We are not closed to this path," he said of diplomacy, speaking from hiding in Gaza. He praised Hamas fighters as heroes who would be victorious. Aid groups, meantime, spotlighted what they said was a growing number of refugees. When Israeli soldiers moved deeper into the Zeitoun neighborhood of Gaza on Sunday night, Olfat Jaawanah decided she had had enough. Shrapnel flew through a window, injuring her son, Ali, she said, and on Monday morning, she gathered a few blankets and moved her nine children out of their large house. The nearby United Nations school was full -- its bare classrooms packed with families and its toilets smelling foul -- so she took her family instead to her husband's office, in a building belonging to an international organization in the center of Gaza City.

According to Mr. O'Leary, about a third of the agency's 91 schools are now full. Movement is complicated by the confusion over when it is safe to leave. When the Abu Hajaj family received a leaflet last weekend, they took it as a sign of safe passage. But Majad Abdel Karim Abu Hajaj, a teacher at a United Nations school, said his mother and sister were killed as they walked holding a white flag. Their bodies remain where they fell, he said, because ambulances cannot get to the area. Sarit Michaeli of B'Tselem, an Israeli human rights group, said she had had six reports of families stuck in areas now occupied by Israeli troops.

At times, the city took on a cinematic quality. A woman came with a pan and dough to Al Nasir hospital, asking for the use of its electricity so she could bake. A corpse was wheeled in a donkey cart where an ambulance was afraid to go. Humanitarian shipments were moving on Monday, and Egypt, under pressure to do more for Palestinian victims of the conflict, agreed to allow in 38 Arab doctors and a group of European legislators.
Palestinians interviewed in Gaza on Monday cited another reason for their flight: Israel soldiers, they said, are firing rounds of a noxious substance that burns skin and makes it hard to breathe.

A resident of southwest Gaza City on Monday showed a reporter a piece of metal casing with the identifying number M825A1, which Marc Garlasco, a military analyst with Human Rights Watch, identified as white phosphorus, typically used for signaling, smoke screens and destroying enemy equipment. In recent years, experts and rights advocates have argued over whether its use to intentionally harm people violates international conventions. Major Dallal would not say whether Israel was using white phosphorus, but said, "The munitions we use are consistent with international law." Still, white phosphorus can cause injury, and a growing number of Gazans report being hurt by it, including in Beit Lahiya, Khan Yunis, and in eastern and southwestern Gaza City. When exposed to air, it ignites, experts say, and if packed into an artillery shell, it can rain down flaming chemicals that cling to anything they touch. Luay Suboh, 10, from Beit Lahiya, lost his eyesight and some skin on his face Saturday when, his mother said, a fiery substance clung to him as he darted home from a shelter where his family was staying to pick up clothes. The substance smelled like burned trash, said Ms. Jaawanah, the mother who fled her home in Zeitoun, who had experienced it too. She had no affection for Hamas, but her sufferings were changing that. "Do you think I'm against them firing rockets now?" she asked, referring to Hamas. "No. I was against it before. Not anymore."

GA-NYT-11-JAN-04
The New York Times
January 11, 2009 Sunday
Late Edition - Final
As Talks Falter, Israel Warns Gazans of Stepped-Up Attacks
BYLINE: By ETHAN BRONNER; Taghreed El-Khodary contributed reporting from Gaza, and Steven Erlanger from Jerusalem.
SECTION: Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 6
LENGTH: 1023 words
DATELINE: JERUSALEM
Israel warned Gaza residents on Saturday that it was preparing the next phase of its war against Hamas -- a deeper ground force operation -- as diplomatic efforts to end the 15-day assault and Hamas rocket fire into Israel faltered. Tank and artillery fire pounded Gaza all night and day, with plumes of black smoke visible especially in the eastern part of Gaza City. A tank shell landed outside the home of a family in Jabaliya, northeast of the city, killing eight members of the same family who were sitting outside, hospital officials said, bringing the death toll to more than 820. Nearly half of the dead were reported to be civilians.

United Nations relief operations resumed after a daylong suspension prompted by fears for the safety of the drivers. On Thursday, a United Nations driver was killed and two others were wounded from what the agency said was Israeli fire. Israel issued a statement on Saturday saying it was certain that the shooting had not come from its forces, adding that the drivers were treated in an Israeli hospital. It also redoubled its assurances to the United Nations on holding its fire around aid convoys.

The Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, whose Fatah Party opposes Hamas, was in Cairo pressing a call for a cease-fire, and he discussed with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt the idea of international troops along the Gaza-Egypt border. Hamas representatives were also there, but the plan, also urged by the French, seemed to be losing steam. Egypt is unenthusiastic about the presence of foreign troops on its soil, while Hamas is unwilling to have the troops inside Gaza. More focus was being placed on technical assistance to the Egyptians to help them block and destroy the smuggler tunnels that help Hamas stay lethal.

Both Israel and Hamas rejected a United Nations Security Council resolution on Friday calling for a cease-fire. And the actions of both on Saturday made their resolve to keep fighting manifest. More long-range rockets hit Israel, including two in open areas in Ashdod, a city of 200,000 on the way to Tel Aviv. Israel said its aircraft attacked more than 40 targets throughout Gaza, striking 10 rocket-launching sites and weapons-storage facilities. It also rounded up people in the north of Gaza, questioning them and telling them to deliver warnings to Hamas activists. It said it killed the man in charge of Hamas's rocket launchers and another 15 militants.

In Gaza City as well, residents reported getting phone calls that said: "We are going to intensify the military strike against Hamas. Our intention is not to harm civilians. If you live near Hamas, evacuate." Leaflets were dropped addressed to "the residents of Gaza," saying that the Israeli military had in recent days warned residents of the southern city of Rafah of "an imminent operation," and asking them to evacuate their homes for their safety.

"The fact that the residents of Rafah abided by the orders," the leaflets continued, "has protected those who had nothing to do with the fight. The Israel Defense Forces will intensify shortly its directed operation against tunnels, weapon storehouses and members of terrorist groups all over Gaza. For your safety and that of your family you are asked to stay away from terrorist elements and from places where terrorist operations occur. Please continue abiding by our orders." Red Cross workers said their telephones were flooded with calls from residents of the Beach refugee camp who had received large numbers of the calls and leaflets. The callers wanted to know if they should evacuate their homes, and if so, to where.

A Beach camp car mechanic named Hamdi Eki, 47, was asked why he did not leave after receiving such a call. "I have nine children," he said. "Where can I go? I prefer to die at my own house." Some Beach camp residents did leave but ended up in other neighborhoods or camps that had received similar warnings. Israel has come under increasing international criticism for the growing number of civilian casualties of this war and for complicating efforts by aid and rights groups to help those caught in the cross-fire. Israel says Hamas fighters hide consciously among civilians, in mosques and schools and under clinics. Khaled Meshal, the leader of Hamas who lives in exile in Syria, said Saturday that the ferocity of the Israeli campaign had crossed the line and called it a "holocaust." "You have destroyed the last chance for negotiations," Mr. Meshal said, according to Reuters.

Fred Abrahams, a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch, who has studied both the Kosovo and Lebanon conflicts, said he was concerned that Israel was not paying enough attention to international legal requirements for "distinction and proportionality -- first, to distinguish between combatants and civilians, and second, whether an attack will have a disproportionate effect on the civilians in the area." Even if a target is legitimate, he said, "you can't drop a 500-pound bomb in an area crowded with civilians." This was also the first conflict he could remember when civilians could not flee the war zone. Gaza's borders are shut both to Israel and to Egypt, and civilians, he said, "are fish in a barrel." "Our conclusions are preliminary, but evidence is suggesting serious violations of the laws of war, which require investigation," Mr. Abrahams said. That is also true of Hamas, he said. "We need to know more about what Hamas is doing on the ground," he said. "For example, we know Hamas has stored weapons in mosques, so when Israel targets a mosque, we don't scream war crime." Regarding force protection, he said it "must be balanced by distinction and proportion." "A violation by Hamas shooting from a mosque or school doesn't give the Israeli Army carte blanche to return fire in the name of force protection with everything and anything it has," he added. Human rights groups are also concerned about the Israeli use of white phosphorous, which creates smoke on a battlefield, at low altitudes or crowded areas, because it can burn like a kind of napalm.

GA-NYT-07-JAN-03
The New York Times
January 7, 2009 Wednesday
Late Edition - Final
Israel Keeping Reporters From Close Look at War
BYLINE: By ETHAN BRONNER
SECTION: Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 13
LENGTH: 1077 words
DATELINE: JERUSALEM

Three times in recent days, a small group of foreign correspondents was told to appear at the border crossing to Gaza. The reporters were to be permitted in to cover firsthand the Israeli war on Hamas in keeping with a Supreme Court ruling against the two-month-old Israeli ban on foreign journalists entering Gaza. Each time, they were turned back on security grounds, even as relief workers and other foreign citizens were permitted to cross the border. On Tuesday the reporters were told to not even bother going to the border. And so for an 11th day of Israel's war in Gaza, the several hundred journalists here to cover it waited in clusters away from direct contact with any fighting or Palestinian suffering, but with full access to Israeli political and military commentators eager to show them around southern Israel, where Hamas rockets have been terrorizing civilians. A slew of private groups financed mostly by Americans are helping guide the press around Israel. Like all wars, this one is partly about public relations. But unlike any war in Israel's history, in this one the government is seeking to entirely control the message and narrative for reasons both of politics and military strategy. 'This is the result of what happened in the 2006 Lebanon war against Hezbollah," said Nachman Shai, a former army spokesman who is writing a doctoral dissertation on Israel's public diplomacy. "Then, the media were everywhere. Their cameras and tapes picked up discussions between commanders. People talked on live television. It helped the enemy and confused and destabilized the home front. Today, Israel is trying to control the information much more closely."

The government-commissioned investigation into the war with Hezbollah reported that the army had found that when reporters were allowed on the battlefield in Lebanon, they got in the way of military operations by posing risks and asking questions. Maj. Avital Leibovich, an army spokeswoman, said, "If a journalist gets injured or killed, then it is Central Command's responsibility." She said the government was trying to protect Israel from rocket fire and "not deal with the media." Beyond such tactical considerations, there is a political one. Daniel Seaman, director of Israel's Government Press Office, said, "Any journalist who enters Gaza becomes a fig leaf and front for the Hamas terror organization, and I see no reason why we should help that." Foreign reporters deny that their work in Gaza has been subject to Hamas censorship or control. Unable to send foreign reporters into Gaza, the international news media have relied on Palestinian journalists based there for coverage. But it seems that many Israelis accept Mr. Seaman's assessment and shed no tears over the restrictions, despite repeated protests by the Foreign Press Association of Israel, including on Tuesday.

A headline in Tuesday's issue of Yediot Aharonot, the country's largest selling daily newspaper, expressed well the popular view of the issue. Over a news article describing the generally negative coverage so far, especially in the European media, an intentional misspelling of a Hebrew word turned the headline "World Media" into "World Liars." This attitude has been helped by supportive Israeli news media whose articles have been filled with "feelings of self-righteousness and a sense of catharsis following what was felt to be undue restraint in the face of attacks by the enemy," according to a study of the first days of media coverage of the war by a liberal but nonpartisan group called Keshev, the Center for the Protection of Democracy in Israel.

The Foreign Press Association has been fighting for weeks to get its members into Gaza, first appealing to senior government officials and ultimately taking its case to the country's highest court. Last week the justices worked out an arrangement with the organization whereby small groups would be permitted into Gaza when it was deemed safe enough for the crossings to be opened for other reasons. So far, every time the border has been opened, journalists have not been permitted to go in. On Tuesday, the press association released a statement saying, "The unprecedented denial of access to Gaza for the world's media amounts to a severe violation of press freedom and puts the state of Israel in the company of a handful of regimes around the world which regularly keep journalists from doing their jobs."

At the same time that reporters have been given less access to Gaza, the government has created a new structure for shaping its public message, ensuring that spokesmen of the major government branches meet daily to make sure all are singing from the same sheet. "We are trying to coordinate everything that has to do with the image and content of what we are doing and to make sure that whoever goes on the air, whether a minister or professor or ex-ambassador, knows what he is saying," said Aviv Shir-On, deputy director general for media in the Foreign Ministry. "We have talking points and we try to disseminate our ideas and message." Israelis say the war is being reduced on television screens around the world to a simplistic story: an American-backed country with awesome military machine fighting a third-world guerrilla force leading to a handful of Israelis dead versus 600 Gazans dead.

Israelis and their supporters think that such quick descriptions fail to explain the vital context of what has been happening -- years of terrorist rocket fire on civilians have gone largely unanswered, and a message had to be sent to Israel's enemies that this would go on no longer, they say. The issue of proportionality, they add, is a false construct because comparing death tolls offers no help in measuring justice and legitimacy.

There are other ways to construe the context of this conflict, of course. But no matter what, Israel's diplomats know that if journalists are given a choice between covering death and covering context, death wins. So in a war that they consider necessary but poorly understood, they have decided to keep the news media far away from the death. John Ging, an Irishman who directs operations in Gaza for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, entered Gaza on Monday as journalists were kept out. He told Palestinian reporters in Gaza that the policy was a problem. "For the truth to get out, journalists have to get in," he said.

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The New York Times
January 6, 2009 Tuesday
Late Edition - Final
In Fatah-Governed West Bank, Solidarity With Hamas
BYLINE: By STEVEN ERLANGER; Khaled Abu Aker contributed reporting.
SECTION: Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 11
LENGTH: 1221 words
DATELINE: NABLUS, West Bank

Fewer than 100 people showed up on Monday in the busy center of Nablus for a demonstration in solidarity with the suffering Palestinians of Gaza. There were a few Palestinian flags, and some posters that featured bombs with Jewish stars and dripping blood and demanded, "Where is the conscience of the world?" But when an organizer asked passers-by to join the rally, only a handful responded. The lack of interest was not, for certain, lack of support for Hamas. Fury is rising here over the war in Gaza, as are support for Hamas and anger with the Palestinian Authority in this city, which has long been the beating heart of opposition to Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Many want the authority and the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas of the Fatah party, to do more to criticize Israel.

But a complicated internal struggle is also playing out here in the West Bank, separate geographically and governed by the Palestinian Authority, not, like Gaza, by Hamas. Fatah leaders are growing deeply worried over popular reaction and support for its rival, Hamas, to the point of crushing recent demonstrations.

There is also, after so many years of struggle, of Palestinian against Israeli and of Palestinian against Palestinian, no small degree of weariness with yet another deadly round. Even with the war in Gaza, there is no sign of a third intifada, or uprising, despite Hamas's call for one. "The people are tired," said Jamal Fayez, who runs a modest restaurant in the city center. "They're tired, and they're poor. They're tired of the conflict between Hamas and Fatah, and they're tired from trying to earn bread to eat."

In a series of interviews, people here said they were enraged by the photographs and television images of the Palestinian dead in Hamas-controlled Gaza, which they consider part of themselves. They said that support for Hamas would grow as this conflict went on, and that they were intimidated by the Palestinian security forces of Mr. Abbas and his appointed prime minister, Salam Fayyad -- forces subsidized by the United States and trained by Jordan -- which have cracked down on a series of demonstrations and banned the showing of the Hamas flag.

With American support, Mr. Fayyad, an economist, is trying to create stability, security and a working model of productive life in the region that can provide an alternative to the vision of Hamas. But the same newly organized police forces that are providing better security on the streets of Nablus, Jenin and Hebron in the West Bank are trying to repress popular anger over Gaza. That is a balancing act they may not be delicate enough to pull off. On Monday afternoon, for example, a march of several hundred students from Birzeit University outside Ramallah toward the nearby Atarot checkpoint was broken up by Palestinian security forces wielding clubs. The students wanted to confront Israeli soldiers at Atarot, and the security forces wanted to prevent the confrontation. Last Friday, security forces broke up larger demonstrations in Hebron and Ramallah, arresting Hamas supporters, confiscating Hamas flags and ripping up placards with pro-Hamas slogans. For the first time in memory, the Palestinian police used tear gas against their own people.

"The Palestinian Authority is preventing people from going to the streets," said an angry Hassan Hassan, 50, a lawyer. "They only want their point of view to pertain, and they share the view of Israel and the United States that Hamas should be crushed. They only want Fatah here, they don't want anyone else, despite the fact that 80 percent of the people are in total solidarity with Gaza and against the repression of the Palestinian Authority." Mahmoud Hanaisheh, 69, a weather-beaten farmer, went to the demonstration to show solidarity. "It was important for me to be here," he said. "I have to raise my voice, even if no one listens." Asked if Mr. Abbas was doing enough for the people of Gaza, he yelled, "No, no, no!" He said Mr. Abbas was negotiating with no result and was complicit with Israel in the attacks on Hamas. The Israelis will negotiate seriously only with a partner they respect, he said. "The only right thing is resistance," Mr. Hanaisheh said. "If there is no resistance against the occupation, there is no Palestinian cause. But if you resist now, everyone says you're Hamas, and it's wrong!"

Khalil Shikaki is one of the most highly regarded Palestinian pollsters, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, and a sometime adviser to Mr. Abbas. "This conflict will destabilize what Salam Fayyad has tried to do in the West Bank," Mr. Shikaki said. "There is certainly destabilization already, and if Hamas sees itself on the way to some kind of victory in Gaza, the West Bank will be a different ballgame. As the war drags on, Abbas and Fayyad are more on the defensive, and their ability to crack down will be affected, too." The impact of the Fatah-Hamas struggle is strong, Mr. Shikaki said, with Fatah having lost legislative elections to Hamas in January 2006 and having lost control of Gaza to Hamas in a short but fierce civil war in June 2007. "There is anger with the Israelis over Gaza, but also anger with Hamas, and for the first time, Israel is waging war with a faction of the Palestinian people that has been in a bloody conflict with another Palestinian faction," Mr. Shikaki said. "There is a sense of frustration with both Hamas and Abu Mazen," as Mr. Abbas is known.

Palestinians have conflicting sentiments, Mr. Shikaki said. There is sympathy for those under attack, respect for those who fight and the need to show support for the victims of Israel. "All this is affecting Abu Mazen and Fatah," he said, "and if Hamas can declare some kind of victory in Gaza, this support for Hamas will remain, and Hamas will be able to regain the initiative in the West Bank that they lost after the civil war in Gaza." On the West Bank, he said, people do not blame Hamas now, as Mr. Abbas did. "This is not the moment for blame," Mr. Shikaki said, "which is why Abu Mazen saying that Hamas is responsible for the Israeli attacks did not go down well." But he said that much would depend, in both Israeli and Palestinian politics, on the outcome of the conflict and on whether Hamas or Israel was perceived to have won. Raida Yassin, 30, was one of the teachers who demonstrated. "You see this atmosphere," she said, shrugging and readjusting her head scarf. "We are here for solidarity, but we can do nothing more for Gaza. We have nothing in our hands.'

She hoped the Palestinian Authority would do more, she said. "But the Palestinian Authority is one thing and the people are another," she said. "What I care about is the people; the Palestinian Authority is in a different world." Mr. Fayez, the restaurateur, said: "People feel caught in this conflict between Hamas and Fatah. If you have a business here, it's better to be neutral; I have customers from both sides." The mood is unstable, he said. "There is no question, this generates more support and sympathy for Hamas, so it really worries the Palestinian Authority," he said. Then he stopped and said, not really joking, "I hope tomorrow I won't find myself in jail."

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The New York Times
January 5, 2009 Monday
Late Edition - Final
Israeli Attack Splits Gaza; Truce Called Are Rebuffed: Hospital Fills Up, Mainly With Civilians, and Struggles to Cope
BYLINE: By TAGHREED EL-KHODARY
SECTION: Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1
LENGTH: 1157 words
DATELINE: GAZA

A missile hit their uncle's house, which was made of concrete and so, the Basal family had thought in taking refuge there, safer than their more flimsy one. Fida Basal, 20, was not there when it struck. But her sister, Hanin, 18, was. On Sunday, the day after Israel began its ground invasion of Gaza, Fida found Hanin at Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. One of Hanin's legs, her sister was told, had been amputated. "I want her leg now!" Fida screamed at her mother, blaming her for moving them to the concrete house. "God has no mercy! You get me her leg now!" Her uncle lost both legs in the missile strike on Sunday. Another woman found only half of the body of her 17-year-old daughter in the Shifa morgue. "May God exterminate Hamas!" she screamed in a curse rarely heard these days. In this conflict, many Palestinians praise Hamas as resisters, but Israel contends the group has purposely

endangered civilians by fighting in and around populated areas. The scene at the hospital, a singular and grisly reflection of the violence around it, was both harrowing and puzzling. A week ago, after Israel began its air assault, hundreds of Hamas militants were taken to the hospital. Yet on Sunday, the day Israeli troops flooded Gaza and ground battles with Hamas began, there appeared not to be a single one. The casualties at Shifa on Sunday -- 18 dead, hospital officials said, among a reported 30 around Gaza -- were women, children and men who had been with children. One surgeon said that he had performed five amputations. "I don't know what kind of weapons Israel is using," said a nurse, Ziad Abd al Jawwad, 41, who had been working 24 hours without a break. "There is so much amputation." "It's so hard when you do it to women," he said, adding grimly that even the devastating 1967 war here was over in six days.

For nine days now, doctors have been battling to keep Shifa running under the most adverse circumstances. Sanitation workers constantly mop up blood while Hamas security officers stand guard. But scant resources are being stretched to a breaking point, and a terrible stench is in the air. Dr. Mads Gilbert, a Norwegian who was allowed into Gaza last week to give emergency medical aid, and who has worked in many conflict zones, said the situation was the worst he had seen. The hospital lacked everything, he said: monitors, anesthesia, surgical equipment, heaters and spare parts. Israeli bombing nearby blew out windows, and like the rest of Gaza, here the severely limited fuel supplies were running low. Oved Yehezkel, the Israeli cabinet secretary, said Sunday that from the information at Israel's disposal, "there is no humanitarian crisis in Gaza." Many here would dispute that. With power lines down, much of Gaza has no electricity. There is a dire shortage of cooking gas.

The Israeli government says it has allowed 10,000 tons of essential humanitarian aid, mainly food and medicine, to be delivered to Gaza throughout the past week, even as Hamas has fired its longer-range rockets into major cities in Israel's south. Among the donations were 2,000 units of blood from Jordan, five ambulances from Turkey and five transferred on behalf of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society from the West Bank. In recent days, most of those arriving at Shifa appeared to be civilians. On Sunday, there was no trace here of the dozens of Hamas fighters that the Israeli military said its ground forces had hit in the past few hours in exchanges of fire. The reason was not clear. Many ambulance drivers refused to go near the fighting. It also seemed possible that Hamas and Israeli fighters were still battling at some less lethal distance. It was difficult to know whether fighters were at other hospitals.

But at Shifa, most of the men who were wounded or killed seemed to have been hit along with relatives near their homes or on the road. Two young cousins and a 5-year-old boy from another family were killed by shrapnel as they played on the flat roofs of their apartment buildings. A woman who came to the hospital with a daughter, 15, who was wounded by shrapnel, said soldiers had taken over their house in Beit Lahiya, in the north, and had detained the men, who she said were farmers. The family said the daughter was wounded when Israeli forces fired on the upper floors of the house. The combat was not taking place inside Gaza City on Saturday night and Sunday but in areas like Beit Lahiya and east, closer to the Israeli border. At least five civilians in Gaza City were killed Sunday morning, however, when Israeli shells or rockets landed in the city's market, Palestinian medical officials said. An Israeli military spokesman said the circumstances were being checked.

The Israeli Army has repeatedly emphasized that its operation is not aimed at Gaza's residents. But, sensitive to deep opposition worldwide to the toll on civilians, the military repeated in a statement on Sunday that "the Hamas terror organization operates amongst civilians, using them as human shields." Parts of Gaza, a narrow coastal strip with a population of 1.5 million, are among the most densely crowded areas in the world. Artillery and tank fire can easily cause collateral damage. Israel all but stopped firing tank and artillery shells into Gaza in November 2006 after 18 Palestinian civilians, most from one family, were killed by Israeli shells that missed their target and hit a row of houses in Beit Hanoun.

Speaking by telephone on Sunday morning from her home in Shajaiya, near the border with Israel, Itidal Mushtaha, 58, said there was shelling all around. She, her four sons, their wives and 23 grandchildren had all huddled, terrified, on the ground floor with no electricity or water. The Israelis had destroyed many houses nearby that were identified as belonging to Hamas operatives, she said, adding, "We do not know where to hide." Yet Ms. Mushtaha, who is not usually a political woman, had nothing but praise for Hamas. "God bless these fighters. They are throwing themselves to death to protect us," she said. At Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, the body of Ahmad Abu Daf had been in the morgue for about two hours on Sunday when his relatives came to collect it. Mr. Abu Daf, 37, was hit and one of his children was wounded by Israeli shrapnel outside their house in the Zeitoun district of Gaza City, the relatives said. As the relatives carried Mr. Abu Daf's body from the morgue on a stretcher for burial, they suddenly started to shriek. Blood was trickling out of the mouth, and a hand seemed to shake as if Mr. Abu Daf were alive. Four doctors raced out of the emergency room. One of the men in the family yelled in anger at a doctor: "How could you keep him in this refrigerator for two hours?" The doctors checked. Hope flickered out. "Believe us, he's not alive," one said. "Just pray for him. There is nothing you can do."

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The New York Times
January 3, 2009 Saturday
Late Edition - Final
Escalation Feared as Israel, Continuing Bombing, Lets Foreigners Leave Gaza
BYLINE: By ISABEL KERSHNER and TAGHREED EL-KHODARY; Isabel Kershner reported from Jerusalem, and Taghreed El-Khodary from Gaza. Reporting was contributed by Reem Makhoul-Farrell from Jerusalem, Khaled Abu Aker from Ramallah, the West Bank, Marc Santora from the United Nations, and Alan Cowell from London..
Taghreed El-Khodary reported from Gaza and Isabel Kershner from Jerusalem.
SECTION: Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 5
LENGTH: 1243 words
DATELINE: JERUSALEM
Israeli warplanes pounded Hamas targets in Gaza for a seventh day on Friday while Israel allowed hundreds of foreigners, many of them married to Palestinians, to leave the enclave, raising fears there that Israel was planning to escalate its week-old campaign. Tensions spread to the West Bank and East Jerusalem, where Palestinian anger at reports of civilian casualties in Gaza seemed to be translating into at least a temporary increase in popular sympathy for Hamas. Israel has vowed to press its offensive until there is no more rocket fire out of Gaza; its troops and tanks remained along the border, poised for a possible ground invasion. The United Nations special coordinator for the Middle East, Robert Serry, told reporters on Friday that he was deeply worried that Israel would decide to move into Gaza. "We are gravely concerned about that prospect because that would just mean another cycle of violence and a further escalation of the conflict," he said. "This must stop. With Israeli tanks on Gaza's border, it is absolutely imperative now that we find an immediate and lasting way out to avoid an even deeper and deadlier conflict." Israeli analysts and experts have said that any ground operation should be brief but powerful. Alex Fishman, the military analyst of the popular daily newspaper Yediot Aharonot, wrote Friday, "Since the name of the game is killing and destruction, the ground operation has to be quick, with a lot of firepower at friction points with Hamas." He added, "The goal is to exact a high price in the early stages of the ground operation and to end it quickly." Palestinian militants continued to launch salvos of rockets at southern Israel on Friday, with several hitting the coastal city of Ashkelon, lightly injuring two Israeli women there.

Israeli air and naval forces pummeled more bases of Hamas, the Islamic group that controls Gaza. The military said it hit the houses of several Hamas militants that also served as weapons depots as well as tunnels used for weapons smuggling and missile launching sites. Warplanes also bombed a mosque in Jabaliya, in northern Gaza. The military said that Hamas was using the mosque as a terrorist base and that it was storing rockets there. It was the mosque where Nizar Rayyan, the senior Hamas militant leader killed in an Israeli strike on Thursday, used to preach. Mr. Rayyan's four wives, at least nine of his children and several neighbors were also killed when his home was bombed. About 2,000 Gazans turned out for the funeral in Jabaliya on Friday. Speakers called for revenge as Israeli fighter jets swooped threateningly overhead. With Hamas calling for Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem to make Friday a "day of wrath," a few thousand turned out in Ramallah, the administrative headquarters of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. In Israeli-controlled East Jerusalem, the police came out in force to prevent disturbances after noon prayers. Small riots broke out in some Arab neighborhoods around the city, but most were quickly dispersed. And in Hebron, protesters clashed with the Palestinian police, leaving at least 10 injured. In Gaza, local residents went out to pray at mosques and to shop for essentials, but did not linger. Medical officials in Gaza said 430 Palestinians had been killed and some 2,200 wounded since the Israeli campaign began last Saturday. The casualty figures include many Hamas security personnel members, but the United Nations has estimated that a quarter of those killed were civilians. Three Israeli civilians and one soldier have been killed in rocket attacks in the past week, as Hamas deployed its more advanced, longer-range projectiles capable of hitting Israeli cities more than 20 miles away.

Hundreds of spouses of Palestinians, including women from Russia, Romania, Ukraine and Western Europe, left Gaza on Friday with the help of diplomats from their countries. Alla Semaks, a 34-year-old Ukrainian married to a Palestinian, and her four children were among around 300 people who came in buses to the Erez checkpoint in northern Gaza to cross into Israel. Her husband, Mohammed Atawneh, 36, was not leaving because he had only Palestinian identity papers, she said in a telephone interview. "I want to come back when the situation allows it," she said. "I have nothing in Ukraine. My children are very afraid for their father. We fear there will be an Israeli ground offensive."

A Gaza teenager, Jawaher Hajji, who said she had lost two close relatives in the past week, described a scene of growing desperation in the enclave. "There is no water, no electricity, no medicine,"Jawaher, a 14-year-old who has United States citizenship, told The Associated Press. "It's hard to survive. Gaza is destroyed." At the United Nations, officials moved beyond calls for an immediate cease-fire, saying that an international monitoring mechanism needed to be established in Gaza to prevent future outbreaks of violence. "We will need a monitoring mechanism if we do not want to repeat the mistakes of the past," said Mr. Serry, the Middle East envoy. His comments were echoed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. "We are working toward a cease-fire that would not allow a reestablishment of the status quo ante where Hamas can continue to launch rockets out of Gaza," she said in Washington. "It is obvious that that cease-fire should take place as soon as possible, but we need a cease-fire that is durable and sustainable." Both Israel and the Western-backed Palestinian Authority have been working assiduously to subdue Hamas in the West Bank since the Islamic group took over Gaza in 2007. But the events in Gaza and the gruesome images broadcast repeatedly by the Arabic television networks are stirring strong emotions

among West Bank Palestinians, who are directing most of their anger at Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The authority's security forces had been instructed to prevent any popular displays of support for Hamas and clashes with Israeli forces, by keeping protesters away from Israeli Army checkpoints and other flash points, leading some Palestinians to accuse the authority of colluding with Israel. Muneer al-Zughair, a spokesman in Jerusalem for the families of Palestinian prisoners, said Hamas had been strengthened by what he called "the massacre" in Gaza. "People feel that they are the only ones who are doing something for the Palestinian people," he said. At the entrance to the Shuafat refugee camp on the edge of Jerusalem, Palestinian youths burned tires and threw stones at an Israeli checkpoint where soldiers stood in full riot gear. A man from the camp, who identified himself only as Qassem, said: "Everyone is against what is happening in Gaza. The Israeli Army are the terrorists." Many denounced the bombing of mosques and the deaths of civilians. "Let them go in on the ground and take out Hamas, but spare the children," said a taxi driver from the camp who identified himself by his first name, Yasir. The missiles from the air "do not differentiate," he said. At a news briefing at the White House on Friday, the deputypress secretary, Gordon D. Johndroe, said Israel had a right to defend itself from the rocket attacks out of Gaza. But he added that Israel also needed to "avoid unnecessary civilian casualties," and to continue the flow into Gaza of humanitarian goods.

The Washington Post

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The Washington Post
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Met 2 Edition
Israeli Warplanes Pound Gaza; Hundreds Killed in Reprisal Airstrikes Targeting Hamas Security Facilities
BYLINE: Samuel Sockol; Special to The Washington Post
SECTION: A-SECTION; Pg. A01
LENGTH: 1473 words
DATELINE: JERUSALEM, Dec. 28
Israeli warplanes pounded Hamas installations across the Gaza Strip on Saturday and early Sunday in retaliation for rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel. At least 225 Palestinians were killed and more than 400 wounded, Palestinian health officials reported, one of the highest daily death tolls in decades of conflict.
After the strikes, which created panic across the strip, filled hospitals with the injured and sent black clouds billowing into the sky, Palestinians launched dozens of rockets into southern Israel, killing a man in the town of Netivot and wounding at least four.
The violence followed the expiration of a cease-fire this month. The Israeli cabinet approved what was dubbed Operation Solid Lead in a meeting Wednesday. The assault occurred at a time of political uncertainty in Israel, with elections scheduled for February to choose a successor to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who is stepping down in the wake of corruption charges. Likud party leader Binyamin Netanyahu, who leads in recent polls, has accused the government, led by the Labor Party, and the centrist Kadima party, led by Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, of not doing enough to act against Hamas.
Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who leads Labor, said, "There is a time for calm and a time for fighting, and now the time has come to fight."
Hamas said when the cease-fire ended Dec. 19 that it wanted Israel to ease the cordon around the Gaza Strip, which had been imposed to put pressure on Hamas, an Islamist movement committed to Israel's destruction. Hamas said the humanitarian and economic costs of the embargo were deepening. But Israeli officials said Hamas had not kept its pledge to bring the rocket fire to a halt.
Over the past week, the number of rockets and mortar shells being fired into southern Israel increased dramatically, with more than 60 fired Wednesday and more than 80 Thursday. The rise has sown fear in Israeli towns, but there had been no fatalities among Israelis during the week until Saturday.
Israeli air force F-16 warplanes hit Hamas security installations, killing officials, policemen and bystanders, according to witnesses and officials in Gaza and Israel. Many people were reported still trapped under the rubble of collapsed buildings. Israel destroyed Hamas security structures in Gaza City, Khan Younis and Rafah, they said. The installations hit included a police academy, a coast guard facility and security services, including a jail holding opponents of Hamas.
One of those reportedly killed was Ismail Jumaah, a senior Hamas official and head of one of the local security forces.
On Sunday, Israeli bombs destroyed a mosque, Palestinian officials told the Associated Press. The military called the building a "base for terrorist activities."
The al-Aqsa television station used by Hamas was also struck, with its studio building destroyed. The station used a mobile unit to remain on the air.
Livni warned that Hamas's political leaders could soon be targeted. "Nobody is immune," the AP quoted her as saying.
The Israeli military said in a statement that "this operation will be continued, expanded and intensified as much as will be required." It was not clear whether the air attacks would be followed by a ground incursion in the seaside enclave, home to 1.5 million Palestinians, which has been ruled by Hamas for 18 months.

Olmert said: "The operation in Gaza is intended first and foremost to improve the security situation in the south of Israel in a fundamental way, and it might take time. It demands patience from each one of us, so we can complete the assignment. We want to return peace and quiet to the residents of the south."
Hamas officials in Gaza said its military wing would retaliate. "We will not leave our land, we will not raise white flags, and we will not kneel except before God," said Ismail Haniyeh, leader of the Hamas government in Gaza.
A leader of Hamas outside the strip, Khaled Meshal, who lives in exile in Damascus, Syria, called for a new Palestinian uprising. "I call on you to carry out a third intifada," he told al-Jazeera television, according to the AP. The first Palestinian uprising began in 1987 and a second in 2000.
Israel advised hundreds of thousands of people living within 19 miles of the Gaza border to remain in safe areas indoors in anticipation of further rocket attacks. The rocket firings from Gaza into Israel intensified in the past week after an Egyptian-brokered cease-fire expired Dec. 19. Hamas appeared to be firing longer-range rockets, compared with the relatively short-range Qassam projectiles launched earlier.
Barak said the Israeli operation may continue for some time. For weeks, he said, "Hamas and its proxies launched Qassam and Grad rockets, and mortars, on the towns of the south. We did not intend to let this reality continue."
He said the military had been preparing for the operation for several months "to strike Hamas severely so as to change the situation from its base." Barak added: "The operation will be deeper and expanded as much as needed. I do not want to delude anyone; it won't be short and it won't be easy, but we have to be determined."
Olmert said, "We tried to avoid, and I think quite successfully, to hit any uninvolved people -- we attacked only targets that are part of the Hamas organizations."
Reports from Gaza said numerous civilians were killed and wounded. Eyewitnesses said sick patients were being moved out of Gaza's Shifa Hospital to make room for incoming injured.
Records indicate there has been no similar single-day death toll since the first intifada broke out 21 years ago. In two years at the peak of the first intifada, 1988 and 1989, 289 and 285 Palestinians, respectively, were killed by Israeli security forces, according to the Israeli human rights group B'Tselem. In the second uprising, which began in September 2000, 714 Palestinians were killed in the first year and 1,195 in the second, according to Palestine Monitor.
The airstrikes came on a Saturday, when streets were filled in Gaza's main cities. On Friday, Israel had opened border crossings to allow trucks to carry supplies and food into the strip.
When the assault began about 11:30 a.m., a graduation ceremony was underway in Gaza City at the Hamas police academy. Witnesses said 47 uniformed recruits were lined up when two missiles struck. Ala Zumu, a 27-year-old cameraman for al-Arabiya television, was one of the first on the scene. "I walked in and I saw bodies on the floor of the courtyard, policemen in their blue uniform suffocating. There was a pile of some 50 of them, some breathing, moaning, and some silent," he said. "I saw body parts scattered, heads, arms and legs.
"Outside in the streets, I saw people running in hysteria, children crying. Every five minutes, there was a bombing. No one knew where to go. Children were leaving school. One woman whose son was one of the graduates was shouting, 'Where is my son?' " At Shifa Hospital, he added, "I saw bodies and wounded people lying on the floors, as there are not enough beds. Not only no beds, but also no medical supplies for the wounded. Bodies were on the floor because the morgue was full with bodies. So they piled one body on the other. It was an awful sight. It's the worst thing I have ever seen."
The attack was condemned by Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, which rules the West Bank. Yasser Abed Rabbo, the general secretary of the Palestine Liberation Organization, who is close to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, described the attacks in Gaza as "barbaric" and said the results were "catastrophic."
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in a statement, "The United States . . . holds Hamas responsible for breaking the cease-fire and for the renewal of violence" in Gaza. She added, "The cease-fire must be restored immediately."
The United Nations and European Union called for a halt to the violence. The U.N. Security Council convened late Saturday at the request of Libya, the only Arab nation on the council, to discuss a Russian-drafted statement calling for a halt to Israeli military operations in Gaza and Palestinian rocket attacks upon Israel, diplomats told the Reuters news agency.
In Texas, where President Bush is vacationing, a White House spokesman urged Israel to avoid civilian casualties in airstrikes on Gaza but did not call for an end to the attacks. "Hamas's continued rocket attacks into Israel must cease if the violence is to stop," Gordon Johndroe said. "Hamas must end its terrorist activities if it wishes to play a role in the future of the Palestinian people. . . . The United States urges Israel to avoid civilian casualties as it targets Hamas in Gaza."
Staff researcher Robert E. Thomason in Washington and special correspondents Islam Abdel Kareem and Rayham Abdel Kareem in Gaza contributed to this report.

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The Washington Post
January 3, 2009 Saturday
Suburban Edition
Hamas Provoked Attacks, Bush Says; President Accuses Group of Adding to Civilian Deaths From Israeli Strikes
BYLINE: Sudarsan Raghavan and Dan Eggen; Washington Post Foreign Service
SECTION: FOREIGN; Pg. A08
LENGTH: 1348 words
DATELINE: JERUSALEM, Jan. 2

President Bush issued a sharp condemnation of Hamas on Friday, accusing the Palestinian Islamist movement that controls the Gaza Strip of provoking Israeli military action with rocket attacks and then increasing the death toll by hiding among civilian populations.

In a recorded radio address that was released a day early, Bush avoided faulting Israel for civilian casualties and called for a monitoring system to curtail weapons smuggling into Gaza. Bush's remarks, released in Washington, were his first public comments on the conflict since Israel began an intensive campaign of airstrikes against Hamas a week ago.

Bush has generally supported Israeli military actions during his eight years in office, while strongly condemning Hamas, the Lebanese Hezbollah movement and other anti-Israel groups that are considered terrorist organizations by the U.S. government. At the same time, Bush vowed to finalize a Middle East peace plan by the time he left office -- a pledge that was abandoned even before the latest violence.

Israel pressed its assault Friday, bombing a mosque it said was used to store weapons and the homes of at least half a dozen Hamas leaders, as Hamas continued to fire rockets into southern Israel. Israel also allowed more than 200 holders of foreign passports to leave Gaza, adding to concerns that a wider air assault or a ground operation was imminent.

Most of the homes of Hamas operatives targeted Friday were apparently empty, although wire services reported that one man was killed in the strikes. On Thursday, Israeli forces bombed the home of Nizar Rayyan, a Hamas cleric who had advocated suicide attacks against Israelis, killing him, his four wives and 11 of his children.

The Israeli military said it conducted 65 airstrikes in Gaza on Friday, hitting tunnels and weapons storage facilities. More than 30 rockets were launched from Gaza into Israel, the military said.

As of Friday, Gaza medical officials placed the Palestinian death toll at 431 killed, including 70 children and 45 women, and more than 2,200 injured. Christopher Gunness, a U.N. spokesman, said 25 percent of those killed in Gaza were civilians. Four Israelis have been killed by rocket attacks since Israel launched the offensive, but no serious injuries were reported Friday.

Also Friday, Israel allowed 65 trucks carrying humanitarian supplies, provided by the United Nations and other agencies, to enter Gaza.

In the past week, the Israeli military has counted more than 500 rockets fired into southern Israel from Gaza and conducted 750 airstrikes against targets in the strip.

Israel had authorized 350 to 400 foreigners living in Gaza to leave the territory Friday morning, and the military said 226 foreigners departed. Among them were 108 Russians, mostly women and children, according to Anastasia Fedorova, the press secretary at the Russian Embassy. Eastern Europeans and Americans also left.

Most of those who left were wives of Palestinians. Their husbands stayed behind because they had only Palestinian Authority passports or because they needed to stay with their businesses, Fedorova said. Many worried that the fighting could worsen if Israeli troops launched a ground offensive, she added.

"They were very happy just to get out of Gaza. Each lady came out with three or four or five children," Fedorova said. "Nobody can guarantee their security when they stay in Gaza."

Imad Abulkhair, 38, a pediatrician in Gaza City, said he is praying to be able to leave. He is married to a Romanian, and they have three children. "The children are scared. The bombing is going on continuously. We want to get out of Gaza," Abulkhair said. "The future is not promising."

But Abulkhair has no foreign passport. The Romanian Embassy in Tel Aviv said it would provide him with a visa, and he said he hopes the Israelis will let him leave.

"My wife and children do not want to leave if I have to stay behind," he said. "Either we all leave Gaza or we all stay. The important thing is for us to be together."

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said Friday that the United States and its allies were pushing hard for a truce, although Israel and Hamas rejected international calls this week for a cease-fire. Like Bush, she placed the blame for the crisis squarely on Hamas.

"Hamas has used Gaza as a launching pad for rockets against Israeli cities, and has contributed deeply to a very bad daily life for the Palestinian people in Gaza and to a humanitarian situation that we have all been trying to address," Rice told reporters.

In his radio address, to be broadcast Saturday morning, Bush said he has been in contact with leaders throughout the region, including Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and leaders in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. He also said he would continue to keep President-elect Barack Obama informed and said Rice "is actively engaged in diplomacy" aimed at achieving "a meaningful cease-fire that is fully respected."

Bush's criticism of Hamas was focused largely on allegations that it endangers innocent Palestinians, using civilian areas to hide in and focusing its resources on weapons. "Regrettably, Palestinian civilians have been killed in recent days," he said.

Bush also said he was "deeply concerned" about the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and pledged to increase U.S. assistance.
On Thursday, Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni said there was no humanitarian crisis in Gaza. "Israel has been supplying comprehensive humanitarian aid to the strip," she said during a trip to Paris.
Bush said Hamas had worsened living conditions in Gaza. "By spending its resources on rocket launchers instead of roads and schools, Hamas has demonstrated that it has no intention of serving the Palestinian people," Bush said.
The movement won Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, then seized control of the territory in 2007 by expelling forces loyal to Abbas, who favors seeking a negotiated peace with Israel. Israel has implemented a punishing economic blockade of Gaza since Hamas's takeover.
Israel withdrew troops and settlers from Gaza in 2005 after 38 years of occupation.
The flare-up of violence in Gaza this week underscores the difficulties that the Bush administration has faced in attempting to broker a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians. The latest effort was launched by Bush, Abbas and Olmert during a November 2007 peace conference in Annapolis, Md., but has shown little progress. Hamas was excluded from the talks because it is labeled a terrorist group by the United States.
Also Friday, pro-Hamas demonstrations took place after Friday prayers across the Arab world. In Amman, Jordan, wire services reported that at least 60,000 protesters chanted for Hamas to increase rocket attacks against Israel. Large pro-Palestinian protests also occurred in Turkey and Vienna.
In Cairo, police prevented a rally from taking place downtown. Egypt, a U.S. ally that has made peace with Israel, is concerned about Hamas, which has historical and ideological links to the Muslim Brotherhood, the country's main opposition group.
Demonstrations, mostly small, took place across the West Bank, underscoring the divisions among Palestinians who support Hamas and those who support the movement's rival, Fatah, led by Abbas. In Ramallah, Hamas loyalists tussled with Fatah supporters, calling them collaborators.
In East Jerusalem, Israel deployed riot police who allowed only men older than 55 with Israeli-issued identity cards to enter the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem's Old City for Friday prayers, sparking anger.
In Bethlehem, a few hundred demonstrators marched in the city calling for unity between Hamas and Fatah leaders against Israel. Khaled al-Azza, one of the protest's organizers, declared at the rally, "We call upon the international community to stop the aggression and stop the siege over Gaza and for the Arab countries to take conclusive decisions on Gaza."
Eggen reported from Washington. Correspondent Griff Witte and special correspondent Samuel Sockol in Jerusalem contributed to this report.

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Israel Rejects Intensified Push for Cease-Fire
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DATELINE: JERUSALEM, Jan. 6
Israel brushed aside an intensified effort by European envoys on Monday to broker a cease-fire in the Gaza Strip even as casualties mounted and aid organizations warned of a growing humanitarian crisis.
Diplomatic attempts to arrange a truce between Israel and Hamas failed despite a flurry of meetings across the region and at the United Nations. Most of the pressure was exerted by European leaders, including French President Nicolas Sarkozy and former British prime minister Tony Blair. But Israeli officials repeated their vows to keep fighting until they have crippled Hamas's ability to launch rocket attacks from Gaza into southern Israel.
"When Israel is targeted, Israel is going to retaliate," Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni told reporters as she held talks with European diplomats in Jerusalem.
U.S. State Department officials said Monday they also were pushing for a cease-fire. But unlike European leaders, who have been critical of both sides, President Bush stood behind Israel and gave no sign he was unhappy with America's close ally. "Instead of caring about the people of Gaza, Hamas decided to use Gaza to use rockets to kill innocent Israelis," Bush told reporters at the White House. "Israel's obviously decided to protect itself."
Bush said he agreed with Israel's position that a truce would be a waste of time unless Hamas is somehow prevented from resuming attacks. "I know people are saying, 'Let's have a cease-fire,' " Bush said. "And those are noble ambitions. But any cease-fire must have the conditions in it so that Hamas does not use Gaza as a place from which to launch rockets."More than 40 Palestinians were killed in Gaza on Monday, almost half of them children, and five civilians were killed early Tuesday when a shell fired by an Israeli ship hit their house, according to local medical workers. Palestinian officials said the death toll in Gaza has risen to about 550 since Israel began airstrikes on Dec. 27. More than 2,500 people were reported wounded. At least eight Israelis have died overall, including three soldiers killed Monday evening when they were struck by an Israeli tank shell outside Gaza City, according to military officials. Two dozen others were injured by the errant shell. The soldiers were engaged in heavy clashes with Hamas fighters in densely populated neighborhoods in northern Gaza, the military reported. Hamas asserted that it had killed several Israeli soldiers. Hamas has been defiant in the face of the

military invasion and fired about 30 rockets from Gaza into southern Israel on Monday, including one that struck an empty kindergarten in Ashdod, according to the Israeli military. A mortar shell also injured two people in the village of Shaar Hanegev. Such rockets have killed four Israelis since hostilities broke out.

Mahmoud Zahar, a senior Hamas leader, called on Palestinians to "crush your enemy" and urged them to keep targeting Israeli civilians by launching rockets and mortar shells over the fences and barriers that surround the Gaza Strip. "The Zionists have legitimized the killing of their children by killing our children," he said in a broadcast on Hamas's television station.

As the Israeli military campaign entered its 10th day, Defense Minister Ehud Barak said the operation would continue indefinitely. "Hamas has suffered a very heavy blow, but we have yet to reach the goals we set for ourselves, so the offensive continues," he told Israeli legislators.

Israel launched about 40 airstrikes in Gaza on Monday and targeted more than 150 makeshift tunnels along the strip's southern border with Egypt, said Maj. Avital Leibovich, a spokeswoman for the Israeli military.

Military engineering units also hunted for the smugglers' tunnels from ground level, Israeli officials said. About 300 smugglers' tunnels exist along the border area between Gaza and Egypt, a nine-mile stretch known as the Philadelphia corridor, according to the Israeli military.

Leibovich said Israeli forces also have been targeting weapons caches and the homes of Hamas officials. She blamed Hamas for the rising number of civilian casualties, accusing the Islamist movement of storing explosives in mosques and buildings in densely populated areas.

"We don't have any intention whatsoever to target civilians. The targets we choose are military targets," Leibovich said. "If there were civilian casualties, it would only be under the responsibility of Hamas."

The Israeli army said it allowed 80 trucks carrying emergency supplies to enter Gaza on Monday. But relief agencies said much more was needed. They estimated that two-thirds of Gaza's 1.5 million people were without electricity because several major power lines servicing Gaza from Israel had been cut or damaged.

"Large numbers of people, including many children, are hungry," Maxwell Gaylard, the United Nations' humanitarian coordinator for the Palestinian territories, told reporters in Jerusalem. "They are cold. They are without ready access to medical facilities. They are without access to electricity and running water. They are terrified. That by any measure is a humanitarian crisis." Water supplies for half a million Gaza residents are expected to run out in the coming days, the Red Cross said; water pumps have ceased to function because of the lack of electricity and the lack of fuel to run backup generators. The Red Cross also complained that an unspecified number of wounded Gazans had died after waiting hours for ambulances to arrive, blaming a lack of coordination between Israeli and Palestinian officials to guarantee their safe passage. "This is of course absolutely appalling," said Antoine Grand, head of the International Red Cross office in Gaza. "The ambulances must reach the injured as fast as possible."Accounts of conditions inside the territory are difficult to confirm. Israel has banned foreign journalists from entering Gaza.

In New York, the Palestinian Authority's foreign minister, Riad Malki, pressed for the passage of a new U.N. Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and the deployment of foreign peacekeepers to monitor Gaza's borders and protect Palestinian civilians. Malki also voiced frustration that President-elect Barack Obama had yet to comment on the violence in Gaza, contrasting his silence with his public criticism of the gunmen who carried out the terrorist attacks in Mumbai.

"We expected him really to be open and responsive to the situation in Gaza, and still we expect him to make a strong statement regarding this as soon as possible," Malki said. Arab foreign ministers began arriving at U.N. headquarters Monday to show support for the Palestinian diplomatic push to step up international pressure on Israel to halt its military operation in Gaza. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is expected to address the Security Council on Tuesday afternoon to urge passage of the cease-fire resolution.France's U.N. ambassador, Jean-Maurice Ripert, in a meeting with the Arab foreign ministers, outlined the broad elements of a possible cease-fire pact, according to a European diplomat. It would involve a halt to Palestinian rockets and Israeli military operations. It would also include provisions for the free distribution of humanitarian goods to Gaza and for the protection of Palestinian civilians. The agreement would contain a plan for monitoring implementation of the cease-fire, possibly involving foreign monitors. It would also call for the resumption of negotiations on a Middle East peace process. Jeremy Issacharoff, Israel's deputy chief of mission in Washington, said Israel did not think the Security Council was the appropriate forum for reaching a settlement. "This is a counterterrorism operation in our point of view," he said. Staff writers Dan Eggen and Glenn Kessler in Washington and Colum Lynch at the United Nations contributed to this report.

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Met 2 Edition
Israel Hits U.N.-Run School in Gaza;
40 Die at Shelter That Military Says Hamas Was Firing From
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DATELINE: JERUSALEM, Jan. 6

Israeli soldiers battling Hamas gunmen in the Gaza Strip on Tuesday fired mortar shells at a U.N.-run school where Palestinians had sought refuge from the fighting, killing at least 40 people, many of them civilians, Palestinian medical officials said.

The Israeli military said its soldiers fired in self-defense after Hamas fighters launched mortar shells from the school. The United Nations condemned the attack and called for an independent investigation.

"We are completely devastated. There is nowhere safe in Gaza," said John Ging, head of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency in the Gaza Strip.

The incident -- one of the single most deadly during Israel's 11-day offensive -- underscored the dangers Palestinian civilians face as thousands of Israeli soldiers fight their way across Gaza against an enemy that does not wear uniforms or operate from bases, but instead mingles with the population.

In all, at least 85 Palestinians died in attacks across the Gaza Strip on Tuesday, said Mowaiya Hassanien, a senior Gaza hospital official. He said the Palestinian death toll since the start of Israel's massive military campaign stood at 625, with more than 2,900 injured. The United Nations says 30 percent of those killed have been women and children.

Tuesday's attack on the school came only hours after an Israeli missile struck a residential area in al-Bureij refugee camp, injuring seven U.N. workers in a nearby medical clinic, U.N. officials said. Late Monday, an Israeli airstrike on a U.N. school in Gaza City had killed three members of a family.

U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called the attacks "totally unacceptable."

"After earlier strikes, the Israeli government was warned that its operations were endangering U.N. compounds," he said in a statement. "I am deeply dismayed that despite these repeated efforts, today's tragedies have ensued."

Since the fighting began, the United Nations has opened 23 of its schools as emergency shelters for the 1.5 million residents of Gaza, who are unable to leave the territory. By Tuesday night, the number of displaced Palestinians flooding into the schools had reached 15,000.

Ging, the U.N. official in Gaza, said that all U.N. facilities are clearly marked with flags and that the Israeli military has been given precise Global Positioning System coordinates.

Using unusually strong language for a body known for quiet diplomacy, Ging declared Tuesday that both Israeli and Hamas leaders, as well as the international community, are to blame for the mounting civilian death toll.

"The political leaders who are responsible on both sides have to call a halt," Ging said. "The civilian population is paying a horrific price. We need this right now. Not tomorrow. The civilians in Gaza have international rights to be protected not by verbal protection, but actual protection."

Both Hamas and Israel have rejected calls for a truce.

Speaking in Washington, President-elect Barack Obama commented for the first time on the Israeli offensive, saying that "the loss of civilian life in Gaza and in Israel is a source of deep concern to me, and after January 20th I'll have plenty to say about the issue."

The comments contrasted with statements from the Bush administration, which has focused its public remarks on condemning Hamas's role in initiating the violence. Bush has said that only after Hamas has stopped firing rockets should Israel be required to halt its military campaign.

Rockets continued to be launched from the strip Tuesday, with 35 landing in Israel, the military said. A 3-month-old child in Gedera, about 25 miles north of Gaza, was lightly wounded.

Israeli officials blamed Hamas, which has run Gaza for the past 18 months, for the deaths at the schools.

"Unfortunately, this is not the first time that Hamas has deliberately abused a U.N. installation," said Mark Regev, spokesman for Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

Israeli military officials said soldiers operating in the area around the Jabalya refugee camp in northern Gaza came under mortar fire and responded by targeting the source: the U.N.-run al-Fakhora School.

"When you're fired at, you have to fight back," said reserve Brig. Gen. Ilan Tal, a military spokesman.

Tal said two known Hamas gunmen were killed in the Israeli strike just outside the school, in addition to members of a mortar squad.

U.N. officials said they did not know whether fighters had been in the school, and wanted the matter investigated.

At the local hospital where dozens of the injured were treated, physician Basam Warda said a large number of the casualties were women and children who had gathered at the school because they considered it a haven from the fighting. At the time of the attack, people were standing outside the gate of the school, where hundreds of families had sought shelter.

"The wounded arrived with multiple fractures, ripped stomachs, amputated limbs," he said. "The bodies were ripped apart."

Warda said many of the wounded had to be placed on the floor and treated there because of a bed shortage. Others were sent to another hospital, in Gaza City. "Some might have died on the way," he said.

Ging called the fighting "the product of political failure" and accused Israel of depriving Palestinians of critically needed infrastructure.
In a report, the U.N. humanitarian office in Gaza said Tuesday that water and sewage systems in the strip were on the verge of collapse because of power outages and that a third of Gaza's residents are completely cut off from running water.
As the sense of crisis in Gaza deepened, Israeli forces battled on both ends of the 40-mile-long strip, and reports from within the territory suggested the military was tightening its grip. Witnesses said that Israel made gains in Khan Younis, in the south, and that there was intense fighting around Gaza City, in the north.
One Israeli soldier was killed Tuesday, bringing to six the total dead since Israel launched its ground offensive Saturday night. Of those, four were killed in "friendly fire" incidents.
Three Israeli civilians and a soldier were killed by rocket fire earlier in the campaign.
In his remarks, Obama said he was "not backing away at all from what I said during the campaign. . . . Starting at the beginning of our administration, we're going to engage effectively and consistently in trying to resolve the conflict in the Middle East."
Leading the push for a truce in Gaza is French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who has been visiting Middle Eastern capitals this week, urging an immediate cease-fire.
Sarkozy said the deaths at the school illustrated the need for a nonmilitary solution. "This reinforces my determination for this to end as quickly as possible," Sarkozy told reporters in the southern Lebanese town of At Tiri after learning of the school attack. "Time works against us; that's why we must find a solution."
Sarkozy was also in Damascus, Syria, on Tuesday, in a bid to get President Bashar al-Assad to pressure Hamas into agreeing to a truce. Syria and Iran are two of Hamas's biggest backers.
Assad called Israel's offensive "a war crime." But he also urged a cease-fire.
Hamas, which has never recognized Israel, has vowed to fight on. Israel says it will not stop its offensive until it has international guarantees that Hamas can be prevented from continuing to fire rockets.
As Sarkozy visited Egypt late Tuesday, President Hosni Mubarak said he would propose an immediate cease-fire, followed by talks on the Israeli blockade of Gaza and on ways of keeping arms from being smuggled into Gaza via Egypt. Egypt mediated a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel this summer. The expiration of that truce Dec. 19 precipitated the latest round of violence.
In New York, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said Olmert had responded to Mubarak's initiative with an offer to open a humanitarian corridor into Gaza but did not say whether Israel would participate in talks with the Palestinians. "We are awaiting the Israeli response and we harbor hope that it will be a positive one," Kouchner said. Staff writer Colum Lynch at the United Nations and special correspondents Reyham Abdel Kareem in Gaza City and Samuel Sockol in Jerusalem contributed to this report.

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Met 2 Edition
Hamas Pulling Back Into Crowded Cities, Beckoning Israelis;
For Army, Pursuit Is Tempting but Risky
BYLINE: Griff Witte; Washington Post Foreign Service
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When thousands of heavily armed Israeli soldiers poured into the Gaza Strip on Saturday night, Hamas pulled back.
Rather than stand and fight against the Middle East's strongest army, the Islamist movement opted for a tactical withdrawal, with its fighters melting away into the strip's sprawling cities and refugee camps, according to Gaza residents and Israeli military analysts and officers.
Now, Hamas appears to be daring the Israeli troops to follow.
"They're hitting here and there with antitank missiles and mortars. Overall, though, they're not confronting the Israeli presence in Gaza," said retired Gen. Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, former chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces. "They're challenging the Israeli military to enter the built-up areas."
For Israel, the temptation to move in is great: After 12 days of air-, sea- and land-based attacks that have weakened the Islamist movement's capabilities, Israeli leaders are weighing whether now is the time to try to deal a death blow to Hamas. That, analysts say, would require an expanded ground operation in the twisting alleys of Gaza's main population centers.
But the risks of broadening the campaign are high. Until now, Israeli casualties have been lighter than the military had expected. Six Israeli soldiers have died in five days of ground operations, although only two were killed by Palestinians. The four others died as a result of "friendly fire" incidents.
Analysts say that unleashing ground forces in Gazan cities and refugee camps would almost certainly allow Hamas to launch a campaign of urban warfare featuring sniper fire, suicide attacks and car bombs. The death toll would rise on both sides when Israel is already under international pressure to end its offensive. Palestinian health officials say more than 680 people have been killed in Gaza since the operation began, about a third of them women and children, according to the United Nations.

For the time being at least, Israel has resisted. Instead, military commanders have ordered ground troops to tighten their grip on less-populated parts of the strip that had long been used for launching rockets, while Israeli warplanes and helicopters continue to pound suspected hideouts from the air. Hamas fighters, meanwhile, are lying low in homes, bunkers and tunnels, military experts say, awaiting the chance to spring their traps.

The divergent tactics reflect the asymmetrical nature of the war in Gaza and the vastly different goals of each side.

For Hamas -- an Iranian-backed movement that has no formal army but has committed itself to attacking Israel with whatever weapons it can muster -- the objective is to survive and to show the world that it continues to engage. Even though Hamas fighters largely have avoided battling Israeli soldiers, they keep firing rockets into southern Israel. More than 20 were launched Wednesday. Rockets from Gaza have killed three Israeli civilians and one soldier since Israel launched its offensive Dec. 27, but no one since the ground campaign began. Hamas has also fired mortar shells at soldiers, but Israeli hospital officials say they have seen relatively few gunshot wounds.

"Their objective is to show that their resistance can't be broken," said Martin van Creveld, professor emeritus of military history at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. "Whatever the outcome, they're going to say, 'We won.' They're going to say, 'We were attacked by a vastly superior force, and the rockets kept coming.' " More than before, however, the rockets are now coming from the cities and the refugee camps, where most of Gaza's 1.5 million people live.

In the first hours of Israel's ground offensive, troops seized open areas east and north of Gaza City that had long been favored by rocket-launching fighters because of the unobstructed views of southern Israel.

Mahmoud, a resident of the northern Gazan town of Beit Lahiya, said that the Israelis have commandeered his neighborhood and that there is no sign of Hamas.

"I used to see Hamas launching rockets," said Mahmoud, who spoke by telephone and would not give his last name. "Now I only see Israelis. There is no resistance in my area."

But there is elsewhere in Gaza. Teams of rocket launchers have moved to the vast urban centers, residents say, creating a dilemma for Israel over how to respond.

On Tuesday, troops reported rocket fire from a U.N.-operated school that was being used as a shelter in the center of the Jabalya refugee camp. They returned fire, and killed 40 people. Israel has said Hamas operatives were among the dead; Palestinian medical officials say the majority were women, children and male civilians.

John Ging, the top U.N. Relief and Works Agency official in Gaza, on Wednesday challenged Israeli reports that fire came from the school. He said the U.N. staff at the facility assured him that "there were no militants in the school. . . . I'm very confident that there was no militant activity in the school, and if anybody has evidence to the contrary, we would be very anxious to have it."

Israel accuses Hamas of deliberately attacking from populated areas to drive up civilian casualty figures and stoke anger toward Israel in the Muslim world. But Hamas says it has little choice. There are no military bases in Gaza from which to fight, and the movement's members do not live apart from the rest of the population.

"They don't see themselves as being separate from the Palestinian people. They say, 'We're fighting among our people for our people's freedom,' " said Nassar Ibrahim, a Palestinian journalist based in Bethlehem who does not belong to Hamas.

Israel has said that the goal of its operation is to destroy either Hamas's capacity or its will to fight. So far, Israeli war planners say they have dealt the group a heavy blow, destroying much of its infrastructure and killing large numbers of its members with strikes from F-16 fighters, Apache helicopters, aerial drones, warships and tanks.

But the movement's leadership, which has been in hiding since before the offensive began, remains.

Israel's objective now is to raise the pressure on top Hamas officials and to destroy as much of the group's arsenal as it can before international pressure forces the military to stop. "Time is the name of the game. We need time to put more pressure on them," said a former senior military official who was authorized to speak on behalf of the Israel Defense Forces, but not by name.

The official said ground forces had surrounded Gaza's main population centers and were methodically tightening the noose. Going in is a definite possibility, he said, but so is a prolonged siege.

"When we were in Beirut in 1982, it took three months to force Fatah to give up," said the official, referring to the first Lebanon war, when the Palestine Liberation Organization refused to give in despite being pummeled by Israeli attacks.

Israel has said it intends to force Hamas to stop firing rockets or at least significantly reduce the number. But pressure is also building within Israel for the military to use this opportunity to carry out regime change in Gaza.

Hamas has been in charge there since June 2007, when its fighters routed gunmen loyal to the rival Fatah party. Israel, which pulled its troops and settlements out of Gaza in 2005, has enforced a strict economic embargo on the territory for the past 19 months. Lipkin-Shahak, who was Israel's military chief in the late 1990s, said he hopes Hamas halts its rocket fire before Israel decides to escalate.

"The best thing for both sides will be the end of fighting as soon as possible," he said. "The longer it goes on, the more casualties there will be on both sides, and the end result will be the same -- unless the IDF is forced to occupy the whole Gaza Strip. We don't want to do that. But it's not impossible."

Staff writer Colum Lynch at the United Nations and special correspondents Reyham Abdel Kareem in Gaza City and Samuel Sockol in Jerusalem contributed to this report.

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Red Cross Reports Grisly Find in Gaza;
Israel Accused of Blocking Aid to Wounded
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DATELINE: JERUSALEM, Jan. 8

The International Committee of the Red Cross said Thursday that it had found at least 15 bodies and several children -- emaciated but alive -- in a row of shattered houses in the Gaza Strip and accused the Israeli military of preventing ambulances from reaching the site for four days.

Red Cross officials said rescue crews had received specific reports of casualties in the houses and had been trying since Saturday to send ambulances to the area, located in Zaytoun, a neighborhood south of Gaza City. They said the Israeli military did not grant permission until Wednesday afternoon.

In an unusual public statement issued by its Geneva headquarters, the Red Cross called the episode "unacceptable" and said the Israeli military had "failed to meet its obligation under international humanitarian law to care for and evacuate the wounded."

When rescue workers from the Red Cross and the Palestinian Red Crescent arrived at the site, they found 12 corpses lying on mattresses in one home, along with four young children lying next to their dead mothers, the Red Cross said. The children were too weak to stand and were rushed to a hospital, the agency said.

A spokesman for the Israel Defense Forces declined to comment early Thursday on the specific allegations made by the Red Cross but said in a statement that the military "has demonstrated its willingness to abort operations to save civilian lives and to risk injury in order to assist innocent civilians."

"Any serious allegations made against the IDF's conduct will need to be investigated properly, once such a complaint is received formally," the statement added.

The deaths came to light as Israel continued a military offensive against the Islamist group Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Early Thursday, Israeli officials reported a number of explosions in northern Israel and said they were caused by rockets fired from southern Lebanon.

An Israeli military spokesman said that several rockets had been fired from Lebanon about 7:30 a.m. and that they had landed in western Galilee. One man was lightly wounded. The spokesman said the military returned fire into southern Lebanon, targeting the rocket-launching site.

Officials in Galilee said the rockets -- the first fired into Israel from southern Lebanon since the end of the 2006 war with the Shiite Muslim movement Hezbollah -- landed around the city of Nahariya.

There was no immediate comment from within Lebanon. Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah has threatened Israel with retaliation for its offensive in Gaza.

In the Zaytoun incident, the Red Cross said its workers evacuated 18 wounded survivors from the houses in donkey carts. They said ambulances could not reach the site because of earthen barriers erected around the neighborhood by the Israeli military. Red Cross officials said that Israeli soldiers posted nearby tried to chase rescue workers away from the site but that the rescuers refused to leave.

"This is a shocking incident," Pierre Wettach, the Red Cross's head of delegation for Israel and the Palestinian territories, said in a statement. "The Israeli military must have been aware of the situation but did not assist the wounded. Neither did they make it possible for us or the Palestine Red Crescent to assist the wounded."

The Geneva Conventions provide that parties to a conflict "at all times" should "without delay" take "all possible measures to search for and collect the wounded and sick, to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment, to ensure their adequate care, and to search for the dead and prevent their being despoiled." The conventions also say that wounded "shall not willfully be left without medical assistance and care."

The Red Cross said it was able to remove only three of the bodies and had received reports of other casualties in the neighborhood. The agency said that it was trying to return to the site but that negotiations with the Israeli military to guarantee safe passage were ongoing.

Palestinian journalists confirmed that large numbers of wounded survivors, including children, had arrived at Red Cross hospitals in Gaza from Zaytoun on Wednesday. Other details could not be independently corroborated; the Israeli military has barred foreign journalists from entering Gaza.

There have been other reports of wounded Gazans who have been forced to wait many hours or even days for ambulances since the Israeli offensive began Dec. 27, including several in the Zaytoun neighborhood.

Meanwhile, Israel said Wednesday it was in "fundamental agreement" with a cease-fire proposal offered by Egypt and France, but fighting continued in the Gaza Strip as diplomats from more than a dozen countries haggled over details in a bid to stop the conflict.

Israeli officials said they would send emissaries to Egypt on Thursday to hold talks on a potential truce proposed by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Parallel diplomatic efforts were underway in New York at the United Nations. But many sticking points remained. The French-Egyptian proposal calls for an immediate cease-fire, followed by talks on securing Gaza's borders and ending an economic blockade that Israel has imposed since June 2007, when Hamas expelled rival Fatah forces from Gaza to seize sole control of the strip.

U.S. officials have supported the French-Egyptian effort but said the basic issues that led to the conflict need to be resolved upfront. "It has to be a cease-fire that will not allow a return to the status quo," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said.
Israel has vowed to continue its 12-day military campaign until it is satisfied that Hamas will be unable to rearm itself by smuggling weaponry through cross-border tunnels from Egypt. Hamas has fired hundreds of rockets, most of them crude and unguided, into southern Israel since a six-month truce between the group and Israel expired Dec. 19.
The Netherlands, Denmark and Turkey said Wednesday they would be willing to contribute to an international force that would patrol the Gaza-Egypt border to prevent smuggling. Israeli officials said they wanted to ensure that any such force would have the authority to stop arms trafficking.
Hamas officials, who have been involved separately in negotiations with Egypt, reacted coolly to the cease-fire plan.
Ahmed Youssef, a Hamas spokesman in Gaza, said the group would not stop firing rockets into southern Israel until the Israeli military withdrew from the Palestinian territory and ended the economic blockade, which has left Gaza's 1.5 million people dependent on smugglers and relief organizations for their basic needs. About 25 rockets landed in southern Israel on Wednesday, wounding two people, the Israeli military said.
The Israeli military observed a three-hour cessation in the fighting Wednesday afternoon to allow relief agencies to deliver about 80 truckloads of emergency supplies. The lull in the violence also gave besieged Gaza residents an opportunity to emerge briefly from their homes and seek food, fuel and medical care.
Gazan medical officials said the pause in fighting led to a drop in casualties compared with other days since Israel launched its ground offensive Saturday. Twenty-nine Palestinians were reported killed Wednesday, bringing the toll to more than 680 since the fighting began, Palestinian health officials said. U.N. officials estimate that about one-third of those killed have been women and children, including three youngsters killed Wednesday when a shell struck a car.
Seven Israeli soldiers and three civilians have died in the conflict. Four of the soldiers were killed by errant shells fired by Israeli forces.
Staff researcher Julie Tate in Washington contributed to this report.

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January 11, 2009 Sunday
Suburban Edition
The View From Israel: Victors in a Necessary War
BYLINE: Griff Witte; Washington Post Foreign Service
SECTION: FOREIGN; Pg. A12
LENGTH: 1247 words
DATELINE: TEL AVIV, Jan. 10
After 15 days of war that have left more than 800 Palestinians dead -- as many as half of them civilians, medical officials say -- Israelis are sure of two things: They are the victims, and they are also the victors.
This is an unwanted war, Israelis say, but it is necessary, and they are winning it.
Unlike in 2006, when Israelis grew bitterly split over the war in Lebanon, the invasion of Gaza has produced a rare consensus here. In newspapers and on television, commentators approvingly note that the Israeli military has sown devastation in Gaza without a high toll in Israeli lives. If Palestinians are dying, they say, it is Hamas's fault.
On the streets of this palm-shaded city, just 40 miles up the coast but a world away in atmosphere from the horrors of Gaza, residents echo that line.
"This war's been very successful. We should have done it four or five years ago," said Menachem Haygani, 47, owner of a juice stand on high-rent, high-fashion Dizengoff Street. "It's very justified. Sure, people there are suffering, but also people here are suffering."
And in the Israeli news media, the focus is squarely on the latter.
While television screens around the world display grisly scenes from Gaza of blood-smeared hospital floors and critically wounded Palestinian children, Israelis are watching a very different war. Here, images from Gaza are relatively scarce, while the plight of Israelis injured or killed during the war is covered around the clock.
"The suffering of the citizens of Gaza is unbelievable. It's hell. But we are not uninvolved. We are broadcasting for our citizens," said Reudor Benziman, chief executive of Channel 10 News, one of the two major private stations in Israel. "We don't pretend to show the whole picture, as though we are covering a war in Tanzania. It's our war."
The disparity in coverage may help explain why Israelis have been so resolute in their support for a military campaign that has still not achieved its objective of halting Hamas rocket fire and that has come under international scorn for the high civilian toll.
But to Benziman, the coverage does not shape Israeli public opinion so much as it reflects it. Relatively little airtime is given to civilian deaths in Gaza, he said, because Israelis accept the government's position that Hamas must be attacked, no matter the cost.
"You can't fight a clean war. It's not a battlefield. It's neighborhoods," he said, sitting in the station's ultramodern studios, with their panoramic views of Tel Aviv. "Civilians are on the first floor, and Hamas is in the basement. That's war."

When the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations accused Israel in the past week of obstructing the delivery of humanitarian aid in Gaza, neither allegation received much attention in the Israeli news media. But the deaths of three soldiers in one day dominated the news.
Overall, 13 Israelis have been killed since the Israeli military offensive began Dec. 27, and each death has received blanket media coverage, complete with family interviews and anguished funeral scenes.
Of the 13, four were killed by the persistent rocket fire from Gaza that Israeli officials say prompted the war. But even rockets that cause no injuries -- as is usually the case -- get extensive play on television. Benziman said that Channel 10 has camera crews stationed across the south, chasing down the remains of every rocket and going live when they find them. With an average of 30 or more rockets landing daily, rocket-chasing is a fixture of the prime-time schedule.
"Every minor injury is emphasized," said Arad Nir, foreign editor and anchor with Israel's Channel 2, the country's largest private broadcasting station. "Every incident that the soldiers are involved in is discussed at length."
The reason, Nir said, is not government pressure. It's what viewers want.
Israelis and Palestinians, longtime neighbors and adversaries, have in recent years begun to live far more separate lives. Since Israel pulled its troops and settlers out of Gaza in 2005, Israelis have been prohibited from entering the strip. Nearly all Gazans, meanwhile, have been prevented by Israel from leaving.
Since the war was launched, no foreign or Israeli journalists have been allowed into the strip, except in the company of Israeli troops. And even if Israeli television crews were permitted inside, station executives here say, there is not much interest in documenting how Palestinians are coping amid Israel's relentless bombardment.
An anchor at Channel 2 recently became the target of an online petition seeking her dismissal because her tone was considered overly sympathetic to the Palestinians. Nir said any additional coverage of the lives of Gazans "would just make people angry."
"We are Israelis broadcasting to the Israeli public," Nir said. "Among the Israeli public, unfortunately, there's no empathy for the other side."
The feeling, of course, is mutual. And the coverage on many Arabic news stations is the opposite of the coverage in Israel. Arabic stations devote uninterrupted hours every day to graphic images of Gazans whose bodies have been torn apart by Israeli air raids. Al-Aqsa TV, Hamas's station, intersperses those scenes with sermons by religious leaders who deliver fiery denunciations of the Jewish state.
But to some in Israel, a Western-style democracy where press freedoms are enshrined in law, the lack of attention paid to how Israel's campaign is affecting the people of Gaza has been troubling.
In a column in the daily newspaper Haaretz, Gideon Levy, one of the most outspoken opponents of the war, ridiculed the apparent absence of concern.
"There was a massacre of dozens of officers during their graduation ceremony from the police academy? Acceptable. Five little sisters? Allowed. Palestinians are dying in hospitals that lack medical equipment? Peanuts," he wrote. "Our hearts have turned hard and our eyes have become dull. All of Israel has worn military fatigues, uniforms that are opaque and stained with blood and which enable us to carry out any crime."
But Levy's view is in the minority here, where polls show that 80 to 90 percent of Israeli Jews support the war. Far more common is the sentiment expressed by columnist Guy Bechor, writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel's largest daily, who declared a few days ago that "we have won."
"No one in the Arab world will now be able to say that Israel is weak and begging for its life," he wrote. "The images of the past two weeks have been imprinted for years, and Hamas's bravado and arrogance have gone into the tunnels along with their frightened leaders."
In the news pages of Yedioth and Israel's second-largest daily, Maariv, the focus is on Israel's troops. On Friday, both papers displayed large, full-color photos supplied by the Israel Defense Forces of the troops in action in Gaza, plus profiles of the three soldiers killed Thursday. There were no prominent pictures of Palestinians, and there was only a fleeting mention of the worsening humanitarian situation in Gaza.
In an unusual move, Maariv also carried a piece by the publisher, Ofer Nimrodi, in which he publicly apologized for a column published the day before that he felt had been overly critical of the military.
Recalling his own military service, he assured readers that Maariv is "a patriotic newspaper."
"These are days of battle, days to sacrifice blood and tears," he wrote, "not days to curse and swear the soldiers of the IDF and their officers."

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January 13, 2009 Tuesday
Suburban Edition
Israel's Top Leaders Weighing Their Next Steps in Gaza
BYLINE: Griff Witte; Washington Post Foreign Service
SECTION: FOREIGN; Pg. A10
LENGTH: 1272 words
DATELINE: JERUSALEM, Jan. 12
Israel's leaders debated Monday how and when to bring their 17-day-old offensive in Gaza to an end, as battles continued to rage on the edge of Gaza City and as Israeli reservists flowed into the territory, ready for a possible deeper push into urban areas.

The moves came as negotiators in Cairo sought to reach a cease-fire agreement, hoping to put a halt to violence that medical officials in the Gaza Strip said has claimed the lives of more than 900 Palestinians, as many as half of them civilians. Thirteen Israelis have been killed, three of them civilians.

Speaking after a meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, special Middle East envoy Tony Blair said that "the elements of an agreement" for a cease-fire were in place. But Israeli officials with knowledge of the talks said significant obstacles remained.

Hamas representatives were also in Cairo on Monday, conferring with Egyptian officials including intelligence chief Omar Suleiman. An Israeli Defense Ministry official, Amos Gilad, was negotiating with the Egyptians by phone Monday and was expected to travel to Cairo later in the week.

The talks in Egypt center on the question of how to keep Hamas from smuggling weapons across the Egypt-Gaza border. A senior Israeli official said Israel and Egypt are in basic agreement on a plan that would allow the European Union and the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority to share responsibility for monitoring the border and the crossing point at Rafah.

"We think the Egyptian position is very reasonable," the senior Israeli official said. Egypt has said that it is reluctant to have any international monitoring presence on its borders.

But the Israeli official said the Islamist Hamas movement is adamantly opposed to any deal that would permit the Palestinian Authority, which is led by the secular Fatah party, to return to Gaza. Hamas, which won 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, routed Fatah forces in June 2007 and has had control of Gaza ever since.

Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, speaking from an undisclosed location on the movement's television station, attempted Monday to rally supporters. "As we are in the middle of this crisis, we tell our people we, God willing, are closer to victory. All the blood that is being shed will not be in vain," Haniyeh said, while also acknowledging that the group is pursuing diplomacy. Hamas leaders in Gaza could not be reached for comment because they have gone into hiding.

If the negotiations in Cairo are successful, they could preempt an Israeli push into the strip's densely packed cities and refugee camps, where Hamas leaders are believed to have taken refuge. Israeli military officials allege that Hamas politicians are riding out the war in a bunker beneath Gaza City's main medical center, Shifa Hospital, in addition to other sites.

Any broadening of the Israeli operation would also be likely to include an effort to retake the area around the Egyptian border, known to Israelis as the Philadelphi corridor, military analysts say.

Israel pulled its troops and settlers out of Gaza in 2005 but continued to carry out raids in the coastal territory as Hamas and its allies used the strip to launch rockets at Israel. A six-month cease-fire expired in mid-December, followed by a barrage of rocket launches aimed at southern Israel. Israel began its military offensive with a surprise attack on Dec. 27.

On Monday, Israel carried out more than 60 airstrikes, continuing to bomb tunnels along the border, as well as homes of Hamas leaders. There was intense fighting reported around Gaza City as Israel tightened its cordon on Gaza's largest population center, home to 400,000 of Gaza's 1.5 million residents.

Officials and analysts say Israel's top three political leaders disagree over how the remainder of the war should play out. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is said to favor an expansion, while Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and Defense Minister Ehud Barak are believed to be more hesitant. Barak has aggressively pushed the talks in Egypt; Livni has said that Israel can soon declare victory and withdraw. The three run the country together and must achieve consensus before Israel can act.

Olmert spokesman Mark Regev acknowledged that Barak, Livni and Olmert don't always see eye-to-eye, but said they have agreed on the war's aims. "It's probably a very good thing that we don't have group-think at the top levels of the Israeli government," he said.

In an interview with Israel Radio on Monday, Livni said Israel had succeeded in proving to Hamas it is serious about deterrence.

"Israel is a country that reacts vigorously when its citizens are fired upon, which is a good thing," she said. "That is something that Hamas now understands, and that is how we are going to react in the future if they so much as dare fire one missile at Israel." Israel and the United States consider Hamas a terrorist organization.

Gabriel Sheffer, a political scientist at Hebrew University, said politics may play a role in the differing opinions among the three. In elections slated for Feb. 10, both Barak and Livni are hoping to succeed Olmert, who is stepping down under an ethics cloud. "If the number of Israeli casualties goes up, the effect on Barak and Livni will be very bad," he said. "Olmert has nothing to lose."

Sheffer said U.S. politics may also be a factor: Israel probably does not want to be fighting a war when President-elect Barack Obama is inaugurated next week, he said.

As international pressure to end the war has mounted, Obama has largely stayed out of the debate over whether Israel should be allowed to continue its offensive, while President Bush has staunchly backed the Jewish state. In his final news conference as president, Bush again asserted Israel's "right to defend herself" and called on Hamas to stop its rocket fire.

"There will not be a sustainable cease-fire if they continue firing rockets," he said. "I happen to believe the choice is Hamas's to make."

Hamas and its allies continued to fire rockets into southern Israel on Monday, launching more than 20. There were no reports of major injuries, and the number was significantly down from earlier in the war, when Hamas was launching 40 per day or more.

"The organization has lost much of its willingness to fight," said Shlomo Dror, spokesman for Israel's Defense Ministry. "It's much less than we anticipated."

Military analysts, however, have warned that Hamas could be saving its ammunition, with plans to launch urban warfare if Israeli troops push into Gaza's cities and camps.
Ahmed Qassim, a 30-year-old insurance salesman, said Hamas fighters had moved into densely populated parts of Gaza City in recent days and were using residential neighborhoods as bases for firing rockets. But he blamed Israel for the civilian casualties that result when the military strikes at those fighters. "The Israelis are so powerful and they have so much technology," he said. "They should be able to tell the difference between the resistance and civilians."
The Israeli military has not allowed foreign journalists into Gaza to work independently. But the military on Monday permitted a small group of reporters to travel with troops into the strip. A Reuters journalist reported from the outskirts of Gaza City that soldiers said they were meeting little resistance, but that they were pushing into urban centers to try to draw Palestinian fire.
"We are tightening the encirclement of the city," Brig. Eyal Eisenberg said, according to Reuters. "We are not static. We are careful to be constantly on the move."
Special correspondent Reyham Abdel Kareem in Gaza City contributed to this report.

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Suburban Edition
Israel, Aid Groups Have Long Feuded;
Tensions Only Heightened by Gaza War
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DATELINE: JERUSALEM
The humanitarian disaster in Gaza -- hundreds of dead civilians, overflowing shelters, an acute shortage of anything to eat -- stems in part from a long-running feud between aid groups and Israel that has worsened since the war began, according to interviews with Israeli officials and international aid workers.
Relief agencies have complained that their stockpiles of food, fuel and medicine in the Gaza Strip were scarce even before the war started Dec. 27 because of Israel's 18-month economic blockade of the territory. Agency officials said their attempts to deliver supplies since then have been delayed repeatedly by Israeli officials who are reluctant to open border crossings, even for emergency shipments.
"Sadly, this was entirely predictable, and in fact, we did predict it," said John Ging, head of Gaza operations for the U.N. Relief and Works Agency, which provides food for 750,000 Palestinians there, roughly half the population.
Ging said the agency normally stores two months' worth of food and six months of medicine in its Gaza warehouses. But because of the Israeli blockade, the warehouses were nearly empty before the fighting started. "We had simply no reserves," he said. "We were at our wits' end to highlight just how precarious the situation was."
Military officials said they set up a special operations center in Tel Aviv on Saturday to improve coordination with aid groups in response to concerns that emergency supplies weren't getting through. They have blamed Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups for the blockade, saying it was necessary to force them to stop firing rockets into southern Israel.
Israel imposed the blockade when Hamas took exclusive control of Gaza in June 2007 after routing forces loyal to Fatah, a rival Palestinian party that favors peace negotiations with Israel. Hamas, considered a terrorist organization by the United States and Israel, rejects Israel's right to exist.
"We're doing everything we can to address humanitarian needs," said Maj. Peter Lerner, a Defense Ministry spokesman. Last week, the Israeli military also began a practice of ceasing combat operations for three hours each day, in part to allow relief workers to move around more freely.
Many Israeli officials, however, have long nurtured suspicions that U.N. agencies and other aid groups, which are supposed to be politically neutral, favor the Palestinian cause.
They say the organizations are quick to accuse Israel of mistreating Gazans but slow to criticize Hamas for targeting Israeli civilians. They also argue that Hamas draws little scrutiny for tactics that place noncombatant Palestinians in harm's way.
"It reinforces the Israeli sense that the U.N. and the international system is extremely biased," said Gerald Steinberg, a professor at Bar-Ilan University and executive director of NGO Monitor, a blog dedicated to tracking activities of nongovernmental aid organizations in Israel.
Representatives of the United Nations and aid organizations counter that they do not favor one side or the other in the conflict, but tensions peaked last week when U.N. officials accused the Israeli military of fatally shooting a driver in a humanitarian-aid convoy and firing at two other U.N. employees in Gaza. The United Nations also lodged protests after an Israeli mortar struck a U.N. school serving as an emergency shelter.
The Israeli military has denied involvement in the fatal shooting of the U.N. driver. Military officials said they did not intentionally target any of the aid workers or the school, but have offered different accounts in recent days of what happened.
The International Committee of the Red Cross has complained about two separate incidents in which ambulance crews were fired upon, even after Red Cross officials had secured permission from the Israeli military to travel

specific routes. The Red Cross also issued a rare public statement Thursday from its headquarters in Geneva, blaming Israel for "unacceptable" delays in allowing rescue missions.
Antoine Grand, head of Red Cross operations in Gaza, said he is careful not to send his ambulance crews into active combat zones. But he said he has become increasingly frustrated at how long it takes to obtain clearance from the Israeli military to go anywhere.
"They say, 'The green light is pending, the green light is pending,' but it can take days," he said. "In the meantime, people have died because of a lack of medical care."
Other groups have experienced similar obstacles. Doctors Without Borders, a Geneva-based organization, said Monday it had been waiting three days for permission to send a crew of physicians and medical supplies into Gaza. "We're more than frustrated, of course, because we know there's a huge need for surgical services," said Franck Joncret, the group's head of mission in Jerusalem.
Aid officials said problems persist even when they're allowed to work. On Friday, the U.N. Relief and Works Agency suspended deliveries into Gaza to protest the attacks on its drivers. The Red Cross also curtailed some operations within the Gaza Strip, saying it no longer had confidence that its crews would be safe from Israeli soldiers. The disputes spurred meetings between senior U.N. and Israeli officials. In response, Israel opened the Tel Aviv center to coordinate communications with aid groups.
Lerner, the Defense Ministry spokesman, said Israel was not deliberately trying to hamper the efforts of aid groups. "The problems in the beginning can be attributed to the fact that it was an ongoing military operation," he said.

Among many Israelis, however, there is lingering distrust about the relief organizations' goals. In a column in the Wall Street Journal last week, Natan Sharansky, a former Israeli deputy prime minister, criticized the United Nations for sustaining Palestinian refugee camps that have existed in Gaza for decades. "For the rest of the world's refugees, the U.N. works tirelessly to improve their conditions, to relocate them, and to help them rebuild their lives as quickly as possible," Sharansky wrote. "With the Palestinians, the U.N. does exactly the opposite."
The U.N. Relief and Works Agency was founded in 1949 to assist Palestinians displaced by the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Originally intended as a temporary program, its charter has been extended repeatedly by the United Nations. The agency today provides food, education, health care and other social services to 4.6 million Palestinians in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and the West Bank.
Many Israelis harbor widespread doubts about the United Nations in general. Last month, Israel barred Richard Falk, a U.N. special envoy for Palestinian human rights, from entering the country, saying he was biased against Israel. Israeli officials also bristled at a vote Monday by the U.N. Human Rights Council to investigate what it called "massive violations" of Palestinian human rights by the Israeli military in Gaza.
Aid officials said they've had better luck in getting their supply convoys past Israeli checkpoints in recent days. But they said they're still unable to distribute more than a fraction of the food, medicine and other items needed in Gaza. And with reports that Israel is weighing an expansion of its ground operations, concerns are high that conditions in Gaza will deteriorate before they improve.
"The main fear we have is that the risks to civilians will get worse and that our own staff will be put in further danger," said Filippo Grandi, the deputy commissioner-general for the U.N. Relief and Works Agency. "Neither side seems to be giving signals that they will stop fighting."

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Met 2 Edition
Israelis Announce Cease-Fire In Gaza;
Olmert Declares Success; Hamas Vows to Fight On
BYLINE: Craig Whitlock and Jonathan Finer; Washington Post Foreign Service
SECTION: A-SECTION; Pg. A01
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DATELINE: JERUSALEM, Jan. 17
Israel said Saturday that it would cease fighting in the Gaza Strip and pronounced victory in the devastating war that it launched 22 days ago. But fears persisted that the conflict could rekindle, as Hamas vowed to keep up its attacks.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced a cease-fire in Gaza, effective 2 a.m. local time Sunday (7 p.m. Saturday in Washington), saying Israel had achieved its aims. He said Israel had succeeded in dealing a harsh blow to Hamas, the Islamist movement that rules Gaza, that would make it think twice about resuming its practice of firing rockets into southern Israel.
"The operation proved again the power of Israel and improved its deterrence against those who threaten it," Olmert said in a late-night televised speech. "Hamas was hit hard, in its military arms and in its government institutions."
Olmert did not say when Israeli troops would withdraw from Gaza and made clear they would fight back if Hamas did not lay down its weapons, raising the possibility that the cease-fire could be short-lived.
"If they stop firing, we will consider leaving Gaza at a time that is suitable to us," he said. "If they continue attacking us, they will again be surprised by our determination."
Hamas leaders ripped Olmert for ignoring third-party negotiations, brokered by Egypt, that have sought to bring an end to the war. They said they would continue to fight until Israel agreed to withdraw its forces from Gaza, open

border crossings and end its restrictions on the delivery of food, medicine and other supplies to the impoverished Palestinian territory.

"If the Israeli military continues its existence in the Gaza Strip, that is a wide door for the resistance against the occupation forces," Osama Hamdan, an exiled Hamas leader in Lebanon, told al-Jazeera television. Hamas, which has controlled Gaza since June 2007, does not recognize Israel's right to exist.

In Gaza, exhausted residents said they hoped that a cease-fire would take root but were skeptical. Noha Abu Jabaim, 37, a housewife whose family members were chased from their village by the fighting, said things could "still get much worse."

"We need a long cease-fire, 10 years at least," she said. "But I don't see any light of hope with either side of this conflict. Both Israel and Hamas are losers. Hamas lost because Israel hit so many civilians. As for the Israelis, they didn't end the launching of the rockets or stop the resistance. They only killed the innocents. In the end, nobody wins."

More than 1,140 Palestinians, including about 500 women and children, have been killed in Gaza since the fighting began Dec. 27, according to Gazan health officials. Thirteen Israelis, including 10 soldiers, have died.

The stated goal of the Israeli offensive was to weaken, if not destroy, Hamas so that it could no longer launch missiles and unguided rockets from Gaza into southern Israel. Palestinian fighters have fired more than 7,000 of the rockets since 2005, according to the Israeli military, and their range and lethality have progressively improved.

Although Hamas absorbed heavy losses in manpower and materiel over the past three weeks, it never lost its capacity to launch strikes on Israel. On Saturday, Palestinian fighters aimed about two dozen missiles and rockets into Israel, including several that landed after Olmert's speech.

Some security analysts said they did not expect the Israel Defense Forces to remain in Gaza for long. Israel withdrew its soldiers and settlers from Gaza in 2005, ending a presence in the territory that began in 1967 when Israeli forces occupied Gaza and the West Bank. Palestinians envision establishing a state in the two territories.

"The IDF never stands at a post passively, so if they will not go deeper, then the only way Israel will go is backwards, out of Gaza," said Menachem Klein, a professor of political science at Bar-Ilan University. "This means they may have to endure some fire from Hamas on the way out for this to hold."

But others questioned whether Israel had asserted victory prematurely and had failed to destroy Hamas's control over Gaza when it had the chance.

"Unfortunately, the goal presented was relative and not conclusive enough," said Moti Yogev, a retired army colonel and former deputy commander of Israeli forces in Gaza. "Yes, Israel went up a few steps, and now Hamas will have to think twice before it acts. But what was done was not enough. I would have made them think for 10 or 20 years before they try to do anything again."

The Israeli decision was independent of intensive peace talks that have been mediated by Egypt, which borders southern Gaza. Like Israeli leaders, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak sees Hamas as a threat because of its ties to Muslim fundamentalists who would like to overthrow the secular government in Cairo.

In his speech, Olmert thanked Mubarak but did not mention whether Israel would accept any part of a truce agreement that Egypt has been crafting in consultation with emissaries from Hamas and several European countries.

Mubarak had urged Israel earlier Saturday to declare a unilateral cease-fire in Gaza, saying the death toll had become unacceptable. Egyptian officials said Mubarak would host a summit in the Red Sea resort of Sharm el-Sheikh on Sunday, as leaders from Turkey, Jordan and several European countries gather to discuss conditions in Gaza.

In Washington, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice welcomed the Israeli announcement and called on both sides to observe a "durable" cease-fire.

Gaza saw sporadic but intensive combat Saturday. The Israeli military said it pounded more than 70 targets, including tunnels used to smuggle weapons into the territory from Egypt.

Two Palestinian brothers -- ages 5 and 7 -- were killed when an Israeli tank fired on a United Nations school in northern Gaza that had been serving as an emergency shelter for an estimated 1,600 people.

The incident was the latest Israeli attack on a U.N. building. On Thursday, the Israeli military shelled a compound belonging to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency, injuring three people and setting a warehouse ablaze. On Jan. 6, Israeli mortar shells struck another U.N. school serving as an emergency shelter, killing 43 people, according to U.N. and Palestinian health officials.

Saturday's strike prompted U.N. officials to ask for an independent investigation to determine whether a war crime had been committed, the first time they have done so since Israel began its offensive. "We think it's necessary," said Christopher Gunness, a spokesman for the U.N. Relief and Works Agency. "We'd like to see the facts speak for themselves."

In each of the attacks on U.N. buildings, the Israeli military has said it was responding to shots or mortar fire from Hamas fighters, although Israeli officials have apologized for Thursday's strike.

The Israeli military said Saturday that it would investigate the latest incident but again suggested that soldiers were defending themselves. "Initial inquiries have shown that in all of these incidents, soldiers were fired upon, either from the buildings in question or from their vicinity," the Israel Defense Forces said in a statement.

In his speech, Olmert said Israel was continuing its efforts to win the freedom of Cpl. Gilad Shalit, who has been held by Hamas in Gaza since June 2006, when he was grabbed by Palestinian fighters during a raid on an Israeli army post.

"We do not need any prompting on this issue," Olmert said. "The political attempts have started long before the military operation did, and will continue."

Israeli society places the highest premium on the welfare of its soldiers, and there is widespread public pressure on the government to secure Shalit's freedom. The Israeli government has in the past released Palestinian prisoners in exchange for captured soldiers.
In a letter to the Israeli government released Saturday, before the announcement of the cease-fire, Shalit's family said his return "must be an overt and explicit part of any agreement."
Shalit's capture and the subsequent seizure of two other Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah fighters in northern Israel helped spark a two-front war in July 2006. At the time, Olmert said the soldiers' return was a precondition for peace.
But after the war, Shalit, now 22, remained in custody.
The remains of the other two soldiers were returned last summer in exchange for five Lebanese fighters held by Israel.
"We are facing a critical juncture and a one-time window of opportunity to return Gilad, after more than 2 1/2 years in Hamas captivity," Noam Shalit, the soldier's father, said at a news conference Saturday.
As the cabinet met Saturday night, hundreds of demonstrators gathered outside the Defense Ministry headquarters in Tel Aviv, chanting, "No deal without Gilad," Israeli news services reported.
Special correspondent Reyham Abdel Kareem in Gaza City and researcher Samuel Sockol contributed to this report.

Appedix 5.2: Texts of the Sampled Editorials

Guardian
GA-GU-30-DEC-04
Gaza air strikes: Arab reaction: Islamists urge pro-western regimes to act
BYLINE: Ian Black, Middle East editor
SECTION: GUARDIAN HOME PAGES; Pg. 6
LENGTH: 586 words
Israel's offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip is putting western-backed Arab governments under pressure from Islamist movements at home and in the region, as well as from Iran, which is stepping up its rhetoric against the US and Israel.
The continuing onslaught yesterday led to the suspension of talks between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, as well as those between Syria and Israel, brokered by Turkey.
Little progress had been taking place on either track, but the symbolism was clear.
"It is not possible to carry on the negotiations under these conditions," Ali Babacan, Turkey's foreign minister, said.
Egypt, which controlled Gaza until it was conquered by Israel in 1967, again came under fire because of its relations with Israel, Hamas and the Lebanese Hezbollah movement openly accusing it of colluding with the attacks.
The Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's biggest opposition movement, and an ally of the fellow Islamists of Hamas, called on Arabs and Muslims to rise up against "the despicable silence and connivance on the part of most Arab and Islamic governments".
Egypt condemns Israel's Gaza operation, but implies that Hamas is to blame for having failed to renew the shaky six-month ceasefire when it expired 10 days ago.
"If you can't kill the wolf, don't pull its tail," an article in the state-run daily, al-Ahram, said.
Ahmed Abul-Gheit, Egypt's foreign minister, said he had warned his Israeli counterpart, Tzipi Livni, not to attack Gaza. "Unfortunately, what happened happened," he told reporters after talks with Babacan in Ankara. "The question is, what can we do about it now?"
Abul-Gheit also criticised Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's leader, for urging Egyptians to demonstrate against Hosni Mubarak's government.
Pro-Palestinian protests were held in Cairo, but the interior ministry declared a state of emergency for its security forces, cancelling all leave.
In Beirut thousands of demonstrators came out in solidarity with the Palestinians in response to Nasrallah's televised appeal. Israel's actions, Nasrallah said, were against the entire Palestinian people, not just Hamas.
Syria, which openly backs Hamas and is Iran's only Arab ally, called for an emergency summit meeting of the 22-member Arab League to discuss the crisis.
But the signs were that Arab governments would again be paralysed by their divisions. League foreign ministers had been due to meet yesterday, but the meeting was postponed until tomorrow. Saudi Arabia has called on the US to intervene. Buthayna Shaaban, a Syrian government spokeswoman, condemned what was happening in Gaza as "a genocide, a crime against humanity, and a terrorist operation against the defenceless Palestinian people". The line-up of Arab forces is similar to that during the 2006 conflict, when Syria backed Hezbollah while the conservative and US-backed authoritarian regimes quietly acquiesced in Israel's actions until pressure mounted for a ceasefire. Iran, which rejects any dealings with Israel, has reacted furiously to the Gaza crisis, perhaps also seeing a welcome diversion from international focus on its nuclear ambitions.
Thousands of Iranians shouted "Down with USA" and "Down with Israel" in Tehran yesterday, many carrying banners reading "Israel must be wiped off the face of the earth".

Reports from Tehran said a group of Iranian clerics was signing up volunteers to fight in Gaza. Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called on Muslims around the world yesterday to defend Palestinians "in any way possible".

GA-GU-07-JAN-03
Gaza: Behind the battle lines, fight for ceasefire gathers pace
BYLINE: Ian Black, Middle East editor and Ed Pilkington, New York
SECTION: GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES; Pg. 6
LENGTH: 777 words

Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, claimed last night a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip was "not far off" as he unexpectedly returned to Egypt after talks in Syria, which is the chief Arab ally of the Hamas movement fighting Israel's invasion. Sarkozy flew from Beirut back to Sharm el-Sheikh on the Red Sea for a second, unscheduled meeting with President Hosni Mubarak, a major player in international attempts to engineer a truce between Israel and the Palestinians. The move, as diplomats gathered at the UN in New York to discuss the crisis, suggested the possible beginnings of shuttle diplomacy to call a halt to Israel's 11-day onslaught.

Sarkozy gave no details, but said during a visit to French troops serving with the UN in south Lebanon: "I'm convinced there are solutions. We are not far from that. What is needed is simply for one of the players to start for things to go in the right direction." Gordon Brown also said he was hopeful of finding the basis for a ceasefire.

Earlier, a Hamas delegation held talks in Cairo with General Omar Suleiman, Mubarak's intelligence chief, who has brokered previous ceasefires in Gaza. The meeting was Hamas's first contact with a main regional player since fighting began on 27 December, and afterwards Egypt said it proposed an immediate ceasefire between Israel and Gaza, an end to the blockade of Gaza, and talks on border arrangements.

Osama Hamdan, the Hamas representative in Lebanon, said later that nothing had been agreed.

"Israel is attempting to kill as many civilians as they can to exert pressure on the people of Gaza," he [Osama Hamdan] said.

In Jerusalem, an Israeli official said Sarkozy had presented Israel with a serious initiative, in partnership with Egypt. Discussions were focused on the size and equipment of an "international presence" to be deployed on the border between Egypt and Gaza. Later Israel's prime minister, Ehud Olmert, said Israel was to set up a "humanitarian corridor" into Gaza, allowing periodic access to the Strip to allow the transfer of "people, foodstuffs and medicines".

Tony Blair, representing the Middle East Quartet - the US, EU, UN and Russia - spoke of the need to cut off the supply of arms and money through tunnels under the border. "I think if there were strong, clear, definitive action on that, that would give us the best context to get an immediate ceasefire and to start to change the situation," Blair said.

Calls for a Gaza ceasefire dominated a debate last night at the UN security council, with attention focused on the US position. Last weekend Washington blocked a Libyan-sponsored call for an immediate truce, arguing that it had to be "durable". The UN security council in New York last night became the stage for a war of words between the Israelis and Palestinians, amid frantic diplomatic efforts to secure a durable ceasefire within days.

Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, asked the security council to act immediately to stop the Israeli operation in Gaza, which he described as a catastrophe for his people.

He [Mahmoud Abbas] said the "massacre" at the UN school in the Jabaliya refugee camp was "proof of the heinous crime being committed against our people.

Children fall before their mothers, roofs fall down on entire families, and the cries of the innocents in their agonies rise."

Any delay from the UN in imposing a ceasefire on Israel, he said, would deepen the tragedy. Young Palestinians would conclude in that event that "hope in peace, commitment to international law are all mirages that will never come true - that the present and future is only open to extremism". The Israeli ambassador to the UN, Gabriela Shalev, adopted equally stark language to defend before the security council the military operation, insisting that Israel took every possible measure to prevent civilian casualties. The Israeli government had no choice but to launch the assault "in the face of terrorism. We have to defend ourselves not from the Palestinian people but from the terrorists who have taken over their streets."

The foreign secretary, David Miliband, addressed the security council immediately after the Palestinian and Israeli envoys, saying their speeches underlined the challenge facing the UN. "The UK believes the crisis in Gaza is an indication of our collective failure - all of us - to bring about a two-state solution," he said. He said the task was to give substance and permanence to a ceasefire. That would involve finding ways to curb the smuggling of weapons to Hamas, and the opening of crossings under Palestinian control to undercut smuggling. 'There are solutions. We are not far from that. What is needed is simply for one of the players to start'

Times (London)
Times 16 January 2009 Gaza
GA-TL-16-JAN-01
Smoke Screen
Israel's cause is just but some of its tactics are self-defeating

Eleven days ago The *Times* reported that Israel appeared to be using white phosphorus shells over built-up areas of Gaza.
Since then, Israeli spokesmen and women have issued a series of increasingly forlorn denials as the number of Palestinian deaths in Gaza bas passed 1,000 and many of the injured have been treated for burns caused, apparently, by white phosphorus
It is time to clear the air. Israel has a right to defend itself, and the nature of its enemy makes that task extraordinarily hard.
Hamas, like Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, regards the use of civilians as human shields as a central plank of its strategy for tormenting Israel. Like its principal state sponsor, Iran, Hamas's rallying cry is not the creation of a Palestinian state but the destruction of the Jewish one.
This is why, when a ceasefire ended last month with' an onslaught of Hamas rockets aimed at civilian Israeli targets, Israel had no choice but to prosecute this war.
But the need to strike back does not excuse the mistakes that Israel has made in doing so. The dreadful death toll from 20 days of fighting points to three possible conclusions about Israel's methods and intentions: first, that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) are guilty of woeful failures of execution, not least the shelling of a UN aid distribution centre in Gaza City; second, that despite years of meticulous intelligence gathering on the Hamas threat, the IDF have committed needless tactical errors in fighting it; or, third, that Israel actually intends to send a message that it is willing to incur international opprobrium for the bloodshed in Gaza if that is the price of breaking the will of Hamas and the Palestinians of Gaza who suffer under its ruleThe first two conclusions are broadly accurate.
The third is not. Israelis grieve as all humans do for the children cut down in Gaza's maelstrom, and their leaders know full well the damage that this conflict is doing to the country's reputation, especially where images of Palestinian suffering are broadcast more as propaganda than news.
The lDF's continued obfuscation on white phosphorus only compound that damage.
White phosphorus is illegal under international law when used in built-up areas, but a legitimate weapon of war when used to provide cover for troops in open country. There is scant evidence of the IDF using it deliberately against civilians, but northern Gaza, where the fighting is concentrated, is one of the most densely' populated places in the worldCivilian casualties were inevitable, and the deep bums that white phosphorus can cause are virtually untreatable.
The longer that the IDF equivocate about its use, the more ammunition they hand to those who would accuse them of war crimes (see page 4). It bears repeating that the crime that triggered this war was last month's Hamas rocket barrage; vivid proof of its defining dread of peace. Hamas knew then that only its refusal to acknowledge Israel's right to exist stood in the way of a resumption of the peace process. It knows now that only its refusal to end the rocket attacks and stop rearming through tunnels under Gaza's Egyptian border stands in the way of a ceasefire. Israel holds itself to higher standards than its enemies.
So does the world. That is why, as the world waits for Hamas to accept Israel and renounce violence, it also expects Israel to prosecute this war with greater respect for civilian life.

Times (London)
Bitter Harvest
Israel had little choice but to respond to the Hamas attacks. But its deadly action shatters hopes for the already battered Middle East peace plan
Number of words: 615
No author
After eight days of rocket attacks from Gaza the Palestinian group Hamas seemed to have left Israel with little choice but to retaliate. On Saturday it did so, launching one of the deadliest series of air assaults in the history of the 60-year-old conflict. As a result, innocent lives are being destroyed. The Middle East peace plan was already dog-eared. It now looks threadbare.The latest tragedy is the outcome of a vicious cycle that has gripped Gaza since Hamas seized full control of the territory from the more moderate, secular Palestinian Fatah movement in June 2007. Israel tightened its blockade as a result, and has been demanding that Hamas cease its rocket attacks. Hamas vowed to continue them until Israel opened the border and stopped retaliating.
In the past few weeks, an uneasy six-month truce between the two sides has unravelled. Israel has tightened its control of the border, permitting only the intermittent delivery of humanitarian supplies. The result is a violent impasse that shows no sign of abating, despite the call by the UN Security Council (see pages 6, 7 and 8) for an immediate end to the bloodshed.
The increase in violence is a huge blow for the moderate Palestinian leadership. Prolonged fighting in Gaza would make it extremely difficult for the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank to continue the peace talks.
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is left looking beleaguered as he rightly calls for Egypt to help to negotiate a new truce.

The animosity between Hamas and Fatah had already shredded the notion of a united Palestinian leadership. This latest move underlines the deep divisions that exist on the Palestinian side, divisions that are exacerbated by Iranian backing for Hamas and other militant groups in Gaza.
Yesterday's call by the exiled Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal, for Palestinians from both Gaza and the West Bank to come together in a new Islamist intifada, or uprising, was a clear attempt to undermine Mr Abbas's Fatah administration. Both the Israelis and Palestinians have failed in Gaza.
The Israelis had hoped to make life intolerable for Hamas, intending either that it would reform and start to co-operate, or that the people of Gaza would decide that they had had enough of their Government.
Neither has happened.
On the contrary, the bold words of Hamas leaders suggest that they have found renewed strength through the conflict. In their turn, the Palestinians have claimed to want peace.
But they have been only occasional partners in the peace process, and sometimes openly hostile. Israel's withdrawal from Gaza three years ago was a traumatic process for that country.
It removed its soldiers and settlers from the coastal strip, only then to come under fire from its new neighbours. There will be plenty of Israeli politicians happy to argue that Hamas has squandered its chance. Both the leading candidates to become Israel's next prime minister, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and Likud party leader Binyamin Netanyahu, have said that they are prepared to use military force to overthrow Hamas in Gaza (although Ms Livni has also said that there is no wish to reoccupy Gaza).
With the election looming in February - the timing of the violence is not coincidental - such a venture looks increasingly possible.
But the human price would be terrible. Israeli leaders must consider whether their country's security would really come from more bloodshed. In Gaza, Hamas leaders have gone into hiding.
They are leaving their people to bear the brunt of the Israeli attacks. Yet most of the impoverished citizens of Gaza just want a better life.
They must decide whether more moderate leaders could offer them that, rather than a vicious cycle of senseless destruction.

New York Times
GA-NYT-16-JAN-03
A Way Out of Gaza?
SECTION: Section A; Column 0; Editorial Desk; EDITORIAL; Pg. 28
LENGTH: 509 words
We agree that Israel had to defend itself against Hamas's rocket attacks. But we fear the assault on Gaza has passed the point of diminishing returns. It is time for a cease-fire with Hamas and a return to the peace negotiations that are the only real hope for guaranteeing Israel's long-term security. We are encouraged that a cease-fire finally seems to be gaining traction. Although not much detail is known, reports have focused on an Egyptian proposal for a phased-in truce, followed by a pullout of Israeli forces and the reopening of border crossings to ease the economic blockade of Gaza. The sudden diplomatic activity came as Israel unleashed its heaviest shelling of Gaza neighborhoods, including a hit on a United Nations compound where hundreds of Palestinians had taken shelter. Israeli officials acknowledge that the 20-day offensive has not permanently crippled Hamas's military wing or ended its ability to launch rocket attacks.
It is unlikely that Israel can achieve those aims militarily any time soon.
The cost in human life and anti-Israeli fury would be enormous.
Already more than 1,000 Palestinians have died in the densely populated Gaza Strip, where an always miserable life has become unbearable.
Thirteen Israelis have died.
We also fear that the war is further weakening the palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, and his Fatah faction -- Hamas's sworn enemy.
We know Mr. Abbas's limitations, but he believes in a two-state solution. If there is going to be a negotiated peace, he is the best hope.
As part of a cease-fire deal, Israel is right to demand a permanent halt to Hamas's rocket fire.
Israel is also right not to rely on Hamas's promises. Hamas used the last cease-fire to restock its arsenal with weapons ferried in through tunnels dug under the Egypt-Gaza border.
The best protection would be to place monitors on the Egypt-Gaza border to stop the smuggling that is Hamas's lifeline. The Israelis also must be ready to ease their blockade of Gaza to allow more food and normal economic activity. The Israeli foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, is expected in Washington on Friday where she will sign a hastily arranged deal to accept United States equipment and technical assistance to help monitor the Israeli-Gaza border. American and Israeli officials say that Israel would never accept a cease-fire without that help and both are eager to heap praise on Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice for making it happen.
But Washington could have provided that assistance years ago -- just as it should have been pressing harder on every aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
President-elect Barack Obama says he will work for a peace deal from Day 1. We hope Israel picks a new leader in elections next month who is truly committed to a two-state solution. With the support of the new American president, he or she must make an early downpayment on peace by ending settlement construction, cooperating seriously with Mr. Abbas and improving the lives of all Palestinians in the West Bank and in Gaza.

Washington Post
GA-WP-28-DEC-02
Israel Strikes; Hamas suffers a serious blow -- but the real winner may be Iran.
SECTION: EDITORIAL COPY; Pg. B06; LENGTH: 540 words
ISRAEL'S AIR offensive against the Gaza Strip yesterday should not have been a surprise for anyone who has been following the mounting hostilities in the region -- least of all the Hamas movement, which invited the conflict by ending a six-month-old ceasefire and launching scores of rockets and mortar shells at Israel during the past 10 days. The initial Israeli strikes appeared to deal a punishing blow to the Islamic movement, reportedly killing several of its leaders and dozens of other militants and security force members. Inevitably, however, civilians were among the more than 200 reported Palestinian dead, and renewed Palestinian rocket fire against Israeli cities killed at least one person. While Israel could justifiably describe its action as one of self-defense, it's far from clear that it will end up improving the country's security -- even as it risks a wider conflict. Israeli officials say the aim of the attack is a modest one: to force Hamas to return to the uneasy and informal truce, under which Palestinian rocket and mortar fire was curtailed if not entirely stopped and Israel relaxed but did not lift its economic blockade of Gaza.

Hamas's Damascus-based leadership, which ordered an end to this "calm," as Israel calls it, also seems to have a relatively limited objective. It demands an end to all Israeli (and Egyptian) restrictions on movement in and out of Gaza in exchange for more quasi-peace. One considerable obstacle to such an outcome is that Israel is engaged in an election campaign in which the various candidates -- including the serving defense and foreign ministers -- are staking out hawkish positions. The outgoing Bush administration, for its part, was quick to offer support to Israel yesterday and to blame the conflict on Hamas. Over time, however, a fight in Gaza could be costly for Israel.
Military commanders have repeatedly warned that it could lead to punishing attacks on Israeli cities, spread to the West Bank or Lebanon, or force a ground invasion that would cause thousands of casualties and leave Israeli troops stranded without an exit strategy. Israel cannot stop rocket attacks by military action alone; eventually a political deal will be needed. And any hopes its leaders have of overthrowing Hamas's government in Gaza are probably illusory, unless a long-term reoccupation of the territory is undertaken. While the fighting lasts -- and Israeli officials were warning yesterday that it could be prolonged -- Hamas's principal sponsor, Iran, will have achieved a tactical success. Israeli diplomats have been working feverishly in recent weeks to focus international attention on the Iranian nuclear program as the Obama administration prepares to take office. They've been warning that the new U.S. president will have to act quickly if an Iranian bomb is to be stopped.
Now, for weeks or possibly months to come, all eyes will be on Gaza -- on the fighting, the continued suffering of civilians and the need for a fresh settlement.
Israel might have avoided this fight, and gained a diplomatic advantage of its own, by relaxing the economic blockade. Now it will be embroiled in a costly battle that, in the end, is a distraction from the most serious threat it faces.

Hard Lesson for Israel
GA-WP-09-JAN-02
BYLINE: Jackson Diehl
SECTION: EDITORIAL COPY; Pg. A17
LENGTH: 813 words
Israel's military campaign in the Gaza Strip is failing, but there may be a silver lining.
The war against Hamas is proving -- once again -- that the Middle East's extremist movements cannot be eliminated by military means.
If the incoming Obama administration absorbs that lesson, it will have a better chance of neutralizing Iranian-backed groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and of eventually brokering an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement.
Israel's bet was that it could substantially reduce Hamas's military capacity and then force it to accept a cease-fire with improved terms for Israel.
Hamas, predictably, has refused to play by those rules. It has defined victory as its own survival; by that standard, it has no incentive to agree to a new truce unless it receives major benefits in return, such as an end to Israel's economic blockade. That means Israel must choose among attempting to drive the Islamic movement from power (which would be hugely costly and leave its troops stuck in Gaza indefinitely), making significant concessions to Hamas or withdrawing without any assurance that rocket fire against its cities would ceaseAt best, outgoing Prime Minister Ehud Olmert might win an agreement for international forces to help stop the smuggling of new weapons from Egypt into Gaza, something that doesn't necessarily require Hamas's consent. But that won't stop Hamas from continuing to build its own rockets or from claiming that -- like Hezbollah in Lebanon -- it successfully resisted an Israeli invasion. The trap that Olmert, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni have created for themselves lies not just in Hamas's ability to withdraw its fighters and rockets into mosques, schools and densely populated neighborhoods, where they could probably survive weeks of bloody fighting or go underground.
The larger fallacy is the persistent conceit among Israeli leaders that Hamas can somehow be wiped out by economic strangulation or force of arms.
Unlike al-Qaeda, Hamas is not merely a terrorist organization but a social and political movement with considerable support. Its ideology, however repugnant to Israel and the West, is shared by a considerable slice of the population in every Arab country from Morocco to Iraq. Because it is extremist, it thrives on war, the suffering

it inflicts on Palestinians, and the anger generated by the endless, graphic and one-sided coverage of the Middle East's satellite television channels. Every day this war continues, Hamas grows politically stronger, as do its allies in other countries and its sponsor, Iran. Though Israel must defend its citizens against rockets and suicide bombings, the only means of defeating Hamas are political. Palestinians, who have no history of attraction to religious fundamentalism, have to be persuaded to choose more moderate leaders, such as the secular Fatah. In the meantime, Hamas's existence must be tolerated, and it should be encouraged to channel its ambitions into politics rather than military activity. That means, yes, elections -- like those Hamas won in 2006, when it took control of the Palestinian legislature. Those elections took place over Israel's objections, and the outcome caused the Bush administration, which had championed democracy in the Middle East, to lose its nerve. But during the relative quiet of the past six months, when Israel and Hamas observed a semi-truce, politics was beginning to work. Polls conducted by Palestinians showed that Hamas's support was falling in Gaza and the West Bank. Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority president and Fatah leader, was beginning to talk about holding new elections for president and the legislature; he thought he could win both.

Egypt was working on brokering a deal between the two Palestinian parties. A split began to emerge in Hamas between leaders who wanted to make that deal and extend the peace with Israel, and Iranian-backed hard-liners who wanted to draw Israel into a fight. Israel probably could have ensured that the moderates won the argument by offering to lift its economic blockade of Gaza in exchange for a continued cease-fire. It then could have focused on negotiating a two-state settlement with Abbas and on improving life for Palestinians in the West Bank, while Hamas absorbed the blame for the unremediable misery of Gazans. Instead, Israel took the Iranian bait and chose to fight. Now, bogged down, suffering casualties and inflicting many more, creating terrible pictures for television, it will have to accept an unsatisfying settlement -- or prolong its agony indefinitely.

It should settle so that the leaders chosen by Israeli voters in an election next month will have the chance to work with a fresh American administration on a smarter and more effective strategy for countering Iran and its clients -- one grounded in politics rather than bombs.

Appendix 6.1: Calculations of Percentages of Other Actors in News Stories

NP	No. of clauses	US				UK				EU				UN				Arab				International				other nationalities			
		Dir		Ind		Dir		Ind		Dir		Ind		Dir		Ind		Dir		Ind		Dir		Ind		Dir		Ind	
		No.	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
GU	101	3	3,0%	1	1%	2	2,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	3	3,0%	9	8,9%	1	1,0%	2	2,0%	2	2,0%	2	2,0%	1	1,0%	4	4,0%
TL	94	4	4,3%	2	2%	3	3,2%	3	3,2%	2	2,1%	2	2,1%	3	3,2%	4	4,3%	0	0,0%	3	3,2%	2	2,1%	1	1,1%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%
NYT	226	4	1,8%	2	1%	0	0,0%	1	0,4%	0	0,0%	3	1,3%	8	3,5%	6	2,7%	2	0,9%	5	2,2%	0	0,0%	3	1,3%	1	0,4%	9	4,0%
WP	282	17	6,0%	9	3%	0	0,0%	1	0,4%	3	1,1%	5	1,8%	17	6,0%	13	4,6%	1	0,4%	2	0,7%	9	3,2%	25	8,9%	1	0,4%	2	0,7%
Total	703	28	4,0%	14	2%	5	0,7%	5	0,7%	5	0,7%	10	1,4%	31	4,4%	32	4,6%	4	0,6%	12	1,7%	13	1,8%	31	4,4%	3	0,4%	15	2,1%