Gaza University
Faculty of Communication & Languages

Translation and Politics:

A Case of the Deal of the Century in Al-Mezan

A graduation project submitted
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By

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Dedication

To the soul of my dear grandmothers, whose presence brought life to everything and

whose absence brought great pain

(May their souls rest in peace)

To my hero dad and precious mum, the first teachers and the best moral school ever

To my distinguished sister, Nada

To my lovely brothers Ibrahim, Ahmad and Hisham

To them all, I dedicate my graduation project.

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List of Abbreviations

SL	Source language
TL	Target language
TS	Translation Studies
ST	Source text
TT	Target text
ALF	The Arab Liberation Front
DFLP	The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PA	The Palestinian Authority
PALF	The Palestine Arab Liberation Front
PDA	The Palestinian Democratic Assembly
PFLP	The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO	The Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PLF	The Palestinian Liberation Front
PM	Prime Minister
PPSF	The Palestine Popular Struggle Front
PPP	The Palestinian People's Party
PNI	The Palestinian National Initiative

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1   Background

Translation has become one of the most important means for understanding international relations in particular within the subjects of Arts, Literature, Politics, Law, Economics and Technology. It also has an overwhelming influence on the way people communicate and understand other languages, cultures and beliefs. The quality of translation largely depends on the translator's knowledge, skill, cultural background and awareness of a combination of factors including the source text (ST), such as context, syntax, culture, style and more.

According to Toury (1980: 200)[1], translation is considered as a type of activity which definitely involves at least two languages and two culture-related aspects. Thus, cultural diversity makes translation a hard task. According to Bell (1991: 6) "*translation is the replacement of a representation of a text in one language by a representation of an equivalent text in a second language*".[2] Therefore, equivalence is one of the most difficult issues within the realm of translation. While achieving the equivalence between units of the SL and TL is the foremost aim of the translation, it is not easy to achieve terminological equivalence in Arabic-English translation, particularly, when dealing with political terms. More specifically, Shunnaq (1997: 18) states that variations between languages in terms of linguistic forms and cultural patterns may vary in scope depending on the gap linguistically and culturally between the two languages.[3] This, in turn, leads to a lack of synonymy of culturally-bound terms.

As for Translating Political Texts, the theorists Hatim & Mason (1990: 1997) consider translation as *"a communicative process that takes place in a social context"*.[4] They claim that the translator is doing the work within a large social system. Social purposes, context and the relationship between the sender and the receiver play an important role in translation. More

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[1] Toury, G., (1980) *In Search of a Theory of Translation*. Tel Aviv: The Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics, Tel Aviv University.
[2] Bell, R. T., (1991) *Translation and translating: Theory and practice*. London and New York: Longman.
[3] Shunnaq, A., (1997). *Issues in Translation: Problems in Translating Arabic Texts into English*. Irbid: Irbid National University & Jordanian Translators' Association.
[4] Hatim, B. & Mason, I., (1990) *Discourse and the Translator*. London: Longman Inc., New York.

importantly, because each culture or country has its own political system, political language can be difficult to translate.

According to Newmark (1991: 147-148), the political language contains many abstract concepts which may cause difficulties; at first sight, seem to be easy to translate. Take, for example, the words *democracy* and *communism* which exist in many languages. A direct translation of these words could turn out to be hard because conveying the intended meaning may not be straightforward. Such concepts often have different meanings in different countries since they are strongly influenced by the political tradition of their countries (Newmark, 1991: 142). [1]

As mentioned earlier, translation plays a key role in understanding international relations pertaining Arts, Literature, Politics, Law, Economics and Technology… etc. Thus, politics is one of the areas causing problems in translation as it is an integral part of human daily life. It plays a key role in shaping people's thinking at the social, economic, philosophical and ideological level. Therefore, translating political texts from one language into another is not an easy task for the cultural gap between languages. As a result, to complete the translation process successfully, translators should have knowledge of both the SL and TL as well as the subject itself.

On the other hand, the key role played by politics in humans' lives gives importance to the translation of political books and works. As a result, the importance of translating political texts and terms is drastically increasing due to the continuous emergence of new terms and expressions which require accurate translation taking into consideration the intended meaning.

The translation of a Source Text (ST) is taken from a 2019-published book called صفقة القرن في الميزان.[2] It is translated as *'The Deal of the Century Hangs in the Balance;* it is part of "*The Path to Independence*" series issued by the "Palestinian Center for Documentation and Information".

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[1] Newmark, P., (1991) *About Translation*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
[2] The authors of the book are:
  - Qais Abdul Karim, a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and of the political bureau of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
  - Tayseer Khaled, a member of the politburo of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
  - Ramzi Rabah, a senior member of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

The title indicates that the fate of the *pro-Israel* (my emphasis) deal hangs in the balance. A number of regional and international players have welcomed the plan announced by the Trump administration, openly defying the rules-based international order.[1] Trump's deal is basically asking for another huge compromise from the Palestinian leadership. At the end of the day, the deal will turn any would-be Palestinian state into a Swiss cheese—with the disconnected "holes in the cheese" being Palestine.

This "deal" was pushed forward by Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and Trump's regional representative, Jason Greenblatt at an international economic workshop in Bahrain on June 25-26. Their stated aim was to launch the Middle East peace plan by encouraging investment and economic promises in the Palestinian territory. However, their proposal seemed destined to fail for several reasons. First, the Palestinian leadership boycotted the gathering. Additionally, all major Palestinian actors, including the Palestinian Authority (PA), Fatah, Islamic Jihad and Hamas, stood against the conference. The conference itself was seen as another unilateral attempt by the Trump administration and its regional allies on the Middle East Peace problem.

Worse, the majority of regional powers including Iran and Turkey have adopted a confrontational approach to Trump's Middle East approach. On the global level, there was strong opposition and unwillingness to consider this anything other than unilateral posturing for Trump's domestic base in the United States; the European Union still supports a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, and Russia and China continue to resolutely oppose Trump's projections for the region.

Further, the majority of Arab countries were reluctant to attend the conference fearing domestic backlash for paying lip service to a heavily pro-Israel biased Trump administration. For instance, in spite of being US allies, states such as Kuwait, Qatar and Oman were unwilling to go to the conference. Jordan and Egypt were also hesitant to participate; however, after heavy pressure from the United States and Saudi Arabia, they decided to attend. Although the stated purpose of the conference was encouraging investment and economic

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- Samir Mustafa Abu Mdallalah, an Associate Professor, Faculty of Economic and Administrative Science, Al-Azhar University – Gaza.

[1] ILC, (2001), Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, *Article 41*, available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.

promises in the Palestinian territory, the Trump administration was seeking to buy off Palestinians and deprive them of an independent state. At the same time, the proposal was envisioned as a tool for improving the relationship of the Gulf states and Israeli as a means to bolster the anti-Iranian coalition in the region.

1.2   Target Readership

As a part of the translation process, I am to translate the text for an English-speaking newspaper (*The Guardian*)[1], a British daily newspaper, which was founded in 1821. First, *The Guardian* is chosen because it is reported to be the most-read of the '*quality newsbrands*' in the UK.[2] In our context, the intended readership is native speakers of English in the UK who resist any translation offering and creating a pro-Israeli narrative. The readership is expected to demonstrate a thorough and detailed knowledge of the Arab-Israeli conflict, with a main focus on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but does not have any specialist expertise in the issues being explored.

1.3   Structure of the Project

The project consists of three chapters:

Chapter One outlines an introduction and a background of the project as well as the target readership. *Chapter Two* reviews the relevant literature with an emphasis on the following questions: What is translation? What are translation problems and difficulties encountered in the translation of politics-related texts? What are translation strategies used? What are translation decisions made by the researcher/ translator? *Chapter Three* presents the translation of the political text in question.

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[1] For more articles to read regarding the Guardian's view of the US Deal of the Century, look at these websites: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jan/29/the-guardian-view-on-trumps-peace-plan-a-con-not-a-deal; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jan/30/donald-trump-israel-palestinians-middle-east [Accessed on Sunday, 26 April 2020].
[2] For more information concerning '*the Guardian being a reliable source*', visit this website: https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/oct/31/guardian-rated-most-trusted-newspaper-brand-in-uk-study [Accessed on Sunday, 26 April 2020].

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This chapter includes a number of theoretical studies related to translation and mainly related to political translation; it emphasizes on the following points: What is translation? What are translation problems and difficulties encountered in the translation of politics-related texts? What are translation strategies used? What are translation decisions made by the researcher/translator?

2.1 What is Translation?

Translation was not considered a serious intellectual activity until the seventeenth century although there were some insightful observations on translation from time to time. It was only from the seventeenth century onwards that the critics started looking more closely into the nature of translation. In 1970s, Translation Studies (henceforth, TS) developed into an independent discipline. It leads to the establishment of qualified departments in various universities. The development of translation studies affected major changes in the principles and theories of translation during the twentieth century. Prominent contributions were made by scholars. The most innovative theorists in this field are Catford, Newmark, Vinay and Darbelnet, Jakobson, Nida and Taber, Munday, House and finally Baker.

In his book, *A linguistic theory of translation*, Catford defines translation as *"the replacement of textual material in one language; source language (SL) by equivalent textual material in another language; target language (TL)"*.[1] He describes translation as a uni-directional process; it is always performed from a given source language to a given target language. In Catford's view, the aim of translation is to find the target language equivalents, and he also gives importance to meaning and spirit in translation.

Newmark is ranked as another prominent scholar in translation studies. According to Newmark (1988: 5) "*translation is rendering the meaning of a text into another language in the way that the author intended the text*".[2] Bell stated that translation has been variously defined. He says

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[1] Catford, J., (1965). *A linguistic theory of translation. An essay in applied Linguistics*. London: Oxford University Press.
[2] Newmark, P., (1988) *A textbook of translation*. New York & London: Prentice Hall.

(1991: 5), "*the expression in another language (or target language) of what has been expressed in another, source language, preserving semantic and stylistic equivalences*".[1] Similarly, Lederer (2003: 3) states that "*translation is a process which attempts to establish equivalence between two texts expressed in two different languages. These equivalents are, by definition, always dependent on the nature of the two texts, on their objective, on the relationship between the two cultures involved*".[2] Nida (1964: 94) stated that "*language is part of the culture, but translation from one language to another involves, in addition to other cultural problems, the social characteristics of respect language*".[3]

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2.2   Translation Difficulties in Translating Political Texts

According to Ghazala (1995: 17), *"A translation problem is any difficulty we come across at translating, that invites us to stop translating in order to check, recheck, reconsider or rewrite it, or use a dictionary, or a reference of some kind to help us overcome it and make sense of it. It is anything in the SL text which forces us to stop translating. A translation problem can be posed by grammar, words, style, and or sounds. Thus, we have grammatical, lexical, stylistic and phonological problems".*[4]

Ray (2002: 21) points out that the translation dilemma is as old as history, and Cicero summed up the translator's dilemma in the following words: *"If I render word for word, the result will sound uncouth and if I compelled by necessity, I alter anything in the order or wording. I shall seem to have departed from the function of a translator".*[5]

According to Newmark (1988: 32-33), *"the chief difficulties in translating are lexical, not grammatical - i.e. words, collocations and fixed phrases or idioms".* Accordingly, he believes that *"difficulties are of two kinds: a) you don't understand them; b) you find them hard to translate. If you can't understand a word, it may be because all possible meanings are not known to you or because its meaning is determined by its unusual collocation or are reference elsewhere in the text".*[6]

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[1] Bell, R. T., (1991) Translation and translating: Theory and practice. London and New York: Longman.
[2] Lederer, M., (2003) *Translation: The interpretive model.* Manchester: St. Jerome Pub.
[3] Nida, E. (1964) *Principles of Correspondence.* In Venuti, L., Ed., The Translation Studies Reader, Routledge, London.
[4] Ghazala, H., (1995) *Translation as problems and solutions: a textbook for university students and trainee translators.* Dar al ilm lilmalayin.
[5] Ray, M., (2002) (Ed.) *Studies in translation.* Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors.
[6] Newmark, P., (1988) *A textbook of translation.* New York & London: Prentice Hall.

In case of translating political texts, Tawfiq (2011)[1] clarifies some of the problems that may face the translator as clashing ideologies, neologisms, adopting the wrong approach, translational inaccuracy and political metaphor which will be illustrated below.

Newmark (1991: 161) comments *"the translator's neutrality is a myth"*. So, this can be shown in using the term '*deal of the century*' or '*the long-awaited peace plan*' by the western media for the Palestinians who resist the Israeli occupation, instead of using the expression 'the Pro-Israel peace plan'. However, an Arab translator who believes in standing up against the Israeli occupation would translate the above concept into '*the pro-Israel peace plan*' or '*slap of the century*'.

In the world of politics, politicians often use metaphors to compress some facts. So here the role of translator comes to render the words appropriately. Newmark (1991: 124) points out that the essence of metaphor is that it *"encompasses a wider range of meaning than literal language"*.

Based on Nida's concept of 'dynamic or functional translation', the Arabic sentence **" وقد استفادتا إلى حد كبير في تكريس ذلك من اشتباك المواقف الاقليمية تجاه الانقسام الفلسطيني "** is translated as follows: ***They [Hamas and Fatah] have greatly benefited from this political and geographical, decade-long divide, for the Palestinian issue has still been used as a political football by regional and international players to transform their own interests and narratives, as well as their realism-based policy.*** The translation produced is stemmed from Nida's dynamic translation; it means *"thoroughly understanding not only the meaning of the source text but also the manner in which the intended receptors of a text are likely to understand it in the receptor language"* (Nida and De Waard 1986).[2]

Newmark (1991: 153) states that *"Political language is particularly susceptible to a quick 'accept' and 'reject' and every word as well as every person gets ten minutes of fame"*. Since politics is changing in its nature, new words and expressions can be added to political diction in order to match political events and changes. However, a good and alert translator is expected to be acquainted with the new words and expressions and therefore to find the proper equivalent that helps the reader to understand the new term in the right context. Finally, language and politics have an

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[1] Tawfiq, K. (2011). *Problematic Aspects of Translation*. Cairo: Dar Hala.
[2] Nida, E., and De Waard, J., (1986) *From One Language to Another: Functional Equivalence in Bible Translation*. Nashville, TU: Thomas Nelson.

intertwined relation that cannot be separated, and this leads to create so many problems and difficulties to understand the political discourse and to translate it as properly as possible.

Lai (2013) summarises the translation problems in the following points[1]:

1) When the translators do not make useful and significant additions.
2) Having the context unavailable.
3) Lack of equivalent meaning.
4) The translator's inability to understand and comprehend the exact and true meaning.
5) Unnecessary deletion.
6) Producing illogical senses.
7) Distortion of logic.
8) Contagion: in which the translator's misunderstanding of something in the SL results into misunderstanding what follows.
9) Elaboration: translators should elaborate sometime and they should not other times.

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2.3   Translation Strategies[2]

Newmark (1988b: 81) mentions the difference between translation methods and translation procedures. He writes that, *"[w]hile translation methods relate to whole texts, translation procedures are used for sentences and the smaller units of language"*.[3] Newmark (1988:45) goes on to refer to the following methods of translation: *word-for-word, literal, faithful, semantic, communicative, idiomatic, free, and adaptation*.

- **Word-for-word translation:** the word order of the SL is preserved and the words translated singly by their most common meanings, out of context.

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[1] Lai, Y-P., (2013) *The Anatomy of Translation Problems*. Oxford: Chtridge Book Oxford.

[2] Comprehension Strategies, Transfer Strategies and Production Strategies are other similar terms of the Translation Strategies. In contrast to translation strategies (the translators' global approach or plan of action on a given text, according to their intention), translation procedures are used for sentences and smaller units of language within that text. Translation procedures are methods applied by translators when they formulate an equivalence for the purpose of transferring elements of meaning from the Source Text (ST) to the Target Text (TT).

[3] Newmark, P., (1988b) *Approaches to Translation*. Hertfordshire: Prentice Hall.

- **Literal translation:** the SL grammatical constructions are converted to their nearest TL equivalents, but the lexical words are again translated singly, out of context.

- **Faithful translation:** it attempts to produce the underlying contextual meaning of the original within the constraints of the TL structures at the grammatical level.

- **Semantic translation:** it must pay more attention to the aesthetic value of the SL text.

- **Adaptation:** it is the freest form of translation and is used mainly for plays (comedies) and poetry; the themes, characters, plots are usually preserved, the SL culture is converted to the TL culture and the text is rewritten.

- **Free translation:** it produces the TL text regardless of the style, form, or content of the original.

- **Communicative translation:** it attempts to produce the same effect on the TL readers as was produced by the original on the SL readers.

SL Emphasis	TL Emphasis
Word for Word Translation	Adaption
Literal Translation	Free Translation
Faithful Translation	Idiomatic Translation
Semantic Translation	Communicative Translation

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2.4   Translation Decisions

Before translating a text, I need to consider a genre-related question. Because, once determining the genre of a text, I think it is an essential factor mainly when it comes to the author's attitude to the treatment of the subject matter of the text – an attitude, explicit or implicit, to the treatment of the subject matter. The Arabic text I tend to render into English

falls into the category of "persuasive genre" – a piece of work about the Deal of the Century. The main feature of this genre is that it focuses on getting readers or listeners to take a specific course of action and perhaps suggesting on how to take it. (Dickins 2002: 179)[1].

To Nord (1997)[2], translations are classified as being source-culture oriented or target-culture oriented. Taking Nord's classification of translations into account, I have chosen to work toward the target culture-related norms. My choice of this classification and other translation strategies –that will be mentioned below – ultimately lead to a different translation product – a pro-Palestinian translated piece of work.

I have chosen to avoid the orthodox definition of translation (word-for-word translation) as rendering the message of a text into another language fails to convey the intended meaning, for it excludes other aspects, such as the communicative requirements of the receptor and the purpose of the translation. In other words, it is a translation method that sticks very closely to ST lexis and syntax (Munday 2001: 44).[3]

My translation follows "the communicative or instrumental" translation. (Snell-Hornby: 2006: 53)[4]. It is a subjective TT reader focused oriented translation (Munday 2001: 45). Similarly, based on Dickins' classification of meanings, the terms I have brought in the translation have highly positive associations to the TT reader (Dickins 2002: 68).

Once having chosen the domestication method, the translation of the text I have done is based on Nida's concept of "dynamic" or "functional" translation. Because Nida's dynamic translation does not randomly use "anything which might have special impact and appeal for receptors"; it rather "means thoroughly understanding not only the meaning of the source text but also the manner in which the intended receptors of a text are likely to understand it in the receptor language". (Nida and De Waard 1986)[5].

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[1] Dickins, J., Hervey, S., and Higgins, I. (2002) *Thinking Arabic Translation*. London and New York: Routledge.
[2] Nord, C. (1997) Translation as a Purposeful Activity: Functional Approaches Explained. Manchester
[3] Munday, J., (2001) *Introducing Translation Strategies*. Abingdon: Routledge.
[4] Snell-Hornby, M., (2006) *The Turns of Translation Studies: New Paradigms or Shifting Viewpoints?* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
[5] Nida, E. A and De Waard, J., (1986) *From One Language to Another: Functional Equivalence in Bible Translation*. Nashville, TV: Thomas Nelson.

Also, I have applied the *Skopos* theory – which answers the question of the way political texts are rendered – as it focuses on the rule which says that the *"TT must be translated in such a way that it is coherent for the TT receivers, given their circumstances and knowledge"* (Munday 2001: 79). *Skopos* theory, in other words, regards the intended receiver, or audience, of the target text as being the main factor conditioning the translation strategies. In other words, it is a translation that is based on "dethroning" the source text, with an active role of both the translator and the target-text reader (Snell-Hornby 2006: 62).

I have used translation by addition as well as transliteration. As the name suggests, translation by addition simply means adding something to the TT that is not present in the ST. Addition is a fairly common feature of Arabic-English translation and is therefore worth specifically identifying. Examples of translation by addition frequently occur where either general considerations of English usage or specific contexts require something to be added. (Dickins 2002: 24). Also, Dickins et al (2002: 36) states that *"The advantage of a transliteration system is that it allows the reader to reconvert the English back to Arabic script".* Therefore, I have decided to transliterate **"اتفاق الشاطئ"** into *"Al- Shati reconciliation agreement".*

The examples below are an illustration and support of the translation strategies I have used, which are stemmed from the domestication method, Nida's dynamic translation and *Skopos* theory:

❖ **"وقالت مصادر مطلعة إنه لم يتم التوافق على اسم وزير الأوقاف...."**

"Nobody was entrusted with the posts of home secretary or Waqf (Muslim endowment) and Religious Affair secretary. Therefore, Dr Shtayyeh will fill in as a home secretary and Waqf and Religious Affair secretary until new appointees are named for the two posts". **(It is an example of dynamic translation).**

❖ **"خلفاً لحكومة د. رامي الحمد الله ... بعد ترؤسه ثلاث حكومات، بدءاً من الحكومة الخامسة عشرة (6/6/2013) ..."**

"<u>The academic-turned-politician</u> Dr Hamdallah formed three governments: He was sworn in as prime minister of the fifteenth government on 6 June 2013 <u>having replaced Mr Salam Fayyad in the post;</u>" **(The underlined is an example of Translation by addition).**

❖ **"وإذا كانت حكومة الحمد الله الأخيرة وُلدت وسط جو عام من الارتياح السياسي والشعبي الفلسطيني عقب توقيع "اتفاق الشاطئ" (2014/4/24) بين "فتح" و"حماس""**

"Dr Hamdallah's government was born in the midst of a positive atmosphere prevailing, with a glimpse of hope coming from al-Shati' refugee camp reconciliation agreement signed on April 24, 2014 between the PA and Hamas. It was warmly welcomed by the territory's two million residents who are overwhelmingly in favour of this intra-Palestinian reconciliation agreement [that is] said to promise to tackle the acute humanitarian crisis inside the war-damaged Gaza Strip". **(The underlined is an example of Translation by addition)**.

❖ **"خارج سرب التجمع الديمقراطي"**

"The Palestinian Democratic Assembly Not Singing from the Same Hymnsheet" **(Idiomatic Translation);** it is an example of idiomatic translation.

CHAPTER THREE

TRANSLATION

TT TEXT	ST TEXT
The Eighteenth Palestinian Government	**الحكومة الفلسطينية الثامنة عشرة**
On 10 March 2019, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas named the member of the Fatah Central Committee Dr Mohammad Shtayyeh to be his new prime minister succeeding Dr Rami Al-Hamdallah who formed a technocrat government in 2014. The resignation become effective on 29 January 2019. The academic-turned-politician Dr Hamdallah formed three governments: He was sworn in as prime minister of the fifteenth government on 6 June 2013 having replaced Mr Salam Fayyad in the post; he was later reappointed as the prime minister of the seventeenth government on 2 June 2014 until his resignation on 13 April 2019, a day after the swearing-in of Shtayyeh's new government.	كلّف الرئيس محمود عباس (2019/3/10)، د. محمد اشتية، عضو اللجنة المركزية لحركة فتح، بتشكيل الحكومة الفلسطينية الثامنة عشرة، خلفاً لحكومة د. رامي الحمد الله، الذي قدم استقالة حكومته يوم 2019/1/29، بعد ترؤسه ثلاث حكومات، بدءاً من الحكومة الخامسة عشرة (2013/6/6)، حتى السابعة عشرة (2014/6/2)، والتي استمرت حتى 2019/4/13، بعد يوم ترسيم حكومة اشتية.
Dr Hamdallah's government was born in the midst of a positive atmosphere prevailing, with a glimpse of hope coming from al-Shati' refugee camp reconciliation agreement signed on 24 April 2014 between Fatah and Hamas. It was warmly welcomed by the territory's two million residents who are overwhelmingly in favour of this intra-Palestinian reconciliation agreement [that is] said to promise to tackle the acute humanitarian crisis	وإذا كانت حكومة الحمد الله الأخيرة وُلدت وسط جو عام من الارتياح السياسي والشعبي الفلسطيني عقب توقيع "اتفاق الشاطئ" (2014/4/24) بين "فتح" و"حماس"، فإن حكومة اشتية ولدت في جو مختلف تماماً، إلى درجة أنه يمكن تشبيه وقائع "حفل" ترسيمها المرتبك بمراسم توديع جهود المصالحة بين الحركتين.

inside the war-damaged Gaza Strip. Yet, the circumstances surrounding the formation of Dr Shtayyeh's government gave it shaky foundations, thus putting him in an awkward position: the signing ceremony having taken place in Ramallah has come in the midst of difficult times surrounding the birth of such a government; they turned out to be quite similar to those troubled times in which many efforts by different mediators (e.g., Egyptian side, in particular) that would supposedly repair the decade-long territorial and political rift have not succeeded. In light of past experience, it is not surprising that these efforts made to secure a reconciliation agreement between the two largest Palestinian factions – such as in 2014 –have always come to nothing.	
The Catastrophic Harm Caused by Bilateral Agreements to Weary and Disgruntled Palestinian	لعنة الصفقات الثنائية
The 2014-Egyptian-brokered, Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreement failed due to the regular distrust and suspicion between the two largest Palestinian factions which have resurfaced strongly. In this context, both have used it as a calculated move, that they may well be acting out of self-interest, not because of the Palestinian cause. However, one of greatest stumbling blocks that remains in the path of any reconciliation agreement reached between them has been this naïve and delicate question: Who will effectively take over the day-to-day running of the territory?	في الأساس، يعود فشل تطبيق "اتفاق الشاطئ" إلى أن كلا من الحركتين رأى فيه "صفقة رابحة"، ونصوص الاتفاق وآليات تطبيقه تضمن الإجابة التي يريدها حول السؤال الساذج: من سيحكم غزة؟ وعندما لم يتحقق لأي منهما ذلك وفق شروطه وتصوراته، انفجر الخلاف بينهما مجدداً على وقع تبادل الاتهامات عن مسؤولية فشل تطبيق الاتفاق.

Like many unfruitful efforts to form a power-sharing unity government in Gaza and the West Bank, when an agreement is not reached, Fatah and Hamas end up blaming each other for obstruction and exclusion.	
Hopes for the 2017 Fatah–Hamas reconciliation agreement signed on 12 October 2017 were tempered by the knowledge that many previous Palestinian initiatives have failed: Like other many efforts to reconcile the two main parties, the Cairo Agreement of October 2017 was not also reached. All the attempts by the leading Palestinian political factions who had gathered in Cairo on 22 November 2017 to push ahead with reconciliation efforts have also failed. The reason is simple: instead of forming a unity government representing the all Palestinians, the two main parties have directly or indirectly engaged in bilateral agreements, and have profitably exploited the deep and political division which is designed to consolidate each party's rule. The regional powers' influence is no secret: The Palestinian cause has also been used as political football, with Hamas and Fatah viewed as players in a wider regional conflict. The result is that the Palestinian cause is not their number one priority.	وكان لـ "تفاهمات القاهرة" بين الحركتين (2017/10/12) المصير نفسه، ولم تنجح نتائج حوارات القوى والفصائل في العاصمة المصرية (2017/11/22) في تغيير هذا المصير، لأن القاعدة العملية التي نجحت الحركتان في تكريسها منذ وقوع الانقسام قامت على تنحية قرارات الحوارات الشاملة لصالح "إنتاج الصفقات" عبر المفاوضات الثنائية، وقد استفادتا إلى حد كبير في تكريس ذلك من اشتباك المواقف الإقليمية تجاه موضوعة الانقسام الفلسطيني.
Unsurprisingly, the crisis of the Palestinian political system has deepened, with its far-reaching and adverse consequences arising throughout two	ضمن هذا المسار، تفاقمت أزمة النظام السياسي الفلسطيني، التي تعددت مظاهرها وتراكمت تداعياتها عبر المرحلتين اللتين عاشهما هذا النظام الفردي منذ قيام السلطة الفلسطينية وحتى الانتخابات الرئاسية والتشريعية الثانية، التي نقلته نتائجها إلى

phases: (1) the *authoritarian*[1] regime of the PA since its establishment until the second presidential and parliamentary elections. Instead of forming a power-sharing government, the elections have resulted in two separate administrations in Palestine, the Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and the Hamas-run government in the Gaza Strip. (2) Following the deadly clashes in Gaza in the summer of 2007, Fatah and Hamas, having ruled with a rod of iron, have barely missed the chance to change tactics and set up an authoritarian regime, with the aim of ensuring a political hegemony and a one-party rule.	نظام برأسين متصارعين. والمفارقة أن كلا من طرفي الانقسام حافظ على النظام الأول، بل وتسابقا في تطبيق أسوأ أشكال السياسات الفردية وأساليب الهيمنة في مساحة نفوذ كل منهما.
As expected, the efforts to mend the political and geographical rift and forming a united government representing the Palestinians seem like getting blood out of a stone. Thus, the current, alarming situation requires implementing a package of practical measures designed at achieving the vital goal of rebuilding the Palestinian political system according to the agreements reached, with a unity government formation remaining one of the most fundamental issues to be addressed.	على هذا، نخلص إلى أن تحقيق هدف إنهاء الانقسام واستعادة الوحدة، غير ممكن دون أن يكون خطوة في سياق تنفيذ رزمة إجراءات يتطلبها تحقيق هدف إعادة بناء النظام السياسي الفلسطيني وفق أسس. وبالتالي، فإن موضوعة تشكيل الحكومة تدخل حكماً في السياق المذكور.
Developments and Responsibilities	**تطورات واستحقاقات**
In the past two years, key events have unfolded leading up to an array of unprecedented financial, humanitarian and political challenges that the Palestinians have been facing, challenges	في العامين الأخيرين، وقعت تطورات مفصلية وضعت الحالة الفلسطينية أمام تعقيدات إضافية واستحقاقات غير مسبوقة. في المقدمة منها، قرارات إدارة ترامب العدوانية حول القضية

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[1] I have italicised the word to distance myself from its negative connotation.

threatening the very survival of the Palestinian state building efforts, one of which is the so-called long-awaited peace plan,[1] otherwise known as 'the Deal of the Century'. Seen as a winner-take-all deal for Israel, the deal has become the biggest diplomatic gift the US president has ever given to Israel since its founding for many reasons: Produced by a small group of pro-Israel Americans willingly adopting the long-standing plans of the Israeli right-wing party, the deal has made a remarkable success in paving the way for the Israeli colonial plan. On the ground, Trump handed Jerusalem and the Golan Heights to Israel, effectively closed the Palestinian dossier, and seeks to terminate the refugees' right to return. Also, it aims to ensure that the PM Benjamin Netanyahu is re-elected,[2] offering him a once-in-a-lifetime chance to establish a political agenda of annexing parts of the West Bank and effectively quashing Palestinian aspirations for a state of their own.	الفلسطينية، وتوالي إجراءاتها وخطواتها العملية في سياق تطبيق ما سمي "صفقة العصر". إلى جانب ذلك، اندفع نتنياهو في تطبيق مشروعه الاستعماري، بعدما اتحدت محاوره مع عناوين الصفقة الأمريكية وأهدافها. ووجد نتنياهو في هذه الصفقة رافعة استثنائية لتحقيق انتصار حاسم على المشروع الوطني الفلسطيني.
These [two] bitter realities have seriously harmed the Palestinian project. On the national level, participation in the formation of a government that achieves Palestinian unity and consensus as well as reconciliation agreement of April 2014 should be their top propriety. Yet, all the attempts made	هذان العاملان الخطيران المتكاملان وضعا قضية الشعب الفلسطيني وحقوقه أمام خطر داهم. ومن البديهي الاستخلاص بأن التصدي لهذا الخطر يتطلب خطوات وإجراءات فلسطينية جدية وموحدة، وهو ما تعجز الحالة الفلسطينية عن القيام به في حالتها الراهنة.

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[1] The so-called phrase is used to stress on the fact that trump's deal of the century is a slap of the century; it is a recipe for war. For more information, please visit this website https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/02/21/trumps-middle-east-peace-plan-whats-there-to-be-upset-about/

[2] Locally, the Trump's deal will allow him to put off his corruption trial, smash the country's main opposition party, and now forge a governing majority that eluded him since late 2018.

by Palestinian factions, regional or international players have been futile.	
Accordingly, standing shoulder to shoulder in their opposition to Trump's new Middle East plan, Palestinians from different political factions in Gaza have outlined a political vision to face the huge challenges and the terrible consequences of Trump Administration's Israel-Palestine plan. In its effort to drop the so-called Middle East peace plan, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) outlined a comprehensive political vision to respond to the crisis of the Palestinian political system.	من هذه الرواية، طرح عدد من القوى والفصائل خارطة طريق تجمع ما بين تصويب الوضع الفلسطيني، وما بين مواجهة المخاطر التي تتهدد القضية الفلسطينية. وقدمت الجبهة الديمقراطية لتحرير فلسطين رؤية سياسية وتنظيمية متكاملة وواضحة لحل أزمة النظام السياسي الفلسطيني.
In order to oppose Trump's plan, an objective and comprehensive analysis of the nature of the crisis of the political system should be carried out. An emphasis on reaching a national consensus should be stemmed from a successful national strategy formulated to dismiss the pro-Israel, US-brokered plan, with the aim of arriving at consensus over developing the existing Palestinian political system. This is done through holding local and legislative elections at their determined time on the basis of an election system of proportional representation to be agreed upon, with the aim of adopting a pluralist democratic political system capable of establishing a national program.	وفي هذه الرواية أرفقت التحليل الموضوعي لطبيعة أزمة هذا النظام، بالتأكيد على أن حلها يكون بتأمين التوافق الوطني على برنامج تتصدره استراتيجية وطنية موحدة تلبي استحقاقات مواجهة المشروع الأمريكي – الإسرائيلي، وتأمين التوافق على إعادة بناء هذا النظام عبر الانتخابات المباشرة، وفق قانون التمثيل النسبي الكامل، لضمان الوصول إلى نظام سياسي ديمقراطي تعددي قادر على تنفيذ البرنامج الوطني.
The DFLP stressed on the development of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,	وأكدت الجبهة أن قيادة تنفيذ جميع هذه الخطوات، من اختصاص وصلاحية "هيئة تفعيل وتطوير منظمة التحرير"، التي تشكلت بقرار إجماع وطني في ختام حوارات فلسطينية

including all the Palestinian powers and factions. A committee would be made up to define the bases for the development. This committee was set up in a declaration which was signed on 19 March 2005 by twelve Palestinian factions at the end of three days of meetings in Cairo. To do this, it has been agreed upon to form a committee to define these bases; it will be made up of the president of the National Council, the chairman of the PLO's Executive Committee, the secretaries general of all Palestinian factions and independent national personalities. They were unanimous in unifying their speech and stopping the policy of singularity, with the aim of rebuilding the Palestinian political system.	موسعة صدر عنها "إعلان القاهرة" في العام 2005. وتضم هذه الهيئة، كما هو معروف، الأمناء العاملين للقوى والفصائل ورئيس المجلس الوطني ورئيس اللجنة التنفيذية وأعضاءها وشخصيات وطنية. ومن الواضح أن التأكيد على هذه المرجعية يهدف إلى قطع الطريق على تحكم أي من طرفي الانقسام، أو كليهما، بمسار ومآل الجهود المبذولة لإعادة بناء النظام السياسي الفلسطيني.
The PA at loggerheads with some Palestinian Factions	**في الاتجاه المعاكس**
The PA has announced a boycott of any Palestinian reconciliation talks or meeting with Hamas. It has blamed its rival for the failure of achieving a national reconciliation. The Fatah Central Committee recommended the formation of a Fatah-dominated government consisting of the left-wing PLO factions. However, large factions in the Organisation such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Palestinian National Initiative (PNI) have said they won't take part in any government that would block any opportunity for	أقفلت القيادة الرسمية ملف المصالحة مع "حماس" وفق استخلاص حمّل الحركة مسؤولية فشل الجهود في هذا الاتجاه. وأوصت اللجنة المركزية لحركة فتح بتشكيل حكومة من فصائل منظمة التحرير بقيادة شخصية فتحاوية. وقامت وفود من الحركة بحوارات مع قيادات فصائل المنظمة لإقناعها بالمشاركة. وتبين في ختام هذه الاتصالات أن تشكيل حكومة فصائلية من منظمة التحرير لم يحظ بموافقة فصائل أساسية في المنظمة وفي المقدمة الجبهتان الديمقراطية والشعبية وإلى جانبهما حركة المبادرة الفلسطينية.

achieving reconciliation and patching up the deep, intra-Palestinian rift.	
The DFLP, which is the second-largest of the groups forming the PLO, announced in a statement that the formation of such a new government will complicate the situation in light of the mounting and grave crisis of the whole Palestinian political and national system. It, therefore, called for an alternative to the formation of a new national and transitional government responsible for holding presidential and legislative elections; reaching an agreement on a joint political platform; and healing the bitter intra-Palestinian division.	الجبهة الديمقراطية رأت أن تشكيل حكومة بالصبغة المطروحة ليس أولوية وطنية في ظل الأزمة المركبة التي تعانيها الحركة الوطنية والنظام السياسي الفلسطيني برمته. ودعت بدلاً من ذلك إلى تشكيل حكومة وحدة وطنية لمرحلة انتقالية تشرف على انتخابات شاملة رئاسية وتشريعية، تعيد بناء المؤسسات الوطنية وتنهي الانقسام.
It [DFLP] pointed out the PA, has not made real changes in the formation of the new government excluding other PLO factions; the Fatah-dominated PA said that it has the right to make a list of names containing Fatah-affiliated candidates. Thus, the DFLP believed that the PA might not be up to the task of meeting the needs of the country's exceptional situation and the real and serious threats presented by Trump's deal. Therefore, it won't be part of any new government. On the ground, Fatah leaders recommend a strong presence of the largest faction of the confederated multi-party Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) -Fatah- in the new government. Secretary General of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) Nayef Hawatmeh, told Russian news agency Sputnik, that the new	وأشارت إلى أن كل ما تفعله القيادة الرسمية للسلطة في هذا الأمر هو تغيير أسماء من يشغلون المقاعد الوزارية، وهذا لا يتصل من بعيد أو قريب باستحقاقات المرحلة التي تواجهها القضية الفلسطينية، وما تحمله من مخاطر كبرى على يد المشروع الأمريكي – الإسرائيلي. وعلى هذا الأساس، قالت الجبهة إنها لن تكون شريكاً في هذه الحكومة، وإن المسألة تتجاوز الحصص الوزارية نحو قضايا أشمل تطال المصالح الوطنية العليا للشعب الفلسطيني.

government "*does not prioritise the interests of our people or the Palestinian issue*".	
It has become clear that the new government, which is expected to be dominated by Fatah, won't win the approval of the Palestinians at the political (e.g., the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) won't be part of it) national level, independents and community institutions, all of which have expressed their disinclination to participate in the upcoming government. The PA, however, decided to go ahead with its plan: forming a Fatah-dominated government, thus excluding other Palestinian factions. On the ground, on 10 March 2019, the process of forming the government was conducted through back-door negotiations. Strongly backed by President Abbas, Mohammad Shtayyeh, a veteran politician and member of the Fatah Central Committee, was asked to form the 18th Palestinian government.	وبات واضحاً أن الحكومة المقترحة لن تحظى بغطاء سياسي، لا على الصعيد الوطني العام، ولا صعيد منظمة التحرير، خاصة أن صفاً واسعاً من الشخصيات الوطنية والمؤسسات المجتمعية أبدى اعتراضه على هذه الصيغة. ومع ذلك، كانت القيادة الفلسطينية قد اتخذت هذا الخيار، وجرى بعد مداولات داخل "المطبخ السياسي" للسلطة تسمية د. محمد اشتية لتشكيل الحكومة وتم تكليفه رسمياً من قبل الرئيس عباس في 10/ 3/ 2019.
According to political commentators, the PA's decision to form a new government has fiercely been criticised by Palestinian factions: it has been described as "power grab," where it may negatively and unfavourably react to meet the huge challenges and wriggle out of its commitments arising from the shaky foundations on both the political and economic fronts. Accordingly, it has turned into a one-party government dominated by Fatah, while its	وقد قرأ مراقبون في الإصرار على تشكيل حكومة بهذه الصيغة محاولة لتدوير أزمة السلطة الفلسطينية وتغطية هروبها من الاستحقاقات الكبرى التي تفرضها المرحلة. فالحكومة – حسب ما ورد في كتاب التكليف – عليها أن "تبذل جهوداً حثيثة لدعم جهود استعادة الوحدة الوطنية..". فكيف لها ذلك وهي نتاج قرار قَطَعَ من اتخذه مع هذه الجهود؟ وفهم من هذا النص أنه ليس أكثر من رسالة "تطمين" للجهود الإقليمية التي بذلت بشأن المصالحة.

predecessor drew support from all parties. According to President Abbas' seven-point letter of assignment, a tremendous effort must be stepped up in order to repair 13-old rift and heal the bitter deep division between Fatah and Hamas-controlled Gaza. In reality, it is nothing more than a reassurance given to regional players who are behind reconciliation efforts being made.	
It can be said that President Abbas's seven-point letter of assignment and Dr Shtayyeh's eloquent televised acceptance speech that he takes on the role of prime minister in the name of Fatah, turned out to be a fruitless attempt in light of the serious challenges and dangers facing the Palestinians. Such a government will not offer a way out of the Palestinian impasse, rather than ending it. It is required that the government not be a one-colour government; it should instead win an overwhelming approval of the widest participation, at the national level.	يمكن القول إن كتاب التكليف المقتضب، وكتاب الرد بالقبول المسهب بالمديح، جاءا خارج سياق استحقاقات المرحلة الخطيرة التي تعيشها القضية الفلسطينية. وحتى لو ورد فيهما شيء من هذه الاستحقاقات، فلن يكون في قدرة الحكومة (أي حكومة) النهوض بها، فهي تحتاج جميع مكونات الحالة السياسية والمجتمعية الفلسطينية دونما استثناء.
The Palestinian Democratic Assembly Not Singing from the Same Hymnsheet	**خارج سرب التجمع الديمقراطي**
At the beginning of the year 2019, the Palestinian Democratic Assembly (PDA) was formed by five leftist parties: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Palestinian People's Party (PPP), the Palestinian National Initiative (PNI) and the Palestinian Democratic Union (generally known as FIDA), including a	في بداية العام 2019، أعلن عن قيام "التجمع الفلسطيني الديمقراطي" وضم خمسة فصائل هي: الجبهتان الديمقراطية والشعبية، وحزب الشعب، وحركة المبادرة الفلسطينية، و"فدا"، وصف واسع من الشخصيات وممثلي المؤسسات المجتمع – مدنية.

number of personalities and representatives of the civil society organisations.	
In a statement by the PDA, it has unanimously agreed upon the following: - Rejecting the so-called US 'deal of the century'. - Rejecting Normalising relations with Israel in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. - Healing the intra-Palestinian rift between Fatah and Hamas. - Enhancing the resilience of the Palestinians. - Demonstrating a genuine commitment on holding local and legislative elections at their determined time (within six months) on the basis of an election system of proportional representation to be agreed upon, under a national unity government entrusted with overseeing democratic elections in the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and in the Gaza Strip.	وجاء في بيان إعلان التجمع نص البرنامج الذي اتفقت حوله مكوناته، واشتمل محاور متعددة ومتكاملة عنوانها العريض "إسقاط صفقة القرن ومجابهة التطبيع بإنهاء الانقسام وتعزيز صمود الشعب والمقاومة". وشدد البرنامج على "الالتزام الجاد بالدعوة إلى انتخابات عامة تجري خلال ستة شهور وفق نظام التمثيل النسبي الكامل وفي ظل حكومة وحدة وطنية تؤمن شروط إجرائها بحرية ونزاهة في الضفة الغربية، بما فيها القدس، وفي قطاع غزة".
In early February 2019, the Assembly's Central Committee discussed a government reshuffle carried out in various meetings. It called on the Palestinian factions to form the upcoming government. It stressed on its policy as set out in the founding charter, which is based on the fact that the formation of a new government will not be the real solution in itself to overcome the ongoing political crisis. Alternatively, a huge effort must be renewed to face the real dangers to which the Palestinians have been exposed: a call for a complete unity and constructive dialogue, in response to the deal of the century announcement,	وفي مطلع شباط (فبراير) 2019، بحثت اللجنة التوجيهية للتجمع في الحوارات الجارية حول التغيير الحكومي، بما في ذلك الدعوة لتشكيل حكومة فصائلية، وجددت التأكيد على مواقف التجمع المعلن في بيانه التأسيسي، انطلاقاً من أن الأزمة السياسية القائمة هي "أعمق من أن تجد حلها بمجرد تشكيل حكومة، وأن علاجها ومواجهة التحديات الخطيرة المحدقة بقضيتنا الوطنية يتطلب إجراء حوار وطني شامل يفتح الطريق أمام انتخابات عامة للرئاسة والمجلس التشريعي وللمجلس الوطني الفلسطيني".

which will pay the way for elections, whether for the Palestinian National Council, the Palestinian Legislative Council or the presidency.	
After the new Palestinian government was sworn in, headed by Prime Minister Dr Muhammad Shtayyeh, factions, including the PLO's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine(DFLP) and the Palestinian National Initiative have said they won't be part of the new government, a decision praised by a number of personalities and representatives of the civil society organisations. Surprisingly, the Palestinian People's Party (PPP) and FIDA[1] have agreed to take part in the upcoming government.	وعقب تكليف د. اشتية بتكليف الحكومة، تبلور إثر حوارات وفد مركزية فتح مع فصائل منظمة التحرير، ومن ضمنها فصائل التجمع، رفض الجبهتين الديمقراطية والشعبية و"المبادرة" المشاركة في هذه الحكومة (كما ذكرنا سابقاً)، وأيد هذا الموقف الشخصيات المستقلة وممثلو المؤسسات المجتمعية المنضوية في إطار التجمع، لكن اللافت والمستغرب، أن حزب الشعب و"فدا"، وافقا على المشاركة، في موقف يتعاكس مع برنامج التجمع وموقفه من هذه المشاركة.
As a result, the central committee of the Palestinian National Democratic Assembly had held a meeting on 9 April, before the government was formed. It stressed on a statement made regarding the government and elections, having expressed its concern over the decision made by the PPP and FIDA to participate in Dr Shtayyeh's government. Also, the Assembly is almost unanimous on the fact that the new government headed by Dr Shtayyeh does not face up to the current difficult situations.	على ذلك، عقد اللجنة التوجيهية للتجمع الديمقراطي الفلسطيني اجتماعاً (4/9) أي قبل ترسيم الحكومة، أعادت فيه التأكيد على ما جاء ببيان التجمع بشأن الحكومة والانتخابات. وبحثت في قرار حزب الشعب و"فدا" المشاركة في الحكومة. وقد أعربت سائر مكونات التجمع مجدداً عن قناعتها بأن صيغة الحكومة وشروط تشكيلها لا تلبي متطلبات المرحلة.
After the new Palestinian government was sworn in, headed by Prime Minister Dr Muhammad	وعقب ترسيم الحكومة بمشاركة حزب الشعب و"فدا"، أصدرت اللجنة التوجيهية للتجمع الديمقراطي الفلسطيني بياناً

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[1] FIDA is offshoot of the DFLP; it was founded in 1990 by Yasser Abd Rabbo, and currently led by Saleh Ra'fat.

Shtayyeh, the central committee of the Palestinian National Democratic Assembly put out a statement during a meeting on 13 April, having expressed its disinclination to be part of the new government.	(4/13) أكدت فيه مجدداً على مواقف التجمع الرافض للمشاركة في حكومة اشتية.
In its statement, the Committee said, 'The decision made by the PPP and FIDA to be part of the eighteenth government appears to sharply contradict their position to boycott it. Also, it offers a sharp contrast with the political program based on joint principles (Article No. 4). The Assembly hopes that the PPP and FIDA's Central Committee will reserve their decision, boycott the government formed by Dr Shtayyeh and agree on the political program based on joint principles laid down'.	وقالت: "إن قرار حزب الشعب الفلسطيني، والاتحاد الديمقراطي الفلسطيني "فدا" المشاركة في الحكومة الفلسطينية الثامنة عشر يتعارض مع موقف التجمع وما ورد في برنامج عمله المشترك (البند الرابع)، ويأمل التجمع أن تقوم الهيئات القيادية لكلا الحزبين بمراجعة موقفها خلال الفترة القادمة، وبما ينسجم مع برنامج العمل المشترك للتجمع".
The Current Palestinian Government Structure	**بازار الحقائق**
The new 18th Palestinian government headed by Dr Shtayyeh was sworn-in in Ramallah in front of President Mahmoud Abbas. The Fatah-dominated, 22-secretary government includes the prime minister, the Palestinian government spokesman and the adviser to the Prime Minister for Arab funds. Dr Shtayyeh will fill in as a home secretary and Waqf (Muslim endowment) and Religious Affairs secretary until someone else is named to these two posts. Following is the makeup of the new 22-secretary cabinet: Fatah (9); FIDA (1); the Palestinian People's Party (PPP) (1);	ضمت تشكيلة الحكومة 22 وزيراً بمن فيهم رئيسها، وإلى جانبهم المتحدث باسم الحكومة ومستشار رئيس الوزراء للصناديق العربية، ويُلاحظ في التشكيلة أنه لم تتم تسمية وزيري الداخلية والأوقاف. 9 وزراء من التشكيلة ينتمون إلى حركة فتح، ووزير واحد لكل من "فدا" وحزب الشعب وجبهة النضال و10 وزراء مستقلون.

Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF) (1); Independent (10).	
The newly formed government has undergone a series of changes pertaining secretary-related posts. It caved in political pressure to the approval of President Abbas. This means that this power grab by Abbas's longtime allies and supporters is another clear indication of the frailty of this uneasy partnership as well as the rift in Fatah's Central Committee. Some of the Committee's members believe that the secretaries are nominally independents. Yet, the process of forming the current government was conducted through back-door negotiations. It is granted without the consent of the Fatah Central Committee. Accordingly, the government in its structure may be out of the policy formulated by the Fatah Central Committee.	مرت التشكيلة بسلسلة من التغييرات في أسماء بعض الوزراء المقترحين في سياق عرضها على الرئيس عباس الذي ردها مصحوبة بتعديلات، عكست الخلافات الدائرة داخل اللجنة المركزية لحركة فتح، التي يرى بعض أعضائها أن الحكومة في تشكيلتها المطروحة "لا هي فصائلية، ولا هي فتحاوية"، وإنما تعبر عن رأي وقرار المطبخ الرسمي الضيق الذي سبق وأن اتخذ قرارات تجاوزت اللجنة المركزية لحركة فتح في شؤون تمس الحركة نفسها؛ وأن الحكومة بصيغتها النهائية لا تعكس حصيلة المواقف داخل اللجنة المركزية.
Significant PLO members like the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) and the Palestine Arab Liberation Front (PALF) had previously agreed to be part of the government and put up their candidates. Yet, they appear deeply shocked by the fact that they have completely been excluded.	واللافت أيضاً أن عدداً من الفصائل في منظمة التحرير (جبهة التحرير الفلسطينية، وجبهة التحرير العربية، وجبهة التحرير العربية الفلسطينية) سبق وأن أعطت موافقتها على المشاركة في الحكومة وقدمت مرشحيها لعضويتها، لكنها تفاجأت، بل صُدمت، عندما لم تجد ضمن التشكيلة النهائية، أي من الأسماء التي رشحتها.
To some analysts, the current structure of the government, which should have been an interesting mix between specialists and others affiliated with political parties, is not even considered as a one-colour government.	ومن هذه الزاوية ينظر إلى الحكومة في تشكيلتها الراهنة وحجم تمثيلها السياسي على أنها لا تغطي حتى مساحة اللون السياسي الواحد الذي أنتجها.

Nobody was entrusted with the post of Waqf (Muslim endowment) and Religious Affair secretary. Therefore, Dr Shtayyeh will fill in as a Waqf and Religious Affair secretary until new appointees are named for this post. According to informed Palestinian sources, Waqf and Religious Affair secretary is currently under discussion. The PA's supreme sharia judge and Mahmoud Abbas's adviser on Religious and International Islamic Relations Mahmoud al-Habbash is Mr Abbas's trusted aide, entrusted with the post of secretary of Waqf and Religious Affair, in spite of opposition expressed by Fatah Central Committee. Similarly, the post of the home secretary has not been filled yet. Two candidates have been put up: Ismail Jabr, a member of Fatah's Central Committee, a senior adviser on the Governorates and Military Affairs and Deputy commander of the Palestinian security forces; and Major General Ziad Hab al-Rih, the head of the Preventive Security Service. The two posts have not been filled yet.	وقالت مصادر مطلعة إنه لم يتم التوافق على اسم وزير الأوقاف، وإن قاضي القضاة محمود الهباش طُرح من قبل الرئيس عباس، فيما رفضت مركزية فتح ذلك. كما لم يتم التوافق على اسم وزير الداخلية، حيث طرح للوزارة الحاج إسماعيل جبر مستشار الرئيس لشؤون المحافظات، ومساعد القائد العام للقوات، وأيضاً اللواء زياد هب الريح، رئيس جهاز الأمن الوقائي، لكن لم يجر الاتفاق على أي منهما. وأجلت في النهاية تسمية الوزيرين إلى حين الاتفاق حولهما.
The Ministry of Education, Higher Education and Scientific Research is not an exception: two candidates have been put up; they belong to political parties. The government is bitterly divided over which candidate should fill the post. To add insult to injury, the efforts to put up one candidate has come to nothing. The result is that the ministry will be run as follows: Minister of Education and minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research. As a part of the last-ditch	واشتعل الخلاف حول من يتقلد وزارة التربية والتعليم العالي والبحث العلمي، بعدما طُرح اسمان لحمل حقيبتها، وتمترس كل طرف خلف مرشحه، إلى أن وُجد حلاً عن طريق تقسيم الوزارة إلى وزارتين، واحدة للتربية، والثانية للتعليم العالي والبحث العلمي، فرضي بذلك طرفا الخلاف (!).

efforts, the disputing parties have finally agreed to reach to such an agreement.	
Several key positions were unchanged from the previous administration of Rami Hamdallah. According to media sources, Shukri Bishara, the Finance secretary, has had the backing of President Abbas, in spite of opposition from the Fatah Central Committee. In spite of the Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh's insistence on keeping the ministry of Finance, an agreement was reached: it recommended that the [Economic] Planning Unit be transferred from the Ministry of Finance to the Council of the Ministers. It plays a key role in the following: it is assigned the responsibility for priorities-setting; formulation; recommendations and projects-funding.	وأشارت مصادر إعلامية إلى أن تولي شكري بشارة، وزير المالية، تم بضغوط من الرئيس عباس رغم معارضة "مركزية" فتح؛ وأنه أمام إصرار رئيس الوزراء د. محمد إشتية على تولي وزارة المالية بنفسه، تم التوصل إلى حل وسط قضى بنقل وحدة التخطيط من وزارة المالية إلى مجلس الوزراء، وهذه الوحدة تلعب دوراً في وضع أولوياتها وصياغة التوصيات بشأن المشاريع وتمويلها.
Swearing-in Ceremony Held in An Electric and Stained Atmosphere	**ترسيم باهت.. ومرتبك**
The swearing-in ceremony of the government was conducted on 13 April, 2019. Yet, the circumstances surrounding the 18th newly formed Palestinian government of Prime Minister Dr Mohammad Shtayyeh gave it shaky foundations, thus putting him in an awkward position. After a typing error in the text of the swearing-in was found, the government would have to repeat the swearing-in ceremony in front of President Mahmoud Abbas. The correct text of the swearing-in should read, "I *swear to be loyal to the homeland and its sanctities, **to the people and its***	جاء الإعلان عن ولادة حكومة السلطة الفلسطينية الثامنة عشر باهتاً ومرتبكاً. فبعد الانتهاء من تشكيلها تم تحديد يوم 2019/4/13 موعداً للترسيم. وعلى غير المعهود، تلا أعضاء الحكومة اليمين الدستورية مرتين. فقد أعاد رئيسها وأعضاؤها أداء اليمين أمام رئيس السلطة الفلسطينية محمود عباس في اليوم التالي لأدائهم القسم في الموعد المقرر لترسيم الحكومة، بعدما تبين أن هناك عبارة قد سقطت من نص اليمين عند تلاوته في المرة الأولى، بحسب ما نص عليه القانون الأساسي للسلطة، وهي عبارة "الإخلاص للشعب وتراثه القومي".

***national heritage[1]**, to respect the constitutional order and the law, and to take full care of the interests of the Palestinian people*."	
Shortly after the swearing-in of the government, many have expressed their concern over the removal of the oath's text (Article No. 35) from the PA's basic law. Such an error has never happened since the establishment of the PA. It is another clear indication of the scene of great confusion, the continuing internal dispute caused by the power grab and political affiliation shorty before the birth of the government.	يذكر، وأنه وبعد دقائق من إلقاء رئيس وأعضاء الحكومة الجديدة اليمين القانوني أمام الرئيس عباس، أثير الكثير من الجدل حول اقتطاع جزء من نص قسم اليمين المتعلق بالمادة 35 من القانون الأساسي للسلطة الفلسطينية. وهذه هي المرة الأولى التي يحدث فيها ذلك منذ قيام السلطة الفلسطينية، مما يعكس حجم الإرباك الكبير والانشغال بتفاعلات الخلاف الدائر حول ما وصلت إليه التشكيلة الحكومية في "لمساتها" الأخيرة.
The typing error discovered was due to the lack of preparation for the swearing-in ceremony. Fatah Central Committee and member of the PLO's Executive Committee have boycotted the ceremony, arguing some names have been decided upon without their consent. It is another indication of the continuing dispute over the process in which the government has been formed. Following in footsteps of Fatah Central Committee, members of the PLO's Executive Committee, who should stand beside the president as per protocol, have not attended the oath-taking ceremony of the government. It has also decided not to participate in the formation of the government, in spite of the fact it could easily play a key role in the government-forming. Surprisingly, two of its members have decided to	وفيما أحيلت سقطة الخطأ في تلاوة القسم إلى الارتباك وعدم التحضير المتقن لحفل الترسيم، لفت الانتباه غياب "مركزية" فتح وأعضاء اللجنة التنفيذية لمنظمة التحرير عن هذه المراسم. وفُسر هذا الغياب كاحتجاج على بعض الأسماء في تشكيلة الحكومة على أرضية الخلافات التي اشتعلت في مركزية فتح حول ذلك. كما لفت الانتباه في الوقت نفسه عدم حضور أعضاء اللجنة التنفيذية، على عكس البروتوكول المتبع عادة بوقوفهم إلى جانب الرئيس عباس. وكانت اللجنة بالأساس أبرز الغائبين عن نقاش موضوع تشكيل الحكومة والتقرير بشأنها على الرغم من أنها من المفترض أن تكون المرجعية الأولى في هذا الشأن. واللافت أن الحكومة على الرغم من ذلك ضمَّت عضوين من اللجنة التنفيذية للمنظمة، وقد أثار الأمر جدلاً حول سبب ووظيفة هذه الازدواجية بين الحكومة وبين مرجعيتها المفترضة.

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[1] The sentence in bold was missed out.

be part of the new government headed by Dr Shtayyeh. Thus, this has sparked off a heated debate over the reasons behind the double standards and the troubled relationship between the government and its umbrella -the 1964- Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). May 2019.	آيار (مايو) 2019
Appendices	**ملاحق**
1- The Makeup of the Cabinet	**1- تشكيلة الحكومة**
1. Dr Mohammad Shtayyeh, Prime Minister (Fatah).	1. د. محمد اشتية، رئيس مجلس الوزراء (فتح).
2. Ziad Abu Amr, Deputy Prime Minister (Independent).	2. زياد أبو عمرو، نائب رئيس الوزراء (مستقل).
3. Nabil Abu Rudeineh, Deputy Prime Minister, Information Secretary (Fatah).	3. نبيل ابو ردينة، نائب رئيس الوزراء، وزير الاعلام (فتح).
4. Riyadh al-Maliki, Foreign Affairs and Expatriates Secretary (Independent).	4. رياض المالكي، وزير الخارجية (مستقل).
5. Shukri Bishara, Finance Secretary (Fatah).	5. شكري بشارة، وزير المالية (فتح).
6. Dr Mai Kaileh, Health Secretary (Fatah).	6. د. مي كيلة، وزير الصحة (فتح).
7. Khalid Al-Esseily, Economy Secretary (Fatah).	7. خالد العسيلي، وزير الاقتصاد (فتح).
8. Mohammad Al-Shalaldeh, Justice Secretary (Independent).	8. محمد الشلالدة، وزير العدل (مستقل).
9. Dr Atef Abu Seif, Culture Secretary (Fatah).	9. د. عاطف ابو سيف، وزير الثقافة (فتح).

10. Majdi al-Saleh, Local Government Secretary (Independent).	10. مجدي الصالح، وزير الحكم المحلي (مستقل).
11. Riad Attari, Agriculture Secretary (FIDA).	11. رياض عطاري، وزير الزراعة (فدا).
12. Rula Maayah, Tourism and Antiquities Secretary (Fatah).	12. رولا معايعة، وزير السياحة (فتح).
13. Ishaq Sadr, Telecommunications and Information Technology Secretary (Independent).	13. إسحق سدر، وزير الاتصالات (مستقل).
14. Nasri Abu Jaish, Labor Secretary (The Palestinian People's Party).	14. نصري ابو جيش، وزير العمل (حزب الشعب).
15. Marwan Awartani, Education Secretary (Independent).	15. مروان عورتاني، وزير التربية والتعليم (مستقل).
16. Mahmoud Abu Mwais, Higher Education and Scientific Research Secretary (Independent).	16. محمود أبو مويس، التعليم العالي (مستقل).
17. Ahmad Majdalani, Social Affairs Secretary (The Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF)).	17. أحمد مجدلاني، وزير التنمية الاجتماعية (جبهة النضال).
18. Amal Hamad, Women Affairs Secretary (Fatah).	18. آمال حمد، وزير المرأة (فتح).
19. Assem Salem, Transportation Secretary (Independent).	19. عاصم سالم، وزير المواصلات (مستقل).
20. Mohammad Ziyara, Construction and Housing Secretary (Independent).	20. محمد زيارة، وزير الأشغال (مستقل).

21. Fadi Al-Hadmi, Jerusalem Affairs Secretary (Fatah).	.21 فادي الهدمي، وزير القدس (فتح).
22. Osama Al Saadawi, Secretary of State for Entrepreneurship and Empowerment (Independent).[1]	.22 أسامة السعداوي، وزير الدولة للريادة والتمكين (مستقل).
- Ibrahim Melhem, Palestinian Government Spokesman.	- إبراهيم ملحم، المتحدث باسم الحكومة.
- Raed Radwan, adviser to the Prime Minister for Arab Funds.	- رائد رضوان، مستشار رئيس الوزراء للصناديق العربية.
- The Prime Minister will fill in as the home secretary and Waqf and Religious Affairs secretary until someone else is named to these two posts.	- ولم يتم تسمية وزيري الداخلية والأوقاف.

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[1] In the United Kingdom, a secretary of state (SofS) is a Cabinet minister in charge of a government department (though not all departments are headed by a secretary of state).

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